Self-sufficiency-a completion in the possession of good things; la habit, according to which they, who possess it, are the masters of themselves.1

Reasonableness—a reduction in what is just and useful; a moderation in compacts; a well-ordering of the soul, founded on reason, as regards things honourable and base.

Endurance-the bearing-up against pain, for the sake of what is honourable; a bearing-up under labour for the sake of what is honourable.

2 Boldness-the non-expectation of an ill; an imperturbability in the presence of an ill.2

Non-perception of pain-a habit, according to which we do not fall into sorrows.

The love of labour—a habit, that accomplishes what a person chooses (to do); a voluntary endurance; 3a habit not to be cavilled at on the subject of labour.3

--

Modesty a voluntary shrinking from daring on just grounds towards what seems to be the best; a voluntary laying hold of the best; a cautious care of blame on just grounds.

Freedom-the ruling power of life; a power ruling by itself on every occasion; a power over that, which relates to oneself in life; 4 5an unsparingness in the use and possession of property.5

Liberality-a habit in transacting money matters in a way

want of, and pain from, that, which is a natural desire:" where I have translated as if the Greek were τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐφέσεως ἐνδείας—to which I have been led by Gesner's conjecture, κατὰ φύσεας in lieu of κατὰ φύσιν See too the definition in Diogen. L. vii. 93, τὴν δὲ ἐγκράτειαν, διάθεσιν ἀνυπέρβατον τῶν κατ ̓ ὀρθὸν λόγον ἢ ἕξιν, αήττητον ἡδονῶν· τὴν δὲ καρτερίαν, ἐπιστήμην ἢ ἕξιν ὧν ἐμμενητέον ἢ μὴ. Ficinus has here potestas, quæ nunquam dejicitur e rationis proposito," which is intelligible indeed, but not to be got from the Greek.

The words between the numerals are a definition rather of Continence than of Self-sufficiency. Corradus renders 'Eукρáтɛια by “Beatitudo ".

22 Ficinus has elegantly, but not closely-" Audacia securitas, qua quis malum neque futurum exspectat, neque præsens horrescit." 33 Ficinus-" adversus labores inconcussus habitus." "habitus laborem nunquam reprehendens."

Corradus

44 Such, I presume, is the meaning of 'Ežovoía rov kaľ kavròV ÉV Bio: Ficinus-" licentia propria vitæ." Corradus-“ in uno quoque sita potestas vivendi ❞—as if he wished to read ¿v ¿káσry—

55 The words between the numerals are the definition rather of the following 'Ελευθεριότης, than of 'Ελευθερία.

that is fitting; the adding to, and possession of, property, as is meet.

Mildness-the settling down of an excitement arising from passion; a moderated temperament of soul.

Decorum-a voluntary yielding to what appears the best; a well-ordering respecting the movement of the body. Felicity-a good composed of all good things; a power self-sufficient towards living well; a consummation as regards virtue; an utility self-sufficient for a living being.1

Magnificence-the estimation according to correct reason 2 of that which is the most worthy of respect.2

Sagacity-a natural ability in the soul, according to which he, who possesses it, makes a conjecture in the quickest (time)3 relating to what is needful; an acuteness of intellect. Honesty a simplicity in moral conduct in union with fair speaking; a steadiness in moral conduct.

6

Kalokagathia 5-a habit of selecting things that are the best. High-mindedness-a gentlemanly use of accidental circumstances; a majesty of soul in union with reason.

1 Stephens renders "vitæ," as if he wished to read wns in lieu of wov, or else he got "vita" from Ficinus.

* Instead of τὸν σεμνότατον, which could not be applied to λογισμòv, I have translated, as if the Greek were rou σεμvoтáтov. One MS. has τo and another καὶ, which seem to lead to καὶ τὸ σεμνότατον. Ficinus too, "6 et honorandum." Corradus has, what to myself is unintelligible, "Magnificentia, amplitudo a gravissima mentis agitatione, et propositione profecta."

Since one MS. offers iv ikάory in lieu of xáory, it is easy to elicit from thence ἐν ὠκίστῳ. So the Stoics defined ἀγχίνοιαν by ἕξιν εὑρετικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα, as we learn from Diogenes L. vii. 93, where Casaubon refers to Aristotle, Ethic. vi. 9, who says that ἀγχίνοια is κατὰ ταχύ τι εὐστοχία. Ficinus however found in his MS. iv čkáσrų: for his version is "in singulis "

Here, as before, I have translated σrovdaιórns by “steadiness." "As there is no single nor even compound word in English to answer to the Greek Kaλokayalía, by which was meant the union of bodily and mental accomplishments, I have put the Greek word into English letters, just as Philanthropy is in the next definition but one, where, for a similar reason, Ficinus has left in his Latin version the Greek word Φιλανθρωπία; but translated Καλοκαγαθία by "bonitas." The whole definition is omitted by Corradus.

6

By aσreios, literally, "living in a city," was meant also

of elegant manners," for such those in the city were, as opposed to those of inelegant manners, who lived in the country and were called ȧypoĩkoi. Ficinus has "moderatus "--

Philanthropy-a habit of moral conduct that easily leads to a friendship with man; a habit of acting kindly towards men; 'the having thanks; a recollection with kind conduct.1

Piety-justice relating to the gods; a power2 paying attention to the gods willingly; a correct perception of the honour due to the gods; a knowledge of the honour due to the gods.

Good that on account of itself.4

Fearlessness-a habit, according to which we do not fall into fear.

Apathy-a habit, according to which we do not fall into sufferings.

Peace-a quietness as regards enmity in war.

Listlessness-an easiness of soul; apathy respecting the objects of anger.

Skilfulness-a habit, according to which he, who pos

All the words between the numerals were first edited by Bekker from the text of five MSS., and the margin of two. But what is the meaning of χάριτος σχέσις, and how φιλανθρωπία can be defined as μνήμη μετ' εὐεργεσίας, I cannot understand. I could have understood χάριτος ἔκχυσις γνώμῃ μετ ̓ εὐεργεσίας, a pouring out of favours designedly in combination with beneficence." The words were found in the MS. of Ficinus likewise; for his version is " gratiarum redditio; gratitudo benefica."

66

2 Instead of duvaμg the sense evidently requires diálɛois, similar to "affectio" in Ficinus.

3 I have translated, as if the Greek were ἑκουσίως, not ἑκούσιος. Ficinus has "voluntaria veneratio dei; recta honoris divini scientia "— Corradus, "voluntaria religionis deorum susceptio; recta cultus deorum scientia;" one or both of whom Stephens has followed in his version, "voluntaria de deorum cultu existimatio; recta cultus deorum scientia," as if he wished to unite ἑκουσιος with ὑπόληψις, and ὀρθὴ with ἐπιστήμη, not, as Bekker has done, ἑκούσιος with δύναμις, and ὀρθὴ with ὑπόληψις. The definition of piety given by the Stoics in Diogen. L. vii. 119, is shorter, if not better, Εὐσέβεια, ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπείας.

The words between the numerals, in Greek, 'Ayaðòv, Tò avтoυ EvεKEV, are too few to make either syntax or sense. Stephens' version in English is, "Good is that, which exists for its own sake," a definition scarcely intelligible. Did the author write ̓Αγαθὸν, ταὐτὸν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον peleias, which is the very definition given by the Stoics in Diogen. L. vii. 94; for woeλeías might easily have dropt out before ȧpoßía, Ficinus has supplied the word, requisite for the sense, in his version, "Bonum, quod sui ipsius gratia expetendum:" and so too has Corradus, "Bonum, quod sua ipsius causa appetitur.'

There is no single word in English to answer to the Greek davórns,

sesses it, is able to form a conjecture about the peculiar termination (of a thing).

Friendship-a union of sentiment, relating to things honourable and just; the choice of the same kind of life; a union in opinion on questions of sect1 and practice; a union in sentiment relating to a communion in life in combination with kind feelings; 2a communion in doing well and in suffering.2

3 Ñobility of birth—the virtue of a noble moral conduct; an easy leading of the soul to words and deeds.3

Selection-a correct approval after examination.

Kind feeling the selection of a person for the purpose of embracing by a person.4

Familiarity-a sharing in the same family.

by which was meant, as explained by Suidas, a power in speaking and a cleverness in acting.

Such seems to be the meaning here of "poaípeσiç, similar to the simple aipɛois. Stephens' version is, "consensio de proposito et actione.” Ficinus has "in deliberando atque agendo.' Corradus, "de eligendo et faciendo opinionum consensus.'

22 Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Stephens' version is "societas beneficiorum mutuorum." Ficinus has "communio in dandis accipiendisque beneficiis."

33 Orelli, unable to understand how Εὐγένεια is ἀρετὴ εὐγενοῦς ἤθους, proposed to read σvyyɛvous, by which he probably meant cognate.' But what is gained by the alteration I confess I cannot discover. The author wrote, I suspect, Εὐγένεια, ἀρετὴ οὐ γένους, ἤθους δὲ, εὐαγωγικὴ ψυχῆς πρὸς λόγους καὶ πράξεις, “Nobility is an excellence, not from birth, but moral conduct, leading the soul to words and deeds;" where the definition is best explained by the sentiment of Juvenal in viii.,

Tota licet veteres exornent undique ceræ

Atria, nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus

But even thus the definition is defective. For as words and deeds are of different kinds, it should be stated of what kind they are, to which nobility leads. Ficinus has, "Generositas, virtus ingenui moris; facilitas animi ad dicenda pariter atque agenda." Corradus, "Generositas, generosi moris virtus; animi ad rationes et actiones facilis inductio."

44 Here again Orelli was, as I am, at a loss about the meaning of the definition; and hence he wished to cut out aipeois. But to my mind the difficulty lies in πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀσπασμός, or as eight MSS. read, άonаoμ. Stephens' version is, "Benevolentia est electio hominis; hominis amplexus et salutatio," as if he wished to omit πpòs- Ficinus has, "Benevolentia, electio hominis ad hominem grata atque accepta." Corradus, "Benevolentia, electio; complexus hominem cum homine copulans."

1

1 Agreement—a sharing in all things existing; a concordance in thoughts and conceptions.1

2 Lovingness-a perfect exhibition.2

Statesmanship 3-the knowledge of what is honourable and advantageous (for a state); a knowledge productive of justice in a state.

Sociality—a friendship arising from an association amongst persons of the same age.

"Good counsel—the cognate virtue of reasoning.7

Belief-the correct conception of a thing being really as it seems to be;8 9a firmness in moral conduct.9

As it is difficult to perceive the difference between vonμárov and ὑπολημμάτων, I suspect the words καὶ ὑπολημμάτων ought to follow Twv övтwv åπávrov in the preceding clause, or be omitted altogether. Ficinus has "cogitationum suspicionumque concordia."

22 Of the words between the numerals I am quite content to express my perfect ignorance. Ficinus has "Charitas integra animi declaratio,” as if he had found vxns in his MS.

3 So I have translated Пoλirikòç in the dialogue of that name. The words between the lunes have been added for the sense.

5 By ἑταιρεία was meant a political club," as it would be called in England, not merely domestic sociality.

• In lieu of γεγενημένοις, which seems superfluous after καθ ̓ ἡλικίαν, one would have expected ovvnvoμévois, "united." Ficinus has " ex diuturna æqualium consuetudine conflata."

With this unintelligible definition of Good Counsel, may be contrasted the very intelligible one given by the Stoics, as found in Diogenes Laertius, vii. 93, τὴν δὲ εὐβουλίαν, ἐπιστήμην τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι ποῖα καὶ πῶς πράττοντες πράξομεν συμφερόντως, i. e. “ good counsel is the science of considering by doing what, and in what manner, we can act advantageously." Stephens' version is "Consilii præstantia est virtus rationi insita,” as if he wished to read Εὐβουλίας ἀρετὴ ἀρετὴ λογισμῷ ἔμφυτος. Ficinus, however, translates Evßovλía by "Sagacitas," evidently for the sense. Corradus, "Consilium bonum, vis cogitationis insita:" as if he wished to read ἔμφυτος in lieu of σύμφυτος.

Bekker's text is rou ouros exεiv is aurų paíveral, which I cannot understand. Opportunely then does one MS. offer avrò: for the author probably wrote, as I have translated, τοῦ ὄντως ἔχειν τι, ὡς αὐτὸ paiverai. Stephens' version is "Fides-persuasio, quæ res ita se habet, velut ipsi videtur," which, to myself, is quite as unintelligible as the Greek. Ficinus," Fides, recta presumptio quod res sic se habet, ut sibi videtur." Corradus, "Fides, opinio recta rem ita, ut ipsi videtur, habere certa veri comprehensio.'

The author has evidently confounded mioris, "belief," with ɩoTóτns, "fidelity."