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DEFINITIONS.

1 Eternal-that which has existed formerly through all time, and is now not destroyed.1

God-an immortal living-being," sufficient in itself for happiness; an eternal existence; the cause of the nature of the good.

Generation—a movement towards existence; 3a sharing through a change3 in existence; a progression towards existence.

The sun―a fire in heaven, which can alone be seen from morning to evening by the same; 4 5 the greatest star, visible by day;5 a perpetually living being, possessing a soul.6

Time-7a movement of the sun; a measure of progress.7

As the idea of eternity necessarily includes the idea of continuance through the three periods of time, past, present, and future, this definition is evidently defective.

2 I have translated wov "a living being," to avoid the incongruity of considering god as an 'animal," the ordinary meaning of Lov.

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33 This is the proper version here of μeráλnic, not merely "a sharing."

* Instead of "by the same," in Greek roic aurois, one would have expected "the same," in Greek o avròg: for the question is not about the parties seeing, but the thing seen. Hence Corradus has "Sol-idem videri potest."

s_s I have followed the reading of four MSS., ἄστρον ἡμεροφανὲς τὸ μέγιστον, and placed the words ζῶον ἀΐδιον ἔμψυχον after μέγιστον, not before them, as Bekker has done. Ficinus omits nuɛpopaves. Corradus has correctly, astrum maximum de die lucens."

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On the sun possessing a soul, see Epinomis, p. 982, C. § 6.

Although this definition coincides in part with that of Eratosthenes, who, as we learn from Plutarch, ii. p. 884, B., described Time as "the journeying of the sun," yet it would be more correctly defined as "the measure of the motion of the sun, or of the progressive movement of

Day-a journeying of the sun from its rising (east) to its setting (west); a light, the opposite to Night.1

Morning-the beginning of day; the first light from the

sun.

Mid-day-the time when the shadows of substances have the least length.

Evening-the close of day.

Night-darkness, the opposite to Day;2 a deprivation of

the sun.

Chance-a proceeding from uncertainty to uncertainty, and from what is spontaneous ;3 the cause of a fortuitous action.5 Old Age-the wasting away of a thing with life, the result of time.

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Wind- -a movement in the air around the earth. Air--an element, all of whose movements according to space are according to nature.7

Heaven-a substance, surrounding all things perceived by the senses, except the uppermost air.8

any thing,” in Greek Χρόνος ἡλίου κινήσεως μέτρον ἢ φορᾶς του, not Χρόνος ἡλίου κίνησις, μέτρον φορᾶς. The Stoics defined it as "the interval during (two) motions of the world." Corradus has, mensura cœlestis conversionis."

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1 From this definition it would seem as if Night were a light, as well as Day. Hence one would have preferred φῶς, τοὐναντίον νυκτὸς σκότῳ, not simply τούναντίον νυκτὶ, and similarly in 3, Νὺξ σκότος τοὐναντίον ἡμέρας φωτί, not ἡμέρᾳ merely. Corradus makes this a new definition, 'Lux, id, quod nocti est contrarium."

3 So Suidas, Τύχη—ἡ φορὰ ἐξ ἀδήλου εἰς ἄδηλον καὶ αὐτόματον. But Aristotle, according to Plutarch, ii. p. 885, C., made a distinction between Τύχη and τὸ αὐτόματον.

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Then, which is found before k in two MSS., and in its place in two, from whence & is placed over in two others, belongs in fact to airía. 55 So I have translated daiμovíaç mрážεwę. Stephens has, causa felicis successus ;" but as "chance" is the cause of an unsuccessful as well as a successful action, the version in English should be as ambiguous as daiμovíaç is in Greek. Ficinus, too, "felicis actionis causa.” Corradus, "et felicis actionis fortuita causa."

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6 Why vεuua is written here, where one would have expected aveμos, I must leave for others to explain. Corradus renders vεuμа by "spiritus.' 7. Here, again, I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot understand, the meaning of karà púov. Did the author write Karà pevov? For the Stoics asserted, as we learn from Plutarch, ii. p. 895, A., that πᾶν πνεῦμα ἀέρος εἶναι ῥεῦσιν.

Here seems to be an allusion to what is called in Phædr. p. 247, C. Ficinus omits aiolŋrà—

πepovρávios tóños

Soul-1 that which moves itself;1 the cause of vital motion

in living beings.

2 Power-that, which is able by itself to produce an effect.2 Vision-3 the (bodily) habit3 of distinguishing substances. Bone-marrow, consolidated by heat.

Element-4 that, which combines and separates (particles) brought together.4

Virtue-5a (mental) constitution of the best kind; a habit of a mortal living being; the object of praise on account of itself; a habit, according to which that, which possesses it, is said to be good; a just communion of laws;7 a disposition, according to which that, which is constituted perfectly, is called steady;9 a habit, effective of a good state of law.

- On the self-moving power of the soul, see Phædrus, p. 246, D. § 51. 2 2 There is another definition of power given in p. 144.

3_3 Although is and diálɛoiç seem to be synonymous in p. 136, yet ic appears to be applied to the body, and diálσiç to the mind; and hence I have introduced between the lunes "bodily " here, and shortly afterwards" mental" in 5.

44 A similar definition was given by the Stoics, as we learn from Diogenes L. vii. 136, ἐστι δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρώτου γίνεταί τι (so Suidas correctly in Στοιχεῖον in lieu of γινόμενα) καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται. Ficinus has " ex quo componuntur, et in quod composita dissol

vuntur.

5 See at 3-3.

6_6 So Cleanthes the Stoic, in Diogenes L. vii. 89, defined virtue as διάθεσιν—δι ̓ αὐτὴν-αἱρετὴν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἤ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν : from whence one would prefer here αἱρετὴ to ἐπαινετή.

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How virtue can be said to be "a just communion of laws" I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus; and hence he considered this as a fresh definition. But the two following sentences plainly prove that Virtue is still the subject of the definition. Did the author write ποιητικὴ εὐνομίας καὶ κοινωνίας νόμων δικαίας ? And so perhaps Stephens wished to read; for his version is-" Communio, legum est justa affectio, secundum quam id, quod habet perfecte affectum, honestum dicitur; aut habitus, qui æquitatis et concordiæ faciendæ vim habet:" which he got perhaps partly from Ficinus-" Communio, legum justa constitutio: qua quod præditum est, probum dicitur; habitus concordiam præstans." Corradus too considers this a new definition. His version is-" Communitas, legum justa dispositio, quam quicunque est adeptus, si modo sit optime affectus, honestus appellatur; habitus bonas legum lationem efficiens."

88 I have followed Bekker; who says, "libri rò exov:" where he meant by "libri" printed books, not MSS., where those two words were, it seems, wanting.

9 I have translated σrovdałoç "steady," i. e. a person who pursues an object in view without swerving and earnestly.

1 Discretion-a -a power effective by itself of the good fortune of man; a knowledge of things good and evil; 2a knowledge effective of felicity;2 a (mental) constitution, by which we determine what is to be done and what is not to be done.1

Justice-3an agreement of the soul with itself,3 and a correct arrangement of the parts of the soul towards each other and about each other;4 5a habit, distributive to each person of that, which is according to worthiness;5 a habit, according to which he, who possesses it, can select what seems to him to be just; a habit in life, subservient to law; 7an equality that can share in common ;7 a habit ministering to upright laws.

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Temperance-a moderation of soul relating to the desires and pleasures, which exist in it according to nature; a fitness in, and correct ordering of, the soul, as regards its natural pleasures and pains; a harmony in the soul touching the states

The whole of this definition is found in Stobæus iii. p. 49, with a slight change in the position of the sentences.

2__ The words ἐπιστήμη ποιητικὴ εὐδαιμονίας, although acknowledged by Stobæus, have been cut out by Bekker from the text on the authority of a single MS.

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33 How Justice can be said to be "an agreement of the soul with itself," I confess I cannot understand; and still less how, in *—*, it is a "correct arrangement of the parts of the soul towards each other and about each other;" especially as a similar definition is given of Temperance in Stobæus v. p. 78, 1. Σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν ὁμολογία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερшv πρòç äλλna. Stephens too seems to have been at a loss; for he renders πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ περὶ ἄλληλα by merely “ inter se, "similar to 66 ad invicem cui mutuus in Ficinus. Corradus has more closely 66 inter se et secum ordinis conservatio."

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55 A similar definition is given from a not-mentioned author by Stobaus, ix. p. 125, 40. Δικαιοσύνη δέ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς διανεμητικὴ τῶν κατ ̓ ἀξίαν—where ἑκάστῳ seems to have dropt out between διανεμητικὴ and τῶν

Since one MS. offers Bia for Bio, perhaps the author wrote ǎvεv Biac, not iv Bip, and thus showed that Justice is subservient to law, not by force, but willingly.

How Justice can be "an equality sharing in common," I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Stephens; whose version is-" socialis æqualitas.” I could have understood ισότητος κοινωνία, or ἰσότητος κοιvwvikη is—“ a habit sharing in equality.'

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As four MSS. omit op0v, one would suspect that ȧypάowv was written here originally, similar to the άypápovę vóμove mentioned by Xenophon in Memorab. iv. 4, 19, and by Demosthenes, p. 317 and 343, ed R., and the aуражта-νóμμа in Soph. Antig. 453, and the "lex non scripta," on which Cicero is so eloquent, Pro Milone, § iii.

of ruling and being ruled; a self-acting according to nature; [a well-ordering of the soul;] an 2intercourse of the soul,2 founded on reason, relating to things honourable and base; a habit according to which he, who has it, can select and be cautious of what he ought.

Fortitude-a habit of the soul, not to be moved by fear; a boldness in war; 3a knowledge of the things relating to war;3 a command over the soul relating to things of fear and dread; a boldness subservient to discretion; a bold bearing under the expectation of death; a habit, preservative of right reasoning in dangers; a strength (of mind) balancing (the apprehension) of danger; a strength, bearing up on the side of virtue; a tranquillity of soul with reference to things that appear, according to correct reasoning, to be full of dread and daring; the safe preservation 5 of uncertain determinations 5 relating to things of dread; a skill in war;6 7a habit, that can abide in law.7

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Continence--a power enduring pain; a following of correct reasoning ;3 9a power not exceeded by that which is pereeived by correct reasoning.9

The words between the brackets are evidently an interpolated repetition of the preceding evražia vxns. They are omitted by Ficinus. 22 I confess I do not understand how Temperance is ouλía rñs 4Vxns: nor could Corradus; for his version is-" animi quasi sermo33 Most assuredly Fortitude could never be correctly defined as knowledge of the things relating to war."

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a

This, although paraphrastical, is still as close a version as can be well made of the terse original-ῥώμη πρὸς κίνδυνον ἀντίρροπος. On the word ἀντίρροπος, see Porson's translation of ἀντίρροπον ἄχθος in Soph. El. 119, as given by Monk in the Museum Criticum, No. 1. Ficinus, apparently unable to understand the clause, has omitted it. Corradus has-"robur periculo par.".

55 Of the meaning of doypárov áðýλwv, I confess myself quite in the dark. I could have understood oỷ dâɩλ☎v—“ not cowardly." Ficinus has-" observatio eorum, quæ ratio dictat, in rebus pavendis." Corradus, "incertarum opinionum de rebus adversis liberatio."

6-6 Here again Fortitude is said incorrectly to be " a skill in war." 7 Instead of vóμov one MS. has λóyou: which seems to lead to ψόγου, “ blame :” while in ἐμμελητικὴ, found in two MSS. for ἐμμενηTin, perhaps auεληrikỳ, " neglectful," lies hid.

8 and 99 These definitions of 'Eykpárea are quite beyond my comprehension. How much more intelligible is the language of an unknown author, quoted by Stobæus, xvii. p. 157, who defines Continence as "the being able to restrain by reason the desire, that is rushing to the enjoyment of improper pleasures; and the bearing up against and under the

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