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DEFINITIONS.

1 Eternal—that which has existed formerly through all time, and is now not destroyed.1

God—an immortal living-being,2 sufficient in itself for happiness; an eternal existence; the cause of the nature of the good.

Generation—a movement towards existence; 3a sharing through a change3 in existence; a progression towards existence.

The sun—a fire in heaven, which can alone be seen from morning to evening by the same;4 5the greatest star, visible by day ;5 a perpetually living being, possessing a soul.6

Time7 a movement of the sun; a measure of progress.7

11 As the idea of eternity necessarily includes the idea of continuance through the three periods of time, past, present, and future, this definition is evidently defective.

2 I have translated ZHov " a living being," to avoid the incongruity of considering god as an " animal," the ordinary meaning of Gav.

*—* This is the proper version here of ftiTaX^is, not merely "a sharing."

* Instead of "by the same," in Greek rote airoic, one would have expected "the same," in Greek o aurbe: for the question is not about the parties seeing, but the thing seen. Hence Corradus has " Sol—idem videri potest."

before them, as Bekker has done. Ficinus omits Tijupoipaviq. Corradus has correctly, "astrum maximum de die lucens." • On the sun possessing a soul, see Epinomis, p. 982, C. § 6. 77 Although this definition coincides in part with that of Eratosthenes, who, as we learn from Plutarch, ii, p. 884, B., described Time as "the journeying of the sun," yet it would be more correctly defined as "the measure of the motion of the sun, or of the progressive movement of

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Day—a journeying of the sun from its rising (east) to its setting (west); a light, the opposite to Night.1

Morning—the beginning of day; the first light from the sun.

Mid-day—the time when the shadows of substances have the least length.

Evening—the close of day.

Night—darkness, the opposite to Day;2 a deprivation of the sun.

Chance—a proceeding from uncertainty to uncertainty, and from what is spontaneous;3 the4 cause 5 of a fortuitous action.5

Old Age—the wasting away of a tiling with life, the result of time.

Wind^—a movement in the air around the earth.

Air—an element, all of whose movements 7 according to space are according to nature.7

Heaven—a substance, surrounding all things perceived by the senses, except the uppermost air.8

any thing," in Greek Xpovoc Ijxzou Kivr\atmQ pirpov Ij popag rov, not XpoVoc r;\/otr Kivtjais, pirpov Qopdg. The Stoics defined it as " the interval during (two) motions of the world." Corradus has, "mensura ccelestis conversionis."

1 From this definition it would seem as if Night were a light, as well as Day. Hence one would have preferred <j>wg, rovvavrtov Vvktoq ereoVji, not simply Tovvavriov Vvkti, and similarly in 2, Nil Gkotoq rovvavriov i)pipaQ 0um, not ripiptf merely. Corradus makes this a new definition, "Lux, id, quod nocti est contrarium."

3 So Suidas, Tv^t/—r} Aopa adrjXov eig adjjXov Kai avropaTov. But Aristotle, according to Plutarch, ii. p. 885, C, made a distinction between TvxV an(i r0 CLVToparov.

* The )?, which is found before Ik in two MSS., and in its place in two, from whence Ik is placed over r; in two others, belongs in fact to ama.

s5 So I have translated Saipovtag irpa&uig. Stephens has, "causa felicis successus;" but as " chance" is the cause of an unsuccessful as well as a successful action, the version in English should be as ambiguous as Saipoviag is in Greek. Ficinus, too, "felicis actionis causa." Corradus, "et felicis actionis fortuita causa."

8 Why nvivpa is written here, where one would have expected avtfio(, I must leave for others to explain. Corradus renders nvtvpa by "spiritus."

7—' Here, again, I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot understand, the meaning of Kara tyvmv. Did the author write icari pevaiv? For the Stoics asserted, as we learn from Plutarch, ii. p. 895, A., that Ttav irvtvpa aipeg Aval ptvaiv.

* Here seems to be an allusion to what is called iirepovpaviog rorof in Phaedr. p. 247, C. Ficinus omits alaOtira

Soul—'that which moves itself so the cause of vital motion in living beings.

1Power—that, which is able by itself to produce an effect.2

Vision3the (bodily) habit3 of distinguishing substances.

Bone—marrow, consolidated by heat.

Element4 that, which combines and separates (particles) brought together.4

Virtue5a (mental) constitution of the best kind; a habit of a mortal living being; 6 the object of praise on account of itself;6 a habit, according to which that, which possesses it, is said to be good; 7a just communion of laws;7 a disposition, according to which 8 that, which is constituted perfectly,8 is called steady ;9 a habit, effective of a good state of law.

'—1 On the self-moving power of the soul, see Phsedrus, p. 246, D. § 51.

'—5 There is another definition of power given in p. 144.

'—3 Although t'Stc and BiaQtaiq seem to be synonymous in p. 136, yet <S'C appears to be applied to the body, and StdBeoic to the mind; and hence I have introduced between the lunes " bodily" here, and shortly afterwards " mental " in 5.

*—* A similar definition was given by the Stoics, as we learn from Diogenes L. vii. 136, tort U oroix«ov, ££ o{ irpwrov yivtrai n (so Suidas correctly in Sroix"»" in lieu of yivo/iiva) mu' t o taxarov dva\itnu. Ficinus has " ex quo componuntur, et in quod composita dissolvuntur.

'See at »—».

_ '—' So Cleanthes the Stoic, in Diogenes L. vii. 89, defined virtue as ciaBtuivavrrivaiptTrjv, ov £id nva <pof3ov rj tXiriSa rj n Ttov t£w9fv: from whence one would prefer here aiptrfi to tiraivtrri.

'—' How virtue can be said to be " a just communion of laws" I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus; and hence he considered this as a fresh definition. But the two following sentences plainly prove that Virtue is still the subject of the definition. Did the author write t'|<c tfourrucii livoftiag Kai icotvuvtac v6/iu>v SiKaiagt And so perhaps Stephens wished to read; for his version is—" Communio, legum est justa aflectio, secundum quam id, quod habet perfecte affectum, honestum dicitur; aut habitus, qui sequitatis et concordiae faciendee vim habet:" which he got perhaps partly from Ficinus—" Communio, legum justa constitutio: qua quod praditum est, probum dicitur; habitus concordiam prastans." Corradus too considers this a new definition. His version is—" Communitas, legum justa dispositio, quam quicunque est adeptus, si modo s<t optime affectus, honestus appellate; habitus bonas legum lationem efficiens."

11 I have followed Bekker; who says, "libri rb £xov-" where he meant by " libri" printed books, not MSS., where those two words were, it seems, wanting.

* I have translated inrovSatoe " steady," i. e. a person who pursues w object in view without swerving and earnestly.

1 Discretion—a power effective by itself of the good fortune of man; a knowledge of things good and evil; 2a knowledge effective of felicity;2 a (mental) constitution, by which we determine what is to be done and what is not to be done.1

Justice3 an agreement of the soul with itself,3 and 4 a correct arrangement of the parts of the soul towards each other and about each other;4 5a habit, distributive to each person of that, which is according to worthiness ;5 a habit, according to which he, who possesses it, can select what seems to him to be just; a habit in life,6 subservient to law; 7an equality that can share in common ;7 a habit ministering to upright8 laws.

Temperance—a moderation of soul relating to the desires and pleasures, which exist in it according to nature; a fitness in, and correct ordering of, the soul, as regards its natural pleasures and pains; a harmony in the soul touching the states

11 The whole of this definition is found in Stobaeus iii. p. 49, with a slight change in the position of the sentences.

22 The words lirioTriiiii 7roitjract) tvdaifiovtac, although acknowledged by Stobaeus, have been cut out by Bekker from the text on the authority of a single MS.

31 How Justice can be said to be " an agreement of the soul with itself," I confess I cannot understand; and still less how, in 4—*, it is a "correct arrangement of the parts of the soul towards each other and about each other;" especially as a similar definition is given of Temperance in Stobaeus v. p. 78, 1. J^uxppoavvt) lariv ofiokoy'ia r&v T-ijc^uxSc /itpuv irpbc dXXjjXa. Stephens too seems to have been at a loss; for he renders irpoQ dXXi/Xa Kox iripl aXkrjKa by merely " inter se," similar to "ad invicem cui mutuus" in Ficinus. Corradus has more closely "inter se et secum ordinis conservatio."

5s A similar definition is given from a not-mentioned author by Stobaeus, ix. p. 125, 40. Aucaioavvrj dk iariv aperi) ipvXVG ^la-ve^irjTiKtj Tuv tear a£iav—where iisaaTtp seems to have dropt out between ^iav£/tijnti} and ran,

8 Since one MS. offers /3i'a for (Hip, perhaps the author wrote avtv jSi'ae, not iv |3i<j), and thus showed that Justice is subservient to law, not by force, but willingly.

77 How Justice can be " an equality sharing in common," I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Stephens; whose version is—" socialis asqualitas." I could have understood iVorijroe Koivwvia, or i<r6i-ijroe KoiVwvikt) iUs—" a habit sharing in equality."

8 As four MSS. omit 6p9u>v, one would suspect that aypaQwv was written here originally, similar to the dypaipove vop.ov£ mentioned by Xenophon in Memorab. iv. 4, 19, and by Demosthenes, p. 317 and 343, ed K., and the aypairravofit/ia in Soph. Antig. 453, and the " lex non scripta," on which Cicero is so eloquent, Pro Milone, § iii.

of ruling and being ruled; a self-acting according to nature; '[a well-ordering of the soul;]1 an 2intercourse of the soul,2 founded on reason, relating to things honourable and base; a habit according to which he, who has it, can select and be cautious of what he ought. .

Fortitude —a habit of the soul, not to be moved by fear; a boldness in war; 3 a knowledge of the things relating to war;3 a command over the soul relating to things of fear and dread; a boldness subservient to discretion; a bold bearing under the expectation of death; a habit, preservative of right reasoning in dangers; 4a strength (of mind) balancing (the apprehension) of danger;4 a strength, bearing up on the side of virtue; a tranquillity of soul with reference to things that appear, according to correct reasoning, to be full of dread and daring; the safe preservation 6of uncertain determinations5 relating to things of dread; 6 a skill in war;6 7 a habit, that can abide in law.7

Continence-*-a power enduring pain; 8 a following of correct reasoning ;3 9 a power not exceeded by that which is perceived by correct reasoning.9

'77' The words between the brackets are evidently an interpolated rePetition of the preceding sira^ta tyvxnQ- They are omitted by Ficinus. _ —J I confess I do not understand how Temperance is ojuiX/a rjjc if/vW; nor could Corradus; for his version is—" animi quasi sermo—"

1 Most assuredly Fortitude could never be correctly defined as " a knowledge of the things relating to war."

~ This, although paraphrastical, is still as close a version as can be ^ell made of the terse original—pdjfiri npbg Kivbvvov avrtppoTrog. On TM word avTippoiroQ, see Porson's translation of avrippo-Kov &x9og in Soph. El. 119, as given by Monk in the Museum Criticum, No. 1. Ficinus, apparently unable to understand the clause, has omitted it. Corradus Mr.... " robur periculo par."

~s Of the meaning of Soyp,a.Tu>v aSijXwv, I confess myself quite in ue dark. I could have understood 011 foikiov—" not cowardly." Ficinus observatio eorum, quse ratio dictat, in rebus pavendis." Corradus,

incertarum opinionum de rebus adversis liberatio."

—' Here again Fortitude is said incorrectly to be " a skill in war."

"—7 Instead of vopov one MS. has \6yov: which seems to lead to yvyov, " blame:" while in e/i/jtXjjriK)), found in two MSS. for ip/uvriruri), perhaps d/ttXijruo), " neglectful," lies hid.

1 and '9 These definitions of 'KyKparua are quite beyond my com Prehension. How much more intelligible is the language of an unknown JMhor, quoted by Stobseus, xvii. p. 157, who defines Continence as " the Wig able to restrain by reason the desire, that is rushing to the enjoymew of improper pleasures; and the bearing up against and under the

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