then of this kind I conceive that those, who possess any sense, should think it fit to give advice; but not about the matters on which you are requesting me to advise; for from their advice the result is good fortune, but from the trifling of these misfortune.

[4.] I was once present with a person while he was admonishing his friend, because the latter had trusted to an accuser, not having heard the other party making an apology for himself, but hearing only the accuser. He said that (the friend) had done a terrible thing, in deciding against the party without having been present himself, or having heard from the friends of the party, to whose statements it was reasonable for him to trust. For, after having heard both, he would not have so hastily trusted to the accuser; but that it was just, before conferring praise or blame, to hear the party make his defence, as well as the accuser. For how could any one decide correctly a suit, or judge in a proper manner between persons, without hearing the opposite parties? for that it is better that assertions, like a purple colour and gold-money, should be judged of by being placed side by side. Or for what purpose has time been allowed to both the opposite parties in a suit? or the judges sworn to hear both sides equally? unless the lawgiver conceived that suits would be decided more justly and better by the judges. But you seem to me to have not even heard of what is said by the multitude. What is it? said (the other).

2 Decide no suit, till both accounts you've heard.2 And yet this would not have been thus circulated, if it had not been well said, and as is fitting. I advise you therefore, said he, for the future not to blame or praise persons so hastily. The other then said that it appeared to him an absurd thing, if it were impossible to know, when one person was speaking, whether he was telling the truth or a falsehood, and yet possible to know, when two persons were speaking; and impossible to

! I have translated as if the Greek were οὐ γὰρ ἂν— not οὐδ ̓ αὖ-? On this proverbial verse see my note on Esch. Eum. 417. Winckelmann refers to Faehse on Muret. Var. Lect. vii. 18, and Stephan. Thes. L. Gr. T. i. p. 190, ed. Par.

learn from a person, when telling the truth, but possible to be taught by that very person and another, when telling a falsehood; and if one by speaking straightforwardly and truly should be unable to show what he is saying clearly, but that two, one of whom should tell a falsehood, and not speak straightforwardly, should be able to show clearly that, which the party speaking straightforwardly was not able to show clearly. And I am at a loss, said he, on this point likewise, how they are to show it clearly; whether by being silent, or speaking. For if they are to show it clearly by being silent, there would be a need of hearing neither, much less both. But if by speaking both are to show it clearly, and both parties speak according to no regular manner and time 1-for both think they have a right to speak in turn-how is it possible for both to show the matter clearly? For if both are showing the matter clearly at the same time, both will be speaking together at the same time. 2 But this they are not wont to do, nor do the laws permit it; 2 so that if they are to show the matter clearly by speaking, each of them will do so by speaking; and when either party speaks, then either party will show the matter clearly; so that they will speak one before and the other after; and they will show the matter clearly, one before and the other after. Now if each party in turn shows the same matter clearly, what need is there to hear the latter? for the matter will have become clear by the party first speaking. But if both parties show clearly 3 that matter, said he,3 how will not either of them have done so? for how would both be able to show clearly that, which one of

3

In lieu of тρóπоv one MS. affords as a var. lect. xpóvov― and hence

χ ν

united I have been led to For in a law-suit at Athens

another has rрожоv- By the aid of both τρόπον καὶ χρόνον, what I have translated. both the manner and the time were, in some cases, defined by law. 22 The Greek is at present, ToŬTO d' Oỷk έwσl— But as there is nothing to which two can be united, opportunely does one MS. read ovκaθῶσιν, where evidently lies hid οὐκ εἰώθασι— while from ἐῶσιν it is easy to elicit éo' oi vóμoi- what I have translated; for custom and law are thus perpetually united.

3 The Greek is at present ἐκεῖνο δ ̓ ἔφη— But ἐκεῖνο could hardly be used for avrò: and if it could, still less would on be here introduced superfluously. Opportunely then do MSS. offer, one äons, another ons, and a third φῆς : for the author wrote, I suspect, ἐκεῖνο δ', ὃ ἀσαφὲς ἦν i. e. "that matter, which was not clear-"

them shall not have done so? But if either shall have shown it clearly, it is evident that the former will have spoken of it, and the former will have shown it clearly; so that how is it not possible for the person hearing him alone to know all correctly? On hearing them I was at a loss, and unable to decide. For the others, who were present, said that the first reasoning was true. If then you can advise me 2 on this matter, whether it is possible, 3 when one person is saying any thing, to know correctly what he is saying, say so; 3 or whether there is need of a speaker on the opposite side, if a person would know which is speaking straightforwardly. Or whether it is not necessary to hear both parties? Or how do you think?

[5.] The day before yesterday a person was finding fault with another, because he was unwilling to lend money or to trust him; and the party, with whom he was finding fault, was defending himself; whereupon another person amongst those, who were present, inquired of the party finding faultwhether he, who had not trusted nor lent the money, had erred? and have not you too, said he, who did not persuade him to lend, erred? In what, said the other party, have I erred? Which of the two, said (the inquirer), seems to you to err? the person, who fails in what he wishes, or he, who does not (fail)? The person who fails, said he. Have you then not failed in wishing to borrow; while he, who did not wish to give up (his money), has not failed in that point. Truly so, said he; but in what have I erred, even if he has not given it me? Because, said (the inquirer), if you have begged the things which you ought not, how do you think that you have not erred? while he has acted correctly in not giving them up; but if, on the other hand, you have begged

1 I have translated as if πάντ' εὖ had dropt out between ἀκούσαντα and γνῶναι.

2 in lieu of ξυμβαλέσθαι, the sense evidently requires ξυμβουλεύεσθαι— For the party himself could make a conjecture, but could not give the advice he wanted.

3 Here again I suspect that something has dropt out. The Greek is at present ἑνὸς λέγοντος γνῶναι τί λέγει— It was originally ἑνὸς λέγοντός τι, γνῶναι εὖ, ὅ, τι λέγει, λέγε— what I have translated.

what you ought, and failed in this point, how have you not of necessity erred? Perhaps so, said he; but how has he not erred, who did not trust me? If you had treated with him, said (the inquirer), as was fitting, you would not have erred at all. Not at all. But now you have not treated with him, as was fitting. I appear so, said he. If then he was not persuaded, when you were treating with him, as was not fitting, how can you justly find fault with him? I am unable to say. Nor can you say that one must not pay attention to those, who conduct themselves ill? This (I can say) very much, said he. Do not then those persons seem to you to conduct themselves ill, who treat with a party in a manner that is not fitting? To me at least (they seem so), said he. In what then did he err, if he paid no attention to you, when conducting yourself ill? It appears, said he, in nothing. Why then, said (the inquirer), do persons find fault on such matters with each other, and blame those, who are not persuaded by them, because they are not persuaded, but do not find fault with themselves at all, because they have not persuaded them? Hereupon another party who was present, observed - When a person has conducted himself well towards any one, and has assisted him, and subsequently requests that party to conduct himself in a similar manner towards him, but does not meet with such conduct, how does he not reasonably find fault? Is not, said (the inquirer), the person whom the party requests to conduct himself in a similar manner, either able to conduct himself well, or unable? (Yes.) And if he is unable, how can he properly make the request, who requests him (to perform)2 what he cannot? but if he is able, how did he not persuade him (to do so)? or how do persons, who speak in this way, speak correctly? But, said (the other), it is requisite, by Zeus, to find fault with such a person,3 in order that both he may for the remainder of his life conduct himself better, and the other mean fellows, who hear the party finding fault. Think you, said (the inquirer), that any persons will conduct

4

1 I have introduced the answer "Yes," which could hardly be dispensed with.

2 The Greek is ἐστὶν— I have translated as if it were ἁνύτειν

3 The train of thought evidently leads to τοιούτῳ instead of τοῦτο

4 Instead of ἄλλοι φίλοι, the author wrote either ἄλλοι οὐ φίλοι, οι äλλo pavλo, as I have translated.

themselves better when they hear a party speaking correctly,' or when in error? When speaking correctly, said he. 2 Now the party, who was speaking not correctly, did not seem to you to make a request correctly?2 Truly so, said he. How then will those, who hear a person finding fault in this way, conduct themselves better. Not at all, said he. For what purpose, then, 3would a person find fault 3 in this way? He confessed he could not discover

[6.] Some one was accusing a person of stupidity, because he had given credence quickly even to parties he happened to meet with, while they were speaking. To fellow-citizens and familiar friends, when speaking, it is reasonable to trust. But to persons of that kind, whom he had never seen nor heard of before, to give credence, and this too when he was not ignorant that the majority of men are braggarts and knaves, was no little proof of silliness. When one of those present observed-For my part I thought that you considered a person of greater value, who could quickly understand even any one he met with, rather than him, who did so slowly. And so I do consider, said the other. Why then, said (the former), do you find fault, if a person gives credence quickly, even to those he meets with, when they speak the truth? But, said (the other), I do not find fault with this, but because he gives credence to those, who tell falsehoods. But, if after a longer period even to those not accidentally met with he had given credence, and suffered annoyance,5 would you not have found fault with him still more? Yes; I should have done so, said he. Is it, because he gave credence slowly, even to those not acci

' The words καὶ ἀξιοῦντος, commonly found here between λέγοντος and ǹ, were properly omitted originally in one MS.

2-2 To preserve the chain of reasoning the author evidently wrote, not Ὁ δὲ γε οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν ἐδόκει σοι— which I cannot understand, but Ὁ δὲ λέγων οὐκ ὀρθῶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν ἐδόκει σοι— what I have translated.

3-3 Since all the MSS. but one read ¿yxaλoĩ, it is evident the author wrote τοιαῦτ ̓ ἂν— not τοιαῦτα

66

So I have translated roïç ruxovσ all through this section, although οἱ τυχόντες generally means ordinary persons." For οἱ τυχόντες are here opposed to οἱ οἰκεῖοι, and compared with οἱ ἀγνῶτες.

" In lieu of the unintelligible gruaro, I have substituted viãro