call the medical art is surely itself an assistance nearly of such (ills) as the seasons cause by cold and unseasonable heat, and make by all such matters,' the nature of animals their spoil. But not one of these (arts) is in good repute for the truest wisdom; for being made the subject of conjecture, they are carried along without measure by opinions. And assistants we will call pilots and sailors likewise. But not one of these let any person, by cheating us with words, proclaim a wise man on every ground. For not one of them would know the rage of the winds or their kindness, which is the most acceptable thing in the whole of the pilot's art. Nor yet such as say they are assistants in lawsuits by their power in speaking, and, by their memory and practice, give their minds to unusual 2 opinions, but stumble outside the truth in cases of real justice. There still remains a certain strange power with respect to the opinion of wisdom, which the many would then call by the name of nature rather than wisdom, when any one perceives that he is easily learning, what even a child3 could learn, and is remembering many things and firmly so, and can call to mind what is suited to each thing, and quickly do it, when it would be becoming, if it took place. Now all this some will place 4 under nature, others under wisdom, and others under a cleverness of nature. But no prudent person would ever be willing to call any one of these a truly wise man.

_ Such is the literal version of the Greekβοήθεια δέ που καὶ αὐτὴ σχεδὸν ὅσων—where καὶ αὐτὴ is without meaning, and so too is σχεδὸν by itself; while βοήθεια ὅσων, which is the same as βοήθεια τόσων ἃ— would introduce the relative a, to which nothing is to be referred. Ficinus indeed avoids all the difficulty by his version-" medicina quoque nobis opitulatur contra immoderati caloris et frigoris impetum cæterorumque hujusmodi-" But this he got rather out of his own head than his MS. Unless I am greatly mistaken, the author wrote something to this effect βοήθεια, ἄλυπος καὶ θεία τις σχεδὸν, νόσων, αἳ ἀώρῳ ψύχει καὶ καύματι ȧkaip-i. e. "an assistance painless and almost a divine one in diseases, which through cold before its season, and heat out of its season-"

2 The Greek is at present donc neo-which Winckelmann, unable to understand, would correct into dóžais ĥñoεσ— But the sophists, to whom the author is here alluding, were wont rather to run counter to opinions and customs, than to pay attention to them. Hence I have translated, as if the Greek were originally δόξαις ἀηθέσι: for ἀηθέσι and ἀληθείας would be opposed to each other here as in Euthyd. § 16, n. 35; Laws vi. § 5. * Two MSS., in lieu of περ ἂν, read πᾶσαν, in which lies hid παῖς ἂν as I have translated.

All the MSS. but the one used by Ficinus, as shown by his nuncupabunt,” read θήσουσι for φήσουσι.

[3.] It is however necessary for a certain science to become apparent, by which he, who possesses it, would be wise in reality, and not be so in opinion merely. Let us, then, consider. For we are endeavouring by a reasoning, difficult in every way, to find some other science beyond those already mentioned, which may be truly and with propriety called wisdom; while he, who receives it, will be a person neither vulgar nor silly, but wise and good through it; and, whether he governs or is governed by the state, in justice1 become an elegant2 person.

Let us, therefore, consider that science first, which singly proceeds from human nature, and which, amongst all that are present, would, by not being present, render the race of man of (all) animals3 the most senseless and thoughtless. Now this it is not very difficult for any one to consider. For that, which has given number to the whole race of man, would, so to say, being compared one against one,4 effect this. I conceive however that a certain god himself, rather than a certain accident, gave it to us to preserve us; but whom I conceive to have been the god, it is necessary to state, strange although it be, and, on the other hand, somehow not strange. For how must we not conceive that he, who is the cause to us of every good thing, should not have been the cause likewise of intellect, the greatest good by far? Now what god am I speaking of, Megillus and Clinias, and making an object of worship? It is almost 5 Heaven, whom it is most just we should honour, as all the other dæmons and gods do, and pray pre-eminently to it. For all of us would confess that it is the cause of all good

1 Instead of ἐνδίκως Ast would read ἔνδικος, and unite ἔνδικος ἅμα kai éμμɛλns. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits ivdikwg entirely.

2 This word uueλns, strangely introduced here, is translated by Ficinus "modestus." It seems to have been one of those, to which Plato and his imitators attached no specific meaning, or at any rate to which there is no definite equivalent in English.

3 Instead of wov all the MSS. read To Lov I have translated, as if the author had written wávrwv (wwv without rò- Ficinus has-" quæ ex omnibus humanis artibus ita se habet, ut si hæc una semoveatur amentissima et insipientissima hominis natura reddatur ' which has led me to read rig for rig, and rai for - Ast too is here equally at a loss.

4

On this expression see Ast on Legg. i. § 14.

This gxedov is strangely introduced here by itself. It should be united to δικαιότατον

1

things to us. And we assert to boot that it has given us number, and will give it us still, if any one is willing to follow us. For if a person will proceed to a right view of it, whether it be the pleasure of any one to call it the World, or Olympus, or Heaven, let him so call it; but let him follow, wherever it assumes a varied form, when it causes the stars in it to revolve along all their courses, and when it imparts the seasons and food for all, and the remaining gift2 of intellect, as we should say, together with all number, and every other good. Now this is the greatest thing, when any one, receiving from it the gift of number, proceeds through every period. Returning back still a little in our discourse, let us call to mind that we have conceived very correctly, that if we take away number from human nature, we should be intellectual not at all. For the soul of the animal, from whom reason is absent, would scarcely any longer be able to receive every virtue. Now the animal, which does not know two and three, even and odd, and is entirely ignorant of number, would never be able to give a reason respecting those things, of which it alone possesses sensation and memory; but nothing hinders it (from possessing) the other virtues, fortitude and temperance. But he, who is deprived of true reason, will never become wise; and he, to whom wisdom is not present, which is the greatest part of the whole of virtue, would never be perfectly good, nor happy. In this way there is every necessity for number to be laid down as a principle. But why it is necessary, there would be a discourse longer than all that has been spoken. And correctly will the present one have been stated likewise, that of the things, mentioned as belonging to the other arts, which we have gone through, and permitted them all to be arts, not even one would remain, but all perish entirely, when any one

3

1 Ast says that in dekódovs there is an allusion to the notion, that the stars formed an army, which went out upon expeditions. But, unless I am greatly mistaken, the author wrote λožovs odovs- For not only was the apparent course of the Sun through the ecliptic said to be obliqueand hence he was called Aogíaç-but those of the other stars likewise. See at the Rivals, p. 420, n. 6. On the confusion of λogòg see at Hipp. Maj. § 18, n. 65, and here, § 9, p. 26, n. 1.

2 In lieu of δὲ οὖν, which could not thus follow καὶ τὴν ἄλλην, I have translated, as if the Greek were dóσw, similar to apieμov dóow just afterwards.

• Ficinus alone adds, what the sense requires, " habere—”

✦✦ The words Evтes εivaι are omitted by Ficinus and Taylor.

takes away the science of numbers. But to some of those, who have looked to the arts, the race of man would appear sufficiently1 for the sake of some small matters to have no need of number. And yet is it a thing of moment. And if any one looks to what is divine and mortal in generation, in which piety towards the gods and true number are known, 2 he could not mention the person, who knows the whole of number, and of what power it is, when present, the cause; since it is evident that what relates to all music, requires numbered motion and sound; and, what is the greatest, that it (number) is the cause of all good things, but of nothing evil, this must be known well, 3 which would perhaps take place by another road; for 3 the movement, which is without reason, and order, and shape, and rhythm, and harmony, and all such things as partake any evil, is deficient in nearly all number. And this it is meet for him to conceive in this way, who is about to end his days happily; and no one, except him, who knows the just, the good, the beautiful, and all such things, and has laid hold of a true opinion respecting them, 5 will through number know how with regard to any thing 5 to persuade himself and others at all.

of

4

[4.] Let us then proceed to consider this very thing, how we learnt to number. Say, from whence did it arise that we have understood one and two? Do persons possess from the

1 Instead of ikavos, which is unintelligible here, Ficinus has " forte," from which Cornarius elicited lows, adopted by Ast. The author wrote, I suspect, où kεvwç- See at Hipp. Maj p. 258, n. 6; Epist. 7, p. 515, n. 4.

2 The Greek is in some MSS. οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πᾶς ἄν τις— in others πᾶς μávτiç similar to "inveniet nullum vatem" in Ficinus. But then πãs ought to be omitted, or rig introduced. I have translated, as if the Greek were οὐκ ἂν ἔτ ̓ εἴποι τιν', ὃς

_ The Greek is at present, ὃ καὶ τάχα γένοιτ ̓ ἂν. ἀλλ ̓ ἡ σχεδὸν,— all of which Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits. I have therefore adopted, what Stephens suggested, γένοιτ' ἂν ἄλλῃ· ὅτι σχεδόν- Ast indeed asserts that aλà means enimvero," but that it never does, nor could do. 4 I have translated, as if the Greek were οὐδείς ποτε, πλὴν ὁ γιγνώσ κων, not οὐδεὶς ποτε μὴ γιγνώσκων

The Greek is diapiunoerai, which Ficinus translates " numen rationisque vi uti poterit,” as if his MS. read διαριθμήσεται καὶ διαλογίGeral, the origin of diaλoyinraι as a var. lect. in one MS. I have translated, as if the Greek were originally δι' ἀριθμοῦ γνώσεται πρός τι not pòç rò-which I cannot understand.

• I have translated, as if the Greek were φύσιν τοιαύτην ἴσχουσιν ἐκ

6

creator a nature of this kind towards their being able to understand them? Nature, indeed, has not been present to many other animals for this very purpose, so that they are able to learn from their father to number; but the deity has established within us this very thing first, so as to be competent to understand what is shown to us; and afterwards he showed it and is still showing; of which things what can a person see one, as compared with one,2 more beautiful than the birth3 of day? 4 and then, when he comes to the portion of night, he will have a sight, from whence every thing will appear to him quite different. And when he ceases not revolving upon these very matters for many days and many nights, 6 (he will see) how 6 Heaven ceases not in teaching men one and two, until even the most hard to learn shall learn sufficiently how to number. thus each of us, on perceiving these, would understand three and four and many. And amongst these the deity has formed one thing, the Moon; which at one time appearing greater, and at another less, 8 proceeds through (her path), showing continually another day up to fifteen days and nights. And this is a period, if any one is willing to establish the whole circle as one; so that the most indocile animal, so to say, would learn to number, if it were one, to whom the deity had imparted the nature of being able to learn. And up to these points, and in these matters, the whole mass of animals have the power to be

For 7

τοῦ ποιοῦντος πρὸς τὸ δυνατούς—not φύσιν ταύτην ἴσχουσιν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς πρὸς τὸ δυνατούς: where τοῦ ποιοῦντος is similar to τοῦ πατρὸς just afterwards.

1 I cannot believe that the author wrote παρὰ ἡμῖν—ἐνώκισεν, contrary to the genius of the language. Hence I would read yέpaç for aρа— 2 I have adopted ¿vòs áv¤' ¿vòs, as suggested by Stephens, from si unum uni conferatur," in Ficinus.

3 I have translated yévog "birth." Ficinus has "diei lucem," as if his MS. read oέλaç.

44 The Greek is εἶτα εἰς—ἔλθοι—ἔχων— where ἔλθοι is without regimen. I have translated as if it were originally εἶτα εἰ εἰς—ἔλθοι, xo av-where si is due to Ast.

5 I have adopted orav, furnished by three MSS., in lieu of övτа— 66 I have translated, as if the Greek were not äç, but soɛraι ws, to which I have been led by finding in Ficinus " videbis-"

* Ast would read καὶ γὰρ for ὡς γὰρ, with the usual change of ὡς and kai, noticed by Schæfer in Meletem. Crit. p. 73. See below, p. 24, n. 3. 88 Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "ita quotidie varia-cernitur:" which leads to any aνTýv dei paivovo' donμepat-"showing itself ever different daily—”