take the place of, the ordinary proceedings. Such are "Certiorari," "Mandamus," Quo Warranto," and "In

formations."

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Certiorari.

This is an ancient writ by which an inferior Court is commanded to "certify" or formally remit a cause pending in it to a superior Court to be tried there. It is by this writ that the trial of peers indicted for treason, felony, or misprision of treason is removed into the Court of the Lord High Steward, and ordinary criminal indictments in certain cases of special importance or difficulty are removed into the Division of the Queen's Bench.

Mandamus.

This writ (which is called a "prerogative" writ, as issuing under the prerogative of the Crown) issues from the Division of Queen's Bench, and directs persons, corporations, and courts, not easily reached by any ordinary process, to do certain specified acts; as, for instance, to admit to office, or to replace, a properly qualified officer, to proceed to pronounce judgment, and the like.

Quo Warranto.

This writ is a very ancient one, though the procedure in respect of it has varied from time to time. Its original purpose was to command some one who claimed or exercised any office or franchise to show by what authority he supported his alleged right. The writ was largely used in Charles II.'s time to procure a forfeiture of the Charters of corporate towns by alleging a neglect or abuse of the franchises created by them. The proceeding by "information" in the nature of a quo warranto" is now principally used to determine disputes between corporations and their officers, or to ascertain the validity of existing Charters.

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Informations.

"Informations" are of various sorts; but they are all extraordinary modes of obtaining civil remedies or criminal con

victions by a direct application for justice made by the Attorney-General to a division of the Supreme Court. Their purpose may be (1) (if made in the Division of the Exchequer) to recover money due to the Crown, or to obtain satisfaction for a wrong committed upon the lands or goods of the Crown; (2) (if made in the Division of the Queen's Bench), to obtain a penalty due partly to the Crown and partly to the informer upon a penal Statute; or (3) to secure the immediate and certain trial of an alleged offender either against the Crown directly, or-as in cases of riot, libel, and atrocious immorality-against the Crown and a private person jointly. In these last cases the effect of granting leave to file "a criminal information" is to put the accused immediately on his trial without requiring a true Bill to be found by a Grand Jury. The purpose of the

procedure is to avoid the delay, uncertainty, or even popular prejudice which may attend a more regular course of proceeding. It is entirely in the discretion of the Court to grant the application; and in determining how to exercise their discretion, they take into consideration the time that has elapsed, the evidence on which the charge is founded, the motives of the applicant, and the sufficiency, for the purposes of doing complete justice, of the ordinary mode of proceeding. When the information is filed, the trial takes place either "at Bar," or, like an ordinary civil case, at Nisi Prius, in the county where the offence is charged to have been committed. In either case judgment is given by the Division of the Queen's Bench. A "Trial at Bar" is a trial before the Judges of the Court in which the action is brought. The Judges sit together (or in banco). This mode of trial is resorted to only in cases of great difficulty or importance, or where the Crown has its interests involved and insists on such a mode of trial. As any criminal case may be removed by certiorari into the Division of the Queen's Bench,—the highest Criminal Court of original Jurisdiction in the country, -any criminal case may, in the discretion of the Court, be tried at the Bar of the Court.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH LAW.

The constitution and government of England are implicated at so many points with the system of English Law, that it is not possible thoroughly to understand the former without a comprehension of the general character of the latter. On this account, and in particular connection with the Judicial organisation of the country, a description of the leading institutions and principles of English Law is here interposed. The subject may be conveniently and succinctly treated under the following heads, it being understood that Constitutional Law, which forms the main topic of the whole of this treatise, and Laws of Procedure, of which an account has just been given, are omitted from what would otherwise be their proper places.

I. SOURCES OF ENGLISH LAW.

II. LAW OF PROPERTY.

III. LAW OF CONTRACT.

IV. LAW REGULATING

CERTAIN SPECIAL

RELATION

SHIPS, AS THOSE OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, OF GUARDIAN

SHIP, AND OF TRUSTEESHIP.

V. LAW OF CIVIL INJURIES.

VI. CRIMINAL LAW.

I. SOURCES OF ENGLISH LAW.

The word Source in reference to Law is used sometimes (1) to signify the facts to which the existence of particular laws is immediately due; and sometimes (2) to signify the authorities to which reference must be made in order to know what the state of the Law is.

In the first sense of the word "source that of the facts to which particular Laws immediately owe their existence— the Sources of English Law are

(1) Ancient and General Customs or institutions, such as hose of the feudal system as gradually modified by the suc

cessors of William I., and such as those implied in the relation of the Church of England to the State.

(2) Statutes or Acts of Parliament, that is, formal expressions of the will of the Legislature.

Some parts of the Law are wholly due to this source. Other parts, such as the law regulating commercial contracts, Jury trial, and procedure generally, are only partly due to it. Some parts, again, are not affected by this source in the least.

(3) Public engagements made at critical epochs by persons held to represent conflicting claims and interests in the State. Either the fact of these engagements is tacitly recognised or express evidence of them is preserved. They thus share the character both of Statutes and of universally binding customs.

(4) Fudicial decisions on cases actually controverted in Courts of Justice, where such decisions are generally acquiesced in by successive races of Judges, or supported on appeal to the highest tribunal.

(5) Foreign Law accidentally introduced in early times into this country, and still maintaining in some Courts and in some portions of the Law a distinct amount of influence. Thus Roman Law has prescribed many of the rules of procedure and some of the principles adopted in the Court of Chancery and the High Court of Admiralty, while the Canon Law (which was a system introduced by Papal decrees for the government of the Clergy, and largely fashioned after the type of Roman Law) originated many of the rules of procedure adopted in the Ecclesiastical Courts, and has largely affected that part of the Law which relates to wills, intestate succession, marriage, and divorce.

The result of the process by which English Law has been gradually built up from the above various materials is, that in order to know what the state of the Law is on any given point, reference must be made to one or other of the following authorities, or (it may be) to both conjointly. Hence the following are Sources of English Law in the second of the senses of the word Sources.

(1) Statutes of the Realm, including the great constitutional documents of Magna Charta, as successively confirmed; the Petition of Rights; and the Bill of Rights.

The Statutes are scattered through a large number of bulky volumes. They are now in course of being revised and subjected to a sifting process by which the repealed parts are separated from the still subsisting parts.

(2) Reported Decisions of Courts of Justice.-These are said to be scattered through 1,300 volumes, and to apply to 100,000 cases. It is to these decisions that recourse must be had to ascertain (i) what universal customs have been incorporated into the Law of England, and become either the "Common Law" or the principles and rules of " Equity," as the case may be; (ii) what sorts of local or class customs are incorporated into the Law; (iii) what logical rules for the interpretation of written language are recognised by Law ; and (iv) what is the actual meaning impressed by Courts of Justice on the language of Statutes.

This distinction between Law as gathered from the decisions of Courts of Justice and Law expressed in the form of Statutes is sometimes marked by calling the one "Unwritten," and the other " Written," Law.

The principles of "Equity" are those which, up to the time of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act coming into force, were recognised only in the Court of Chancery. They grew, as has been indicated elsewhere, out of the somewhat arbitrary jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, who originally represented the King in controlling the rigour, and enlarging the contracted field of operation, of the Common Law. The Lord Chancellor was originally an ecclesiastic, and versed in the principles of the Roman and the Canon Law, which thus became to some extent the basis of the system applied in his Court. The Court of Chancery gradually gathered to its jurisdiction most of the more complicated matters to which an advancing social condition gave birth, and more especially those matters for which the procedure of trial by Jury was inadequate or unsuitable. Such matters were