took the enemy by surprise at Princeton, broke through their line, captured many prisoners and much baggage, and placed the remnant of his army in secure and comfortable quarters in the high lands of Jersey.

Those masterly movements changed the aspect of the war, and verified the adage, that "all is not lost that is in danger." They convinced the commander of the British troops, that he had at least, an equal to contend with; and that the conquest of the colonies, which but a few days before, he believed to be on the point of consummation, was more remote than he had supposed, at the beginning of the

contest.

Those desperate and successful achievements, confirmed the confidence of Congress and the people, in the prudence, bravery and skill of the American commander, and gave fresh hope and energy to the friends of liberty, in every part of the country. A short time before, they were in a state of despondency, and almost prepared to desist from further effort to oppose the oppressions of the mother country, and to establish the independence of their own.

Notwithstanding these brilliant achievements, individuals were found, ready to depreciate the character of the Commander-in-chief. A very formidable effort of that nature was made by some of the officers, under the influence of General Gates, immediately after the capture of Burgoyne. A little band of conspirators was then formed, who concerted a plan to supplant General Washington, and elevate Gates to the chief command in the army.

Although that attempt proved to be a miserable failure, yet the persons engaged in it, became the inveterate, irreconcilable enemies of Washington, and never afterwards permitted an opportunity, to question his talents or injure his military fame, to pass unimproved. The achievements at Trenton and Princeton, in the winter of 1776-7, were as distinguished for military skill, as for personal bravery; and were devised by himself, while his associates in arms, en

camped on the banks of the Delaware, were indulging in hopeless despair. At that time, not a pen nor a tongue had ventured to question his wisdom or prudence, nor was any attempt of that nature made, prior to the conspiracy in the military family of General Gates. That plot soon exploded, and was put down; yet the persons engaged in it, still cherished their hostility, and suffered no opportunity of inflicting a wound on the feelings, or the fame of the Commander-in-chief, to pass unimproved. They awarded to others the credit of his plans, whenever it could be done with the least plausibility. It is remarkable, that this disposition to injure the standing of General Washington, was most active after General Gates, for whose benefit it was got up, had been defeated by Lord Cornwallis at Camden, and his army scattered to the winds; and after he himself had deservedly sunk into oblivion.

A manifestation of this spirit is found in the Memoirs of General Wilkinson, written after the close of the war, in which he gives General St. Clair the credit of proposing the night march on Princeton, as the most advisable expedient to save the army from impending ruin. It may also be found in a more recent attempt to award to General Mercer the honor and glory of originating the same proposition. On the interesting occasion of removing to Philadelphia the remains of that lamented officer, from Princeton, the field of his glory, and the battle ground on which he fell; the eloquent gentleman who delivered the eulogical address, exultingly affirmed, that in the council of officers convened in the American camp, on the evening of the 2nd of January, the gallant Mercer first advanced the bold idea of ordering up the militia from Philadelphia, and by a night march, attacking the enemy at Princeton.

These conflicting claims for the laurels of Washington, destroy each other; but if either be well founded, we cannot escape the conclusion, that the Commander-in-chief was the weakest officer in the army. He knew that the

British outnumbered him, seven to one-that they were well disciplined and provided with every thing necessary for their comfort; and that his own troops were undisciplined and destitute of almost every thing. He was at the time occupying a position of comparative safety, on the west bank of the Delaware. He knew that the enemy were so situated, that they could be united and brought to bear on any point in New Jersey, in forty-eight hours; and yet it is more than insinuated, that he deliberately abandoned the protection afforded by the river-changed his position without necessity; and placed his little band of half naked troops, the last hope of liberty, in a situation from which they could not retreat, and in which they could not sustain themselves twenty-four hours-without having any specific object in view, or having formed any plan for the government of his subsequent movements. In other words, that he plunged into imminent danger, unnecessarily regardless of consequences.

If such had been the case, he could not escape the charge of imbecility or infidelity. He must have been an impostor or a traitor; but he was neither-he saw and felt his situation to be desperate-his companions in arms were disheartened his life, his fortune and his character were at stake, as well as the liberty of the nation. He therefore assumed the responsibility of forming his own plan, which was done before he crossed the Delaware and abandoned the protection it afforded. He knew that the enemy occupied Amboy, New Brunswick, Kingston, Princeton, Trenton, and Bordentown. The presumption, therefore, was, that they must be weak at some one or more of those points. That consideration suggested his plan, which was, to surprise them by a night march-break through their line at the point he might ascertain to be the most vulnerable, and place his army where they might rest in safety, through the residue of the winter.

In accordance with that arrangement, he crossed the

river, placed his army on the Sampink, in sight of the enemy at Trenton, and ordered their tents to be pitched and their fires kindled. He had previously directed the militia to join him from below, by a night march, and had sent out videttes to ascertain and advise him of the situation of the enemy between Trenton and New Brunswick. His arrangements were so made as to furnish the information required in time to enable him to reach the point of attack during the first night, and before his object was discovered by the enemy. In the interval, his officers, most of whom were ignorant of his plan, looked at the scene with amazement.

In the evening, his videttes came in, and, from their reports, it was apparent that Princeton was the weakest point in the line of the enemy. A council of officers was then called, to whom his movement was explained, and the information just received, communicated.

The only question then proposed to the council was, as to the place where the attack should be made. On that subject there was but one opinion. Whether General St. Clair or General Mercer first named Princeton, is not known, nor is it of the least importance. It is enough to know that that question was the only one submitted; and that the evidence necessary to decide it, was before them. All other matters had been settled by the Commander-inchief in his own mind, and on his own responsibility.

The attack on Princeton, having been thus decided on, the little half clothed army of Washington, about midnight, silently withdrew from the shelter of their tents, in a cold winter night, and taking the Quaker road, because it was more circuitous, less traveled, and therefore afforded the greater prospect of avoiding discovery-arrived in sight of Princeton, fatigued and exhausted, at the first dawn of day. There they met two regiments of British troops, who had just commenced their march to Trenton. A severe conflict ensued, in which the Americans were repulsed and

thrown into disorder. The Commander-in-chief, seeing his danger, and knowing that every thing was at stake, rode to the front, addressed his troops, and conjured them to follow him. Order was restored, and the Americans, seeing their leader in the foremost front of the battle, rushed to the rescue, and in turn repulsed the enemy, and compelled them to retreat in disorder.

On that occasion, Washington exposed his person to the heaviest fire of the enemy, during the whole conflict, directing every movement of his troops himself; and it was evident, that the inspiring influence of his example decided the fate of the battle.

It was afterwards ascertained from the inhabitants of Trenton, that the first knowledge of the movement of the American army from their encampment on the Sampink, was communicated to them by the report of the American cannon from Princeton-Washington having taken the precaution to leave his tents standing, with a small detachment, to perform the ceremony of relieving guard, and replenishing the fires during the night.

The attempt to transfer the laurels of Washington to the brow of Mercer, is based on an allegation, that on the evening of the 2nd of January, in the board of officers then convened, "General Mercer first made the bold proposal to order up the Philadelphia militia, and make a night march on Princeton."

Now it appears, from Washington's official letter to Congress, that he had previously ordered them up-that they had actually joined the army on the night of the 1st, and were in camp, when, it is said, the proposition of General Mercer was made.

The claims which have been set up by the friends of different officers, to the honor of originating the plan of saving the army on that occasion, is sufficient of itself to discredit the story. If a proposition of that character had been made, the mover would have been known-his identity