all discharged before the Ambassadress. Several letters passed between Captain Pentreith and Mr. Morton, and between Capt. Pentreith and Messrs. Body, White, and Company, who had been appointed agents for the New York Accessory Company, in place of Mr. Morton, with respect to the delay, and demurrage, at the rate of £9 per day, was from time to time paid, Capt. Pentreith, however, giving notice that he did not consider that a full discharge of his claim for loss caused by detention. For the plaintiff it was contended that he was entitled to demurrage for seventy-three days, three months, between March and June, 1853, which had been paid; and also to the recovery of the value of the vessel to the plaintiff during those seventy-three days. The estimated value was thus ascertained. In her outward voyage, which occupied 139 days, the Ambassadress made £2,964, which would leave profits for seventy-three days £1,557. They maintained that they were also entitled to recover £400 as the amount of damage the vessel had sustained by remaining that length of time under a burning sun. Capt. Pentreith, in deposing to these facts, stated that on the 14th of January, after waiting from the 2d, he commenced discharging into the Brother Jonathan, a large steamer belonging to the Vanderbilt Company; but after receiving about 320 tons the Brother Jonathan went away, and the Ambassadress was detained three months. In a subsequent part of his evidence, he stated that the vessel was afterwards lost in the Bay of Fundy. In reply to Mr. FORSYTH, witness admitted that on the 28th of March he received instructions to place coals on board the steamer Pacific. He tried to beat to her, but found it was impossible. The Pacific could easily have come alongside the Ambassadress, which had a good anchorage, with plenty of water. In answer to the jury, the witness said the Ambassadress was 846 tons burden, and her actual expenses, while in Salinas Bay, were £15 or £16 a-day. Mr. Fernie, of the firm of Fernie Brothers, merchants and shipowners, stated that his firm were the agents for, not the owners of, the Ambassadress. He calculated that she was worth between £25 and £30 to her owners. Capt. Pentrieth interrupted the witness during his examination, and ran imminent risk of being ordered out of court by his lordship. Mr. J. S. De Wolfe was examined as to the value of freights to Nicaragua between March and June, 1853. He estimated the freights at that period, on such a voyage, at fifteen shillings per ton per month. Mr. FORSYTH contended that until the Damascus and Dumbarton were discharged, the turn of the Ambassadress had not come; that they filled the hulks, which, therefore, could not be made available for the cargo of the Ambassadress; that no steamer came up, and that, therefore, there was no possibilty of taking the coal from the Ambassadress until March; that then the Pacific arrived at Salinas, and intimation was given to the captain to place himself alongside, but he refused to do so; that no other opportunity was afforded until the 14th June; that not only had all the legal claims presented by Captain Pentreith, as to demurrage, been paid, but that demurrage for the eleven days between the 2d and 14th of January had, been paid, that being on a period in reference to which there was no legal claim; that the captain had received $1,617 in full settlement of all claims against the Vanderbilt Company; and that this was the first time, after a lapse of three years, that the extraordinary claim for loss of profit had been set up. The action, he said, was an unjustifiable attempt to extract from the pockets of the defendants damages with respect to a transaction which had been entirely settled three years ago. After his LORDSHIP had summed up, the jury almost immediately returned a verdict for the defendants, on the ground that there had been a full discharge of all claims. His LORDSHIP: Then you are of the opinion, gentlemen, that Mr. Pentreith had authority to settle the matter? The FORE MAN: Certainly.

COMMON CARRIERS GIVING through TICKETS DOES NOT MAKE PARTNERS.

If the several proprietors of different portions of a public line of travel, by agreement among themselves, appoint a common agent at each end of the route to receive the fare and give through tickets, this does not per se constitute them partners as to passengers who purchase through tickets, so as to render each one liable for losses occurring on any portion of the line. (Ellsworth vs. Tartt. Supreme Court of Alabama.)

BANKRUPTCY-NEW CODE OF MERCANTILE MORALS.

In Supreme Judicial Court, April Term, 1856, at Worcester, Massachusetts, Judge B. F. Thomas presiding. Turner, Wilson & Co., appellants, vs. John H. Comer, assignee, et al.

This novel bankrupt case, presenting an entire new code of morals of the merchants of Boston, came up by appeal from the decision of Commissioner A. H. Bullock, in the Court of Insolvency in the County of Worcester. It appeared, in evidence, that James Snow, the insolvent debtor, had once before been unable to pay his debts in full, when a contract was drawn up by his creditors, releasing him from all liability to them by paying fifty per cent on their several claims, a copy of which we annex :

BOSTON, January 6, 1854.

We, the undersigned creditors of James Snow, of West Brookfield, agree to release said Snow from all liability to us, upon his paying, within thirty days from the date hereof, 50 per cent on our several claims-25 per cent in cash, and 25 per cent in six months, without interest, satisfactory paper; accounts to be made up to January 10, 1854. This obligation not binding unless all creditors become parties hereto.

It was alledged that one of the leading dry goods firms in Boston received their pay in full in consideration of signing the contract to take one-half. The financial partner of that firm being in Europe, the allegation failed in proof.

It was in evidence that J. W. Blodget & Co. received 75 per cent, and Jordan, Marsh & Co., 70 per cent on their claims, the names of both firms appearing on the above contract. Turner, Wilson & Co., and other creditors, who had been misled by these decoys, and settled their claims according to the contract, finding on investigation the fraud perpetrated on them, offered for proof before the Commissioner the unpaid 50 per cent. Lester M. Clark, et al., assignees of J. W. Blodget & Co., also offered for proof their unpaid 25 per cent, all of which claims were rejected. The evidence before the Court was substantially the same as before the Commissioner. The counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon their contract, while the defendants argued that, inasmuch as they had accepted of the 50 per cent, they had, by the act, waived any further claim. The Court ruled that the contract, being conditional, the plaintiffs' claim was valid with the evidence. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs.

Exceptions were taken, and it will go before the full bench in October, 1856.

CASE OF SMUGGLING SILKS TO UNITED STATES-BREACH OF CONTRACT.

At the Liverpool Assizes. Brennan vs. Howard.

This was an action for the recovery of damages for a breach of contract, arising out of rather singular circumstances. Mr. Atherton, Q. C., with whom was Mr. Ovens, was counsel for the plaintiff; and Mr. Edwin James, Q. C., with whom was Mr. Blair, for the defendant. In stating the case to the jury, Mr. Atherton said that the plaintiff is Mr. John Brennan, a silk merchant of Manchester, and who had also a place of business at New York. The defendant is Mr. Henry Howard, who held the situation of berthing clerk in the employ of Messrs. Grimshaw & Co., of Liverpool. In November, 1853, the plaintiff. being desirous of forwarding some silk goods to New York, came to Liverpool for the purpose of entering into arrangements with Messrs. Grimshaw & Co. to forward the same. Plaintiff met a person named Devine, to whom he stated his object. Devine then introduced him to the defendant, and the three arranged to meet in the evening, which they did. Plaintiff stated that he wished to forward a considerable quantity of silk goods to New York, packed, not in the usual way, but in fact in hampers, with the view, it must be acknowledged, of escaping the ad valorem duty that would be exacted upon their importation into New York. Devine said that the defendant was just the very man, being intimately acquainted with several mates of ships in the New York trade. An arrangement was then entered into

between the plaintiff and the defendant, who contracted to deliver three hampers of silk-packed in three dozen hampers, to imitate bottled porter, (laughter)—for which he was to receive £7 upon each. The usual charge for the conveyance of such a package to New York would not be more than from 5s. to 10s.; while the ad valorem duty upon the silk in New York, if openly landed, would be considerably more than £7 each. On the 11th November, 1853, one hamper, containing silk goods to the value of £188 0s. 6d., was addressed to Devine for the purpose of his handing it over to the defendant for transit to New York, as per contract; on the 25th November a second hamper of silk goods, of the value of £127 odd, was similarly sent; and on the 17th December of the same year, a third hamper was dispatched from Manchester, under like circumstances, containing silk goods worth £152 16s. 7d. For each of these hampers the defendant gave a receipt. It turned out, however, that two of these hampers had never reached their destination, while the third came to hand with half its original contents abstracted. This action was therefore brought to recover the amount of plaintiff's loss, the result of the defendant's neglect and non-fulfillment of contract. The plaintiff was examined, and his evidence corroborated the foregoing. Mr. James cross-examined the plaintiff at great length, and elicited that he had been in the habit of smuggling silks to America during the last five or six years, through Devine and the defendant. Devine was what was called a “runner," in the same employ as the defendant, and received £1 upon hampers for his trouble. The goods were generally forwarded in the boxes of emigrants, sometimes by the mates of sailing vessels and steamers. Plaintiff had not, upon the whole, been the gainer by these smuggling transactions. It was something like horse-racing, for he had been taken in; so it was not, after all, a very profitable business-certainly not in the transactions in question. The loss of the hampers had been accounted for by a statement to the effect that they had been thrown overboard in the river Hudson, to avoid their seizure. By Mr. Atherton-I have not sent more than thirty parcels to be smuggled into New York during the past six years, but sent out silk goods in the regular way to the extent of some £500 monthly.

John Devine said he had known the defendant some years, and had been engaged. in the same office with him. Witness got 10s. per week and commission for obtaining passengers. Recollected the plaintiff calling in November, 1853, and stating that he wanted to ship some goods through Messrs. Grimshaw for New York. Witness told the defendant this, when he (defendant) replied that if the plaintiff would send the goods safe to Liverpool, he would forward them right enough to New York. According to agreement, plaintiff, defendant, and witness met in the evening, first at the office, after the clerks had left, whence they adjourned to a hotel. An agreement was there entered into by the defendant to deliver "three dozen hampers" of silk at the plaintiff's warehouse in New York, free of duty, at £7 each, no money to be paid until plaintiff should hear of the safe arrival of the property. The defendant also stipulated that the hampers should not be addressed to him, but to witness, which was done, the three hampers in question received, and handed over to the defendant, who gave a receipt for each. In cross-examination by Mr. James, the witness said he had sent away a few boxes for the defendant, who paid him ten shillings a box; he had smuggled nothing, and had not the slightest knowledge that the boxes contained contraband goods. If he had known the fact, and was paid for it, he would send off boxes of smuggled goods. Perhaps he might have known that the thirty boxes and hampers he had sent off contained smuggled goods, but he did not know what. Witness also kept a boarding-house. The police had not very lately been there looking after any person. By Mr. Atherton-Witness had been left a considerable sum of money lately, and was no longer a "runner," having left Messrs. Grimshaw's employ. After some further corroborative evidence, Mr. Atherton applied for permission to amend the declaration. Mr. James objected. His lordship said that he must object; and observed that he should not be a party to assist a person who had been defrauding the American revenue. The way would be to withdraw a juryman, which was done, and the plaintiff was non-suited.

TIMBER MERCHANTS-ACTION TO RECOVER FOR GOODS SUPPLIED.

Fazakerley vs. M'Knight and another.

In this action both parties are timber-merchants, and the plaintiff sought to recover £337 ls. 10d. from the defendants for goods supplied. In October, 1854, defendants were indebted to plaintiff the above sum, and plaintiff drew a six months' bill on them, which was duly accepted. In January, 1855, the defendants (M Knight and Abbinett) made a composition with the creditors. A deed was drawn up under which their property was to be taken possession of by Mr. Abbinett, sen., the father of one of the defendants, who undertook to pay creditors to the amount of £10,000, ten shillings in the pound, upon their respective claims. For the defense it was contended that the plaintiff signed the deed of composition for the whole amount of his claim, and also that he had received goods to the amount of £142. 9s. 7d., which left a balance due to the plaintiff on his own claim of only £194 12s. 3d. It transpired that the amount of the plaintiff's debt was inserted after he had attached his signature to the deed of composition. His LORDSHIP thought this destroyed the validity of the deed. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of £200, the balance (with interest) which the defendants had pleaded was due between the parties.

SALVAGE-STEAM-TUG NOT ENTITLED TO IT-OPPRESSIVE BARGAIN.

Decision in Admiralty, United States District Court-March 21, 1856. Before Judge Betts. Humphrey H. Crary et al. vs. the schooner El Dorado and her cargo.

This libel was filed by the owners of the steam-tug C. P. Smith, to recover a salvage compensation for services rendered to the schooner. The libelants allege that on the 4th of February, 1856, the schooner, with a cargo of molasses on board, was lying at anchor in the North River, surrounded by heavy ice, by reason of which she was in great danger, and that those on board of her hailed the steam-tug and agreed to give $1,000 to be towed to a place of safety, which the tug succeeded in doing, suffering great damage herself in the service, and they claimed to recover the sum of $1,000. It was proved that the tug had been employed in towing other vessels which were near the El Dorado on that morning; that she was engaged in the service only a few hours; that the captain of the schooner was not on board, but the mate was, who, as the claimants alleged, could not make any binding agreement in the premises; but the customary compensation to tugs for aid of that description was $20 an hour, and no case was shown where more than $350 had been paid.

HELD BY THE COURT-That the recovery in this case cannot justly be placed on the basis of salvage services in their proper acceptation in law, nor on the footing of a specific bargain to pay $1,000 for the service.

That an essential branch of employment of steam-tugs in this port during the season of ice is moving vessels from place to place in the harbor. The use of this kind of craft has grown to be one of the necessities of commerce and navigation in this port, and the demand for their services has brought into use a numerous flotilla of tugs, which, like pilots, are always to be had to give vessels the advantage of their capacities, and the constancy of the demand guaranties in the average a remunerative reward for their services, which, however, has not yet been measured by an absolute scale of charges.

That so fundamental a change in the interterritorial and coast navigation since the foundation of the principles of maritime jurisprudence, renders the rules which define the relation of helping vessels to those relieved by them in distress, in a good degree inapplicable. The new relation of things no longer places the relieving vessel in the character of a volunteer, governed by impulse of humanity, leaving her own pursuits and devoting herself to the rescue of another in peril.

Steam-tugs stand on different grounds. They impose no unauthorized risks on their owners; they may have a reward whether needed or not, and will not necessarily lose it because the service undertaken by them fails; and what makes their aid essentially different from that of vessels coming casually upon one in distress, is that the steam-tugs pursue and solicit the employment.

That these considerations do not detract from their claim to an adequate recompense, or impair the importance of their services to the interests and safety of navigation, but show that they are no longer entitled to claim the character of salvors, in most instances where it might be readily attributed to vessels not devoted to this special pursuit, which has become a kind of public calling.

That the Courts possess ample authority to adapt the recompense for towage in extraordinary cases to their exigencies, as they may, when not restrained by positive law, augment the ordinary amount of pilotage.

But they will not allow their process to be used as a means of coercing the fulfillment of exorbitant and unconscionable bargains, however they may have been obtained.

That the demand of $1,000 in this case, whether placed upon the agreement of the mate of the schooner, or on the work of the services, is immeasurably beyond what ought to be awarded the tug.

Decree, therefore, that the libelants recover the sum of $350 with costs against the schooner, and that the libel against the cargo be dismissed with costs.

FREIGHT-RIGHT OF BROKER TO RECEIVE FREIGHT-MONEY-INSOLVENCY OF BROKER -REVOCATION OF HIS AUTHORITY-LIEN OF SHIPOWNER.

A case of great importance to merchants and ship-brokers, with reference to the authority of a broker, to whom a ship is consigned, to receive the freight-money, under bills of lading signed by the captain of the ship, and as to the lien of a shipowner on goods shipped on bills of lading under the character of the ship, has been decided in the Court of Common Pleas :—

The action was brought to recover damages for the detention of a quantity of oil-cake, shipped at New York, for which the freight had been paid, and of which the plaintiffs held the bills of lading. At the trial it appeared that the plaintiffs, who are merchants in London, purchased, by their agents at New York, a quantity of oil-cake, which was shipped for them on board a vessel chartered for England, of which the defendant, a shipowner at North Shields, was the proprietor. The vessel was consigned to Cooper, Fitton & Co., brokers in London, and the terms agreed on with the captain were for a lump freight of 500 tons for £500, half of which was to be paid in cash on delivery of the cargo, and the rest by approved bills. It was found, however, that the vessel would only carry 460 tons, and a proportionate reduction in the amount of freight was therefore agreed upon between the charterer and the captain, and bills of lading were given. The plaintiffs having previously made arrangements for the necessary entries at the customhouse, and for payment of the freight, the vessel arrived on the 20th of December. The brokers, Cooper & Co., duly reported her arrival, and made out the freightnotes, and on Saturday, the 28th of December, received the £133 13s. 8d. for freight, from parties who represented the plaintiffs.

At this time the vessel was in the St. Katherine's Docks, and was partly unloaded into the plaintiffs' barges; but the captain, learning that the brokers had become insolvent, refused the pass necessary for the barges to leave the dock, and ultimately only allowed them to go upon receiving an indemnity from the plaintiffs. The chief question between the parties at the trial was, whether the plaintiffs, before they paid the freight to Cooper & Co., had received notice that the authority of these gentlemen to act as brokers had been revoked; and upon this point the evidence was very conflicting. The jury, however, found a verdict for the plaintiffs.

There had been another action in the Court of Queen's Bench, in which the jury found that there had been notice of the revocation of the brokers' authority.