3. A treaty for the regulation of the commerce between the two countries.

4. The exchange of a minister.

The letters of Mr. Morris before mentioned, state the communications, oral and written, which have passed between him and the ministers; and from these the Secretary of State draws the following inferences :

1. That the British court is decided not to surrender the posts in any event; and that they will urge as a pretext that though our courts of justice are now open to British subjects, they were so long shut after the peace as to have defeated irremedially the recovery of debts in many cases. They suggest, indeed, the idea of an indemnification on our part. But probably were we disposed to admit their right to indemnification, they would take care to set it so high as to insure a disagreement.

2. That as to indemnification for the negroes, their measures for concealing them were in the first instance so efficacious, as to reduce our demand for them, so far as we can support it by direct proof, to be very small indeed. Its smallness seems to have kept it out of discussion. Were other difficulties removed, they would probably make none of this article.

3. That they equivocate on every proposal of a treaty of commerce, and authorize in their communications with Mr. Morris the same conclusions which have been drawn from those they had had from time to time with Mr. Adams, and those through Mayor Beckwith; to wit, that they do not mean to submit their present advantages in commerce to the risk which might attend a discussion of them, whereon some reciprocity could not fail to be demanded. Unless, indeed, we would agree to make it a treaty of alliance as well as commerce, so as to undermine our obligations with France. This method of stripping that rival nation of its alliances, they tried successfully with Holland, endeavored at it with Spain, and have plainly and repeatedly suggested to us. For this they would probably relax some of the rigors they exercise against our commerce.

4. That as to a minister, their Secretary for foreign affairs is

disposed to exchange one, but meets with opposition in his cabinet, so as to render the issue uncertain.

From the whole of which, the Secretary of State is of opinion. that Mr. Morris' letters remove any doubts which might have been entertained as to the intentions and dispositions of the British cabinet.

That it would be dishonorable to the United States, useless and even injurious, to renew the propositions for a treaty of commerce, or for the exchange of a minister; and that these subjects should now remain dormant, till they shall be brought forward earnestly by them.

That the demands of the posts, and of indemnification for the negroes, should not be again made till we are in readiness to do ourselves the justice which may be refused.

That Mr. Morris should be informed that he has fulfilled the object of his agency to the satisfaction of the President, inasmuch as he has enabled him to judge of the real views of the British cabinet, and that it is his pleasure that the matters committed to him be left in the situation in which the letter shall find them.

That a proper compensation be given to Mr. Morris for his services herein, which having been begun on the 22d of January, and ended the 18th of September, comprehend a space of near eight months; that the allowance to an agent may be properly fixed anywhere between the half and the whole of what is allowed to a Chargé d'affaires; which, according to the establishment of the United States at the time of this appointment, was at the rate of $3,000 a year; consequently, that such a sum of between one and two thousand dollars be allowed him as the President shall deem proper, on a view of the interference which this agency may have had with Mr. Morris' private pursuits in Europe.

XVIII.-Report relative to the Mediterranean trade.

December 28, 1790.

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred by the House of Representatives so much of the speech of the President of

the United States to both Houses of Congress, as relates to the trade of the United States in the Mediterranean, with instructions to report thereupon to the House, has had the same under consideration, and thereupon makes the following report:

It

The loss of the records of the custom houses in several of the States, which took place about the commencement and during the course of the late war, has deprived us of official information, as to the extent of our commerce and navigation in the Mediterranean sea. According to the best which may be obtained from other sources meriting respect, it may be concluded that about one-sixth of the wheat and flour exported from the United States, and about one-fourth in value of their dried and pickled fish, and some rice, found their best markets in the Mediterranean ports; that these articles constituted the principal part of what we sent into that sea; that that commerce loaded outwards from eighty to one hundred ships, annually, of twenty thousand tons, navigated by about twelve hundred seamen. was abandoned early in the war. And after the peace which ensued, it was obvious to our merchants, that their adventures into that sea would be exposed to the depredations of the piratical States on the coast of Barbary. Congress, too, was very early attentive to this danger, and by a commission of the 12th of May, 1784, authorized certain persons, named ministers plenipotentiary for that purpose, to conclude treaties of peace and amity with the Barbary powers. And it being afterwards found more expedient that the negotiations should be carried on at the residences of those powers, Congress, by a farther commission, bearing date the 11th of March, 1785, empowered the same ministers plenipotentiary to appoint agents to repair to the said powers at their proper residences, and there to negotiate such treaties. The whole expenses were limited to eighty thousand dollars. Agents were accordingly sent to Morocco and Algiers. Before the appointment of the one to Morocco, it was known that a cruiser of that State had taken a vessel of the United States; and that the emperor, on the friendly interposition of the court of Madrid, had liberated the crew, and made restitution

of the vessel and cargo, as far as their condition admitted. This was a happy presage of the liberal treaty he afterwards concluded with our agent, still under the friendly mediation of Spain, and at an expense of between nine and ten thousand dollars only. On his death, which has taken place not long since, it becomes necessary, according to their usage, to obtain immediately a recognition of the treaty by his successor, and consequently, to make provision for the expenses which may attend it. The amount of the former furnishes one ground of estimate; but the character and dispositions of the successor, which are unknown here, may influence it materially. The friendship of this power is important, because our Atlantic as well as Mediterranean trade is open to his annoyance, and because we carry on a useful commerce with his nation.

The Algerines had also taken two vessels of the United States, with twenty-one persons on board, whom they retained as slaves. On the arrival of the agent sent to that regency, the dey refused utterly to treat of peace on any terms, and demanded 59,496 dollars for the ransom of our captives. This mission therefore proved ineffectual.

While these negotiations were on foot at Morocco and Algiers, an ambassador from Tripoli arrived in London. The ministers plenipotentiary of the United States met him in person. He demanded for the peace of that State, thirty thousand guineas; and undertook to engage that of Tunis for a like sum. These demands were beyond the limits of Congress, and of reason, and nothing was done. Nor was it of importance, as, Algiers remaining hostile, the peace of Tunis and Tripoli was of no value, and when that of the former should be obtained, theirs would soon follow.

Our navigation, then, into the Mediterranean, has not been resumed at all since the peace. The sole obstacle has been the unprovoked war of Algiers; and the sole remedy must be to bring that war to an end, or to palliate its effects. Its effects may, perhaps, be palliated by insuring our ships and cargoes destined for that sea, and by forming a convention with the regency,

for the ransom of our seamen, according to a fixed tariff.

That tariff will, probably, be high, and the rate of insurance so settled, in the long run, as to pay for the vessels and cargoes captured, and something more. What proportion will be captured nothing but experience can determine. Our commerce differs from that of most of the nations with whom the predatory States are in habits of war. Theirs is spread all over the face of the Mediterranean, and therefore must be sought for all over its face. Ours must all enter at a strait only five leagues wide; so that their cruisers, taking a safe and commanding position near the strait's mouth, may very effectually inspect whatever enters it. So safe a station, with a certainty of receiving for their prisoners a good and stated price, may tempt their cupidity to seek our vessels particularly. Nor is it certain that our seamen could be induced to engage in that navigation, though with the security of Algerine faith that they would be liberated on the payment of a fixed sum. The temporary deprivation of liberty, perhaps chains, the danger of the pest, the perils of the engagement preceding their surrender, and possible delays of the ransom, might turn elsewhere the choice of men, to whom all the rest of the world is open. In every case, these would be embarrassments which would enter into the merchants' estimate, and endanger the preference of foreign bottoms not exposed to them. And upon the whole, this expedient does not fulfil our wish of a complete re-establishment of our commerce in that sea.

A second plan might be to obtain peace by purchasing it. For this we have the example of rich and powerful nations, in this instance counting their interest more than their honor. If, conforming to their example, we determine to purchase a peace, it is proper to inquire what a peace may cost. This being merely a matter of conjecture, we can only compare together such opinions as have been obtained, and from them form one for ourselves.

Mr. Wolf, a respectable Irishman, who had resided very long at Algiers, thought a peace might be obtained from that regency, and the redemption of our captives included, for sixty or seventy