bility, which had been an act of the three branches, and has not been complained of. It was, at least, as important a one as the present.

But the construction now proposed, he contended, was an easy and natural construction. Recurring to the collection law, he observed, that it was by construction that the receipts are ordered to be made in gold and silver.

With respect to creating a mass of capital, he supposed just and upright national measures would create a will to form this capital.

Adverting to the idea that Congress has not the power to establish companies with exclusive privileges, he observed that, by the amendments proposed by New Hampshire, Msssachusetts, and New York, it plainly appears that these States considered that Congress does possess the power to establish such companies.

The constitution vests Congress with power to dispose of certain property in lands, and to make all useful rules and regulations for that purpose. Can its power be less over one species of its own property than over another?

With respect to giving preference to one State over another, he observed that, ten years hence, the seat of Government is to be on the Potomac, and, whereever the Government is finally settled, the place will enjoy superior advantages; but still the Government must go there, and the places not enjoying those advantages must be satisfied.

It is said we must not pass a problematical bill, which is liable to a supervision by the judges of the supreme court; but, he conceived there was no force in this, as those judges are invested, by the constitution, with a power to pass their judgment on all laws that may be passed.

It is said that this law may interfere with the State Governments; but this may or may not be the case; and in all interferences of the kind, the particular interest of a State must give way to the general interest.

With respect to the corporation possessing the power of passing laws, this, he observed, is a power incidental to all corporations, and, in the instance of the Western territory, Congress have exercised the powers of instituting corporations, or bodies politic, to the greatest possible extent.

He defended the right of Congress to purchase and possess property, and quoted a passage in the constitution to show that they possess this right.

He then touched upon the expediency of banks, and of that proposed, in particular. The advantages generally derived from these institutions, he believed, applied peculiarly to this country. He noticed the objections, from banks banishing the specie; he said, the surplus only would be sent out of the country. But, is it given away? No, Sir, it is sent off for articles which are wanted, and which will enrich the country.

With respect to a run on the bank, he mentioned the circumstances under which those runs on the British banks, which had been noticed, took place, and showed there was no parallel that would ever take place in this country. From several particulars, he showed that the objection which arose, from the United States not having made a good bargain by the system, was not well founded. He then mentioned the peculiar advantages which the United States will enjoy over common subscribers.

The objections from banks being already established in the several States, he obviated, by stating the mischiefs which might arise from an ignorance of the situation of those banks; and concluded by some remarks on the inexpediency of the General Government's having recourse to institutions of merely a local nature.

Mr. JACKSON said that, having been the person who brought forward the constitutional objections against the bill, he thought himself bound to notice the answers which had been offered to that objection. Newspaper authorities, he said, have been alluded to, and their silence on the subject considered as indicating the approbation of the People. He would meet the gentlemen on that ground, and, though he did not consider newspapers as an authority to be depended on, yet, if opinions, thro' that channel, were to be regarded, he

would refer gentlemen to those of this city. The expediency and constitutionality of the bill has been called in question by the newspapers of this city.

The latitude contended for in construing the constitution on this occasion, he reprobated very fully. If the sweeping clause, as it is called, extends to vesting Congress with such powers, and necessary and proper means are an indispensable implication, in the sense advanced by the advocates of the bill, we shall soon be in possession of all possible powers, and the charter under which we sit will be nothing but a name.

This bill will essentially interfere with the rights of the separate States, for it is not denied that they possess the power of instituting banks; but the proposed corporation will eclipse the Bank of North America, and contravene the interests of individuals concerned in it.

He then noticed the several arguments drawn from the doctrine of implication; the right to incorporate a national bank has been deduced from the power to raise armies; but he presumed it would not be contended that this is a bill to provide for the national defence. Nor could such a power, in his opinion, be derived from the right to borrow money. It has been asked what the United States could do with the surplus of their revenue, without the convenience of a bank, in which to deposite it with advantage? For his part, though he wished to anticipate pleasing occurrences, he did not look forward to the time when the General Government would have this superabundance at its disposal.

The right of Congress to purchase and hold lands has been urged, to prove that they can transfer this power; but the General Government is expressly restricted in the exercise of this power; the consent of the particular State to the purchase, for particular purposes only, is required; these purposes are designated, such as building light houses, erecting arsenals, &c.

It has been said that banks may exist without a charter, but that this incorporation is necessary, in order that it may have a hold on the Government. Mr. Jackson strongly reprobated this idea; he was, he said, astonished to hear such a declaration, and hoped that such ideas would prevent a majority of the House from passing a bill that would thus establish a perpetual monopoly. We have, said he, I believe, a perpetual debt; I hope we shall not make a perpetual corporation. What was it drove our forefathers to this country? Was it not the ecclesiastical corporations, and perpetual monopolies of England and Scotland? Shall we suffer the same evils to exist in this country, instead of taking every possible method to encourage the increase of emigrants to settle among us? For, if we establish the precedent now before us, there is no saying where it shall stop.

The power to regulate trade is said to involve this, as a necessary means; but the powers consequent on this express power, are specified: such as regulating light houses, ships, harbors, &c. It has been said, that Congress has borrowed money; this shews that there is no necessity of instituting any new bank, those already established having been found sufficient for the purpose. He denied the right of Congress to establish banks at the permanent seat of Government, or on those sand heaps mentioned yesterday: for, if they should, they could not force the circulation of their paper one inch beyond the limits of those places. But, it is said, if Congress can establish banks in those situations, the question becomes a question of place, and not of principle; from hence, it is inferred that the power may be exercised in any other part of the United States; this appeared to him to form a very dangerous construction of the powers vested in the General Government.

Adverting to the powers in Congress, in respect to the finances of the Union, he observed that those powers did not warrant the adoption of whatever measures they thought proper; the constitution has restricted the exercise of those fiscal powers; Congress cannot lay a poll tax, nor impose duties on exports, and yet these undoubtedly relate to the finances.

The powers exercised in respect to the Western territory, he observed, had reference to property already belonging to the United States; it does not refer to property to be purchased, nor does it authorize the purchase of any

additional property; besides, the powers are express and definite, and the exercise of them, in making needful rules and regulations in the government of that territory, does not interfere with the rights of the respective States.

Mr. Jackson then denied the necessity of the proposed institution, and, noticing the observation of Mr. Ames, that it was dangerous, on matters of importance, not to give an opinion, observed, that he could conceive of no danger that would result from postponing that construction of the constitution now contended for, to some future Congress, who, when the necessity of a bank institution shall be apparent, will be as competent to the decision as the present House. Alluding to the frequent representations of the flourishing situation of the country, he inferred that this shows that the necessity of the proposed institution does not exist at the present time; why should we then be anticipating for future generations? State banks he considered preferable to a national bank, as counterfeits can be detected in the States; but, if you establish a national bank, the checks will be found only in the city of Philadelphia or Conogocheague. He then passed an eulogium on the Bank of Pennsylvania; the stockholders, said he, are not speculators; they have the solid coin deposited in their vaults.

He adverted to the preamble and context of the constitution, and asserted that this context is to be interpreted by the general powers contained in the instrument. Noticing the advantages it had been said would accrue to the United States from the bank, he asked, is the United States going to commence stockjobbers? The "general welfare" are the two words which are to involve and justify the assumption of every power. But what is this general welfare? It is the welfare of Philadelphia, New York, and Boston: for, as to the States of Georgia and New Hampshire, they may as well be out of the Union, as to any advantages they will receive from the institution. He reprobated the idea of the United States deriving any emolument from the bank, and, more especially, he reprobated the influence which it was designed the Government should enjoy by it. He said, the banks of Venice and Amsterdam were founded upon different principles. In the famous bank of Venice, the Government holds no shares, and yet has at command 5,000,000 ducats; but the United States were to be immediately concerned in theirs, and to become stock jobbers. The Bank of Amsterdam was under the entire direction of the burgomasters, who had alone the power of making by-laws for its regulation; this power, by the bill, was given up by Government, very improperly he thought, and was to be exercised by the stockholders. The French bank, he added, was first established on proper principles, and flourished; but afterwards became a royal bank; much paper was introduced, which destroythe establishment, and was near oversetting the Government.

The facility of borrowing, he deprecated; it will, said he, involve the Union in irretrievable debts; the facility of borrowing is but another name for anticipation, which will, in its effects, deprive the Government of the power to control its revenues-they will be mortgaged to the creditors of the Government. Let us beware of following the example of Great Britain in this respect. He said, undue advantages had been taken in precipitating the measure, and the reasonable proposition respecting the State debts is not admitted; this, I consider, as partial and unjust. A gentleman from Virginia has well observed, that we appear to be divided by a geographical line-not a gentleman, scarcely, to the eastward of a certain line, is opposed to the bank, and where is the gentleman to the southward, that is for it? This ideal line will have a tendency to establish a real difference. He added a few more observations, and concluded by urging a postponement, if any regard was to be had to the tranquillity of the Union."

Mr. BOUDINOT said he meant to confine himself to two or three great points, on which the whole argument appeared to him to rest. He considered the objections to the bill as pointed against its constitutionality and expediency. It was essential, he observed, that every member should be satisfied, as far as possible, of the first: for, however expedient it might be, if it was clearly

unconstitutional, the bill should never receive the sanction of the Representatives of the People. He would, in a great measure, refer for its expediency, if constitutional, to the experience of every gentleman of the House, as the most satisfactory proof on that head, and he conceived there was no need of much argument in support of its decision. The first question, then, was, is Congress vested with a power to grant the privileges contained in the bill? This is denied, and ought to be proved. In order to show in what manner this subject had struck his mind, he first laid down these principles:

Whatever power is exercised by Congress must be drawn from the constitation; either from the express words or apparent meaning, or from a necessary implication, arising from the obvious intent of the framers.

That whatever powers, (vested heretofore in any individual State) not granted by this instrument, are still in the people of such State, and cannot be exercised by Congress; that whatever implication destroys the principle of the constitution, ought to be rejected; that, in construing an instrument, the different parts ought to be so expounded as to give meaning to every part which will admit of it.

Having stated these preliminaries, Mr. Boudinot proceeded to inquire what were the powers attempted to be exercised by this bill: for, until the powers were known, the question of constitutionality could not be determined.

By it, Congress was about to exercise the power of incorporating certain individuals, thereby establishing a banking company" for successfully conducting the finances of the country."

The next inquiry is, What rights will this company enjoy in this new character, that they do not enjoy independent of it? Every individual citizen had an undoubted right to purchase and hold property, both real and personal, to any amount whatever; to dispose of this property to whom, and on what terms, he pleased; to lend his money, on legal interest, to any person willing to take the same; and, indeed, to exercise the power over his property, that was contained in the bill. Individual citizens, then, having these powers, might also associate together in company of co-partnership, and, jointly, exercising the same rights, might hold lands in joint-tenancy, or as tenants in common, to any amount whatever; might put any sum of money into joint stock; might issue their notes to any amount; might make by-laws, or articles of co partnership for their own government; and, finally, might set up a bank to any amount, however great, and no authority in the Government could legally interfere with the exercise of these rights. The great difference between this private association of citizens, in their individual capacities, and the company to be created in this bill, and which is held up in so dangerous a light, is, that the one exposes the company to the necessity of using each individual's name in all their transactions; suits must be brought in all their names; deeds must be taken and given in like manner; each one, in his private estate, is liable for the default of the rest; the death of a member dissolved the partnership, as to him; and, for want of a political existence, the union may be dissolved by any part of its members, and, of course, many obvious inconveniences must be suffered, merely of an official kind. By the bill, these difficulties are to be removed, by conveying three qualities to them:

First. Individuality, or constituting a number of citizens into one legal artificial body, capable, by a fictitious name, of exercising the rights of an individual.

Second. Irresponsibility in their individual capacity, not being answerable beyond their joint capital.

Third. Durability, or a political existence for a certain time, not to be effected by the natural death of its members.

These are the whole of the powers exercised and the rights conveyed. It is true these are convenient and advantageous to the company, but of trifling importance when considered as a right or power exercised by a national legislature, for the benefit of the government. Can it be of any importance to the State, whether the number of its citizens are considered, in legal contempla tion, as united in an individual capacity, or separately, as so many individuals,

especially if the public weal is thereby promoted? By their irresponsibility being known, every person dealing with them gives his tacit consent to the principle, and it becomes part of the contract; and, by political duration, their powers and abilities are limited, and their rights restricted, so as to prevent any danger that might arise from the exercise of their joint natural right, not only as to the amount of their capital, but as to the by-laws they may make for their government.

A private bank could make contracts with the Government, and the Government with them, to all intents and purposes as great and important as a public bank, would their capital admit of it; though they would not possess such qualities as to justify the confidence of Government, by depending on them in a time of danger and necessity. This might put it in the power of any individual to injure the community in its essential interests, by withdrawing the capital when most needed. To prevent this, and many other inconveniences, it is necessary that a bank, for the purposes of Government, should be a legally artificial body, possessing the three qualities above mentioned.

Mr. Boudinot then took up the constitution, to see if this simple power was not fairly to be drawn, by necessary implication, from those vested by this instrument in the legislative authority of the United States. It sets out, said he, in the preamble, by declaring the general purposes for which it was formed: "The ensurance of domestic tranquillity, provision for the common defence, and promotion of the general welfare." These are the prominent fea tures of this instrument, and are confirmed and enlarged by the specific grants in the body of it, where the principles on which the Legislature should rest their after proceedings are more fully laid down, and the division of power to be exercised by the general and particular governments distinctly marked out. By the eighth section, Congress has power "to levy taxes, pay debts, provide for the common defence and general welfare, declare war, raise and support armies, provide for and maintain a navy;” and, as a means to accomplish these important ends, to borrow money;" and, finally, to make all laws necessary and proper for the carrying into execution the foregoing powers." Let us then inquire, is the constituting a public bank necessary to these important and essential ends of government? If so, the right to exercise the power must be in the supreme Legislature.

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He argued, the power was not contained in express words, but it was necessarily deduced, by the strongest and most decisive implication, because, he contended, it was a necessary means to attain a necessary end. Necessary implication had led Congress, under the power to lay and collect imposts and taxes, to establish officers for the collection, to inflict penalties against those who should defraud the revenue, to oblige vessels to enter one port and deliver at another, subjected them to various ceremonies in their proceedings, for which the owners were made to pay; and he conceived it was not so great an exertion of power, by implication, to incorporate a company for the purpose of a bank. He also deduced the right from the power of paying debts, raising armies, providing for the general welfare and common defence, for which they were to borrow money. All these necessarily include the right of using every proper and necessary means to accomplish these necessary ends. It was certain, he said, that money must be raised from the People. This could not be done in sums sufficient for the exigencies of Government in a country where the precious metals were so scarce as in this. The people, in general, are poor, when compared with European nations; they have a wilderness to subdue and cultivate; taxes must be laid with prudence, and collected with discretion. The anticipation of the revenues, therefore, by borrowing money, becomes absolutely necessary. If so, then, as the constitution had not specified the manner of borrowing, or from whom the loan was to be obtained, the Supreme Legislature of the Union were at liberty, it was their duty, to fix upon the best mode of effecting the purposes of their appointment. For it was a sound principle, that, when a general power is granted, and the means are not specified, they are left to the discretion of those in whom the trust is reposed, pro vided they do not adopt means expressly forbidden. The public defence or