to the Government, it was deemed fair, according to the principles of national justice, that they should pay to the community, and to the People of the United States, an equivalent for that advantage, and this decision of the committee was justified not only by the example of other governments, (for gentlemen have quoted instances in which the bank of England has given a bonus for the extension of its charter) but by the practice of the different States: for it has been uniformly the practice of some States to receive a bonus from these monopolizing institutions. Unquestionably, if benefit conferred requires a return in value, it is right and proper that the Government should exact from that monopolizing institution a bonus. But, sir, this course is not only justified by the practice of the State Governments, but by the practice of the republican administration of Mr. Jefferson. The Government of the United States possessed a number of shares in the Bank of the United States, each representing, as each of these does, four hundred dollars; yet, that adminis tration transferred this paper at an advanced price. If the principle of disposing of these shares be correct, it will equally apply to all the shares in the institution. What right had the Secretary of the Treasury, or person acting for him, to demand forty-five per cent. above the real specie capital for the bank stock? In transferring the stock, did not the Government, on that occasion, receive a bonus? Unquestionably they did. If they receive a bonus, as to some shares, can they not, with equal honesty, receive it as to the whole number of shares?

But, it does not require refinement to justify the course which it is proposed to pursue. The thing is worth something. You are offered something for it. There is no oppression in it. If you could, at once, put in requisition so much money of the stockholders, and put it in the pockets of the United States, it would be oppression. But, here is a fair choice offered to them. whether they will take the charter, giving a bonus for it, or reject it. It is perfectly a matter of choice; and, from the arguments of some gentlemen opposed to the bill, so far from being unwilling to give so much, it would seem that the stockholders ought to give much more for the renewal of the charter. I am desirous to receive a quid pro quo. The arguments about foreign stockholders have had so much effect on me, that I would not continue this institution, unless Government received a benefit from it. It is unquestionably true, that the habits, customs, manners, and decisions of nations have established a common course of proceeding on this subject, and we must act according to custom. We now value a dollar at so much, and a piece of iron at so much. The custom of nations has given a sort of common law control over these institutious, and we must act with them as other nations do. I do not consider it a "bribe" that I or the Government are about to receive. On the contrary, I think it a fair bargain. There seems to be no disposition to abate a farthing, but to have the value and nothing less. I do not wish to have more. The provisions of this bill, with some amendments, will give the transaction a character of perfect fairness.

Mr. SMILIE said, that, on this question he differed materially from his friend on his left. The word "bribe" was not applicable to the bargain now about to be made. I take it for granted (said he) there is but one ground on which the Legislature is justified in granting a monopoly; and that is, that it is necessary in the operations of the Government. If that be the case, we certainly have a right, in granting that monopoly, to make the best bargain for our own interest which we can, always remembering that we consider the thing necessary and proper in itself. As that is my opinion, I think it a fair transaction, in making the bargain with the company, to obtain as great advantage to the Government as the justice of the case will admit; and this is a thing we have done before. It will be recollected, when the State of Ohio, then a territory, was made a State, we found it very inconvenient to the Government that they should possess the power of taxing our lands. We made a proposition to them, that, if they would not tax our lands for a certain number of years, we would do certain other things. The bargain took place.

We have derived an advantage from it, at the same time that we paid them a price for it. The consequence fairly follows, that we ought to grant this necessary charter on such terms as are just, both with respect to the country and the Government, and derive as much advantage as we can from it.

Mr. TROUP said he forebore, at present, going into the question of constitutionality. He had no idea that he could, with any efficacy whatever, stand up on this floor, with such a weapon as an argument, to contend with a moneyed institution of ten millions. If I am not disposed to go into the general question of constitutionality, said he, I am as certainly indisposed to derive this power from the power to pass all laws necessary and proper. I am the more reluctant to do so, because it is a dangerous power, and ought not to be derived by implication. I say that the power is dangerous: for, if it be conceded that the Congress of the United States have a right to erect a moneyed It may be competent, therefore, to institution, with a capital of ten or twenty millions, it is competent to erect one with a capital of a hundred millions. the United States to raise a corporation more powerful than itself-a moneyed institution which may absorb all the powers of the State. And this principle, as a precedent, will be the more dangerous, in this case, because the temptation is so much greater, in proportion to the amount of capital. I do contend, that, if the constitution did intend to grant the power of chartering moneyed institutions, it did not intend to grant it for the purposes of speculation, and of speculation merely. Sell privileges! Sell for 1,250,000 dollars the exclusive privilege of taking usurious interest on money! I thought, sir, that the power of selling privileges and indulgences was exclusively the right and power of the Pope. I ask gentlemen on what authority they act? Ön none of morality, certainly-but on what authority? On that of the corrupt government of England. Servile imitators of England, we must have a national bank! And why not an East India company? We could sell a charter tomorrow for millions. We could sell chartered privileges for almost as much as we should choose to ask. If we become the retailers of privileges, we shall go on to sell them till we overdo the business; and when this great national source of revenue, after becoming our chief and only resource, had failed, to what resources for reveuue should we be driven? Is it not a very rational inference, that it will be to the sale of all privileges we can derive from the constitution a power to dispose of? If, sir, on any occasion, you would set up in the market privileges for sale to the highest bidder, even do so with respect to privileges of every description. You would no more hesitate to set up for sale privileges of nobility than this privilege; but. (I thank my God!) the constitution has prohibited you. But for that, you should sell them now as we do bank privileges; we should go on to make it our chief resource, till, by the cheapness of the title, we should destroy the value of the trade. we can draw money into the treasury by bargain and sale of privileges, let it be understood that we will continue to foster it as our chief national resource. Having done with internal and direct taxes of all descriptions, because we considered them oppressive, this sale of privileges will be made the chief national resource.

If

I will add but one thing. The moment you accept this 1,250,000 dollars, you are bribed in the same manner as the British Parliament have suffered themselves to be corrupted. Like them we not only shamefully partake of the crime, but on our statute book acknowledge the fact.

Mr. KEY said that to him it clearly appeared within the power and limit of the constitution to establish a bank, if necessary, for the collection of the revenue. Whether necessary or not, (said he) is a question on which gentlemen must make up their minds; it would be only an unnecessary waste of time to argue it at length. My ideas on this subject, which I have never before delivered to the House, are plain and simple. I know not how far they may appear so to others; but I will explain them as they occur to me. We need not look to the constitution always for precise terms to justify an

exercise of power, because it is but an enumeration of first principles. All we have to do is to examine whether, in what we do, we fall within the plain meaning of the constitution. In the enumeration of specific powers given to Congress by this instrument, the first is to lay and collect taxes. Here is a clear, unequivocal grant of power to lay taxes, imposts, and excises. In construing the general power, afterwards given, to make all laws necessary and proper, &c. the sound construction is to refer to the powers previously given; one of which is, as I have stated, to lay and collect taxes. The mode by which they are collected is not designated in the instrument. We have authority given us to make all laws necessary and proper to carry these powers into effect. The power of laying and collecting taxes is specifically given; but the mode is not stated. To collect is not merely the individual receipt, but the substantial collection into the treasury. It does not simply give power to the collector of a port to receive the revenue, but a power to collate the revenue into a general deposite or focus. Is, then, a bank institution necessary, in the judgment of gentlemen, to draw together, with greater facility and less cost, these taxes? If there are those who think so, we can be at no loss to find express authority for it. We have a right to lay the taxes-the manner of levying or collecting them is not prescribed; and when lodged in the hands of the different collectors, how they are to come into the common exchequer is no where described. Is the instrumentality of a bank necessary for the more speedy and less expensive collection of the revenue? If it be, all who think so are, in my opinion, constitutionally justified in voting for a bank.

In all this, I say nothing of the opinion of learned men on the subject. The act for establishing a bank was suspended some time for consideration, before it received the signature of Washington. It has been considered constitutional by all the States: for I believe I may say that the States, without exception, have given legitimacy to the paper issued by the institution. If it was originally unconstitutional, and the paper was not capable of going abroad, every man punished for counterfeiting United States' bank notes, has suffered unjustly; because, in that case, Congress having no right to create the charter of a bank, had no right to punish the forgery of its paper.

I say nothing of the stability of this institution, and of its utility in collecting the revenue. If, after the lapse of twenty years, various acts have been done, proceeding on the constitutionality of the law establishing the bank, I consider the subject one which has been so acted on, that, whatever obstacles are opposed on the ground of constitutionality, should now be done away. But, laying this consideration aside, all those who believe that a bank is a speedy, safe, and economical mode of collecting money into the treasury, must find authority for it in the constitution. To have given the power to collect taxes, and not the best means of getting them into the treasury in the most correct manner, would, indeed, have been an extraordinary feature in the constitution; it would have been giving the end without the means to attain it. It would be giving a forced construction to the constitution to say that it had done so. I know that gentlemen think the collection of the revenue would be as well accomplished through the State banks. Those who think so justify their opinion only on reasons which, to my mind, show the constitutionality of the United States' Bank, and prove that we have authority to use that instrument, if we think proper, and deem it the most eligible. We are the grantors of power. By whom is it executed? Through the instrumentality of individuals and their funds. In using the instrument, we do create a benefit to the individuals, who, together with their friends, must be employed. For this benefit I can see nothing improper in receiving adequate compensation. And if it be a grant of a benefit, why not grant it to those who will give an equivalent for it?

Sir, the constitution grants to Congress the power to secure to inventors of useful arts the exclusive right to their discoveries. We must not be misled by language or words. We sell privileges every day. Does not our treasury receive benefits from the sale of these patents? And yet, according to the

ideas of the gentleman from Georgia, we thus become the hucksters of privileges. But lest the gentleman should not think that this case applies very strongly, I will call to mind a remarkable case-I know not how the gentleman voted on the law. We have incorporated a number of gentlemen to build a bridge across the Potomac, reserving as a bonus for this privilege, the free passage of all armies, military munitions, &c. of the United States; which was exactly the same thing as receiving so much money. The Government is a body politic; its operations must be carried on by individuals; and when individuals, incorporated for the purpose of receiving revenue, who use their hands and eyes in the business, receive too much emolument, I see nothing improper in requiring from them an equivalent in lieu of it. I hope, therefore, this part of the bill will not be struck out.

Mr. TROUP Observed, that the gentleman has said, that the power to incorporate a bank was derived from the power to lay and collect revenue; and that the power ought to be exercised, because banks give a facility to the collection of the revenue. If the power be exercised, it must be necessary and proper. If it be necessary to the collection of the revenue, the revenue cannot be collected without it. The gentleman from Maryland might say a bank institution was useful. He might say it would give facility to the collection of the revenue; but facility and necessity are wholly different; and the constitution says, that a power, to be incidental, must be necessary and proper. If facility be a ground of action, we are greatly wide of the true policy. We ought to adopt that measure which shall give the greatest facility. The ingenious gentleman himself could sit down, and in fifteen minutes devise half a dozen modes which would give infinitely more facility than a bank, to the collection of the revenue. He might farm out the revenue; establish farming districts; put a farmer general at the head of them, with corps of janissaries. The Secretary of the Treasury would have nothing to do but draw on him for a sum of money, and require it, or his head. This, sir, is a plan which would give the greatest possible facility. You could command money of the farmer general, or you could require his head. Himself and his janissaries could always send the money; or, if he did not, the People and the janissaries could send his head.

The motion of Mr. TROUP was rejected, by a vote of 35 for striking out, and 75 against it.

a

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE VARIOUS PROJECTS FOR A NATIONAL BANK, IN THE YEARS 1814 AND 1815, DURING THE THIRTEENTH CONGRESS.

13TH CONGRESS, 2d Session.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

JANUARY 4, 1814.

Mr. LEFFERTS presented a petition, signed by one hundred and fifty inhabitants of the city of New York, praying that an act may be passed to incorporate a National Bank, with a capital of thirty millions of dollars. Read, and referred to the Committee of Ways and Means.*

JANUARY 10, 1814.

Mr. EPPES, from the said committee, made the following report; which was referred to a committee of the whole House on the state of the Union:

The Committee of Ways and Means, to whom was referred the memorial of sundry inhabitants of the State of New York, praying for the establishment of a National Bank, report:

That the power to create corporations within the territorial limits of the States, without the consent of the States, is neither one of the powers delegated by the constitution of the United States, or essentially necessary for carrying into effect any delegated power.

FEBRUARY 4, 1814.

Mr. CALHOUN, of S. C. moved that the committee of the Whole be discharged from the further consideration of the report of the Committee of Ways and Means, on the petition from New York for the establishment of a National Bank, and that the same be recommitted to the same committee, with a view of making a further motion on that subject. Agreed to.

Mr. CALHOUN then said that it would be found that the Committee of Ways and Means had decided against that report, on the ground of unconstitutionality of establishing such a bank as that asked for in the petition. Mr. C. wished to instruct the committee to inquire into the expediency of establishing a National Bank, within the District of Columbia, the power to do which, it could not be doubted, came within the constitutional powers of Congress. For all practical purposes, he believed, such a bank would be as useful as that which was proposed. To come at his object, Mr. C. proposed the following motion:

Resolved, That the Committee of Ways and Means be instructed to inquire into the expediency of establishing a National Bank, to be located in the District of Columbia.

The resolution was agreed to without opposition.

The said committee consisted of Messrs. Eppes, of Virginia, Taylor, of N. Y. Roberts, of Pennsylvania, Creighton, of Ohio, Alston, of North Carolina, McKim, of Maryland, and Cox, of N. J.