no merit in the contention that there was no evidence of a purchase. It is immaterial as to whether there was evidence of a partnership in the strict sense of the term for there is evidence tending to show that Link, Hutchinson and Wilson were jointly interested in the purchase.

4. The credibility and effect of such evidence was for the jury to determine.

If the promise by Hutchinson and Wilson to pay the note was, as alleged in the complaint, a part of the purchase price, it would be susceptible of proof by parol evidence. As is said in Feldman v. McGuire, 34 Or. 309 (55 Pac. 872):

"It was not a mere promise by the defendant to be responsible for the debts of Corlett to those parties, and to pay those debts, but a promise by him to pay his own debt in that particular way."

The instruction of which complaint is made does not undertake to determine any question of fact, but is a proper statement of the law to the effect that taking possession of the personal property under a written contract, like the one in evidence, is sufficient to make the transaction a sale. Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed. AFFIRMED.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MOORE, MR. JUSTICE BEAN and MR. JUSTICE HARRIS concur.

Argued November 29, affirmed December 28, 1915.

EVANHOFF v. STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT

COMMISSION.*

(154 Pac. 106.)

Injunction-Not the Proper Remedy to Test the Workmen's Compensation Act.

1. The benefits to be derived under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1913, p. 188) will not be enjoined at the instance of an injured employee, on the ground that the State Industrial Accident Commission and the State Treasurer are depriving him of the right of a trial by jury, and are unlawfully attempting to dictate and deter mine the amount he shall recover, for the reason he could test the unconstitutionality of the act and the authority of the commission, by ignoring them and bringing his action either at common law or under the Employers' Liability Act.

[As to constitutionality of Workmen's Compensation Act, see note in Ann. Cas. 1912B, 174.

Injunction-Burden of Taxpayer by Payment of Salaries to Commission as Grounds.

2. Plaintiff has shown but one reason why he should be allowed to bring this suit, and that is because he is a taxpayer; that by the unlawful expenditure of the money appropriated under the provisions of the act, his financial burdens might be increased.

Master and Servant-Title of the Workmen's Compensation Act is Constitutional.

3. The title to the Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1913, p. 188) is as follows: "An act creating the State Industrial Accident Commission and providing an Industrial Accident Fund, making an appropriation for such fund and providing for the administration of the terms of the act, providing for the collection and disbursement of funds for the benefit, compensation and care of workmen, prescribing the duties of employers and workmen subject to this act, and providing penalties for the violation of the terms of this act, and abolishing in certain cases the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence and the negligence of a fellow-servant in actions for personal injury and death," does not violate that part of the state Constitution requiring every act to embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in the title.

Constitutional Law-Act Creating State Industrial Accident Commission is Constitutional.

4. The act creating the State Industrial Accident Commission (Laws 1913, p. 188) is not in contravention of Article III, Section 1

*On the constitutionality of statute rendering the master liable for injury to servant irrespective of negligence, see note in 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162.

The constitutionality, application and effect of the Federal Employers' Liability Act is discussed in notes in 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 38; L. R. A. 1915C, 47. REPORTER.

of the state Constitution that provides as follows: "The powers of the government shall be divided into three separate departments-the legislative, the executive, including the administrative, and the judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these departments shall exercise any of the functions of another." In re Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592, 610, 611 (144 Pac. 505), approved and followed.

Constitutional Law-Judicial Powers Conferred by Constitutional Provision.

5. By force of the amendment to Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution (Laws 1811, p. 7), the legislature was empowered and authorized to confer judicial powers upon the State Industrial Accident Commission under the workmen's compensation law, for the reason under this amendment either the legislature or the people have the right to confer judicial powers upon any tribunal it or they may select, provided, the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the state government are not blended so as to contravene Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

Constitutional Law-Right to Trial by Jury-Due Process of Law.

6. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1913, p. 188), establishing a system of voluntary accident insurance and creating the State Industrial Accident Commission to carry into effect its provisions, does not violate either Article I, Section 10, of the state Constitution, providing "No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered openly ** and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due process of law for injury done him in his person, property or reputation," or Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, declaring 66 # # nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, "for the reason that the act does not attempt to establish a court to try causes without a jury, neither does it compel employers and employees to adjust their grievances without their consent, for the act allows the employer an election to either accept or reject its provisions, and in case he rejects the act, he is left the right to protect himself from personal injury actions in the courts.

*

Master and Servant-Constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

7. The act under consideration (Laws 1913, p. 188) is not unconstitutional, because it requires the employee to elect at the time of his employment and prior to any injury whether or not he will come under the terms of the act, and further providing that in case he chooses to come under the terms of the act, he thereby waives the right to resort to the courts for redress, since the act proposes to both employers and employees a scheme for obtaining life and accident insurance in lieu of litigation, but is not compulsory on either, and this feature eliminates the objection that the act is unconstitutional. Statutes-Construction When Followed and Acquiesced in by the Legislature.

8. The act creating the State Industrial Accident Commission, appointing three commissioners at a salary of $3,600 per annum, payable from a fund provided for by the act, is not in violation of Article IX, Section 7, of the Constitution, for the reason that the act is not an

appropriation bill in the sense that bills providing for general current expenses or salaries of the constitutional officers of the state are such. From the year 1860 to the present time, similar laws to the instant act have been passed and a uniform construction of this section of the Constitution in other states having identical or similar provisions in their constitutions, is that it will not prevent the legislature from passing an act for a particular purpose, and in the same act to provide and appropriate the necessary funds to carry the object of the act into effect.

Constitutional Law-Construction as to Constitutionality of Statute. 9. The rule is well settled in this state that a statute will not be held unconstitutional where a reasonable doubt exists as to its invalidity. (Citing In re Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592 (144 Pac. 505), and other Oregon cases.)

Statutes Constitutional Provisions as to Reading Legislative Bills. 10. Under Article IV, Section 19, of the Constitution, requiring all bills to be read by sections on three several days in both the House and Senate, does not require the whole bill, as amended during its progress through the legislature, to be so read, and such has never been the practice in this state.

From Marion: WILLIAM GALLOWAY, Judge.

In Banc. Statement by MR. JUSTICE MCBRIDE. This is a suit in equity by George Evanhoff against the State Industrial Accident Commission to enjoin the enforcement of Chapter 112, Laws of 1913, generally known as the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the complaint it is alleged that plaintiff is a subject of the king of Bulgaria, but is a resident freeholder and taxpayer of the State of Oregon. The complaint then alleges that he has a good cause of action against the Bridal Veil Lumber Company for damages for personal injuries sustained by him while in its employ, and sets forth in detail the facts constituting such cause of action with all the particularity which could be required in an action for damages against said corporation, averring that he has thereby been damaged in the sum of $15,000. It is further alleged:

"The State Industrial Accident Commission wrongfully professes to have power and authority to deprive plaintiff of his right of action or to a civil trial

in the said cause, and wrongfully professes to have power and authority, and is threatening to and will, unless restrained by this court, deprive this plaintiff of his right of trial of said cause of action before a jury or before any of the established Circuit Courts of the State of Oregon, more especially before the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon otherwise having jurisdiction thereof, and wrongfully professes to have power and authority to determine the amount which plaintiff shall receive in payment by reason of said injuries, and to cause plaintiff to accept from said State Industrial Accident Commission a sum which it may see fit to award plaintiff in full and complete discharge and satisfaction of all of his claims arising from the matters herein alleged, and that the said State Industrial Accident Commission bases its claim upon and in virtue of an act, to wit, House Bill No. 27, entitled, 'An act creating the State Industrial Accident Commission and providing an industrial accident fund, making an appropriation for such fund and providing for the administration of the terms of this act, providing for the collection and disbursement of funds for the benefit, compensation and care of workmen, prescribing the duties of employers and workmen subject to this act, and providing penalties for a violation of the terms of this act, and abolishing in certain cases the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence and the negligence of a fellowservant in actions for personal injury and death,' filed in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Oregon, February 25, 1913, and acts amendatory thereto and thereof. Thos. B. Kay, as State Treasurer of the State of Oregon, wrongfully and without right professes and claims to be empowered by the said act to pay, and unless restrained by an order of this court will pay, to each of the said commissioners constituting the State Industrial Accident Commission the sum of $3,600 a year each as salary for their acts as such, and will make such payments out of a fund purported to be created by and referred to in said act; and, further, the said State Treasurer

*