which he undertakes. He is familiar with the principles of Dr. Smith, and acquainted with other writers in the same science, but he is deficient in a practical knowledge of commerce. Mr. Lushington, without much attention to style, and with little felicity of arrangement, deserves notwithstanding to be read on account of the soundness and liberality of his views. He seems hurt and disgusted at the opposition made last session by the landed interest to the admission of sugar into the Distilleries, and intreats that body as they value their rank, their respectability, or to speak more plainly, the preservation of their property, to desist from opposing the imposition of a fair share of the public burdens on themselves. Instead however of general obligation, the more convincing way for writers on Mr. Lushington's side of the question, would be to present the public with a specific statement of the most striking exemptions from taxation which the landed interest have taken care to stipulate for themselves, from which the public would probably perceive that this spirit of exemption is carried to a length not generally suspected. sufficiently clear to the attentive inquirer, that their distresses are owing to the continuance on our part of the compulsion of sending all sugars home, although the quantity of these sugars (in consequence of our conquests) is now so great as to make this compulsion ruinous, Yet plain as this proposition seems, we cannot mention a single writer on the side of the planters who has stated it with appropriate energy, nor a single speaker in Parliament who has adverted to it. This silence has induced the public to think that the case of the planters is weak; that to afford them relief would be an act of clemency to them but not of policy to us-in short, that all their misfortunes proceed from their own speculations. Now it might be acknowledged that had this been the case, spe culation would have cured itself in the sugar trade, as it would in any other trade, long ago. The dis tress of the planters has already lasted ten years, a period sufficiently long to exhaust the means of the most sanguine projectors. But the truth is that even had many estates been abandoned, the price of sugars would scarcely have been raised, for to go no farther back than last year, the conquest of the Danish Islands threw into the market an additional quantity of no less than 30000 hds. Neither of these pamphlets coutains a representation of the actual state of our West India trade. In truth, much as we have heard of the distresses of the planters, the radical cause of these distresses is very little understood. Much of the public prejudice against the planters is owing to imperfect statements they have given us. It is import, The Distilling affords the West India body at present a partial relief, but their effectual redemption is to be attained only by a dimination on our part of the compulsory ART XXIV. An Appeal to the Landed Interest of this Country, lest permanent Adzantage should be bartered for temporary Gain. 8vo. author takes away from this argument its plea to attention on the score of public utility, by shewing that the process of distilling takes away from the barley four fifths of its fattening quality. As far as the public are interested in the fattening of cattle, it is very clear therefore, that a much smaller quantity of raw barley, that is a much smaller ex penditure of our annual produce, would answer the purpose to which the grains are now applied; leaving the remainder (four fifths) as an addition to our national subsistence. The ideas of this writer would be useful on questions of national policy if more compressed and better arranged. ART. XXV, An Historical Survey of the Foreign Affairs of Great-Britain, with a View to explain the Causes of the Disasters of the late and present Wurs. By GOULD FRANCIS LECKIE, Esq. 8vo. pp. 262. IT is not easy to conceive a subject, at least, of more importance, than what is announced in this titlepage. Considering the means we have expended in the late and present wars, that is to say, the wars we have waged since the commencement of the French revolution, and comparing this extraordinary, this unparalleled expenditure with the smallness of the objects which we have attained, or rather the disasters which we have sustained, we have reason to welcome any inquiry into the cause of those disasters; that we may discover the means, if it be possible, of avoiding, in future, the expenditure of such extraordinary resources, in the acquisition of such trifling objects, or the incurring of such deplorable events. Of the cause that such resources have been spent to so little purpose, there can be but one opinion; that our rulers have mismanaged our national affairs. It never happened, in the history of nations, that such results took place, or could take place, but through mismanagement. It is of great conse. quence for us, however, to understand the particulars of so momentous and singular a case, to discover the very nature and kind of that mismanagement to which we owe so many grievous burthens, and so many disasters. Though not a Little has been written upop the subject, it has been more in the style of declamation than analysis, more calculated to prove that mismanagement must have existed, than to trace that mismanagement in all its workings, and show us the time, the place, and the manner in which it produced the evils we deplore. This is the task which it is now useful for us to see performed, and we earnestly invite our countrymen to the important undertaking. Mr. Leckie, though sensible of the necessity and utility of this service at the present moment; and though he has set himself with the best motives to the performance, has not possessed ideas perfectly clear and satisfactory of the nature of the task which he was undertaking. When we have to thank him," therefore, for some additions, not unimportant, which he has made to the common knowledge of our countrymen on this subject, we have to express our regret that his notions were not a little more profound and accurate. The form of the book is particular. It is divided into short discourses, which the author calls tracts; and these not all immediately written for the purpose of this publication, Some of them are letters addressed to individuals of eminence, as Mr. Drummond, our minister at the court of the King of Sicily, or to Sir John Moore, Sir John Stuart, &c. on some of the topics which enter into the discussions of the present volume. The tracts themselves profess to have been written at different times and places. The first is dated at Syracuse, January, 1806. Some are from Messina, some from Palermo, some from Malta. Some are dated at sea, and parts appear to have been written in England. The date of the last is July, 1808. Mr. Leckie has lived so much abroad, that he professes to have lost his familiarity with his native tongue, and expresses his consciousness that he must, in writing English, offend against the laws of the language. Nor is he mistaken. His language is very bad; not only full of foreign idioms, but of gross solecisms, even blunders in grammar. The book, however, is badly printed; and part of these last may not be chargeable upon the author. After some preliminary observations on the history and fate of nations, he adverts to the overgrown power of the French government, to its spirit of universal aggression, and to the efforts which have been made, and are making, by the government of Great-Britain, to resist the aggressions and exclusion of this exorbitant neighbour.-"In the course of the military measures, and political negotiations of Britain," says he, let us ask if the genius, foresight, and courage of the ministry, were adequate to this enterprize, and if, in the miscarriages of every project they have undertaken, it has not been evident that they have been most grossly deceived by their estimate of resources, their hopes, their fears, and their flatterers." Such is the problem which the author proposes to solve; and from the terms in which it is expressed, it is easy to see that he is not impressed with a very deep conviction of the wisdom which has guided our councils through the storms and tempests of the times. account The opinion which he delivers, on the first operations of the European powers against the republican operations of the French, is not remarkable so much, on of the thing said, because it has been said before, as on account of the proof which it affords of the diffusion over Europe of ideas, which the influence of authority in this country has been so much exerted to beat down. The fall of the French monarchy," says he, "and the dissolution of the ancient government, excited all Europe to a crusade against that kingdom. Under the pretence of re-establishing the monarchy, a treaty of partition had been settled, the emigrants found themselves the instruments and the dupes of the allies; and the fortresses which were taken displayed the standard of Austria, and not that of Bourbon. The jealousy of Russia was awakened, and the private understanding between that court and the French, shows how the minister had been deceived and betrayed." The projected partition of France is here assumed as a fact, which needs not to be proved; and while our minister was stirring up the people of this country to attack a portentous monster, against which all the world was combined, one of the principal powers in Europe was actually cultivating a good understanding with this hideous republic. In adverting still further upon the materials of which the coalitions against France were composed, and the extreme want of foresight, and of information which the hopes built upon them display, he says,"the inhabitants of Holland and the. Netherlands, who had only a few years before exhibited a republican spirit, notwithstanding that the internal factions had with difficulty been quelled; because, through their rulers, the allies of a party, they were predetermined to betray. The corruption and degeneracy of the Austrian cabinet, the weakness of the government, the cabals of the court, the insincerity of her military officers, were alike overlooked in the formation of this motley system." These two facts, the decided partiality of the great body of the people in Holland and the Netherlands to the French cause, and the imbecility, through corruption, of the Austrian government, were radical evils which, if duly appreciated and known, would have clearly portended all that has come to pass. "A mass of such discordant materials," says our author, "was mistaken for a combination of all the regular governments against anarchy; thrice was the experiment tried; and thrice it failed," [this tract was written before the formation of the fourth coalition ;]" and though the evidence of experience shews how imprudent it was to go to war with these disadvantages on the side of the allies, yet we are not yet cured of coalitions." He adds, "but our whole conduct, during this war, has been marked by indecision and weakness of measures. From the time that Pichegru invaded Holland, and drove the British from the Continent, hostilities, on our side, were never conducted on any regular plan, founded on a general view of the state of the world." This is a humiliating view of the conduct of our rulers in so important a season. As the prejudices and partialities of the moment were off, it is a view which seems to be every day more generally adopted. If it be a true one, it is deeply to be lamented that the eyes of the nation have been so slowly opened to it; for the same system which governed our affairs in the preceding mo ments of disaster, unfortunately continues to govern them still. Our foreign conduct was the result of the principles we adopted."When," says he, " it began to be understood, from the evidence of facts and experience, that the French, however absurd were their tenets, and however fantastic their views, met with a success even beyond their expectations; all welldisposed persons were alarmed at a spirit so destructive of those principles, which had hitherto been received as unquestionable. The obvious means of opposing this torrent of innovation were, by defending every thing that was established, whether good or bad; and the defenders of established government held it equally dangerous to deride the absurdity and tyranny of an Asiatic despotism, as to question or cavil at the perfections of the British constitution. By this system, instead of being the supporters of our own empire, we are reduced to become the knight-errants of every weak, degenerate, and despotic state in Europe, Asia, and Africa. On this principle, we abandoned the people of Egypt to the lawless tyranny of the Turks and Mamelukes; on this principle also we hope to prolong the existence of the Sicilian government, a state which exhibits all the weakness and degeneracy of the Byzantine empire, in its last stage of degradation." It must be owned that a more complete picture of weakness could hardly be drawn, than we have here presented, both of the principles and actions of our government. We must leave it to the reader to compare the picture with the original, and determine the degree of likeness. The author laments the operation of this system, chiefly in regard to its external effects; in preventing us from erect ing a bulwark against the power of the French, by calling forth the people, in various opportune situations, to liberty, and giving them motives to contend against the common enemy. That the most extra ordinary advantages have been lost to this country from that cause, he directs a great part of his discourse to prove; and though we do not think him correct in the whole of bis details, there can be no doubt that there is much weight in the general conclusion. But it is not in our external affairs alone that the partial and illiberal views of policy adopted by our government and our leading men, in consequence of the French revolution, has wrought mischief to the nation. The deep est disasters have been produced at home, in the encouragement given to assume greater controul over the liberties of the people, in vast accessions to the patronage of government, and an extension of venality and servitude among the trading orders of the people. Of this important particular Mr. Leckie has taken no notice, though he distinctly shews, that he conceived it to fall within his subject; for he declares that "the moral sentiments of the people in this empire" (including among these, without doubt, the sentiments of liberty and independence,) "give it a splendid superiority over the profligate nations of the continent; that these are the intellectual springs from which the British energy originates; and that with such materials in their hands, there is no enterprize too great for a wise administration to undertake." What then can be said of an administration which sets out with exertions to spoil those materials, to break those intellectual springs, to corrupt those moral sentiments? Was any thing to be expected of such an administration, but such conduct as Mr. Leckie describes, and such results as we deplore, and our posterity will long feel? Thinking and judging, therefore, as Mr. Leckie did, the corruption of our internal principles of government from the views, which, he says, were suggest ed to our ministers, by the events of the French revolution, did deserve from him some little attention. After this short sketch of the view which our author takes of the political principles which have guided our government, and the transac tions in which it has engaged during the late eventful years, we shall notice an application which he makes, of his general criticism, to the affairs of Sicily. He enters into large details with regard to that country. He gives us an analysis of its government, which, imperfect as it must be pronounced, is by far the most valuable part of his work. It is, indeed, one of the most useful documents which has for a long time been laid before the public. We shall endeavour, if it be possible, to convey an idea of it in few words: Roger, the Norman, divided the land of Sicily into three parts :—the first he took to himself, as royal demesnes; the second he divided among his nobles; the other was appropriated to the bishops, mitred abbots, and convents. This distribution is still maintained. The demesne lands are administered by the corporations of the royal towns, situated within them. Each town, according to the estimated value of the land assigned to it, pays to the king a certain reve nue, beside maintaining the police, roads, &c. The lands distributed among the nobles, were given on the condition of military service, and were still reckoned the property of the king. They are by consequence entirely unalienable except by permission of the king; and being, in like |