belong to them of right by the constitution of the country. Neither can it be supposed, that men in high office and of great experience, should in every instance (though differing from each other in temper, character, and talents) uniformly fall into the same absurdity of declaiming to juries upon topicks totally irrelevant, when no such inconsistency is found to disfigure the professional conduct of the same men in other cases. Yet I may appeal to your lordship's recollection, without having recourse to the state trials, whether upon every prosecution for a seditious libel within living memory, the attorney general has not uniformly stated such writings at length to the jury, pointed out their seditious tendency which rendered them criminal, and exerted all his powers to convince them of their illegality, as the very point on which their verdict for the crown was to be founded.

On the trial of Mr. Horne, for publishing an advertisement in favour of the widows of those Ameri can subjects who had been murdered by the king's troops at Lexington; did the present chancellor, then attorney general, content himself with saying that he had proved the publication, and that the criminal quality of the paper which raised the legal inference of guilt against the defendant, was matter for the court? No, my lord, he went at great length into its dangerous and pernicious tendency, and applied himself with skill and ability to the understandings and the consciences of the jurors. This instance is in itself decisive of his opinion. That great magistrate could not have acted thus upon the principle contended for to day. He never was an idle declaimer. Close and masculine argument is the characteristick of his understanding.

The character and talents of the late lord chief justice De Grey, no less entitles me to infer his opinion from his uniform conduct.

In all such prosecutions while he was in office, he held the same language to juries, and particularly in the case of the King against Woodfall (to use the expression of a celebrated writer on the occasion) he tor

tured his faculties for more than two hours, to con vince them that Junius's letter was a libel.

The opinions of another crown lawyer, who has since passed through the highest offices of the law, and filled them with the highest reputation, I am not driven to collect alone from his language as an attorney general; because he carried them with him to the seat of justice. Yet one case is too remarkable

to be omitted.

Lord Camden prosecuting doctor Shebbeare, told the jury that he did not desire their verdict upon any other principle, than their solemn conviction of the truth of the information, which charged the defendant with a wicked design to alienate the hearts of the subjects of this country from their king upon the throne.

To complete the account, my learned friend Mr. Bearcroft (though last not least in favour) upon this very occasion, spoke above an hour to the jury at Shrewsbury, to convince them of the libellous tendency of the dialogue, which soon afterwards the learned judge desired them wholly to dismiss from their consideration, as matter with which they had no concern. The real fact is, that the doctrine is too absurd to be acted upon; too distorted in principle, to admit of consistency in practice. It is contraband in law, and can only be smuggled by those 'who introduce it. It requires great talents and great address to hide its deformity. In vulgar hands it be. comes contemptible.

Having supported the rights of juries, by the uniform practice of crown lawyers, let us now examine the question of authority, and see how this court itself and its judges have acted upon trials for libels in former times; for according to lord Raymond in Franklin's case (as cited by Mr. Justice Buller, at Shrewsbury) the principle I am supporting had, it seems, been only broached about the year 1731 by some men of party spirit, and then too for the very first time.

My lord, such an observation in the mouth of lord Raymond, proves how dangerous it is to take up as doctrine every thing flung out at nisi prius; above all upon subjects which engage the passions and interests of government. Because the most solemn and important trials with which history makes us acquainted; discussed too at the bar of this court; and when filled with judges the most devoted to the crown, gives the most decisive contradiction to such an unfounded and unguarded assertion.

In the famous case of the seven bishops, the question of libel or no libel was held unanimously by the court of king's bench trying the cause at the bar, to be matter for the consideration and determination of the jury; and the bishops' petition to the king, which was the subject of the information, was accordingly delivered to them, when they withdrew to consider of their verdict.

Thinking this case decisive, I cited it at the trial; and the answer it received from Mr. Bearcroft was, that it had no relation to the point in dispute between us, for that the bishops were acquitted not upon the question of libel, but because the delivery of the petition to the king was held to be no publication.

I was not a little surprised at this state of it, but my turn of speaking was then past; fortunately to day it is my privilege to speak last, and I have now lying before me the fifth volume of the state trials, where the case of the bishops is printed, and where it appears that the publication was expressly proved; that nothing turned upon it in the judgment of the court; and that the charge turned wholly upon the question of libel, which was expressly left to the jury by every one of the judges. Lord chief justice Wright, in summing up the evidence, told them, that a question had at first arisen about the publication, it being insisted on that the delivery of the petition to the king had not been proved; that the court was of the same opinion, and that he was just going to have directed them to find the bishops not guilty, when in came my lord president (such sort of witnesses were no doubt

always at hand when wanted) who proved the delivery to his majesty. Therefore, continued the chief justice, if you believe it was the same petition, it is a publication sufficient, and we must therefore come to inquire whether it be a libel.

He then gave his reasons for thinking it within the case de libellis famosis, and concluded by saying to the jury: "In short, I must give you my opinion. I do take it to be a libel. If my brothers have any thing to say to it, I suppose they will deliver their opinion." What opinion? not that the jury had no jurisdiction to judge of the matter, but an opinion for the express purpose of enabling them to give that judgment which the law required at their hands.

Mr. Justice Holloway then followed the chief justice, and so pointedly was the question of libel or no libel, and not the publication, the only matter which remained in doubt, and which the jury with the assistance of the court were to decide upon, that when the learned judge went into the facts which had been in evidence, the chief justice said to him: "Look you by the way, brother, I did not ask you to sum up the evidence, but only to deliver your opinion to the jury, whether it be a libel or no." The chief justice's remark, though it proves my position, was however very unnecessary; for but a moment before, Mr. Justice Holloway had declared he did not think it was a libel, but addressing himself to the jury had said: "it is left to you, gentlemen."

Mr. Justice Powell who likewise gave his opinion that it was no libel, said to the jury: "But the matter of it is before you, and I leave the issue of it to God and your own consciences." And so little was it in the idea of any one of the court, that the jury ought to found their verdict solely upon the evidence of the publication, without attending to the criminality or innocence of the petition, that the chief justice himself consented, on their withdrawing from the bar, that they should carry with them all the materials for coming to a judgment as comprehensive as the charge; and indeed expressly directed that the infor

`mation, the libel, the declarations under the great seal, and even the statute book, should be delivered to them.

The happy issue of this memorable trial, in the acquittal of the bishops by the jury, exercising jurisdiction over the whole charge, freely admitted to them as legal even by king James's judges, is admitted by two of the gentlemen to have prepared and forwarded the glorious era of the revolution. Mr. Bower, in particular, spoke with singular enthusiasm concerning this verdiet, choosing (for reasons sufficiently obvious) to ascribe it to a special miracle wrought for the safety of the nation, rather than to the right lodged in the jury to save it by its laws and constitution.

My learned friend finding his argument like nothing upon the earth, was obliged to ascend into heaven to support it. Having admitted that the jury not only acted like just men towards the bishops, but as patriot citizens towards their country, and not being able without the surrender of his whole argument, to allow either their publick spirit, or their private justice to have been consonant to the laws, he is driven to make them the instruments of divine Providence to bring good out of evil, and holds them up as men inspired by God to perjure themselves in the administration of justice, in order by the by to defeat the effects of that wretched system of judicature which he is defending to day, as the constitution of England. For if the king's judges could have decided the petition to be a libel, the Stuarts might yet have been on the throne.

My lord, this is the argument of a priest, not of a lawyer; and even if faith and not law were to govern the question, I should be as far from subscribing to it as a religious opinion.

No man believes more firmly than I do, that God governs the whole universe by the gracious dispensations of his providence, and that all the nations of the earth rise and fall at his command: but then this wonderful system is carried on by the natural