1. The Force Bill. This was reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, of which Mr. Grundy, of Tennessee, was chairman. It extended the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, and clothed the President with almost unlimited powers. Mr. Calhoun opposed the bill, and in one of those magnificent expositions of which he is so capable, denounced its every feature. We quote his language:

"What are the provisions of the bill? It puts at the disposal of the President the army and navy and the entire militia; it enables him, at his pleasure, to subject every man in the United States not exempt from militia duty, to martial law; to call him from his ordinary occupation to the field, and, under the penalty of fine and imprisonment inflicted by a Court Martial, to imbrue his hand in his brother's blood. There is no limitation on the power of the sword, and that over the purse is equally without restraint, for among the extraordinary features of the bill, it contains no appropriation, which, under existing circumstances, is tantamount to an unlimited appropriation. The President may, under its authority, incur any expenditure and pledge the national faith to meet it. He may create a new national debt at the very moment of the termination of the former, a debt of millions, to be paid out of the proceeds of the labor of that section of the country whose dearest constitutional rights this bill prostrates thus exhibiting the extraordinary spectacle, that the very section of the country which is urging the measure and carrying the sword of devastation against us, is, at the same time, incurring a new debt, to be paid by those whose rights are violated, while those who violate them are to receive the benefits in the shape of bounties and expenditures."*

But the bill passed. The same convention which indefinitely suspended all operation under the ordinance nullifying the tariff laws, proceeded at once and without hesitation to nullify this last aggravation. The ordinance, so nullifying, remains to this day a law in South-Carolina. No repeal of the odious force bill has ensued.

2. The Test Oath. This asserted the doctrine of primary allegiance to the State of South-Carolina. It was inserted in the military bill of 1833. It was passed in pursuance of the ordinance of the convention; was contested in two memorable cases, and finally carried up to the Appeal Court consisting of three judges. A majority of this court declared it unconstitutional and void. The words of the oath were "I do swear, etc., to be faithful, and true allegiance bear to the State of South-Carolina." An oath differing from this in but one particular, viz. by the insertion of the

* Calhoun's Speeches, p. 81.

clause in its last member, "and of the United States," was introduced into the legislature, and having the necessary majority, became a part of the constitution. It forms the amendment of 1834-the last amendment of that instrument.

These eventful times have passed. The facts and circumstances evolved have been committed to the sure charge of history. The actors have a place there. An impartial verdict will be pronounced by men of other times. The present is not always just. We know that the course of SouthCarolina has been denounced. It was to be expected. She may possibly have erred in some particulars. In what contest of this character has it been known that both parties have come out entirely spotless. Would we be responsible now for every act of the American Revolution? We would South-Carolina is willing to rest the question upon a full view of its every feature. She can never regard the argument of a sneer. She despises the puny shafts which malignity would level at her. Ever ready to defend the Constitution of the United States,-the sacred heritage of her sons, she feels that to resist encroachment upon that sacred instrument, is to defend it. She has resisted such encroachment in the past, and she stands ready to resist it in the future. While the Constitution and the Union are worth preserving, she will be true. For such a Union she has but one prayer,-esto perpetua!

But if South-Carolina was wrong in the doctrines she advanced in this contest,-if she was wrong in her expositions of the Constitution,-wrong in her construction of States' Rights and State remedies,-if nullification, instead of being a constitutional remedy, was disorganizing and revolutionary, as insinuated in other parts of the Union, and re-echoed in our midst, that man must indeed be ignorant of history, who holds the State alone responsible.

The doctrines of nullification originated elsewhere. SouthCarolina applied them. They had been over and over declared, on the highest authority, in other parts of the Union. Not declarations simply, but declarations accompanied with overt acts of such a nature, as not possibly to be misunderstood. State Interposition is a Pennsylvania doctrine. It was proclaimed there by her Supreme Court, as early as 1798.* The Court denied that the United States Court had

* See the case in Dallas' Reports.

a right to settle cases of disputed power. It declared "that each party has a right to retain its own interpretation, until the matter can be referred to the people." In 1809, the Legislature of Pennsylvania resolve, "that to suffer the United States Courts to decide on State rights, will, from a basis in favor of power, necessarily destroy the FEDERAL PART of our government." Now what is all this, more or less, than nullification?

In Virginia and Kentucky, the doctrine of nullification is asserted in the strongest possible language, and maintained in a course of argumentation most elaborate and profound. The resolutions of those States of 1798-9, must last as long as the Constitution. The searching analysis to which that instrument was submitted then, and the character of the parties concerned, ought forever to have decided the controversy. All recollect the occasion of these famous resolutions. Every thing in the country was tending to centralism. The administration of John Adams was grasping for power, and the rights of the States were likely to receive a death-blow at his hands. The alien and sedition laws had passed. Those odious encroachments of executive power were registered upon the statute books. Virginia spoke,— and her organ was Mr. Madison:

"In case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, THE STATES who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them."

Virginia, however, in her mediation to Carolina, maintained that her resolutions did not sanction the course pursued by that State. But what, we would ask,-what can be plainer and more in point than the extract we have quoted, to disprove the assertion? It was more conclusively disproved by Gen. Hamilton, in his "Report on the Mediation of Virginia."

Kentucky spoke, and her organ was Thomas Jefferson:

"That the several States who formed the instrument, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of the infraction, and that a NULLIFICATION by those sovereignties of all unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument, is THE RIGHTFUL REMEDY."

These States, therefore, proceed to pronounce the acts in question "as no law, and altogether void and of no force."

Mr. Jefferson, in a letter to Wm. B. Giles, December, 1825, shows that, even at that period, his views were unchanged:

"Separate from our companions," says he, "only when the sole alternatives left, are the dissolution of our Union with them, or submission to a government without limitation of authority."

Chief Justice Marshall denied that the Supreme Court had "any political power whatever." This, of course, excludes from it all questions between the government and States. Even John Quincy Adams, in 1828, could say:

"The case of a conflict between these two powers, (i. e., the General and State governments,) has not been supposed, nor has any provision been made for it in our institutions,- -as a virtuous nation of ancient times existed more than five centuries without a law for the punishment of parricide."

But we proceed. Nullification was a doctrine of the State of Georgia. At a late period she nullified the intercourse laws by a simple act of legislation; her governor declaring, in 1831, "I will disregard all unconstitutional requisitions, of whatever character or origin they may be." Nullification was a doctrine of Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ohio and Alabama,-"adopted and practised openly, avowedly, decidedly, undeniably," as may be discovered in the "Genuine Book of Nullification by Hampden, 1831."* With these authorities we close the question.

We conclude this paper on the political annals of our State, with the utmost brevity. It has already grown too large. Since 1834, no successful attempt has been made to alter or amend the Constitution of the State. Its great principles remain now as they did then. Bold innovations are, to be sure, frequently discussed, but there seems little disposition to sustain them. To give the election of governor to the people, and break down the compromise of 1808, (providing the ratio of representation,) is sometimes agitated among disaffected spirits. The project, however, is so clearly objectionable, that no reasonable man anticipates any change. The question of the Presidential Electors has, of late, assumed an aspect rather more serious. It is well known that South-Carolina has, ever since the adoption of the Federal

* 1 Stat. at Large, p. 218.

Constitution, exercised the appointment of this college of Electors in her legislative halls. In every other State, their election is given to the people. Whether any thing is gained by this last mode of appointment, is with us exceedingly questionable. On the other hand, it seems that to authorize a change in our present system, much more cogent reasoning than we have yet heard ought to be adduced. The present method of appointment prevents much of that popular excitement which is so deleterious to public morals. It prevents the occurrence of those disgraceful scenes, which are often presented in other States. The system, with little if any exception, has worked well with us. We may well deliberate and hesitate, when told to change it. Under the Constitution of the United States, we think the argument very strong that the people have the right, of themselves, to appoint these Electors. They may, however, if they see fit, exercise this right through their legislative bodies. Either mode we think perfectly constitutional. The matter is one of choice. The people of South-Carolina have elected to deposit this power, and continue it, in their State Legislature. We trust, all things considered, that it will remain there. Those who advocate a change, maintain that the State, or (as they interpret it) the people of the State, are the only appointing body. The Legislature can only prescribe the manner of exercising the appointment. This, say they, was the understanding of the Federalist,-it was also the understanding of the Convention which framed the Constitution, for it negatived a proposition to give the appointment of Electors to the State Legislatures.-the deputies from South-Carolina voting against it. Finally, they present the authority of Calhoun, McDuffie, Hayne and Drayton, in their favor,-deny that the present system has worked well, etc. We shall not delay to notice any of these positions. Were it necessary, we think we could meet them.

The Judiciary, too, has not escaped this radical spirit which has been gaining ground in our State. Touch every thing else, but do not assail the Judiciary. By our Constitution, as in England, the Judges hold their seats quamdiu se bene gesserint. An attempt was made, in 1824, to limit

*

* The history of the System of Courts, or Judicial system in South-Carolina, might very appropriately be introduced here. It will not be uninteresting.

In 1683, an act passed for the "Trial of small and mean causes,” which is VOL. VII.-NO. 14.

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