sion pertaining to an emergency concerning a particular facility or materials licensed or regulated by the Commission, including the functions of declaring, responding, issuing orders, determining specific policies, advising the civil authorities and the public, directing, and coordinating actions relative to such emergency incident.

(b) The Chairman may delegate the authority to perform such emergency functions, in whole or in part, to any of the other members of the Commission. Such authority may also be delegated or redelegated, in whole or in part, to the staff of the Commission.

(c) In acting under this section, the Chairman, or other member of the Commission delegated authority under subsection (b), shall conform to the policy guidelines of the Commission. To the maximum extent possible under the emergency conditions, the Chairman or other member of the Commission delegated authority under subsection (b), shall inform the Commission of actions taken relative to the emergency.

(d) Following the conclusion of the emergency, the Chairman, or the member of the Commission delegated the emergency functions under subsection (b), shall render a complete and timely report to the Commission on the actions taken during the emergency.

Szc. 4. (a) The Chairman may make such delegations and provide for such reporting as the Chairman deems necessary, subject to provisions of law and this Reorganization Plan. Any officer or employee under the Commission may communicate directly to the Commission, or to any member of the Commission, whenever in the view of such officer or employee a critical problem or public health and safety or common defense and security is not being properly addressed.

(b) The Executive Director for Operations shall report for all matters to the Chairman.

(c) The function of the Directors of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, and Nuclear Regulatory Research of reporting directly to the Commission is hereby transferred so that such officers report to the Executive Director for Operations. The function of receiving such reports is hereby transferred from the Commission to the Executive Director for Operations.

(d) The heads of the Commission level offices or successor offices, of General Counsel, Secretary to the Commission, Office of Policy Evaluation, Office of Inspector and Auditor, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel and Appeal Panel, and Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards shall continue to report directly to the Commission and the Commission shall continue to receive such reports.

SEC. 5. The provisions of this Reorganization Plan shall take effect October 1, 1980, or at such earlier time or times as the President shall specify, but no sooner than the earliest time allowable under Section 906 of Title 5 of the United States Code.

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT

To the Congress of the United States:

I am submitting herewith to the Congress Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, under authority vested in me by the Reorganization Act of 1977 (Chapter 9 of Title 5 of the United States Code). The Plan is designed to strengthen management of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to foster safety in all of the agency's activities.

The need for more effective management of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been amply demonstrated over the past year. The accident at Three Mile Island one year ago revealed serious shortcomings in the agency's ability to respond effectively during a crisis. The lessons learned from that accident go beyond crisis management, however. They provide the impetus for improving the effectiveness of all aspects of the government regulation of nuclear energy.

In my statement of December 7, 1979, I responded to the recommendations of my Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island and set forth steps now

being taken to address those recommendations. I stated that I would send to Congress a Reorganization Plan to strengthen the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ability to regulate nuclear safety. I am submitting that Plan today.

The Plan clarifies the duties of the Chairman as principal executive officer. In addition to directing the day-to-day operations of the agency, the Chairman would take charge of the Commission's response to nuclear emergencies and, as principal executive officer, would be guided by Commission policy and subject to Commission oversight.

MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

Intensive investigations undertaken since the Three Mile Island accident have revealed management problems at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These problems must be rectified if the Commission is to be a strong and effective safety regulator. -My Commission, called the Kemeny Commission after its Chairman, Dr. John Kemeny, concluded that the underlying problem at Three Mile Island stemmed not from deficient equipment but rather from compounded human failures. This included the inability of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to pursue its safety mission effectively in view of its existing management policies and practices. The Kemeny Commission reported a lack of "closure" in the system to ensure that safety issues are raised, analyzed and resolved. Kemeny Commission members also concluded that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission relies too heavily on licensing, and pays insufficient attention to ensuring the safety of plants once they are in operation. -During the course of its investigation, the Kemeny Commission found serious managerial problems at the top of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It noted that the Commissioners and the Chairman are unclear as to their respective roles. Uncertain, diffuse leadership of this kind leads to highly compartmentalized offices that operate with little or no effective guidance and little coordination. -A recently completed independent study authorized and funded by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself also found serious fault with the Commission's management and called for a major organizational overhaul. The report states that there is no authoritative manager but, instead, five equally responsible Commissioners who deal individually with office directors who, in turn, head their own "independent fiefdoms."

-Likewise, a recent report of the General Accounting Office notes the failure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to define either the authority of the Chairman or that of the Executive Director for Operations. The staff lacks policy guidance and top management leadership to set priorities and resolve safety issues. There are unreasonable delays in developing policies to guide the licensing and enforcement activities of the agency.

The central theme in all three of these studies is the failure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to provide unified leadership and consistent direction of the agency's activities. The present statutes contain conflicting and ambiguous provisions for managing the agency. Important corrective actions cannot or will not be taken by the Commission until the laws are changed. Failure to do so constitutes a continuing nuclear safety hazard.

The present Reorganization Plan would improve the effectiveness of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by giving the Chairman the powers he needs to ensure efficient and coherent management in a manner that preserves, in fact enhances, the commission form of organization.

COMMISSION

Under the proposed Plan, the Commission would continue to be responsible for policy formulation, rulemaking and adjudication as functions which should have collegial deliberation. In addition, the Commission would review and approve proposals by the Chairman concerning key management actions such as personnel decisions affecting top positions which directly support Commission functions, the annual budget, and major staff reorganizations. In carrying out its role, the Commission would have the direct assistance of several Commission-level offices as well as the licensing board, the appeal panel, and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The Plan would not alter the present arrangement whereby the Commission, acting on majority vote, represents the ultimate authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and sets the framework within which the Chairman is to operate.

CHAIRMAN

Under the Plan, the Chairman would act as the principal executive officer and spokesman for the Commission. To accomplish this, those functions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission not retained by the Commission would be vested in the Chairman, who is currently coequal with the Commissioners in all decisions and actions. The Chairman would be authorized to make appointments, on his own authority, to all positions not specified for Commission approval and would be reponsible to the Commission for assuring staff support by the operating offices in meeting the needs of the Commission. The Executive Director for Operations would report directly to and receive his authority from the Chairman. Heads of operating offices would also report to the Chairman or, by delegation, to the Executive Director for Operations. Office heads would also be authorized to communicate directly with members of the Commission whenever an office head believed critical safety issues were not being addressed.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ability to respond decisively and responsibly to any nuclear emergency must be fully ensured in advance. Experience has shown that the Commission as a whole cannot deal expeditiously with emergencies or communicate in a clear, unified voice to civil authorities or to the public. But present law prevents the Commission from delegating its emergency authority to one of its members. The Plan would correct this situation by specifically authorizing the Chairman to act for the Commission in an emergency. In order to ensure flexibility, the Chairman would be permitted to delegate his authority to deal with a particular emergency to any other Commissioner. Plans for dealing with various contingencies would be approved by the Commission in advance. The Commission would also receive a report from the Chairman or his designee describing the management of the emergency once it was over.

ACTIONS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS PLAN

Not included in this Plan are two actions that I support in principle but that need not or cannot be accomplished by means of a Reorganization Plan. First the Commission, as part of its implementation of this reorganization, can and should establish an internal entity to help oversee the performance of the agency as it operates under the Chairman's direction. This action does not require a Reorganization Plan. Second, I have consistently favored funding assistance to intervenors in regulatory proceedings. This is particularly important in the case of nuclear safety regulation. I therefore encourage the Commission to include consideration of intervenor funding as part of its review and upgrading of the licensing process, as called for by the Kemeny Commission. I have also requested Congress to appropriate funds for this purpose. This activity cannot be authorized by a Reorganization Plan.

NO ADDED COSTS

This proposed realignment and clarification of responsibilities would not result in an increase or decrease of expenditures. But placing management responsibilities in the Chairman would result in greater attention to developing and implementing nuclear safety policies and to strict enforcement of the terms of licenses granted by the Commission.

Each of the provisions of this proposed reorganization would also accomplish one or more of the purposes set forth in 5 U.S.C. 901(a). No statutory functions would be abolished by the Plan; rather they would be consolidated or reassigned in order to improve management, delivery of services, execution of the law, and overall operational efficiency and effectiveness of the Commission.

By Executive Order No. 12202, dated March 18, 1980 [42 U.S.C. 5848 note], I established a Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee to advise me of progress being made by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the nuclear industry, and others in improving nuclear safety. I am confident that the present Reorganization Plan, together with the other steps that have been or are being taken by this Administration and by others, will greatly advance the goal of nuclear safety. It would permit the Commission and the American people to hold one individual—the Chairman-accountable for implementation of the Commission's policies through effective management of the Commission staff. Freed of management and administrative details, the Commission could then concentrate on the purpose for which that collegial body was created-to deliberate on the formulation of policy and rules to govern nuclear safety and to decide or oversee disposition of individual cases.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 27, 1980.

JIMMY CARTER.

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT

To the Congress of the United States:

I herewith transmit the following amendments to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, which I sent to the Congress on March 27, 1980.

The amendments to Reorganization Plan No. 1 are consistent with my original intent of strengthening the management of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to improve safety in all of the agency's activities, while preserving the advantages of the Commission form. The amendments reinforce the purpose of the Plan in two respects. First, the amended Plan gives the Commission a greater role in selection of key program officers of the agency by adding four positions to the list of appointments initiated by the Chairman for the Commission's advice and consent. These are the Executive Director for Operations, the Director of Inspection and Enforcement, the Director of Nuclear Regulatory Research, and the Director of Standards Development. Each of these positions contributes to nuclear safety regulation, and each performs functions that help determine the policy and performance of the agency.

The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards advises the Commission as a whole. Since its members serve renewable 4-year terms another amendment provides that a Commission member, as well as the Chairman, can initiate an appointment to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards for approval by the Commission.

As a means to ensure that the flow of information to the Commission will not be restricted, the Plan has been amended to make explicit that the Chairman, and the Executive Director of Operations through the Chairman, shall keep the Commission fully and currently informed.

The second general purpose of the amendments is to provide for more effective management of the agency by making more explicit the responsibilities of the Chairman and the Executive Director for Operations

acting under his direction. As amended, the Plan charges the Chairman with planning for the development of policy for consideration and approval by the Commission. In the past, this responsibility has not been clearly fixed and has consequently been neglected. The amended Plan continues to make clear that the Executive Director for Operations reports to the Chairman. An amendment, however, requires the Chairman to delegate to the Executive Director for Operations the authority to appoint the staff and the day-to-day administration of the agency. Under this arrangement, the Chairman retains responsibility for

the delegated functions but will be better able to handle his other leadership tasks.

In summary, the amendments I am transmitting to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, based on review and hearings conducted by the Congress and on continued consultations, will help establish a more accountable central management structure for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as it pursues its statutory objective of ensuring safety in the use of nuclear power. JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 5, 1980.

Sec.

[1 to 15. Repealed.]

[88 1 to 5. Repealed. Pub. L. 92-310, title II, § 203(1), June 6, 1972, 86 Stat. 202]

Section 1, acts July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 646; Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 13, 65 Stat. 715, related to custody of official bonds.

Section 2, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 647, directed the examination at least once every two years of the sufficiency of sureties on official bonds.

Section 3, acts July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 647; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 15, 68 Stat. 1231, related to the renewal of bonds and the continuance of liability.

Section 4, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 647, related to notice of delinquency of principal. The provisions of the section were reenacted by section 260 of Pub. L. 92-310, which was classified to section 497a of former Title 31. See section 3532 of Title 31, Money and Finance.

Section 5, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 648, related to limitation of actions against sureties.

[§§ 6 to 13. Repealed. Pub. L. 97-258, § 5(b), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1068, 1085]

Section 6, acts July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 648; Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 683, § 2, 69 Stat. 620; June 6, 1972, Pub. L. 92-310, title II, § 203(2), 86 Stat. 202, related to surety companies as sureties. See section 9304 of Title 31, Money and Finance.

Section 7, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 648, related to appointment of agents and service of process with regards to surety companies as sureties. See section 9306 of Title 31.

Section 8, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 649, related to the deposit of a copy of the charter of a

surety company before transacting business under sections 6 to 13 of this title. See section 9305 of Title 31. Section 9, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 649, related to quarterly statements of surety companies filed with the Secretary of the Treasury. See section 9305 of Title 31.

Section 10, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 649, related to jurisdiction over surety companies with regards to suits on bonds. See section 9307 of Title 31.

Section 11, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 649, provided sanctions for the nonpayment of a judgment by a surety company. See section 9305 of Title 31. Section 12, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 649, estopped a surety company to deny its corporate powers, etc. See section 9307 of Title 31.

Section 13, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 650, provided for the fining of surety companies for their failure to comply with the law. See section 9308 of Title 31.

[§ 14. Repealed. Pub. L. 92-310, title II, § 203(1), June 6, 1972, 86 Stat. 202]

Section, acts July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 650; Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 683, § 1, 69 Stat. 618, related to the purchase of bonds to cover officers and employees of the Federal Government.

[§ 15. Repealed. Pub. L. 97-258, § 5(b), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1068, 1085]

Section 15, act July 30, 1947, ch. 390, 61 Stat. 650, related to bonds and notes of the United States in lieu of recognizance, stipulation, bond, guarantee, or undertaking and contractors' bonds. See sections 9301 and 9303 of Title 31, Money and Finance.

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