Upper Canada in our future Contests with the United States of America. "In the correspondence which has passed between Major Genl. Brock and myself since the invasion of that Province he has repeatedly represented to me in the strongest terms the great assistance he has derived from the Services of the different Indian Tribes settled in and near the Michigan territory and of the necessity of conciliating their future friendship as a barrier against any further attacks of the Enemy in that Quarter." After commenting upon the complaints made by the Northwest Indians as to encroachments by the United States upon their territories, the despatch continued: "It must be obvious to Your Lordship from an inspection of the Map of the Country bordering upon the Western Territories of the United States how extremely important it is to the future security of Upper Canada that the Indians should retain possession of the lands they now occupy and thereby form as long as we remain in friendship with them a formidable barrier to any future attempts of America against His Majesty's possessions in that neighbourhood. The number of Indian Warriors spread over the Michigan and adjoining territories cannot amount to less than from eight to ten thousand. * * "The conduct which has invariably been pursued towards them and the treatment they have met with from America have during the present contest made them our friends and Allies and it remains for the consideration of His Majesty's Government how far it will be politic and prudent to keep them as such by those stipulations in their behalf in our future negociations with America which shall convince them that we have not been insensible of their services or unmindful to consult their interests.''33 On 16th of November, 1812, in replying to the letter of Major General Brock, Earl Bathurst assured these Indians of consideration in any peace which might be negotiated, by the following unequivocal statement: "The faithful and orderly conduct of many of the Indian Tribes gives them a fair claim to protection and reward. "And you will not therefore hesitate to afford them from time to time such supplies of Ammunition as may enable them to relieve their pressing wants; and to give them every assurance that in every negotiation for Peace which may be hereafter entered into with the American Government their interests will not be forgotten."'34 In the reply of Earl Bathurst to the letter of Sir George Prevost the nature of the provision, which was contemplated for these Indians, is more explicitly stated as follows: "The extreme importance of securing during the continuance of hostilities with America the cordial Co-operation of the Indian Tribes has been proved on so many occasions that His Majesty's Government have naturally directed their attention to the mode in which it may be best confirmed in the present instance. "* * * with respect to the future recurrence of hostilities I so entirely concur in the expediency of the Suggestions contained in your Dispatch as to the necessity of securing their territories from Encroachment that I have submitted it to H. M's Secretary of State for foreign affairs in order that, whenever Negociations for peace may be entered into, the security of the Indian Possessions may not be either compromised or forgotten.' 35 It is thus apparent that, two years prior to the negotiations at Ghent, the information given to His Majesty's Government by their civil and military officials in Canada had persuaded them of the wisdom of insisting, in any treaty of peace, upon a provision for the benefit of the Northwest Indians; and that the provision, which seemed to His Majesty's Government to be most acceptable to the Indians and most advantageous in securing Canada from American attack, was one which would guarantee their lands to the Northwest Indians and prevent further encroachments upon them by the settlements of the United States. The effect of such a provision would be to make the territory occupied by these Indians an independent state, which would constitute an effective barrier between the United States and Canada by reason of its geographical situation and the hostility of its inhabitants to the United States. "Appendix, Vol. II, pp. 492-493. When, therefore, negotiations for peace were agreed upon between the United States and Great Britain in 1814, Lord Castlereagh, His Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, realizing the importance of protecting Canada by creating an independent Indian state out of the territory inhabited by the friendly Northwest Indians, instructed the British Commissioners, in part, as follows: "Upon the subject of the Indians, you will represent that an adequate arrangement of their interests is considered by your Government as a sine qua non of peace; and that they will, under this head, require not only that a full and express recognition of their limits shall take place: you will also throw out the importance of the two States entering into arrangements, which may hereafter place their mutual relations with each other, as well as with the several Indian nations, upon a footing of less jealousy and irritation. This may be best effected by a mutual guarantee of the Indian possessions, as they shall be established upon the peace, against encroachment on the part of either State. The best prospect of future peace appears to be that the two Governments should regard the Indian territory as a useful barrier between both States, to prevent collision; and that, having agreed mutually to respect the integrity of their territory, they have a common interest to render these people, as far as possible, peaceful neighbours to both States."36 * This proposed independent Indian state serving as a barrier between the two countries, would accomplish the twofold object of securing Upper Canada from the danger of sudden invasion, and of allying forever to His Majesty's Government the Indian tribes, whose independent status and integrity of territory would be secured through the interposition of His Majesty's Government in their behalf. A study of the official correspondence, in which this Indian state is suggested, and an analysis of the arguments and counter-arguments, advanced by the British and American Commissioners in their discussions respecting it, establishes beyond question: first, that the Indian tribes, for which His Majesty's Government were insisting that provision be made, were the tribes of Indians living between the Ohio River and the northern boundary of the United States; and, second, that no provision was intended to be made for any Indian nations other than those which, though domiciled in the United States, had been acting in hostility to it and as allies of Great Britain during the war. At the first meeting between the American and British Commissioners at Ghent, the British Commissioners stated, as a sine qua non to the negotiation of any treaty, that the Indian allies of Great Britain must be included in the pacification, and a definite boundary settled for their territories. The American Commissioners replied that they were not instructed on the subject of Indian pacification and doubted whether any such article could be admitted, but requested the British Commissioners to state more fully their precise intentions upon this point.37 At the second meeting, the American Commissioners observed that, as the question of Indian pacification had never been a subject of controversy between the two governments, and had not been alluded to by Lord Castlereagh in his letter proposing the negotiation, it could not be expected that they would have been instructed by their government upon that point. They further observed: "that the proposition to define in the treaty between the 37 Appendix, Vol. II, pp. 501-502. 1138 The British Commissioners contended that the United States had recognized the Indians as independent by making treaties with them. The American Commissioners, in reply, pointed out the obvious and important difference between the treaties, which the United States might make with Indians living within its territory, and such a treaty as was proposed to be made respecting them with a foreign power, which had solemnly acknowledged the territory on which they resided to be part of the United States.39 It is significant that at these preliminary conferences no question was raised by either party as to what Indian tribes or nations were included within the provisions of the British sine qua non. It was stated by the American Commissioners, and never disputed by the British, that these nations included only those which had their domicile upon lands which were within the boundaries of the United States as defined by the Treaty of 1783. The British Commissioners asked whether the American Commissioners would feel justified in making some provisional arrangement respecting the Indians which would be subject to the ratification of their government. The latter replied that, before answering that question, the proposition respecting the Indians must be definitely understood by them, and asked whether a pacification and a settlement of a boundary for the Indians were both made a sine qua non. This question the British Commissioners answered in the affirmative, and they further explained that it was the intention that both the United States and Great Britain should be precluded from the right of purchasing by treaty any lands within the territories thus to be set off to the Indians. "The proposition respecting Indian boundaries, thus explained, and connected with the right of sovereignty ascribed to the Indians over the country, amounted to nothing less than a demand of the absolute cession of the rights both of sovereignty and of soil." The American Commissioners, knowing that they had "no power to cede to the Indians any part" of the territory of the United States, thought it unnecessary at that time to ask where it was proposed to establish the line of demarcation of the Indian country." The British Commissioners declared that, unless the American Commissioners were willing to make a provisional arrangement 39 Appendix, Vol. II, p. 503. |