There was anotherally more powerful than either of the two just mentioned, on which the Russians might, and no doubt did reckon, namely, a rigorous climate to which they themselves were inured, but which might prove fatal to soldiers from France, Spain, and Italy. The enemy too, in proportion as he should advance into Poland, or beyond it, would be drawn into difficulties and dangers on the line of his operations, in territories, with the nature or ground of which he could not be well acquainted, and farther and farther removed from supplies and reinforcements. The Russians, on the contrary, would receive reinforcements and stores both by land and sea from Russia, Sweden, and England. The young and heroic king of Sweden, emulating his ancestor the great Gustavus Adolphus, with the aid both of a subsidy, and troops from England, might march an army through the Lower Saxony, from Dantzig and Colberg, as far as Hamburgh. This army, augmented in its progress by insurgents, in Hesse, Hanover, and the Prussian dominions, might pass the Elbe, and establish a war in the centre of Germany; where if he should be able to maintain himself for any length of time, he might

reasonably expect to be joined by the Austrians-Such, it may be presumed, were the considerations that encouraged and determined the court of St. Petersburg to undertake and to persevere in the war with France.

The battle of Pultusk, though bloody and obstinately contested, was indecisive: and it must be admitted that if the nations, on whose favour and co-operation the Russians depended, had understood and pursued their respective, as well as their common interest, and harmoniously joined in one well-concerted plan of action, their design might not have proved abortive.

It is, however, not physical, but moral force that governs the world: bold conception, a just discrimina. tion between difficulty and impossibility, profound combination, unity of design, promptitude and rapidity of action. It was not physical force, but sublime genius and an ascendan cy over the minds of men, that gave energy and success to the measures of Alexander of Macedon, Hanni bal, and Julius Cæsar. All great results spring from small, + and, at first, imperceptible origins; one constant impulsion, constantly and uniformly accelerating. In confe derations there is generally something that misgives; something false

and hollow. It is seldom even possible for the confederating parties to form, as emergencies arise, a concert of wills in time, and seldomer still that they submit without re. serve to the will of one dictator. The fragility of confederations had been proved by three coalitions against the ruler of France, and the issue of a fourth was now to be added to the number.

Buonaparte, sensible of the disadvantages of being placed at so great a distance from France, as the countries between the Vistula and the Niemen, was in the first place, and above all things, attentive to the means of conveyance, or what in the French armies is called the Ambulance. On the great roads between the Rhine and the Vistula, hundreds and thousands of carriages were every where to be scen, going or returning from Thorn and Warsaw. Travellers unacquainted with the state of public affairs in Germany and Poland, might have supposed that the continued motion on the highways was occasioned by a flourishing internal commerce. From the countries that lay at his mercy, Buonaparte drew provisions, and forage, and even additions to his military force, while, at the same time, one body of troops after another continued to march for his support from the frontier of France. Buonaparte was also, in a very particular manner, attentive to the commissary department. The different corps and divisions of his army were sure to find bread, at least, in abundance, and, as much as possible, every comfort required by a rigorous climate. Being intimately acquainted with the interests and views of the courts of Europe, and the individual characters of favourites

and ministers, he endeavoured, if he could not at once induce them to acquiesce in his plans, at least to occupy, and distract their minds, and by an appearance of negotiation, to sow the seeds of mutual discord between the powers confederated, or that might be inclined to confederate against him. At the same time that he was busily employed in forming the confederation of the Rhine, that is, in the extension of his own power, and preparing for the extension of his conquests, he amused Russia and England with a negotiation for peace, which he professed to have always uppermost in his mind and heart,but which he really contemplated not as an end, but a means: the means of renewing war with greater advantage. He laboured by all means, to detach the king of Sweden from the cause of his allies, by professions of goodwill, respect, and admiration, and even by dismemberments in his favour, of Prus sia and Denmark. He roused the Turks to war against Russia, and entered into a negotiation for an alliance offensive and defensive with the emperor of Persia. Ambassa– dors were seen in his camp from Ispahan and Constantinople. Whether he really harboured the extravagant design of sending a French army through Persia to Hindostan, or no, may reasonably be doubted: but an embassy from Persia to the emperor of France, had an imposing air of widely extended and formidable influence, and might have an effect in any fu ture negotiation for peace, on the councils of Russia and England.

On every occasion when a hap py stage-effect might be produced, he was careful to produce it. Eighty four pieces of cannon taken from the B3 2

Russian

saw.

Russian generals Kamenskoy, Bennigsen, and Buxhoevden, in the battles of Czarnowo, Nasielsk, Pultusk, and Golymin, were ranged before the palace of the republic of WarAnd that the effect which the sight of so grand a triumph was fitted to produce might be the greater, it was observed, "That they were the very same that the Russians drew along the streets of that city with so much ostentation, when lately they marched through them to meet the French." In order to heighten the exultation, it was stated, "that 5,000 prisoners had been sent to France, that 2,000 had escaped in the first moments of confusion, and 1,500 entered among the Polish troops. Thus had the battles with the Russians cost them a great part of their artillery, all their baggage, and from 25,000 to 30,000 men, killed, wounded, or prisoners." It is well known that gazettes are strongly inclined magnify advantages gained on one side, and exaggerate losses sustained on the other. This is deemed good policy and so, no doubt, it is, when the statements do not altogether exceed the bounds of probability. But this bias, at the period now spoken of, had been carried to a pitch of extravagance, on the side of the Russian as well as the French generals, altogether uuprecedented.

That the French accounts were more to be depended on in general than the Russian, was clear from the evidence of facts. But that their successes, obtained not without an obstinate and bloody contest, and thousands on thousands killed on the part of the Russians, were attended in so many instances with such trifling losses on that of the French, as is stated by them, is

altogether incredible, and beyond all doubt intended only for the eyes or ears of the young conscripts. They were called to the field of glory, which was represented as dangerous only to their enemies.

He

Buonaparte, at the same time, inflamed the military ardour of his troops, and the whole French nation, with whose character he was thoroughly acquainted, through their characteristical vanity and love of distinction. Though naturally of a reserved, saturnine, and sullen humour, he would now and then, in meetings with his principal officers, and others, assume a familiar talkative humour, and make many sar castic observations on the character and conduct of his enemies. indulged in many gasconades, magnifying the prowess of Frenchmen, and the power and resources of France, beyond all measure or moderation. The same tone of exultation, braggadocio, and confidence, appeared in all his gazettes or manifestoes which were called bulletins : the object of all which was not only to keep up and exalt the courage of the French, but to strike awe and terror into other nations. Though by birth an Italian, he acted to the life the part of a real and true born Frenchman, and always identified his own personal interests and glory with those of France. To the French he represented his power and influence as established in the entire submission or friendly disposition and attachment, though in truth it was in the weakness and folly of almost all the nations on the continent; and to those nations, again, he represented his throne as firmly established in the confidence, love, and admiration of the French. He played off France against the

world,