the admiral to have occupied a station that would have enabled the squadron to commence offensive ope rations against Constantinople. If, how ver it had been otherwise, the English, after combating a force, which the resources of an empire had been employed for weeks in preparing, would not have been able to maintain a successful conflict with the enemy, and then to repass the Dardanelles. In short, says sir T. if they had been allow. ed another week, to complete their defences throughout the channel, it would have been a doubtful point, whether a return lay open to us at all. The fire of the two inner castles of our ships in their inward passage had been severe, but the effects they had on them, in their return, proved them to have been doubly formidable. Bullets, or blocks of marble, of immense weight and size, were fired at our ships, from huge mortars. One of these, weighing 800 pounds, cut the main mast of the Windsor man of war in two, and it was not without much trouble and pains, that the ship was saved. Those masses, however, being easily discovered in their course, our men avoided them on their approach, by step. ping aside, and opening a clear way for their passage. Our loss of men in this unfortunate expedition, amounted in killed and wounded, to about 250.-Of this number, 26 were killed or wounded in a fruit less attempt, February 27th, to dislodge the Turks from the isle of Prota, very near the place where our fleet, after passing the strait, had cast anchor, and where they had begun to construct a battery, that might have annoyed our squa dron greatly.* Af Sir John Duckworth appears to have done every thing that was pos sibe, to effect the object of the expedition; but the expedition it. self was so il contrived, that success was not to be expected, It was generally condemned, not only as being injudicious and weak, but silly and childish. Indeed one may say of this expedition, what the Tur. kish envoy to Charles VII. of France said of a grand tournament, exhibited for his amusement. ter this martial and dangerous pas. time was over, the Turk, being asked what he thought of it, very candidly replied, "that if it was in good earnest, there was not enough done: but if it was in jest, too much." If instead of calms, or of adverse winds, the wind had been so favourable, that our ships of war and bomb-vessels, could have gone up to the very walls of the seraglio, would it have been a thing desirable, or politically wise, to destroy so fine a city as Constantinoplet, the capital, the palace, the arsenal of an ally, whose favour and confidence it was intended, even by menaces to conciliate? The burning of Constantinople must have planted in the breasts of the sultan and divan, the seeds of resentment; nay, the. very menace of burning it was more calculated to "produce a spirit of hostility against England, than of intimidation, and submis sion. The situation of Constantipople is indeed the finest in the London gazette, 5th May, 1807... The private houses are in general only miserable hovels; but the mosques, and other public edifices, are magnificent. world, world, and it also contains magnificent public edifices. But the Turks make so little account of their dwelling-houses, that the usual mode of applying to government, for redress of public-grievances, is, to set fire to 4 or 5,000 houses, which, when matters are settled to their contentment, they soon rebuild in the same simple and slovenly style, as that of those destroyed. Such conflagrations as that threatened by sir John Duckworth, are not so terrible to Turks as the civilized and refined nations of Eu. rope The story of the Dey of Algiers, threatened with a bombardment of his city, by an English fleet, is well known. He sent to the admiral to ask him how much it would cost him to carry his threats into execution?"For (said he) I will myself undertake to do it, at half the price." 1 The demonstrations of sir J. Duckworth, as might easily have been foreseen, produced an effect quite the reverse of what was intended. They co-operated with the address of Sebastiani, to bring the Turkish government, for a time, wholly under the influence of France, and under that influence, to make peace with Russia, when Russia also had declared herself against us. It was also observed, that it was a miserable oversight not to have sent with the feet, a force for co-operating with it, by land. The capital of the Turks could not have been either taken or kept, if we had sent an army of 30,000 men. But even a small force might have debarked behind the fortresses on the Dardanelles, which on the land-side were defenceless, and have destroyed them: which would have opened a safe passage to other English troops, if it should have been thought proper to send any thither, for continuing or supporting their operations; or at ail events, have secured a safe retreat for the English fleet from Constantinople. After the departure of the English fleet from the Dardanelles, the for tresses on both sides, were put into such a state of defence by French engineers, that they could not be attacked by the best appointed, and most daring fleet, with any hope of either success or safety from destruction. The strait was therefore blockaded by a Russian squa dron of ten sail of the line, and a great many frigates, under the command of admiral Siniavin, who took possession of the isle of Lemnos, and made a conquest of Tenedos. Constantinople being cut off, by this blockade, from some of its usual and most productive sources of supplies, the captain bashaw, Seid Ali, was ordered, with what force he could muster, to restore the communication with the mari time provinces, and particularly with the great granary of the capi tal, Egypt. No exertion wanting on the part of the Turkish grand admiral, to equip a fleet with which he might face the Russians. The great difficulty he had to contend with was, the want of seamen'; as the position that had been taken by the Russian fleet, prevented the arrival of the Turkish trading vessels from the islands of the Archipelago, and of the Egean and Ionian seas. The captain bashaw, with as great a naval force as he could raise, on the spur of the occasion, set sail: but having ascertained the strength of the Russian fleet, he did not think it prudent to hazard an en was gagement, RHODESY gagement, but lay at anchor between the outer and inner castles of the Dardanelles, until he should receive some reinforcement. Two additional ships of war, and three corvettes, did not raise the Turkish fleet to more than eleven ships of the line, one frigate, and some corvettes, and other small craft; yet with this force, so great were the exigencies of the metropolis, Seid Ali determined to risk an engage. ment with the Russian flect, consisting of 22 ships of war, ten of which were of the line. The action took place on the 1st of July, near the isle of Tenedos, and was continued for seven hours, with great obstinacy on both sides. Four of the Turkish ships were carried, by the wind, out of the line of battle. Seid Alt, who, at one period of the action, was surrounded by five Russian vessels, fought his ship with admirable bra. very and skill, and, though wounded in the action, made his way through them. But the contest, after the accidental separation of the four ships, was altogether unequal. Four ships of the line were taken, one of which was the viceadmiral's, three were burnt, and above 1,000 Turks were killed, or otherwise perished. The Turks were relieved from the overbearing pressure of the Russians at sea and land, by the 22d article of the treaty of Tilsit, by which it was agreed that the Russian troops should retire from the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia; but that the same provinces should not be occupied by the troops of his imperial high ness, the sultan, until ratifications should be exchanged of a definitive treaty of peace between Russia, and the Ottoman Porte: which treaty was, by the 23d article that of Tilsit, to be concluded und the mediation of his majesty, t emperor of the French, and king Italy, on terms honourable a advantageous for both empires. conformity with these articles, the treaty of Tilsit, an armisti was concluded between Russia a the Ottoman Porte, on the 24th August. If in the course of a gotiation for a definitive treaty peace, difficulties should unfor nately arise, so as to obstruct definitive arrangement, hostil were not to recommence bef next spring; that is to say, be the 21st of March, 1808, new st of the Christian æra. The failure of our attempt on capital of the Turkish empire see ed for some little time to h been, in no small degree, comp sated by the possession of Alexa dria. On the 6th of March, military force of about 5,000 m including three companies of art Hery, with two engineers, was s against that city, by general F from Messina, under the comma of major-general Mackenzie. the night of the 17th, the Apo frigate, with 19 transports out 33, which conveyed the troop parted company, and the other fo teen, with the Tigre, came to anchor, to the west-ward of Ald andria, on the 16th. When o squadron approached the land, véssel was dispatched by ma Misset, who appears to have resid at Alexandria, in the character British consul, and with whom t general was directed by his instru tions to consult as to the best pl of operations, with a letter to hi stating, that the major had not com off himself, thinking his presence Alexand Alexandria absolutely necessary, to counteract the intrigues of the French consul, who was endeavour ing to prevail upon the government, to admit a body of Albanians from Rosetta, to assist in the detence of the place. And he earnestly recommended to the general, to land the troops immediately, as the inba. bitants were well affected to the English, and expressed his sanguine hopes that they should be able to get possession of the city, without firing a shot. The general stated the diminution of bis force, in consequence of the separation of the 19 transports. The major still urged his immediate landing The troops were landed, part on the 17th, part on the 18th. The general finding his situation now, from the increased height of the surf, and appearance of the weather, to be very precarious, both with respect to getting provisions or stores on shore, or having any communica. tion with the transports. determined at all hazards, to force hisway to the western side of the city, where he could receive supplies from Aboukir bay, at the same time to advance into the town with the small force he had, and push his way, if possible, into the forts that commanded it. He therefore moved forward, about eight o'clock in the evening of the 18th. In their way, the Dritish forced a pallisadoed entrench. ment, with a deep ditch in front of it, that had been thrown up as a defence against the Mamalukes and Arabs, on the western side, stretching from Fort des Bains, on its right flank, mounting thirteen guns. This they effected with very little loss, though under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, and proceeded within a few yards of Pompey's gate, where they found the garrison prepared to receive them, the gate barricadoed, and the walls lined with troops, and armed inhabitants. This, added to the smallness of the British force, not much exceeding 1,000, determined the general to proceed to the westward. In the morning of the 19th, he took up his position on the ground which the British troops had occupied in the action of the 21st of March, 1801, immediately sending detachments to take possession of Aboukir castle, and the eut between the lakes Maadie, and Mareotis, by which communication the re-inforcement of Albanians was expected in Alexandria. In both these designs they succeeded. The next day, the 20th, the general sent in by a friendly Arab, that had stolen out of the town, and joined the English, a manifesto addressedto the nhabitants, warning them of the danger of an assault, in the horrors of which, friends would be involved with foes, and urging them to force the government to capitulate. This had the desired effect. A flag of truce was agreed to and signed. The religion, the laws and the property of the inhabitants were respected. The vessels belonging to government, and a 1 public proper ty, to be given up to the British forces.-The crews to be sent to a port of Turkey, with the arms and baggage of individuals, but to consider themselves as prisoners of war, and not to take up arms a ainst the British forces of their allies, until exchanged. The gar. rison of Alexandria, before its surrender, consisted in 467 men; soldiers, gunners, sailors, and ma. rines. The loss of the British, in this reduction of Alexandria, was no more more than one officer, six rank and file killed; one offreer, one sergeant, eight rank and file wounded. The Apollo, with the 10 missing transports, came to anchor in Aboukir bay, on the morning of the 20th ; and sir John Duckworth's squadron arrived there on the 22d, In consequence of a strong representation, by major Misset, our resident at Alexandria, as just mentioned, that the inhabitants of Alexandria ran a risk of being star ved, unless Rosetta and Rhamanie were not occupied by British troops, general Fraser, with the con currence of admiral sir John Duckworth, March 27th, detached the 31st regiment, and the chasseurs Britanniques, amounting together, to about 1,500, under major. general Wauchope, and brigadiergeneral Meade, for that purpose. Our troops took possession of the heights of Abermandour, which command the town of Rosetta, without any loss. But the general, instead of keeping his post there, penetrated, with his whole force into the town, without any previous examination of it, when our men were so briskly fired on, and otherwise annoyed, from the windows and tops of hou. ses, without ever seeing their enemy, that after a loss of about 300 men, in killed and wounded, they retired, in good order to Aboukir, without molestation, from whence they were directed to return to Alexandria. Apprehensions of famine being still strongly declared both by our resident, major Misset, and the sorbagi, or chief magistrate, in the name of the people, without the occupation of Rosetta, another corps, about 2,500 strong, was sent for the reduction of this importa place, under the command of t honourable brigadier-general Ste art, and colonel Oswald. T force took post opposite the Ale andrian gate of Rosetta, on the 9 of April, and after a summons to t town to surrender, was treat with defiance, began to form the batteries. Great stress had be laid by the British commander, assistance promised by the M malukes, and their appearance w now daily, or even hourly expecte Lieutenant-colonel Macleod, w a detachment from the main body our little army, was sent to seize important post, at the village of Hammed, for the purpose of fac tating a junction with the expect succour. No succour, after anxious expectation of many day nor intelligence of any succour w received. Early on the morning the 22d of April, 60 or 70 vess were seen sailing down the Ni and there could not be a doubt t this was a re-inforcement sent the enemy, from Cairo. were immediately dispatched to lonel Macleod to retreat from position to the main bady; t these orders were unfortunately tercepted. The detachment at hammed was completely cut o General Stewart, overpowered so large a force, retreated, fight all the way, to Alexandria. O loss in this unfortunate enterpri was not less than 1,000 men. killed, wounded, and missing. T rash enterprise was deeply regr ted, when it was afterwards for that the apprehensions of fam were altogether groundless. Th was no scarcity of provisions Ord Or British hunters, officered almost wholly by French emigrants. Alexand 2 1 |