Unfortunately for Logic and the true fame of Archbishop Whately, he seems to have imbibed from Dr. Copleston a far too highly favourable opinion of Aldrich's "Compendium," which we do not think merits the encomiums passed on it by those two famous Orielites; -by Dr. Copleston, as containing "the substance of the original [of Aristotle's Organon], relieved of its tedious explanations and subtle. ties, and totally free from the barbarous jargon with which the later schoolmen had overloaded and corrupted it"*-and by our author as "a concise, but in general accurate, treatise," and one of the merits of which he had not "formed a low estimate." So high, indeed, has Whately's opinion of this work been, that his synthetical compendium is, in a great measure, only an expanded and paraphrastic recast of the mediocre production of the versatile Dean of Christchurch, with a few minor corrections, and still fewer criticisms, but a good deal of fresh life and perspicuity interspersed throughout it. We cannot but regret this result of early training and reliance on authority; for much might have been done by a writer so singularly gifted with the capacity for seeing clearly before him, had he given scope to his powers of philosophizing, unrestrained by a sense of the labour expended in the acquisition of the memoria technica of his class-book "authority:" for it is strange that Aldrich is almost the only Aristotelic logician with whose works our author seems to be thoroughly intimate and familiar.

In the first chapter of the Compendium, entitled, "Of the Operations of the Mind and of Terms," the metaphysics is of the most obvious and elementary order. The common threefold division of the subject into "1st. Simple Apprehension. 2nd. Judgment. 3rd. Discourse, or Reasoning," is adhered to, and definitions of them of quite a common kind are given. He then treats of language as a sign and an instrument of argumentation, and proceeds to the consideration of terms, propositions, and syllogisms, the differences which exist amongst them, and the laws which govern them. Our author cannot go far, however, in his exposition of the terms and predicables without introducing mention and definition of other two faculties, viz., abstraction and generalization-the powers by which classification becomes possible. His definition of the several species of terms is in general accurate, terse, and happily illustrated. His account of the different kinds of predicables is less clear, less philosophical, and less satisfactory, especially in the definitions, which are neither truly Aristotelic nor Baconian.

Nomenclature depends on classification, and classification is arbitrary. Whatever the classification, however, some means must be taken to indicate (a) that idea which comprehends another in it, and (b) that which is comprehended in it, i.e., genus and species. But that idea, in either of its uses, is not necessarily representative, in our minds, of the essence of the thing of which we think, as Reply to Edinburgh Review, 1810, quoted in " Memoirs of E. Copleston, D.D.," P. 301. † Preface, p. vii.

Whately seems to suppose; it is a merely convenient assumption in our mind, and it depends entirely upon the object we have in view, which characteristic of any object of thought shall be regarded as essential. Genus and species denote, and are sub stantival; difference, property, and accident connote, and are adjec tival. The former regard classes (larger or smaller) as existences [real or ideal], including individuals in them; the latter refer to the qualities possessed by these classified existences as they are (a) essential, and implied in the name, and either generic or specific; (b) properly inherent in the idea named, though not directly implied in the name; and (c) accidentally present, and forming part of an idea, but not necessary to its formation, or implied in its name. The distinction between these two last forms is imperfectly, if not indeed inaccurately, made in the "Elements of Logic" (p. 84); and the terms material, formal, necessarily, (as equivalent to universally,) are liable to grave objections. The second chapter, "Of Propositions," is highly valuable, and exceedingly distinct, although some writers on Logic regard them as defective in their enumeration, and incorrect in their distribution. To set forth their grounds articu lately would be here out of place; but it may safely be asserted that the Whatelyan classification is, for all ordinary purposes, suff cient and safe. The observations on Opposition" and "Conver sion" are essentially scholastic, and will be found useful, even to the student of the Hamiltonian Logic; while those on "Division and "Definition" are clearly expressed and acutely illustrated. But the latter ought, wherever possible, to be read along with the passages on the same subjects by J. S. Mill and [now Bishop] Thomson.

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In Chapter III., entitled "Of Arguments," a very able and effec tively set down account of the syllogistic scheme is given. No better, clearer, briefer, more judicious, and more exquisitely skilful account of what has been called the school-logic can be read. There is nothing dry, repulsive, "harsh and crabbed " about this portion of the work; no difficulty is evaded, no trickery is practised; there is neither glozing disguise employed regarding that for which syllogism is useful or useless, nor is there any absurd appraisure of the logician's tools, as fitted to accomplish the entire emancipation of the mind from error. The chapter will bear severe scrutiny, and the author need not wince under the application of it, for it is distin guished by force, cogency, and felicity of reasoning. It is con densed and accurate; clear and candid. The matter relating to hypothetical reasoning is clearly Aristotelic in spirit; though scarcely accordant in the use of language with the general letter of the "Organon," it merits considerable approbation as being, for the most part, an excursus into ground but seldom traversed, even by the scholastic philosophers. The technical language of this chapter is precisely employed, and yet is remarkably free from either pedantry or parade.

Book III., which treats "Of Fallacies," is almost beyond praise.

Here the power of a master in the science is shown. In matter, manner, and form it is all but unexceptionable. Ingenuity of thought, subtlety of mind, scrupulous carefulness in the use of terms, transparent diction, extensive information, scholastic dexterity of fence, caustic argument, and minute acquaintance with the rules of accurate reasoning, are palpable on every page. Indeed, did we not remember the able fifth book of J. S. Mill's "System of Logic," and one of the chapters (XIII.) in De Morgan's "Formal Logic," we should be strongly inclined to affirm that this book contained the finest example of the logical analysis of errors in ratiocination since the issue of Aristotle's essays "On Sophistical Proofs," forming Part V. of the "Organon." At any rate, we entirely agree in Mill's commendation, that in this book fallacies "have been most satisfactorily treated," and that, not less by a keen appreciation of logical principles, than by clearly conceived thought, fairly exerted according to syllogistic forms. Detailed criticism of this portion of the work is impossible; but we cannot avoid directing special attention to it in these pages, on account of the just and acute remarks which it contains, upon the mental habits which most tend to make men liable to be imposed on, or to impose on themselves, by fallacious reasoning; as well as its apt and cogent statements of the most likely errors into which controversialists may fall. One word only on the nature of the illustrations. Some have objected, first, that the fallacies are too obvious to require exposure; or, second, that they relate to opinions opposed to the author's own, which he thus, by the fallacy of implication, stigmatizes. To the former objection it may be replied, that after clear explanation, every difficulty appears simple and obvious, the detection of fallacies, like the making of a good joke, seeming perfectly easy after it is done; that, in an elementary work, only such examples as could be easily shown to be fallacious could be quoted; and that, in educative treatises, simple instances are those only through which it is possible to begin the disciplining of the mind, so as to lead it to employ itself, and delight in the practising of a similar sort of dissection of examples of a more complicated nature;-to the latter, that unless the matters had been disputable, or the opinions had required enforcement, they would not have suited the author's purpose. The criticism of fallacious reasoning, if it was to be illustrated by concrete examples, could not but refer to materials on which different opinions could be formed, and these must, by the necessities of the case, have been such [or exhibited as] deviations of the formal laws of thought as could be readily made plain, and be briefly shown to be (latently) erroneous.

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Book IV., which consists of a Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning," and takes the questions of Induction, the Discovery of Truth, Inference and Proof, Verbal and Real Questions, and Realism, forms, in our opinion, an error in arrangement. The main matters in this portion of the work ought to have found a place in the "Introduction" and "Analytic Outline" of the opinions and

topics in which it is, in great part, a reiterative enforcement--a returning to the question of the nature of Logic, its objects, utility, modus operandi, and the controversies they involve. It does, we think. partake largely of the character of special pleading, and affects more by its form than its matter; but it fails to convince its readers that Bacon and the pioneers and workers out of modern science Mill and his coadjutors in the construction of a philosophy of Induetion capable of helping on discovery and right thinking-have been wrong. The arguments have the quality of appearing to be unanswerable, and yet cannot acquire the consent of the understanding, so that it remains true of the reader, even when [and often because] he is thoughtful, painstaking, and careful, that—to quote the common though inaccurate version of Butler's lines

"A man convinced against his will

Is of the same opinion still;"

and he cannot persuade himself to act as if Logic were, indeed, only a step-sister to Induction.*

Notwithstanding the labours of Mill, Whewell, Hamilton, De Morgan, Herschel, Lewes, Hampden, Morell, &c., &c., we do not think that the true interpretation of the relationships of syllogism and induction has been reached; and we have not yet received from any authoritative scientific or logical writer the proper union-point for the systems of Aristotle and Bacon. While we recognize the remarks of Whately on Induction as highly valuable and instructive, we think they only exhibit one side of the truth; but then they do that clearly. In the chapter on "The Discovery of Truth," many important lessons are taught regarding the implication of many truths in received propositions, and of the processes by which the contents of these thoughts may best be elicited. The remaining chapters require only to be commended. The subjects on which they treat are important in a philosophical sense, and in their bearing on the history of opinion; but they do not call for special criticism. The "Appendix" contains excellent elements for praxis in logical dexterity of thought and ingenuity of expression. It contains quite a miniature dictionary of popular ambiguities, and it may fairly be said to contain a larger amount of useful, general wardenship against, or rectification of, error than Brown's "Vulgar Errors;" Bentham's "Book of Fallacies;" Bastiat's "Populár Fallacies;" Dickson's "Fallacies of the Faculty," and many other

It may be as well, here, to note a few of the best sources of information on Induction. The articles Induction, Syllogism, and Organon, in the "Penny Cyclopædia," Mill's "Logic," Whewell's "History and Philosophy" of the Inductive Sciences; Kuno Fischer's "Bacon;" Remusat's "Essais de Philosophie," Vol. II.; Bishop Hampden's article, Aristotle, in the “Encyclopædia Britannica;" a paper on "Reasoning," in Blackwood's Magazine, Feb., 1837, attributed by Sir William Hamilton to Professor Wilson-Christopher North; Sir John Herschel's "Discourse on Natural Philosophy;" Bailey's "Theory of Reasoning." Reference may also be made to Neil's "Art of Reasoning," Chaps. X-XII.

books of that sort put together. No suspicion of Jesuitry or of casuistry need deter the reader, for the love of such truth as he can clearly see is the supreme characteristic of the writer. The examples and praxis are well chosen, and the formal instructions for performing them as exercises are concise and useful, and may be made effective. Of this book, however, we must now finish our notice, merely attempting here to sum up, in half a sentence, our general impression of the work:-Felicitous and elegant in composition; perspicuous and cogent in reasoning; clear, plain, and methodical in construction; acute, varied, and interesting in illustration-" The Elements of Logic" are worthy of the reputation which placed them far ahead of any recently written work on Logic which Oxford had at the time produced (1825), and of being the progenitor of a long line of successors, few of which have excelled it.

"The Elements of Rhetoric" deal with a subject even more embitteredly obnoxious to suspicion and dislike than Logic. The latter undertook to train the reason, the former taught to move the passions of men. Logic might make the worse appear the better cause, but this might make it triumph: for everywhere passion was present and active, and reason was not so prevalent. To construct and expound a regular hypocritic art-an art of persuasion-an art for touching the emotions into life, activity, and force-an art of making passion master in decisions regarding matters of public or personal import-was that not a dangerous sharpening of a weapon already too apt to strike and wound? To instruct the reason might be permissible, however doubtful its results might be-to popularize the art of moving the passions of great masses of men could scarcely fail to be dangerous. The work, however, was safely accomplished, and by a safe man.

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Though Rhetoric might imply all "composition in prose," or might be limited to "persuasive speaking," Whately adopts a medium course, and comprehends under that designation only argumentative composition." We are far from thinking that this is an adequate view of the subject; or that the work covers the whole circle of the implications of the word Rhetoric. We look upon that science and art as a well reasoned and arranged exposition of all the guiding laws of human intelligence, by which speech is made to answer its end-proven and illustrated by facts and examples deduced from fair premises, or selected from admittedly elegant discourses; we regard it as a statement, in orderly sequence, of all the laws which regulate the expression of discursive thought when used to move other minds, and of cautions aptly fitted to preserve the persons employing discourse for this purpose, from injuring the ultimate result of their efforts by violations of the necessary conditions of persuasion. We do not think the definition wide enough; we do not think it encloses the whole area of the subject. Yet, so far as it goes, it is a most commendable piece of judicious authorship. It is a thoroughly sound, judicious, practical book, and may be