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granite, has been raised in St. Michael's Richard Grant White's American churchyard, Dumfries, where the ashes edition of “ Shakespere” is to be comof Burns repose, for John Hamilton, pleted in twelve volumes, the last of first editor of the Star (born 1821, died which will contain a biography of the 1860), who was a native of “ the Queen poet. of the South of Scotland.”
C. E. Leland, translator of Heine, Victor Hugo, jun., has dramatized and lately editor of Knickerbocker, is his father's romance, “ Les Misérables;" | to take charge of the Continental Reand M. Alexandre Dumas has a new view. drama, “ Les Mohicans de Paris” ready. Professor Neckar, grandson of the
Edmund Yates, author of “ After great French financier, author of a Office Hours,” and the “Lounger at the treatise on “Mineralogy,” “ The GeoClubs,” of the Illustrated Times, born | logy of the Alps," &c., died 25th No1827, has begun an entertainment, à la vember, at Portree Skye, N.B., aged 76. Albert Smith, on “ Modern Society." James Duncan, the entomologist,
By a majority of 99 to 96, a Congre contributor to the “Naturalist's Ligation of the University of Oxford has brary," &c., died 30th November, at decreed against a statute for the endow Old Manse, Denholm, N.B. At the ment of the Regius Professor of Greek, time of his death he had almost ready Dr. Jowett, one of the writers in “ Es for the press a complete edition of Dr. says and Reviews.” It is said that Leyden's poems. the leaders of the opposition were Dr. A monument is to be erected in mePusey, who on this occasion (as for mory of Sir Humphrey Davy, at Penmerly) has gone into wrong “ Tracts zance; and one in London to the late for the Times," and Dr. Hawkins, a Dr. Blomfield, Bishop of London. writer “On Tradition" (and a practiser The Rev. Dr. William Dunbar, of of it?). We have not yet got to the Applegirth, N.B., contributor of the halcyon era, spoken of in Oxford, by volume, “Bees,” to Sir William JarWhately in 1831:-“The same spirit dine's “ Naturalist's Library," died 6th which formerly consigned the too pow December, aged 82. erful disputant to the dungeon or the King's “ Court, Peerage, and Parliastake, is now, thank Heaven, compelled ment,” is to be issued soon. to vent itself in railing, which you need The Rev. E. Venables, M.A., has not more regard than the hiss of a ser translated Wieseler's “ Chronological pent which has been deprived of its Synopsis of the Four Gospels.” fangs.”—Lect. on Pol. Econ., p. 16. A translation into Italian of the
A posthumous 'work, by the Rev. “Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas,” by George Croly, D.D., (of whom see a bio Carlo Jourdan, has been issued at graphic notice in the British Contro Naples. versialist, June, 1861), on “The Book "The Religion and Politics of Dante" of Job,” is in the press; as is also one is the title of a new work, by Paolo on “ Religio Chemici,” by the late Pro Ferroni. fessor Geo. Wilson (noticed in the Bri Father J. B. H. Lacordaire, the poputish Controversialist, February, 1860.) lar French preacher, and eminent litte
J. G. Kohl, chiefly known for his rateur, born 1802, editor of L'Avenir, books of travel, is about to issue a Principal of the College of Sorréze, ani “ History of the Discovery of America,” lately chosen a member of the “ Acaand thus enter the lists against Robert demy,” died 21st Nov. son, Irving, Prescott, Bancroft, &c. The“ Shirley” of Fraser's Magazine,
An uupublished volume by Voltaire whose “ At the Seaside” has just been has been found, it is said, among the published, is John Skelton, Esq., advoMSS. of Diderot, and is to be brought cate, Edinburgh, son of the Sub-Sheriff out.
of Aberdeen, at Peterhead.
THE RIGHT HON. AND MOST REV. RICHARD
WHATELY, D.D.,* LORD ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN, ETO., ETC. "Thr Elements of Logic”ť open with a dedication “ to the Right Reverend Edward Copleston, D.D., Lord Bishop of Llandaff, &c., &c.," in which pleasing acknowledgment is made of the author's indebtedness to his instructor, and an honest and modest estimate of his original contributions is expressed. There then follows a “ Preface,” in which much valuable information is given regarding the fate and fortunes of Logic in the University of Oxford, due mention of help received occurs, and many acute remarks are made regarding the aims, province, and utility of logical study. Much excellent advice is also contained in it upon the method of studying and employing. Logic, and several pretty successful articles of defence against adverse criticism are placed before the reader. These preliminaries over, the work itself opens with an “Introduction,” which displays an almost unrivalled skill in the expressive and precise employment of language. “Logic,” he says, “may be considered as the science, and also as the art of reasoning. It investigates the principles on which argumentation is conducted, and furnishes such rules as may be derived from these principles, for guarding against erroneous deductions” (p. 1). He then notices some prevailing mistakes respecting Logic, and afterwards takes “ a slight and rapid glance of the series of logical writers down to the present day, and of the general tendency of their labours.” This part of the work is exceedingly meagre, defective, and superficial; not only “free from all tinge of antiqua. rian pedantry," but also deficient in the results of “laborious research” and “rarity of knowledge.” He gets quite within his depth again, however, when criticizing the incorrect views of the nature of the science of Logic entertained by many, and when arguing in rebutment of the common complaints against Logic. Here, however, in singular forgetfulness of his own definition, he speaks of his work as one which “professes to be wholly conversant about language" (p. 12); a statement which is immediately disproved by the opening sentence of Book I., in which he gives “ an analytical outline of the science,”—" a kind of imaginary history of the course of inquiry by which that system may be conceived to have occurred to a philosophical mind,"--wherein he says, “ In every instance in
* Concluded from page 12. # Our references will be made throughout the present paper to the tenth editior.
which we reason, in the strict sense of the word, i.e., make use of arguments (I mean real, i.e., valid arguments), whether for the sake of refuting an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of satisfying our own minds on any point, whatever may be the subject we are engaged on, a certain process takes place in the mind, which is one and the same in all cases, provided it be correctly conducted” (p. 15). The neglect of this fact of " the sameness of the reasoning process in all cases" he regards as “one of the chief impediments to the attain, ment of a just view of the nature and object of Logic;" and he argues from the fact thus,—"If it be found that the process going on daily in each of so many different minds is, in any respect, the same, and if the principles on which it is conducted can be reduced to a regular gystem, and if rules can be deduced from that system for the better conducting of the process, then it can hardly be denied that such a system and such rules must be especially worthy the attention, not of the members of this or that profession merely, but of every one who is desirous of possessing a cultivated mind (Preface, p. X.); and hence it cannot "but appear desirable to lay down some general rules of reasoping applicable to all cases ; by which a person might be enabled the more readily and clearly to state the grounds of his own conviction, or of his objection to the arguments of his opponent; instead of arguing at random without any fixed and acknow. ledged principles to guide his procedure” (p. 16). “The Logician's object,” he affirms, is, “ not to lay down principles by which one may reason, but by which all must reason, even though they are not distinctly aware of them ; to lay down rules, not which may be followed with advantage, but which cannot possibly be departed from in sound reasoning ” (p. 16). Having by the analysis of argument shown that—when all the propositions implied in, and essential to, a process of reasoning are explicitly stated in words, and are arranged in the order of inference,-every act of argumentation is resolvable into a syllogism; and that each syllogism consists of two related propositions, called premises, and a conclusion, so arranged that it is impossible for any one who admits both premises to avoid admitting the conclusion; he proceeds by exemplification to prove that arguments having a certain form are alone tenable in thought, “and that, consequently, the principle on which they are constructed is the universal principle of reasoning ” (p. 22). He then states and illustrates the Aristotelic dictum- de omni et nullo the “keystone of his whole logical system,”—as a generalized fact acquired by induction. This he gives in thefollowing simplified form :
1. Anything whatever, predicated of a whole class, 2. Under which class something else is contained, 3. May be predicated of that which is so contained (p. 25). .
The process of reasoning having been thus analyzed, and it baving been shown that every valid argument is one which may be “so stated, that its conclusiveness is evident from the mere form of the expression” (p. 26), and so falls under the above-given general principle, and that every fallacy is a deceptive process of thought,
which, while it seems to harmonize with the principle, in reality does not; he next proceeds to analyze the propositions of which syllogisms consist. These, he shows, are made up of two terms, subject and predicate; and he is then led to treat of the distribution of terms, the quantity and quality of propositions, the distinctions of terms, the nature of abstraction and generalization, and the theory of classification, and thus he reaches the simple and ultimate elements of all reasoning-terms. The object of this analysis is " to point out the general drift and purpose of the science, and to render the details of it more interesting and intelligible.” For this part of the work the author claims the honour and repute of originality. It was the idea of a master-thinker, and its successful execution argues great knowledge and capability in the teacher, and å perfect familiarity with his subject. Not only a varied and a detailed acquaintance with the matter to be taught, but a rare capacity of holding steadily and distinctly before the mind both the object aimed, and the means of attaining it, are requisite to accom. plish such a purpose with completeness and precision. This power of simplifying an abstruse subject; of enlisting attention, exciting interest, securing alertness of mind, and gradually unfolding to the awakening intelligence of the student a distinct idea of the necessity and advantage of such knowledge, is a rare endowment. The faint and evanescent impressions made by mere generalities are quite got rid of by this plan, and a conception of the true nature and character of the science is easily, effectively, and vividly intro. duced into the mind. The difficulty of pursuing truth is less felt when the energies of the mind are stimulated by a lively curiosity, and the hankering avidity of the intellect then, most ardently, seeks gratification in study. Whately's “ Elements of Logic" effect this most happily, and seldom fail, in practice, to create quite a predis. position in favour of the science of which they treat, and this "analytic outline” constitutes one of the most valuable portions of that treatise, whose influences have been so unequivocally marked by “the revival of a study, which had for a long time been regarded as an obsolete absurdity.”
A few minor inconsistencies and inaccuracies might easily be noticed, if it were our chief purpose to expose defects. Thus, we might instance the paronymous fallacy (Preface, p. x.), that as reason is the characteristic of man, reasoning is his most charac. teristic occupation; an occasional inattention to the distinction between inductive and syllogistic proof (p. 16); his fluctuating definition of Logic already noticed. If "the greatest mistakes” have always prevailed_respecting the nature of Logie, and if “hardly a writer on Logic can be mentioned who has clearly perceived, and steadily kept in view througkout, its real nature and object," we dare scarcely venture to affirm that he has yet rendered the eomplaint superfluous, who in one set of places informs us that
the process of reasoning itself alone is the appropriate province of Logic" (p. 11); that it is “concerned with the theory of reasoning," and that "reasoning" is "that which Logic treats of” (p. 168); and also, elsewhere, asserts that “Logic is entirely conversant about language (pp. 12 and 37); and is “the art of employing language properly for the purpose of reasoning." There is here evidently a little confusion of speech. This may perhaps, however, be got over by reflecting that Logic is derived from a Greek word which signifies, (1) the operation of the intellectual faculties, (2) the signs or manifestations of this operation, and that reasoning is only remembrance recognizable and communicable by the signs employed to register it. It is perhaps to be regretted that the “Elements" were not founded on a definition of Logic which might have included hoth ideas properly, had it even been no better than that of Peter Du Moulin (1624) — “ Logic is an art which giveth rules to argue well, and to discern truth from falsehood.” Without so thoroughly revolutionizing Aldrich's “Compendium" as to have startled Oxford with horror at the innovation, by calling "Logic the science of the laws of thought as thought,” we fancy that had our author defined Logic,—the science of reasoning formally, according to rule, and of using language rightly in the communication of reasoned thought, - he would have harmonized all the parts of his treatise more thoroughly.
Waiving these and similar objections as of small moment com. pared with the great body of good sense and exquisitely arranged illustration the book coutains, we can thoroughly commend this portion of the work as exhibiting great vigour and acuteness of intellect, a singular dexterity in touching a fallacy to the quick, and a perfect command over both the language and thought the author feels desirous of expressing. The combined charm of the style, and instructiveness of the matter, justly entitle it to its popular pre-eminence among modern logical manuals.
We must now, however, turn to the consideration of a part which we less highly regard.
Book Second is entitled, a “Synthetical Compendium," and is intended to supply a regular, concise, and systematic exposition of the science, such as may make a student fully acquainted with all its details, and may elicit independent efforts in the further employment of the teachings so presented. It aims at carefully distin. guishing between the essential and the accessory topics usually included in works on Logic, and professes to hold completely separate the processes by which premises are ascertained, and those by which deductions are made; and thus to free the science from the intrinsic additions of modern metaphysicians and the elaborate trifling and absurdities of the schoolmen. This fuller exposition of Logical Science contains, therefore, the formal realization of the author's design. It is not intended in it to give instructions for the investigation of truth, but to show how, when two or more truths have been discovered, all that is implied or involved in them may be, by inference, drawn out and ascertained. It might almost, in fact,
ē designated a guide to the right employment of inferential thought, and the right use of language, in so far as it is an instru? ment for expressing or investigating truth.