THE FUTURE OF LORD ROSEBERY

SOME time after Mr. Gladstone's retirement the statesman confided to a friend some personal impressions of his colleagues in the Government of 1892. Nearly all of them were marked by the shrewd humour which lurked in out-of-the-way corners of Mr. Gladstone's mind. The view of Lord Rosebery, expressed generally in terms of praise, was qualified by the remark that he was one of the 'most irresponsible of men.' Probably we are all now agreed that in point of irresponsibility Lord Rosebery stands alone among his contemporaries. A certain fixity of moral tenure is a characteristic of our politics. Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain are quoted as examples to the contrary, but in both cases there has been steady and logical development, governed by strong and in the main selfconsistent natures. Even Lord Randolph Churchill, a man whose high political genius was dwarfed by the fact that by accident of birth he found himself in the Tory, rather than in the Radical, camp, set himself a definite task within party lines and subordinated it to what he rightly conceived to be his party's true interests. None of our statesmen of the first rank have really conceived their lives otherwise than in attachment to one or the other of the great organisations.

It is clear that we must now regard Lord Rosebery as an exception to this rule. The evidence that he has decided to break definitely with the Gladstonian tradition, i.e. with modern Liberalism, I regard as decisive. Since Lord Rosebery resigned the Premiership he has made four incursions into politics. He resigned the leadership of the Liberal party because he would not move one step in execution of Mr. Gladstone's Eastern policy-the policy which the nation acclaimed at the time when Lord Rosebery was Mr. Gladstone's host in Midlothian, and to which Lord Salisbury has given a late but decided adhesion. His second act in retirement was to add the coping-stone, or perhaps I ought to say an ornamental finial, to that North African empire which Mr. Gladstone dreaded and disliked. His third intervention was to invite City Liberalism— that centre of high intent-to go back to 1885, that is to say, to wipe out the policy under which a year later Liberalism suffered its great

modern change, and underwent its most serious material loss. Finally he has come in after the outbreak of what is almost a colonial war to proclaim that the policy of Majuba-a policy associated again with the first Midlothian campaign—is dead. There

is no mistaking testimony like this. The majority of Lord Rosebery's colleagues in the Government of 1892 can hardly have mistaken it. The bulk of the party have made their view clear by the vote on Mr. Philip Stanhope's amendment. Both sides in politics would, I think, agree in regarding the sentence about Majuba as a kind of lèse-majesté to the memory of the old Liberal chief, and say that the author of it had stepped out from the ranks of the Liberal party as it has existed since 1886. Lord Rosebery may still possess, inside the House of Commons and out of it, a small personal following, clinging to him for the sake of his personal grace and distinction, and of other admirable qualities of which he has somehow failed to give his country their full advantage. But a party leader, according to all the rules of the game, he cannot be. Mistakes enough have been made in the conduct of Liberalism as a political force, but no combination not bent on suicide would consent to rule out of its calendar the name of its great saint and hero at the call of a man who has contributed little to its past and promises nothing for its future. No service on Lord Rosebery's part calls for such a sacrifice. No promise of a personality comparable in power to that of Lord Randolph Churchill, who, on a memorable day, asked his party to choose between him and Lord Salisbury, presents itself in association with a second Rosebery Premiership. Such an event could only represent the triumph of a small section of extremists in Imperial politics at the cost of the main body who, without divesting themselves of the Imperial idea, would refuse to cut themselves off from the faith and practice of mid-century Liberalism.

The time and manner of Lord Rosebery's last appearance in politics show, indeed, a vital misconception both of the situation in South Africa and of the inevitable course of the Liberal party in respect of it. Even if one allows that the party is not in absolute unity, the differences are differences of tone more than of policy, and in no quarter has there been a disposition to give a shriller, more eager, pitch to the song of jingoism. That the opportunity of the Liberal party will come, not simply for criticism but for the development of a positive line of action, I regard as one of the certainties of the future. It is clear that the final settlement must rest in the hands of statesmen, not of soldiers, and that those statesmen cannot be men like Sir Alfred Milner and Mr. Chamberlain, · who are violently identified with one of the two parties which divide the white race in South Africa. We have engaged the strength of the Empire in a faction-fight, but so long as the Dutch are in a majority in the Cape we cannot settle on lines of faction. The

Government which has waged the war will have the greatest possible difficulty in rearranging South Africa on the only basis, whatever constitutional forms we may adopt, which promises permanencenamely, a compromise between the Dutch and the English. What the Liberals did for Canada, what the Whigs would have done for America, must be done in South Africa unless the form of that part of our Colonial empire which is autonomous is to undergo a fundamental change. From such a work Lord Rosebery, by insistent identification with the cruder Imperialism, which, after all, has little more than a newspaper basis, has ruled himself out. Who that knows English politics does not reckon that the policy of extension is coming to an end, and that the obvious task of the successors of the present Government is what I may call the 'intensive culture' of the enormous territories, with their vast responsibilities, which the last ten years have added to the British Empire? Even if the Liberal party has to exile itself from power for another ten years, I hold that it must accept this rather than take the Greek gifts that Lord Rosebery holds out to it. When he became Premier many of us hoped that he would be a moderate and safe interpreter of the Imperial idea. No observer of politics can now, I think, retain this view. His political isolation from Progressive forces is equal to his moral isolation, and that is complete.

There is another sense in which, in my view, Lord Rosebery has made himself impossible. If Party Government is to stand in England, as I think it will, it must base itself on the principle of loyalty not only to a set of principles, but to the organisation that sustains them. One of the discoveries of the Anglo-Saxon race is that of government by committee. The country is now governed by a central committee of the Cabinet, communicating with informal expert committees representing the great departments. The Opposition in the House of Commons is kept up by an informal committee of Front Bench politicians, communicating with group committees, English, Irish, Welsh, and Scottish. With none of these is Lord Rosebery in touch or, I imagine, in sympathy. He did not consult his old colleagues when he resigned the leadership. His later appearances on the stage of politics have been of the character of the entrances of the prima ballerina, whose elegant entrechats are not necessarily popular with the corps de ballet. When he speaks it is to depress a party in misfortune, not to stimulate it, to puzzle it with inexpert and dubious phrases at moments when it wants a clear lead. Moreover, Lord Rosebery seems to be the one English politician who is consistently melodramatic. What levity in his belated announcement that we had been on the verge of war with France over Siam !— a suggestion which more than one of his colleagues heard with surprise. Conceive Lord Salisbury adopting this treatment of affairs. When Lord Salisbury speaks you feel that, beyond the touches of personal

fancy, you have a mind devoted to the business of governing the country for its good, but also in harmony with a certain tradition of party rule. But Lord Rosebery of his own act declines the position of what in any worthy sense can be called a representative man. What in fact does he represent? The Daily Mail? I know no other Rosebery party. The public, no doubt, likes to see Lucullus issue from one of his palaces and to discuss his moods. Now it is a merry mood, now a pensive one. But in England seriousness counts for much, and the impression that Lord Rosebery's statesmanship is the statesmanship of whim rather than of principle has prejudiced his future more, I think, than he deserves.

Let me illustrate what I mean, by reference, not to Lord Rosebery the free lance, but to Lord Rosebery the responsible statesman. Lord Rosebery assumed one serious political task, and one alone, during his Premiership. That was the conduct of the campaign against the House of Lords. I think that he was most unfortunate in having such a conflict forced upon him at a moment when the Lords had the country behind them on the question of Home Rule. He faced it with courage, but with singular lack of prescience. A vital point was the choice of attack. But in this respect no preparations were made. Lord Rosebery was greatly handicapped by personal difficulties within the Cabinet. But if the head of the Government decided to make the question of the Lords the ground of appeal to the country, the appointment of a Cabinet Committee, and an appeal for constitutional advice to the Law Officers of the Crown, were clearly necessary. I do not gather that either of these precautions was taken. The campaign was abandoned before it had well begun, and I doubt whether at any moment the nation as a whole was even conscious that a serious constitutional conflict had been opened. Lord Rosebery has certainly refrained from renewing it.

In what direction, therefore, does Lord Rosebery's statesmanship tend? The answer which suggests itself to me is that it tends towards that party of the Centre, led, as in some of the Australian colonies, by successive Cabinets of all the Talents, which vaguely threatens, though I doubt its ultimate success, to overthrow the old Constitutional balance between Whigs and Tories. When Lord Salisbury goes such a party will want a trained diplomatist, and unless the Duke of Devonshire claims the Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs that position might very well be kept open for Lord Rosebery. The choice would harmonise very well with his temper. The beaten cause would never have such an attraction for Lord Rosebery as it possessed for Mr. Gladstone, who had the faith that removed mountains and pursued it in other fashion than by dreaming 'it was a dream.'

In such a Cabinet Lord Rosebery might, I think, be of service to his country. He might instruct the Tories as to their London

policy and stop the futile war against the County Council as a preliminary to a great measure for the unification of London. He might modify their eternal fears of Trade Unionism, and might even frame an effective Conciliation Act. So much he might do with weight and genuine intuition, and, therefore, I guess that he will choose to do it rather than to fret himself with more sojourning in the wilderness with the Liberal party. The flesh pots of Egypt are handy, Lord Rosebery will take to them with cheerful grace, and the Court of the Pharaohs may be the better for his presence there.

H. W. MASSINGHAM.