dictates of a pure and ennobling system of morality, that, aided and fostered by religion and the light of revelation, is well calculated to instill reverence for private rights, and constitutes the only sure basis upon which the fundamental law of a nation can safely rest, and is more potent and effective to secure, and render sacred, rights of property and of person than even the mandates of a fundamental law of a nation."-(Chap. vii., § 132.)

The chapter closes with an examination of the subject of ex post facto laws, and of retroactive legislation in general.

The title of the work, full as it is, conveys but an inadequate idea of the extent of the subject, and of the ground the author goes over. In the first five chapters, by way of natural, and indeed necessary introduction to the whole subject, a historical sketch is given of the origin and history of legislation among the ancient governments, in England, and in the colonies of Virginia, New Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, and Connecticut. In chapter six, the provisions of the Constitutions of all the States respecting the rights of the citizen, generally, and in particular, the regulations and restrictions of the legislative power, are given in detail, and, for the most part, verbatim. The contents of chapter seven we have noticed. The body of the work is taken up with the consideration, among other topics, of the restrictions upon the legislative power of the Federal and State governments in the Constitutions of the United States and of the respective States; of legislative and judicial interpretation; of interpretation and construction; of the construction of Statutes, penal and others; of their repeal, and the proofs of their existence.

We commend this work, and the subject which it treats, to the study, not only of the American lawyer, but of the American legislator, the American merchant, and, we may add, to every citizen who, as a voter, makes a unit in that aggregate of popular will which expresses itself by acts of legislation. The American Union presents a striking spectacle. Here is a great central Legislature, around which cluster thirty local Legislatures, each meeting at least once a year, some twice a year, each promulgating its volume of laws annually. It is true that a large proportion of the laws of both National and State Legislatures are private acts. But we must consider that very often private acts involve the most important questions of public authority and legislative power. Railroads, canals, and other public works, which are multiplying daily, are making daily demands for the appropriation of private property to public uses.

This power of appropriation is obviously an exceedingly delicate one, and involves many important considerations. What is a public use? Can the property be taken before the compensation is paid? Is it sufficient that the Legislature provides for its payment?

This country is in a state of what we may call legislative ferment. The law-making power is in constant action, and manifests a tendency towards changes or reforms, a disposition to overhaul and remodel existing laws, so violent that we should call it revolutionary were it not peaceable.

Within two years the Legislature of New York have abolished a system of pleading and practice, which, in its main features has existed in England for at least four centuries, and had existed a century and a half in New York. It has within a year abolished the rule of law which gave the husband any estate or interest in his wife's property.

The equity system of practice, as distinct from the legal, has ceased to exist in New York. Within a year (we think) several States have passed laws

exempting real estate, to a certain extent, from all liability for debts. We mention these instances not to find fault, for many of them are reforms, but as illustrations of the activity of American legislation.

It is time that the American citizen who elects, and the American legislator who is elected, realize how difficult and delicate, how high and solemn, how deeply to be studied and carefully exercised, is that duty of legislation which is but too often imposed with little discrimination, and performed with little care. Did our legislators more carefully read, and more deeply reflect, we should not be compelled so often as we are, to lament that

"Fools rush in where angels fear to tread."

MERCANTILE LAW CASES.

POINTS IN MERCANTILE LAW.*

FORM I-SANDFORD'S SUPERIOR COURT REPORTS.

With the exception of the two volumes by Mr. J. Prescott Hall, published some fifteen years ago, this volume of reports by Mr. Justice Sandford, contains the only decisions of the Superior Court of the city of New York which have been given to the public. The high character for ability and learning which this tribunal has always maintained, and the great interest and importance of the cases (a large proportion involving mercantile points) decided by it, since its establishment in 1822, render it a matter of serious regret that its decisions have not been more regularly reported.

It is the great commercial tribunal of the State. Recent legislative changes have widened its jurisdiction so that it now takes cognizance of equitable as well as legal actions. Appeal is also now allowed from its decisions directly to the Court of Appeals. It is now, in fact, a local Supreme Court, having jurisdiction in cases involving the most important questions of law, and the largest amounts of property. Not only has the jurisdiction of the Court been widened, but, by an act of the Legislature at its last session, three additional justices for the Court were provided for, who were chosen at the late municipal election in New York. These are John Duer, the distinguished lawyer and commentator on the Law of Insurance, John L. Mason, and William A. Campbell. All these selections have given (we believe) the most entire and general satisfaction.

We hardly know whether the present volume gives us most regret or satisfaction. We certainly feel more fully the loss the public have sustained in not having the decisions of this Court regularly published heretofore, when we perceive the importance of the decisions given in the first volume of the new series. On the Law of Insurance, and in particular on several vital points in the Law of Mutual Insurance, hitherto unsettled, this volume is particularly full.

PREMIUM NOTES IN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES. There are no less than seven cases, in this volume, in which the nature of premium notes, and the liabili ties of the makers of them, are considered.

In a number of the Merchants' Magazine for 1846, the reader will find a careful abstract of the provisions of the various charters establishing these companies, and in particular of the clauses relating to premium notes. The two-fold character of the makers of such notes, they becoming at once provisions, and members of the company to which the promise is made, by the simple act of making

* Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York. By the Hon. LEVI H. Sandford, one of the Justices of the Court. Vol. I. New York: Published by Banks, Gould & Co.

the notes, at the same time payers and payees, leads to somewhat anomalous results. In the cases of Brower vs. Appleby, (p. 158,) and of Hone vs. Allen, (p. 171,) the question arose, Whether there was a sufficient and valid consideration for these notes, they not being given for insurance already effected, or for policies already issued, but in advance for future insurances? It is held in these cases that “the authority given by the statute, the security held out to the dealers, and the advantage contemplated in the compensation for the credit furnished by the makers of the notes, furnished a sufficient consideration to uphold the notes, although no policies were ever taken out by the makers. And the mutual agreement and association of the parties who respectively gave such notes, for the purpose of giving them, also furnished a sufficient consideration." It is further held that "such premium notes are equally valid, for the security of dealers, although the makers have never signed any subscription or paper agreeing to give premium notes to the company." Brower vs. Hill, (p. 629.) The Court in Hone vs. Folger, (p. 177,) further held that "it is no defense to such a note that the company failed, and on application to it subsequently for insurances, so as to apply the same on the note, the company declined to underwrite for the makers of the note.”—Ib.

The important point was decided in the Merchants' Mutual Company vs. Leeds, (p. 183,) that all premiums paid by the maker of a premium note, for policies actually paid after the making of it, must be deducted from the amount of the note. It will be perceived, on referring to the article in this Magazine above mentioned, that the all-important section, upon which most of the controversy in these cases turns, is that numbered twelve in nearly all the charters, they being, for the most part, formed upon one and the same model. The twelfth section provides that "the company, for the better security of its dealers, may receive notes for premiums in advance of persons intending to receive its policies, and may negotiate such notes for the purpose of paying claims or otherwise, in the course of its business; and on such portions of said notes as may exceed the amount of premiums paid by the respective signers thereof, at the successive periods when the company shall make up its annual statement as hereinafter provided for, and on new notes taken in advance thereafter, a compensation to the signers thereof at a rate to be determined by the trustees, but not exeeding 5 per cent per annum, may be allowed and paid from time to time." It will be perceived that here is provided a compensation, a consideration of 5 per cent for the excess of the amount of such notes beyond premiums actually earned. In connection with this section must be taken two others, which provide that every signer of such a note, every party insured is a member of the company, and that in case of loss, the amount of such loss is to be deducted, so that the compensation provided for may entirely fail. The questions which naturally suggested themselves, and which were briefly considered in the article in this Magazine referred to, were, Whether there was any sufficient, any valid consideration to support these notes and, Whether, if, on the one hand, there be a sufficient consideration, it did not arise from relations existing between the makers, which amounted to partnership, inter sese, and, on the other hand, if there were no such consideration, Whether the notes were valid and could be enforced in any way? From these considerations, the importance of the decisions we have cited, affirming the validity of premium notes, is obvious. MARINE INSURANCE-THE ROTTON CLAUSE. The cases in this volume are not confined to Life Insurance and the Mutual System. In the case of Innes vs. Alliance Insurance Company, (p. 310,) the policy contained the rotton clause, which is to the effect that "if, upon a regular survey, the vessel should thereby be declared unseaworthy, by reason of her being unsound, or rotton, or incapable of prosecuting her voyage on account of her being unsound or rotton, then the assurers should not be bound to pay their subscription on the policy. The ship, which was bound for London, was obliged to bear away for Fayal, in consequence of a leak, which was so bad that the pumps had to be kept going night and day. On arriving at Fayal, the Consul, upon application, appointed a survey. The first survey proving insufficient, another survey was ordered by the Consul, Mr. Dabney, and made by the regular Portuguese surveyors of the port, who reported that "they found a great number of the timbers decayed;" "that close to the foremast fourteen timbers were in that state, and incapable of holding a bolt ;" "that the

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breast hooks were started, as also the stern frame, the bolts being worked out of their places," &c. After the second survey, a very heavy gale came, which caused the ship to strain badly, and rendered an additional pump necessary. The captain reported these facts to the Consul, who thereupon ordered a third survey by five captains of American ships. They surveyed the ship, the captain being present, and reported that the twixt decks were strong and secure, with the exception of a "break of quarter deck, which gave strong indications of working much with great motion in heavy weather." In the hold, "the timbers were rotten, and otherwise very much decayed." The Court, after stating the established rule that the rotten clause is a good defense only where the survey proves the rottenness to be the sole cause of unseaworthyness, not the principal cause, or a cause, but the cause, held that the evidence in this case did not present unmixed cause of unseaworthyness, and that the vessel was not to be considered as condemned for rottenness only.

The regularity of the survey by the shipmasters was objected to on the ground that a Consul has no right to order a survey. The Court, concurring in the opinion of Judge Story, held that the survey was regular. Judge Story says, "It is certainly the usual practice for Courts of Admiralty to order surveys as a matter of maritime and admiralty jurisdiction within their cognizance; but I am not aware that it has been held indispensable to the validity of a survey that it should emanate from such a source." There does not seem any good reason why, if an American Consul should interpose in behalf of the master, and, with a view to assist him, should appoint the surveyors at his request, and thereby sanction their competency to the task, such an appointment should be deemed objectionable." STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-WHEN IT BEGINS TO RUN. The case of Argall vs. Brijant, (p. 98,) turns on a rather curious point under the Statute of Limitations, which we hardly know whether to consider settled by this decision or not. The question is, When does the lapse of six years bar an action for the negligent performance of an act, or the non-fulfilment of a duty? Is it the lapse of six years reckoned from the time of the actual neglect, or from the time when the damage from this neglect was first actually felt? In this case the defendant had incorrectly printed a notice of special partnership. In consequence of the misprint the Supreme Court held the partnership to be general, and the plaintiff was held liable for claims for which, as special partner, he would not have been answerable. This decision of the Supreme Court was made more than six years after the misprint, but not more than six years after the debt was contracted, for which the plaintiff was held liable in consequence of it.

The Court held that the action was barred by the Statute, because "the cause of the plaintiff's action occurred more than six years before this suit was brought." "The implied promise, if broken at all, was broken in September, 1835, when the error was committed; and we think the plaintiff could have maintained an action at that time, in either form of remedy for its breach. His right to commence a suit was totally distinct from the measure of his damages. If he had sued in 1835, his damages might have been merely nominal, or they might have been assessed upon the probabilities of the future. The last of these arguments of the Court, that drawn from the probabilities of future loss, does strike us as a little wild. But, admitting the general force of the reasoning in this decision, is not the real question after all, not whether the six years are to be counted from the time of the breach of duty, or from the time the damage was sustained, but what, in fact, was the brecah of duty? Was it the mere misprint? The publishers of newspapers are not mere printers. They are persons who undertake, by means of a printed paper, to convey notifications of certain facts to certain persons, in the case of ordinary advertisements to the public in general, in the case of legal notices provided for by the Statute, as in the present instance, when the Statute makes the publication for six weeks of the notice of partnership constructive notice to all future dealers, to all such dealers. The breach of duty, in this point of view, was not the misprint merely, but the incorrect notification to the party who gave credit within six years, by means of the mistake made more than six years ago. If this view be correct, the breach of duty must be considered as committed within six years.

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

RATE OF MONEY-RISE IN COTTON-IMPROVED VALUE OF EXPORTS-SALES STOCKS-EMIGRANT REMITTANCES-EFFECT ON BILLS-RATES OF EXCHANGE-MOVEMENT OF SPECIE-CALIFORNIA-RATE OF INTEREST-EMPLOYMENT OF CAPITAL-DEMAND FOR MEANS-ACTIVITY OF ENTERPRISE-RAW MATERIALS-WOOL, PRODUCE AND IMPORT OF-BRITISH AND UNITED STATES CONSUMPTION, ETC.

THE general features of the money market, as noted at the date of our last, continue to present themselves in a more marked manner. Money in those great reservoirs whence the leading operations of commerce are supplied with means, are filled to repletion, while the general absence of enterprise, that may be ascribed to the presence of the prevailing epidemic, prevents the creation of that desirable class of paper which banks covet, in any sufficient quantity; and with accumulating deposits in bank, both the institutions and individuals are offering money freely at call to thirty days, on stock securities, at 3 a 4 per cent per annum. While this is the case with the central operations, there is, owing to the stagnation of trade, a scarcity of money among retail dealers, and the shopkeepers offer paper freely at 7 per cent per annum. This is indicative of the difficulty of converting goods into cash, to the usual extent, as obligations for their purchases mature. This is usually the time of year when business is very dull, but when the importations for the fall trade begin to create a demand for money, which is enhanced some sixty days later, through the wants of operators in the large crops of the south and west. This year, however, the importations of goods, to July 1, do not exceed those of last year, while the exportation of specie has been much less, and the importation of the precious metals, as well from Europe as from California, have been considerable greater. The difference in the specie movement between the first six months of this year, as compared with the last, has not been far from $9,000,000. This, of itself, has been an important item in the state of the markets. It has also been the case, this year, that the quantities of produce going forward have been much larger than last year, both cotton and farm produce, and the prices of the former have continued to improve. As an indication of the progress and influence of the cotton exports, we compile a table of the number of bales exported from the United States, at the close of each month, this year and last, with the quotation of fair cotton, in New York, as an index of value.

EXPORTS OF COTTON FROM THE UNITED STATES MONTHLY, WITH ESTIMATE OF VALUE BASED ON PRICES OF FAIR COTTON IN NEW YORK.

The accuracy of this mode of estimate is indicated in the fact that the value of