CHA P. II.

Concerning the Analyfing of Speech into its fmalleft Parts.

TH

HOSE things, which are first to Na- Ch. II. ture, are not first to Man.

Nature

begins from Causes, and thence defcends to Effects: Human Perceptions first open upon Effects, and thence by flow degrees afcend to Causes. Often had Mankind seen the fun in Eclipfe, before they knew its Cause to be the Moon's Interpofition; much oftner had they seen those unceasing Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of Day and Night, before they knew the Cause to be the Earth's double Motion (a). Even

(a) This Diftinction of prior to Man and prior to Nature, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philofophy. See Arift. Phyf. Aufcult. 1. 1. c. 1. Themiftius's Comment on the fame, Pofter. Analyt. 1. 1. c. 2. De Anima, 1. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction be

tween

Ch. II. Even in Matters of Art and human Creation, if we except a few Artifts and cri

tical

tween Intelligence Divine and Intelligence Human. GOD may be faid to view the First, as firft; and the Laft, as laft; that is, he views Effects thro' Caufes in their natural Order. MAN views the Laft, as firft; and the Firft, as laft; that is, he views Caufes thro' Effects, in an inverse Order. And hence the Meaning of that Paflage in Ariftotle: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ ̓ ἡμέραν, ἔτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ Νῆς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, fo is Man's Intelligence to thofe Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and moft confpicuous of all Things, Metaph. 1. 2. c. I. See alfo 1. 7. c. 4. and Ethic. Nicom. 1. I. c. 4. Ammonius, reasoning in the fame way, fays very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatife'Αγαπητὸν τῆ ἀνθρω πίνῃ φύσει, ἐκ τῶν ἀτελεστέρων καὶ συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπλύτερα και τελειότερα προϊέναι· τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα μᾶλλον συνήθη ἡμῖν, καὶ γνωριμώτερα. Ούτω γῆν καὶ ὁ παῖς εἶραι μὲν λόγον, καὶ ἐιπεῖν, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖς οἶδε τᾶτον δέ ἀναλύσαι εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβάς, κἀκεῖνα εἰς σοιχεῖα ἐκέτι, Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more fimple and perfect ; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and fay, Socrates

τα

walketh;

tical Obfervers, the reft look no higher Ch. II. than to the Practice and mere Work, knowing nothing of those Principles, on which the whole depends.

THUS in SPEECH for example-All men, even the loweft, can speak their Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of thofe, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that Grammar, which refpects the Genius of their own Language? How few then must be thofe, who know GRAMMAR UNIVERSAL; that Grammar, which without regarding the feveral Idioms of particular Languages, only respects thofe Principles, that are effential to them all?

'Tis our prefent Defign to inquire about this Grammar; in doing which we shall follow

walketh; but how to refolve this Sentence into a Noun and Verb, and thefe again into Syllables, and Syllables into Letters or Elements, here he is at a lofs. Am. in Cóm, de Prædic. p. 28.

4

Ch. II. follow the Order confonant to human Per

ception, as being for that reason the more eafy to be understood.

WE fhall begin therefore first from a Period or Sentence, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all, and thence pafs, if poffible, to thofe its primary Parts, which, however effential, are only obvious to a few.

WITH refpect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there fo ignorant, as, if we address him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we affert, and when we question; when 'tis we command, and when we pray or wish?

FOR example, when we read in ShakeSpeare*,

The Man, that hath no mufic in himself. And is not mov'd with concord of Sweet founds,

Is fit for Treafons

* Merchant of Venice.

OF

Or in Milton*,

O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble

feet,

Hafting this way—

'tis obvious that these are assertive Sentences, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Senfation.

WHEN the Witch in Macbeth says to her Companions,

When shall we three meet again

In thunder, lightning and in rain?

this 'tis evident is an interrogative Sen

tence.

WHEN Macbeth fays to the Ghost of

Banquo,

Hence, borrible Shadow,

Unreal Mock'ry bence!

he speaks an imperative Sentence, founded

upon the paffion of hatred.

* P. L. IV. 866.

WHEN

Ch. II.