the Eneid to an Epigram of Martial. But Ch. II. the longest Extenfion, with which Grammar has to do, is the Extenfion here confider'd, that is to fay a SENTENCE. The greater Extenfions (fuch as Syllogifms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but Sentences repeated. Now a SENTENCE (c) may be sketch'd in the following defcription-a compound C 2 Quantity tem, aut Interrogantem vocant; vel rem: fique rem, vel cum ipfum confequi cupit, quicum loquitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem : atque in bâc, vel ut a præftantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie Juffus nominatur. Sola autem Enuncians a cognofcendi facultate proficifcitur: hæcque nunciat rerum cognitionem, quæ in nobis eft, aut veram, aut fimulatam. Itaque Hæc fola verum falfumque capit: præterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione. (c) Λόγω δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικής ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ' αυτὰ σημαίνει τι Arift. Poet. c. 20. See alfo de Interpret. c. 4. Ch. II. Quantity of Sound fignificant, of which certain Parts are themselves also fignificant. THUS when I fay [the Sun fhineth] not only the whole quantity of Sound has a meaning, but certain Parts alfo, fuch as [Sun] and [fbineth.] BUT what shall we fay? Have these Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner fignificant, and fo may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we fuppofe all meaning, like Body to be divifible, and to include within itself other Meanings without end? If this be abfurd, then must we neceflarily admit, that there is fuch a thing as a Sound fignificant, of which no Part is of itself fignificant. And this is what we call the proper character of a (d) WORD. For thus, though the Words (α) Φωνή σημαντική, ἧς μέρος ἐδέν ἐστι καθ ̓ αυτὸ anpatxú. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2. & 3. Prifcian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows Words [Sun] and [Shineth] have each a Ch. II. Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts, neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of the other. IF therefore ALL SPEECH whether in profe or verse, every Whole, every Section, every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a certain Meaning, divifible into other Meanings, but WORDS imply a Meaning, which is not fo divifible: it follows that WORDS will be the smallest parts of Speech, in as much as nothing less has any Meaning at all. follows-Dictio eft pars minima orationis conftructæ, id eft, in ordine compofitæ. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id eft, ad totius fenfus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum eft, nequis conetur vires in duas partes dividere, hoc eft, in vi & res; non enim ad totum intelligendum hæc fit divifio. To Prifcian we may add Theodore Gaza.Λέξις δὲ, μέρος ἐλάχιστον κατὰ σύνταξιν 2678. Introd. Gram. 1. 4. Plato fhewed them this characteristic of a Word-Sce Cratylus, p. 385. Edit. Serr. Ch. II. To know therefore the fpecies of Words muft needs contribute to the knowledge of Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its minuteft Parts. THIS therefore muft become our next Inquiry. СНАР, CHA P. III. Concerning the fpecies of Words, the smallest L ET us first search for the Species of Ch.III. commonly received by Grammarians, For The Man, that hath no mufic in himself, And is not mov'd with concord of sweet founds, Is fit for treafon Here the Word [The] is an ARTICLE;- |