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the common use of all the shops and used by the public as a common pas. sageway thereto, is liable to a person who, in the exercise of due care, is injured by a defect in the platform, in the absence of an agreement by the tenants of the shops to keep it in repair. Readman v. Conway, 374.

See ACTION, 2; Evidence, 12.

LARCENY.

See INDICTMENT, 2-4.

LAW AND FACT.

See CONTRACT, 7; EMBEZZLEMENT; NEGLIGENCE; SALE, 2, 8.

LEASE.

1. The assignment of a lease by the lessor entitles the assignee to sue the lessee in his own name on the covenants in the lease; and an assignment by the lessee of his right, title and interest in the lease does not exempt him from liability on his covenant to pay rent, although the assignee of the lessor assents to the latter assignment. Pfaff v. Golden, 402. 2. A lease of a shop provided that the lessee should pay a certain rent, except in case of fire, and should keep the premises in repair, damage by fire excepted; that in case the demised premises should be damaged by fire, so as to be rendered unfit for use and habitation, the rent, or a just and proportionate part thereof, according to the nature and extent of the injury sustained, should be abated or suspended, until the premises should be put in proper condition for use and habitation by the lessor. During the term of the lease, the shop was injured by fire, so as to be unfit for use; the lessor did not repair for a certain time, refused to abate the rent, and demanded full rent of the lessee, which he paid under protest. Held, that the lessee had no cause of action against the lessor. Regan v. Baldwin, 485. See FORCIBLE Entry and DETAINER; RENT; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 2,

WAY, 2.

LEGACY.

See DEVISE AND LEGACY.

LICENSE.

See INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 4.

LIEN.

A hack, described as in use at certain stables, was mortgaged, and, by the terms of the mortgage, the mortgagor was to retain possession, and use and enjoy the same until default. While so in possession, the mortgagor had it repaired. Held, that the person making the repairs had a lien therefor as against the mortgagee. Hammond v. Danielson, 294.

See MECHANIC'S LIEN; MORTGAGE, 4.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

The following instrument, signed in the presence of an attesting witness, "On demand with interest please pay J. S. or order fifty-five dollars,” is a witnessed promissory note, within the statute of limitations, Gen. Sts c. 155, § 4. Almy v. Winslow, 342.

MALPRACTICE.

See ACTION, 1; ATTORNEY AND COUNSEL.

MANDAMUS.

The duties of a board of examiners of election returns, under the Gen. St». c. 7, § 25, are purely ministerial, and the board cannot receive or consider evidence of extrinsic circumstances, but is confined to the records of votes returned and laid before it; and mandamus will not lie to compel the board to count certain votes, containing the initial letter only of the Christian name of a candidate, with other votes containing his name in full. Clark v. Board of Examiners, 282.

MANUFACTURING CORPORATION.

See MASTER And Servant, 2-4.

MARRIED WOMAN.

1. A married woman, who owns a farm and carries it on for the support of her family or her husband's family, is engaged in a "business on her separate account," within the St. of 1862, c. 198, § 1; and, if she fails to file the certificate required by that statute, her personal property used in such business is liable to attachment by the creditors of her husband; and it is immaterial that the produce of the farm is mainly used in the support of her family. Snow v. Sheldon, 332.

2. If a married woman carries on the business of keeping a boarding-house, and neglects to file the certificate required by the St. of 1862, c. 198, § 1, debts due to her for board are liable to attachment by the creditors of her husband. Harnden v. Gould, 411.

3. The St. of 1862, c. 198, is not repealed by implication by the St. of 1874, c. 184. Ib.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE; INTOXICATING LIQUors, 5; Mortgage, 1.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. A person employed and paid by a contractor as driver of a horse and wagon, which, together with the driver, the contractor lets by the day to a city to be used in the work of paving a street, and who has the entire management of the horse as to the manner of driving him, and whose duty it is to see that he is properly shod, is the servant of the contractor in so driving the horse and having him shod, and, for an injury to a third person caused by his negligence in these respects, the contractor is liable. Huff v. Ford, 24.

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2. In an action by an employee against a manufacturing corporation, for personal injuries received while endeavoring to escape from its mill, which was on fire, it appeared that the fire was caused by the heating of a bearing in one of the machines used in the mill, and that it might have been readily extinguished when first discovered; that the defendant had a cistern, with pipes leading to each story of the mill, to which were attached lines of hose, but at the time of the fire the water did not run when attempted to be used. Held, in the absence of evidence of any reason why the water did not run, that it must be attributed to the negligence of the fellow-servants of the plaintiff in failing to keep the apparatus in order, or in failing to put it in operation; and that the defendant was not liable. Jones v. Granite Mills, 84.

3. If a manufacturing corporation has a mill properly constructed for its ordinary business, it is not, in the absence of a statutory requirement, responsible to an employee for not providing a means of escape from a fire, which is not caused by the negligence of the corporation. Ib. 4. In an action by an employee, between twenty and twenty-one years of age, against a manufacturing corporation, for personal injuries received while endeavoring to escape from its mill, which was on fire, the plaintiff requested the judge to instruct the jury that it was the duty of the defendant to provide proper and suitable means of extinguishing fire, proper and suitable ways and means of escape, and of giving alarm to its servants in case of fire. The judge instructed the jury, that if the room in which the plaintiff was at work was a suitable place, and there were proper and suitable means of extinguishing fire, and the means of egress and escape were suitable and proper, and in order and ready for use, the plaintiff could not recover. Held, that the instructions as applied to the first and second requests were sufficiently favorable to the plaintiff; and that the third :equest for instructions was properly refused. Keith v. Granite Mills, 90.

MASTER IN CHANCERY.
See EQUITY, 9.

MAXIM.

Caveat emptor. See Hight v. Bacon, 10, 12.

MECHANIC'S LIEN.

1. A boiler, situated in a building joined to a mill, and used to supply steam to the mill, is a part of the realty, and for repairs on the boiler a lien can be maintained under the Gen. Sts. c. 150; and the whole of the land, on which the mill and the building, in which the boiler is, are situ ated, may properly be included in the description of the premises on which the lien is claimed. Kelley v. Border City Mills, 148.

2. If a mechanic's lien has attached for materials furnished, under a contract with the owner of a building, it is not defeated by a conveyance by the owner, while the contract is being performed, of the premises on which the lien is claimed; and the statement of lien is properly filed within

thirty days after the last materials are furnished under the contract with the owner. Gale v. Blaikie, 274.

3. At the trial of a petition to enforce a mechanic's lien upon land, the owner of which has, before the filing of the certificate of lien, and with the knowledge of the petitioner, conveyed the land to another, evidence is admissible that such conveyance was fraudulent as to creditors and as to the petitioner as a creditor of the grantor, although the latter is described in the certificate as owner of the premises. Amidon v. Benjamin, 276. 4. If a person furnishes labor and materials in the erection of a building, under an entire contract for a round sum, and cannot maintain a lien for the materials for want of the notice to the owner of the land of his intention so to do, required by the Gen. Sts. c. 150, § 2, he cannot maintain a lien for the labor, under the St. of 1872, c. 318, without showing what the labor alone was worth. Smith v. Emerson, 169.

5. If a sub-contractor agrees to furnish all the hammered granite for a building for an entire sum, and has no lien for the stone, on account of his failure to give the owner the notice required by the Gen. Sts. c. 150, § 2, he has no lien under the St. of 1872, c. 318, § 1, for the labor performed in hammering the stone. Donaher v. Boston, 309.

MIDWIFE.
See ACTION, 1.

MILL.

A landowner can maintain a complaint, under the Gen. Sts. c. 149, § 34, for the reassessment by a jury of his annual damages for the flowing of his land by the respondent's dam, although such damages were not "established by a jury" as provided in that section, but by an award of arbitrators, to whom the original complaint, by agreement of parties and under rule of court, was referred, and whose award was returned into court and accepted. Fitch v. Taft, 503.

MONEY BILL.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2; Judge.

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.

1. A., who was in the employ of a corporation, gave B. an order on the corporation for a certain sum, to be paid monthly, in specified instalments, out of his wages. The paymaster of the corporation said he would take charge of the order, and if there was no trouble about it he would pay it. As each instalment came due, B. demanded it, but was refused payment. The paymaster took the money out of A.'s wages, and put it in an envelope marked with B.'s name. No attachment was made of the money in the hands of the corporation. Held, that B. could not maintain an action for money had and received against the corporation. Papinear v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co. 372.

2. In an action for money had and received, the plaintiff testified, against
the defendant's objection, that he went to the defendant with a promissory
note signed by A., and asked the defendant to get it discounted for the
plaintiff's use; that the defendant produced another note for a larger
amount signed by B., and said he would lend it to the plaintiff, and retain
the note of A., and take the plaintiff's note for the difference in amount
between the note of A. and the note of B., and hold these notes as collat-
eral security for the loan of the note of B.; that the plaintiff assented to
this proposal, and gave his note to the defendant; that the plaintiff had
the note of B. discounted; that, a few days before the note of A. and the
plaintiff's note became due, he learned that these notes were held by a
bank; that the defendant then told him that he had used the notes, and
that when the note of B., who had failed before this conversation oc-
curred, became due, the defendant would take care of it; that the plaintiff
paid all of the notes at their maturity, and offered the note of B. to the
defendant, and demanded of him the money paid on the other notes.
Held, that the defendaut had no ground of exception to the admission of
the plaintiff's evidence; and that, on the return of the note of B. to the
defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the action. Mayo v.
Peterson, 516.

See CONTRACT, 5, 6.

MONEY LENT.

See AUDITOR, 2.

MONEY PAID.

A receiptor who pays the amount of the execution issued on a judgment re-
covered against the debtor, after the officer has set off real estate of the
debtor to the creditor in full satisfaction of the execution, cannot maintain
an action against the debtor for money paid; and it is immaterial that the
levy of the execution on the real estate was made under an arrangement
between the receiptor and the creditor, by which the receiptor was to pay
the judgment and take a deed of the land from the creditor, and that the
land was afterwards sold, under a prior mortgage given by the the debtor,
for less than the amount of the mortgage debt. Woodward v. Munson,
102.

MORTGAGE.
I. Of Real Estate.

1. The occupation of a house on mortgaged premises, by a husband and wife,
the latter being the mortgagee, under an agreement between the husband
and the wife's mother, who was supposed to be the owner of part of the
premises, is not such a "possession of the premises" by the mortgagee,
within the Gen. Sts. c. 140, § 15, as will entitle the mortgagor, on a bill in
equity to redeem, to have the rent of the tenement applied towards the pay.
ment of the mortgage debt. Sanford v. Pierce, 146.

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