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or railing against the character of Buonaparte. I difavow any fuch intention. At the fame time, I must confefs, I have an old national prejudice about me fo far influencing my judgement, as to make me regard the blafphemer of his God as not precifely that fort of man with whom I could wish to treat; but any objection of this kind I readily wave, and with only to confider him in the character in which he forces himfelf upon the house, namely, as profefling a pacific difpofition, . and propofing a negociation for peace. I fay, I am bound to confider the character of the man as connected with his propofal, before I can feel fufficient inducement to tempt me to enter into negociation. I hall refer merely to the cafes in which Buonaparte has been the only agent, the fcenes in which he has been the fole performer: I fhall not place to his account the contribution impofed on Hamburgh, nor the conduct obferved by France towards Spain and Portugal, but I fhall refer you to the Cifalpine republic, Naples, Venice, Genoa, Tulcany, and Sardinia; for, in the cafe of all thefe, the conduct of France was the conduct of Buonaparte himfelf. With regard to Venice, what was his conduct to that flate? He entered it on the faith of a previous proclamation, avowing that his fole object was to protect it from falling under the power of Auftria. What was his firft a&? The diffolution of its government. What was his fecond? His furrender of it to the very power against which he declared his only object was to afford it protection. What were the circumftances of his conduct with refpect to the Cifalpine republic? A propofal of a treaty of commerce

and alliance was made to it by France, which the government of that republic had the audacity to decline; and for this free and juft exercife of its rights, the perfons who exercifed it were punished by Buonaparte. With regard to Malta, we have never heard of any aggreffion committed by her against France, any ground or pretence of hoftility; yet the attack upon that island was open, and that attack conducted by Buonaparte. The whole of this queftion would embrace a variety of inftances of fraud and unprovoked aggreffion too numerous in detail; I fhall therefore felect only fuch as immediately apply to the proper object. What, then, I afk, has been the conduct of Buonaparte with regard to Egypt? It is not pretended that there was any aggreffion on the part of the Ottoman Porte.But what has been the conduct of Buonaparte: His last act, before he left that country, was to fend a memorial to the grand vizier, ftating, that he came to it without any hofile intention; that his only obje& was to relieve him from the tyranny of the beys; and that he (the grand vizier) had only to defire him to withdraw with his army, and the order fhould be inftantly obeyed. But what does this man, who makes fuch pacific and friendly profeflions to the grand vizier, fay, when writing to general Kleber? He defires him to enter into a negociation with the Ottoman Porte, but to endeavour to prevent the evacuation of the country by the army, until after a general peace (a cry of "hear! hear!"), that he might ftill preferve a chance of returning to that country. We have this man ftated as a lover of peace; yet all this unprecedented conduct to the

Ottoman

Ottoman Porte, the old friend and ally of France, is the conduct of Buonaparte, who, in his propofals for negociation, plays the double dealer with that government to whom he profefles fincere attachment, while the inftructions to the refpectable officer whom he leaves behind are of a quite contrary import. These are the views of his character, of the most recent parts of his conduct, that I wish to confider; I regard him in the character in which he wishes to be underfood, as a negociator for peace; and I fancy the houfe has anticipated me in the inference which I mean to draw from them. This inference is, that, by the late revolution, we are deprived of all the criteria of fincerity and fidelity which we ought to find in a power with which we could negociate, and are obliged to reft on the fole character of the French conful himfelf, with this difadvantage and ftrong objection to it, that there is not a fingle cafe on record in which he has not violated his faith; and I ftate it again, and I am ready to prove, that in all this catalogue of crimes he himself has been the actor of the principal parts; and that not only when acting under the order of government, but from the uninfluenced impulfe of his own mind, and the dictates of his own confcience, in which capacity he appears in the feveral tranfactions alluded to, and in all of which he has conducted himself in utter contempt of faith or friendship. If I am right in fiating thefe facts, the conclufion I draw from them is, that we should be fure that there was fomething more of fincerity in the negociation which he now propofes, than characterifes that which he en

tered into with the Ottoman Porte; that there fhould be fome proof, arifing out of his conduct in the tranfactions with which he was connected to evince a truly pacific difpofition: but, unfortunately, nothing of this kind is to be found; the current runs the other way. In fhort there is not a fingle ftep on which you can get foot, that you do not find marked with hoftility and breach of faith. But it has been faid, why not make the experiment? If it fhould not fucceed, we fhould be just where we were before. This language I know has been held out of doors. But I alk, does any gentleman who hears me, feriously mean to fay, that in the prefent relative fituation of Europe, this would be an experiment perfectly innocent in its nature? If we fuccceded in the last campaign in calling forth the exertions of foreign power, in exciting the energies of Europe, and in making the most illuftrious efforts-if we have reafon to be proud of the share we have contributed to thefe atchievements, is it a matter of indifference to dif folve that connection to which they owe their birth, and to fend the other nations of Europe fcrambling for a peace, deferted and abandoned by us, their allies? Is this, I fay, a matter of indifference? and yet this would be the first effect of an acceptance of the overture. But this question I shall leave others to decide. I fhall only contend, that without fomething to rest upon for fincerity in the propofal, and fidelity in the obfervance, it would be a degree of infanity to open a negociation. On this point, I may be told, that the prefent reduced ftate of France affords an ample fecurity; but this is a double-edged

weapon,

weapon, that may cut both ways. The weaknels of France may produce a defire for negociation for the purpofe of gaining time, recruiting her ftrength, and alluming a more formidable attitude; but it affords no proof of defire, (when her private views fhall be attained) to conclude the negociation when en tered upon, or to obferve it when concluded. Are we then, I afk, to ftretch out our hands to nurfe and uphold the ufurpation of Buonaparte, to aflift him to confolidate his power, and become the inftrument of his ftrength, that we may fee it, when opportunity hall occur, turned against the powers that created it? Sir, before this line of conduct fhall be adopted, I hope minifters will paufe and weigh well the confequences to which it would lead,"

Mr. Dundas admitted that within thefe ten years paft, this country had twice entered into negociation with France: but he contended, that there was no part of adminiftration that was not deeply imprefled with a fenfe of danger at the time in the event of fuch negociation proving fuccefsful. He put the following questions: Whether in the event of a peace having been concluded at Lifle we should not be now at war? Whether the correlpondence with the Irith rebellion would not have gone on just as it has fince done? Could there be a doubt that the expedition to Egypt would have taken place? If a treaty of peace were actually figned, would Britain venture to difarm? How did Pruflia ftand? She had to maintain a large army to preferve her line of demarcation: how could we ftand? We could have a garrifon in every

foreign colony; fo that we would have all the expense of keeping up a large force, without the power of exercifing it. Would not a peace engage us to refrain from all hoftility against France, leaving her at liberty to act against the different governments of Europe, while our hands were tied up, and we should be held back from every thing but the expenfe. Under thefe circumflances he did not think that this government would act wifely, were it now to enter into negociation.

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Mr. Whitbread oblerved, had it not been for the interference, the folly, and the ambition of the other powers of Europe, the French revolution would, at this time have borne a very different complection : but that every attempt to reprefs its evils had only diffeminated them wider. A worfe effect had followed; the extinction of liberty in every country of Europe, under the pretext of counteracting the licentious principles of France. Mr. Dundas had faid, that from the commencement of the revolution, France had fhewn a fovereign contempt of treaties, and within thefe ten years past, had been at war with almost every ftate of Europe. In faying this the right honourable gentleman had only pronounced his own panegyric; for he had informed the houfe, that he thought it his duty to invite every power in Europe to unite in one common caufe againft France, the common enemy of mankind. In this he had fucceeded. But the views of the allied powers had been fruftrated. The want of good faith had been alleged as a reafon for not entering into a negociation with France. Mr. Whitbread afked if his majefty's minif ters had always acted on principles

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of good faith in their former negociations with France? During the miffion of lord Malmbury to Paris, the jacobin government, then exifting, was no obftacle to negociation in the eftimation of them who fent him. He was not commiffioned to infift on a renunciation, on their part, of exifting principles, or on acknowledgments tending to their crimination. Yet, without thefe eflentials, thefe preliminaries, his lordship expected good faith on their part to any treaty that might have been concluded: otherwife their attempt at negociation could not have been fincere. In the fecond negociation at Lifle, one let of negociators were recalled, and a more jacobinical fet fent in their places. Still no objection was ftarted to farther negociation. His majefly declared, in the face of all Europe, that he was ready to conclude a treaty with them, if their overtures had been at all reconcileable to the honour and interefts of his fubjects and allies. To difcountenance negociation, many arguments had been drawn from the character of the first conful, who was reprefented both as an infractor of treaties, and an unprincipled blafphemer. Every topic that could revile, and every art that could blacken, had been reforted to for the purpoles of political linder: and he was very fory to fee that the intercepted correfpondence, ftrengthened with notes, had made its appearance, with a view to preju dice the country against the first conful, and thereby to fet every hope of negociation at a diftance. It had been faid by Mr. Dundas that fince Buonaparte had been known to mankind, in no one in

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ftance had he ever observed a treaty or kept an armiftice. It was well known, Mr. Whitbread obferved, that the preliminaries of Leoben were not broken, or the peace with Auftria infringed by Buonaparte; for, before thefe events took place, he had left Europe. The conduct of Buonaparte, at Venice, Mr. Whitbread did not attempt to defend any more than that of Austria. As to the charge of mifconduct towards the Cifalpine republic, the ground of accufation was the entire act of the executive directory.With regard to what had been faid of treachery on the part of Buonaparte in ordering general Kleber to negociate with the Porte, but to delay the completion of the treaty till fuch time as he fhould hear from France, the completion of the treaty was the evacuation of Egypt, which Kleber might have been very well told to delay, without any reafonable charge of treachery on the fide of Buonaparte. It was faid that he who could have invaded Egypt ought never to be treated with. To feize and colonize that country, Mr. Whitbread obferved, had always been a favourite fcheme of the old government of France. The only difference between the two was, that the new government of France had executed what the old had only planned. Treachery, however, of that kind, was not confined to France. For Pruffia could feize Silefia, and three of the firit powers of Europe, while England was a tame fpectator, could divide and appropriate to themfelves the unfortunate kingdom of Poland. Yet Auftria and Ruffia, the chief agents in this tranfaction, were still our good and true allies; and with

this contradiction ftaring them in the face, minifters refufed to treat with any one whom they deemed treacherous and unjuft. 66 Buonaparte," faid Mr. Whitbread, " is full as good as they are. If he has broken treaties, fo have they if he has killed his ten thoufands, Suwarrow alfo has killed his ten thoufands." Mr. Whitbread having enumerated many infiances of the treachery, perfidy, and injuftice of the kings of France, afked whether it could really be fuppofed that it was really the wifh of the people of England to lavish their blood and treafure, for the purpose of reftoring to the throne of France the family of Bourbon? Could it be fuppofed that it was the duty of an Englishman to reflore a banished king to his throne, or a pope to his tiara?

Mr. Whitbread, then infifted, that we were now contending for one or the other of thefe two things to reinstate a Bourbon on the throne, or to exterminate the reft of thofe perfons in France who held jacobinical principles. If the former was the cafe, we were fighting, he thought, for an unattainable object, and the conteft must be endlefs: if for the latter, we were fighting for an opinion; and both were equally abfurd. Mr. Whitbread recommended it to the house, to confider the relative fituation of this country with her allies. The allies did not appear to enter at all into each others views. There feemed to be no regular points of union between them: no community of inter fts. This pofition Mr. Whitbread illuftrated. He was fully perfuaded that the prefent French government were fincerely

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defirous of peace, and that they would negociate if we would let them.

Mr. Canning was very much difpleafed at Mr. Whitbread's attempt to juftify the enormities of the French, by faying, that we ourfelves and our allies had been guilty of others little lefs flagrant. As a proof of this pofition, he had ftated, that our conduct was unwarrantable both towards the republic of Genoa and the grand duke of Tufcany. Had the Genoefe performed the duties of neutral nations, their rights would never have been infringed; but they had fent to the French clothes, provifions, military flores, and fupplies of every kind. As to the grand duke of Tulcany, lord Hervey had taken measures for the preservation of British property at Leghorn, and to prevent, as far as was in his power, the government of Tuscany from affifting the French; but he had done nothing which the general practice of nations did not entitle him to do. The court of Florence had complained; but fmall ftates were always irritable, and fenfible that they were able to infult, apt to think themselves infulted. Great ftrefs had been laid on the declaration of his majefty after breaking off the negociation of Life; but because he was willing to negociate, on certain terms then, did it follow that he ought to be fo now? Must a declaration be eternally binding, notwithstanding the greatest change of circumftances? The new conftitution, as it was called, of France, was more defpotic, and more deteftable than any that had gone before it; and unless it could be upheld by fome fupernatural power, like that of the Weird Sifters, in

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