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By these certificates it appears also, that the people were not surprized, but had sufficient notice of the governor's intentions, to enable them to provide for their safety. In a word, all the charges of cruelty against the Prussian commander, and soldiery, were fully overthrown.

This fire made a coup de mainim practicable; regular operations demanded time, and the King of Prussia was now in full march to wards Saxony. M. Daun retired from before the place on the 17th. The King, after crossing Lusatia, passing the Elbe, and joining his troops under Count Dohna and general Wedel, arrived trium. phantly at Dresden on the 20th. The armies of M. Daun and the empire gave way towards Bohemia, into which kingdom they soon after finally retreated, without enterprizing any thing further. Six sieges were raised almost at the same time; that of Colberg, carried on by general Palmbach, un. der the orders of marshal Fermor; that of Neiss, by M. de Harsch; that of Cosel, that of Dresden, by marshal Daun; the blockade of Torgau, by M. Haddic; and that of Leipsic, by the Prince of DeuxPonts.

About the time that the Austrians retired into winter quarters, the French did the same; and the Hanoverians permitted them to do it without molestation, the season being too far advanced, and their army perhaps not of sufficient strength for offensive operations; and Prince Ferdinand kept the field no longer. The British troops had no occasion of signalizing their bravery during this year; but without a battle the nation suffered a very considerable loss, and

was touched with a very deep and general sorrow. The Duke of Marlborough died in Munster, the zoth of October, of a fever, contracted by the fatigues of the campaign. Never did the nation lose in one man, a temper more candid and benevolent, manners more amiable and open, a more primitive integrity, a more exalted generosity, a more warm and feeling heart. He left all the enjoyments which an ample fortune and an high rank could bestow in the public eye; and which every milder virtue, every disposition to make and to be made happy, could give in a domestic life: he left these for the service of his country, and died for its defence, as he had lived for its ornament and happiness.

If we compare the events of this year with those of the last, we shall find in the actions of the present year, perhaps something less of that astonishing eclat; fewer battles; not so many nor so striking revolutions of fortune; but we may discover upon all sides far greater management, and a more studied and refined conduct; more artful movements, a more judicious choice of posts, more quick and vigorous marches. If in the last year, the King of Prussia was the hero of the imagination, he is this year the hero of the judgment; and we have, I think, reason to admire him upon juster principles. Obliged to evacuate Moravia, he throws him. self into Bohemia, and executes a retreat with all the spirit of an invasion. He marches more than an hundred miles through an enemy's country, followed and harassed by large armies, who are unable to obtain any advantages over him. Gaining at length his own territories, he engages the vast army of the Rus

Nor was the conduct of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick less worthy of admiration. Placed at the head of a body of troops, who were but lately obliged to lay down their arms, he found the enemy in possession of the whole open country, and of all the strong places in it. Commencing the campaign in the midst of a severe winter, without any place of strength in his hands, he drove the enemy from all those they held. obliged them to

He repass the Rhine, he followed and defeated them in a pitched battle. Being afterwards. obliged by the great force of France on its own frontier, and the nu merous armies they had in differ ent places, to repass the Rhine; he defended Lippe against numbers greatly superior, and though they defeated a part of his army, they were not able to turn their victory to the least advantage.-Prince Ferdinand's campaign may well pass for a perfect model of defensive operations.

sians, and defeats it. He is unable to follow his blow, but he disables them from striking any blow against that part of his dominions which he is obliged to leave. Whilst he is engaged with the Russians on the frontiers of Poland, the Austrians and Imperialists enter Saxony. Before they can do any thing decisive, the King is him self suddenly in Saxony, and by his presence at once disconcerts all their projects. The scene is again changed; they surprize him in his camp at Hohkirchen, two of his generals are killed, his army defeated, his camp is taken. They attack Silesia with a formidable army. Notwithstanding his late defeat; notwithstanding the great superiority of his enemies; notwithstanding the advantage of their posts; he makes an amazing sweep about all their forces, eludes their vigilance, renders their positions unprofitable; and marching with an astonishing rapidity into the remotest parts of Silesia, obliges the Austrian armies to retire with precipitation out of that province. Then he flies to the relief of Saxony, which his enemies had again profited of his absence to invade; and again by the same rapid and well conducted march, he obliges them to abandon their prize. Defeated by the Austrians, he acquired by his conduct all the advantages of the most compleat victory. He guarded all his possessions in such a manner, as to enable them all to endure. his absence for some short time; and he conducted his marches with such spirit, as did not make it necessary to them to hold out any longer; he made twice the circuit of his dominions, and in their turn he relieved them all,

The Austrians, in taking winter quarters, disposed their forces se as to form a chain of an amazing length from the frontiers of Moravia passing through Bohemia, all along the skirts of Silesia and the borders of Saxony. There the Imperial army joined this chain, and continued it through Thuringia and Franconia, where it was united to the quarters of the Prince de Soubise. These troops had fallen back from Hessc-Cassel, finding them selves unable to maintain their ground in the landgraviate. The Prince de Soubise's cantonments extended westward along the course of the Maine and Lahn, to meet those of M. de Contades, which stretched to the Rhine, and continued the chain beyond it, quite to

the

the Maese, so as to command the whole course of the Rhine on both sides, both upward and downward. Prince Ferdinand was unable to extend himself to such a length; and especially found it impracticabic to establish quarters on the other side of the Rhine; but he disposed his troops in the most advantageous manner in the bishopricks of Mun. ster, Paderborn and Hildesheim, and in the landgraviate of Hesse-Cassel. The several bodies may all unite with ease, and support each other. To preserve a communication be tween this and the Prussian army, as well as to break some part of that formidable chain of the enemy, the King sent some bodies of his troops into Thuringia, who dispossessed the army of the empire of several of their posts there, and they now threaten to penetrate still farther.

The King of Prussia, when he had a second time driven the Au`strians and Imperialists out of Saxony, resolved to keep no measures with that unhappy country. He declared that he was resolved no longer to consider it as a deposit, but as a country which he had twice subdued by his arms. He therefore ordered those of the King of Poland's privy council, who still remained at Dresden, to retire at a very short warning. But if the King of Prussia had a right, as perhaps he had, to consider Saxony as a lawful conquest, he certainly seemed not to consider the people as subjects, when he continued to exact the most severe contributions; and in a manner, too, very little becom. ing a lawful sovereign; for he surrounded the exchange with soldiers,

and confining the merchants in nara row lodgings on straw beds, he obliged them, by extreme suffering, to draw bills on their foreign cor respondents for very large sums.-This city had been quite exhausted by former payments, and had not long before suffered military execu tion. An enemy that acted thus, had acted severely; but when a country is entirely possessed by any power, and claimed as a conquest, the rights of war seem to cease; and the people have a claim to be governed in such a manner as becomes a just prince; especially when no extreme necessity in his affairs compels him to these rigorous

courses. To retaliate on these miserable people some part of the cruelties committed by the Russians on his dominions, seems to be very unreasonable, as it is but too obvious that the barbarity of that people could not be restrained, however it might be exasperated by the total destruction of Saxony. Such retaliations are odious and cruel. We heartily wish we could praise the King of Prussia as much for his temperate use of his conquest, as for those wonderful and heroic qualities by which he obtained it. We might be considered as partial in out account, if we had omitted to take notice of what is alledged against the King of Prussia, when we have spoken so fully of the outrages committed by his enemies. It is now time to turn our eyes from this great theatre towards lesser events, but such as will employ us altogether as agreeably-the operations of the British feets and ar mies in Europe and America against the French.

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CHAP XIII.

The burning of the ships at St. Malo. Taking of Cherbourg. Defeat at
St. Cas. Operations in America. Siege and taking of Louisbourg.
English army defeated at Ticonderoga. They take Frontenac. The
French abandon Fort du Quesne.
year 1758.

IN

N the beginning of the year, the good condition of our navy and our army; the spirit and popularity of the ministry; the wise choice of commanders, in contempt of vulgar and trivial maxims; the preva. lence of the contrary to all these among the enemy; gave us the best grounded hopes of a vigorous and successful campaign, Concerning the theatre of our operations there was some doubt. It was the opinion of some, that our push in Europe should be made on the side of Germany; and that we ought to strengthen the army of Prince Fer. dinand with such a respectable body of troops, as might enable that finished commander to exert all his talents, and improve to the utmost the advantages he had already obtained over the French. They ima. gined, that if an early and consider able reinforcement were sent to the prince, while the French army was yet in a distressed condition, and if in this condition that should receive any considerable blow, they would find it extremely difficult to retrieve it; and receiving this blow on the frontier of their own territories, the prince might carry the war into France itself; and thus very probably bring matters to a speedy de, cision, That in pursuing this plan a diversion on the coast of France was by no means excluded, and that on the contrary it must, on this plan, be attended with consequences infinitely more important than it could otherwise; that otherwise, France VOL. I,

Conclusion of the annals of the

might laugh at the little desultory ef. forts of an handful of men, who were to be embarked and disembarked with great difficulty and hazard, and which would always be obliged to fly at the first approach of an ene my. That whilst the French had only an army greatly inferior in number to engage on the side of Germany, they would always find themselves to be able to act abroad, and defend themselves at home.

On the other hand, it was strongly urged, that we ought to make the destruction of the French marine our great object, and to consider all continental operations only in a secondary light. That in sending a large body of English troops to the King's army on the Rhine, we must necessarily weaken our ef forts in America, and on the coast of France; and by drawing away all our forces, we must shake that internal security which invigorated all our operations abroad, That whilst we maintained an army of 50,000 foreigners in Germany, it would be the greatest imprudence to send also a large body of our own national troops into the same country, and by that means not only squander away our men, but employ almost every penny granted for the land service out of Great Britain ; a method which could not fail of exhausting us in a very short time. That the force already in Germany was sufficient to keep the French engaged, and that the proposed expeditions to France

would,

would, by attacking the coast, now in one part, now in another, and keeping all parts in continual alarms, necessarily detain a very considerable part of their forces at home, and thus make a powerful diversion, whilst it was pursuing what ought to be the grand perpetual object of all our operations, the destruction of the French mari. time power.

The latter opinion prevailed; but it was, however, so far modified by the arguments on the other side, that after some time a few regiments were sent into Germany, as we have before related. These and better reasons, no doubt, determined the operations on the coast of France; but whilst the necessary preparations were making, their destination was kept an inviolable secret; and now, as they had the year before, inspired France with no little terror. Two squadrons, by the lat. ter end of May, were in readi. ness for sailing; the greater un der Lord Anson, the smaller under commodore Howe, which was so designed to convoy the transports, and to favour the landing and reembarkment. The land forces consisted of sixteen battalions, and nine troops of light-horse: they were commanded by the late Duke of Marlborough. They sailed from Portsmouth; but as soon

June 1. as the fleet set sail, the squadron of my Lord Anson separated from the rest, and bore off to the Bay of Biscay, in order to spread the alarm more widely, and to observe the French squadron in-Brest: the other part of the fleet, which was commanded by commodore Howe, with the transports, arrived without any accident in Cancalle Bay, at a small distance from the city of St. Malo. Here the troops

landed without opposition;
and having fortified a post 5th.

near Cancalle (a post by nature
well fitted for defence), for the se-
curity of their retreat, they march-
ed in two columns to St. Maloes.
When the army arrived there, it
was soon visible that the town,
strongly situated on a peninsula,
communicating with the main land
only by a long and narrow cause-
way, was by no means a proper
object of a coup de main, and
though, for want of out-works, it
was ill qualified to sustain a regular
siege, yet our forces were, for
want of strength and artillery suf
ficient, altogether as ill qualified for
such an operation: they were there. :
fore contented with setting fire to
about an hundred sail of ship- 8th.'
ping, many of them privateers,
which lay under the cannon of the
town, and to several magazines
filled with naval stores. The da
mage was very considerable; yet
what is to be remarked, the enemy
did not fire a single shot on the de
tachment employed in this service.
Having nothing more to do on
this side, they retired to Cancalle,
and re-embarked with as
little opposition as they met
with at landing, the land and
sea commanders having made all
the dispositions with great judg-.

ment.

12th.

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