time, always remained the favourite philosophy of the Germans. On the principle of this doctrine, it is in Reason alone that truth and reality are to be found. Experience affords only the occasions on which intelligence reveals to us the necessary and universal notions of which it is the complement; and these notions constitute at once the foundation of all reasoning, and the guarantee of our whole knowledge of reality. Kant, indeed, pronounced the philosophy of Rationalism to be a mere fabric of delusion. He declared, that a science of existence was beyond the compass of our faculties; that pure reason, as purely subjective, and conscious of nothing but itself, was therefore * In the philosophy of mind, subjective denotes what is to be referred to the thinking subject, the Ego; objective what belongs to the object of thought, the Non-Ego.-It may be safe, perhaps, to say a few words in vindication of our employment of these terms. By the Greeks the word vжоkelμevov was equivocally employed to express either the object of knowledge, (the materia circa quam,) or the subject of existence, (the materia in qua.) The exact distinction of subject and object was first made by the schoolmen; and to the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what precision and analytic subtlety they possess. These correlative terms correspond to the first and most important distinction in philosophy; they embody the original antithesis in consciousness of self and not-self,—a distinction which, in fact, involves the whole science of mind; for psychology is nothing more than a determination of the Subjective and the Objective, in themselves, and in their reciprocal relations. Thus significant of the primary and most extensive analysis in philosophy, these terms, in their substantive and adjective forms, passed from the schools into the scientific language of Telesius, Campanella, Berigardus, Gassendi, Descartes, Spinosa, Leibnitz, Wolf, &c. Deprived of these terms, the Critical philosophy, indeed the whole philosophy of Germany, would be a blank. In this country, though familiarly employed in scientific language, even subsequently to the time of Locke, the adjective form seems at length to have dropt out of the English tongue. That these words waxed obsolete was perhaps caused by the ambiguity which had gradually crept into the signification of the substantives. Object, besides its proper signification, came to be abusively applied to denote motive, end final cause,—a meaning not recognised by Johnson. This innovation was probably borrowed from the French, in whose language the word had been similarly corrupted after the commencement of the last century (Dict. de Trevoux, voce Objet.) Subject in English, as sujet in French, had been also perverted into a synonym for object, taken in its proper meaning, and had thus returned to the original ambiguity of the corresponding term in Greek. It is probable that the logical application of the word (subject of attribution or predication) facilitated or occasioned this confusion. In using the terms, therefore, we think that an explanation, but no apology, is required. The distinction is of paramount importance, and of infinite application, not only in philosophy proper, but in It is grammar, rhetoric, criticism, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, theology. adequately expressed by no other terms; and if these do not already enjoy a prescriptive right, as denizens of the language, it cannot be denied, that, as strictly analogical, they would be well entitled to sue out their naturalisation.— Not that these terms were formerly always employed in the same signification unable to evince the reality of aught beyond the phænomena of its personal modifications. But scarcely had the critical philosopher accomplished the recognition of this important principle, the result of which was to circumscribe the field of speculation by narrow bounds; than from the very disciples of his school there arose philosophers, who, despising the contracted limits, and humble results, of a philosophy of observation, re-established, as the predominant opinion, a bolder and more uncompromising Rationalism than any that had ever previously obtained for their countrymen the character of philosophic visionaries ; "Gens ratione ferox, et mentem pasta chimæris." Founded by Fichte, but evolved by Schelling, this doctrine regards experience as unworthy of the name of science: because, as only of the phænomenal, the transitory, the dependent, it is only of that which, having no reality in itself, cannot be established as a valid basis of certainty and knowledge. Philosophy must therefore either be abandoned, or we must be able to seize the One, the Absolute, the Unconditioned, immediately, and in itself. And this they profess to do by a kind of intellectual vision. In this act, reason, soaring not only above the world of and contrast which they now obtain. For a history of these variations, see 'Dissertations on Reid,' p. 806, sq.-Since this article was written, the words have in this country re-entered on their ancient rights; they are now in common use.] * [This line, which was quoted from memory, has, I find, in the original, “furens;" therefore translated-"Minds mad with reasoning-and fancy-fed." The Author certainly had in his eye the "ratione insanias" of Terence. It is from a satire by Abraham Remi, who, in the former half of the seventeenth century, was Professor Royal of Eloquence in the University of Paris; and it referred to the disputants of the Irish College in that illustrious school. The "Hibernian Logicians" were, indeed, long famed over the continent of Europe for their acuteness, pugnacity, and barbarism; as is recorded by Patin, Bayle, Le Sage, and many others. The learned Menage was so delighted with the verse, as to declare that he would give his best benefice (and he enjoyed some fat ones) to have written it. It applies not only with real, but with verbal, accuracy to the German Rationalists; who in Philosophy (as Aristotle has it), " in making reason omnipotent, show their own impotence of reason," and in Theology (as Charles II. said of Isaac Vossius), "believe everything but the Bible."] +["Intellectuelle Anschauung."-This is doubly wrong.-1°, In grammati cal rigour, the word in German ought to have been "intellectuale." 2°, In philosophical consistency the intuition ought not to have been called by its authors (Fichte and Schelling) intellectual. For, though this be, in fact, absolutely more correct, yet relatively it is a blunder; for the Intuition, as intended by them, is of the higher faculty, the Reason (Vernunft), and not of their lower, the Understanding or Intellect (Verstand). In modern German Philosophy, Verstand is always translated by Intellectus; and this again corresponds to Noûs.] sense, but beyond the sphere of personal consciousness, boldly places itself at the very centre of absolute being, with which it claims to be, in fact, identified; and thence surveying existence in itself, and in its relations, unveils to us the nature of the Deity, and explains, from first to last, the derivation of all created things. M. Cousin is the Apostle of Rationalism in France; and we are willing to admit that the doctrine could not have obtained a more eloquent or devoted advocate. For philosophy he has suffered; to her ministry he has consecrated himself-devoted without reserve his life and labours. Neither has he approached the sanctuary with unwashed hands. The editor of Proclus and Descartes, the translator and interpreter of Plato, and the promised expositor of Kant, will not be accused of partiality in the choice of his pursuits; while his two works, under the title of Philosophical Fragments, bear ample evidence to the learning, elegance, and distinguished ability of their author. Taking him all in all, in France M. Cousin stands alone: nor can we contemplate his character and accomplishments without the sincerest admiration, even while we dissent from the most prominent principle of his philosophy. The development of his system, in all its points, betrays the influence of German speculation on his opinions. His theory is not, however, a scheme of exclusive Rationalism; on the contrary, the peculiarity of his doctrine consists in the attempt to combine the philosophy of Experience, and the philosophy of Reason, into one.-The following is a concise statement of the fundamental positions of his system: Cousin Reason, or intelligence, has three integrant elements, affording three regulative principles, which at once constitute its nature, be and govern its manifestations. These three Ideas severally suppose each other, and, as inseparable, are equally essential and equally primitive. They are recognised by Aristotle and by Kant in their several attempts to analyse intelligence into its principles; but though the Categories of both philosophers comprise all the elements of thought, in neither list are these elements naturally co-arranged, or reduced to an ultimate simplicity. The first of these Ideas, elements, or laws, though fundamentally one, our author variously expresses, by the terms unity, identity, substance, absolute cause, the infinite, pure thought, &c.; (we would briefly call it the Unconditioned.)-The second, he denominates plurality, difference, phænomenon, relative cause, the finite, determined thought, &c.; (we would style it the Conditioned.) These two elements are relative and correlative. The first, though absolute, is not conceived as existing absolutely in itself; it is conceived as an absolute cause, as a cause which cannot but pass into operation; in other words, the first element must manifest itself in the second. The first two Ideas are thus connected together as cause and effect; each is only realised through the other; and this their connection or correlation, is the third integrant element of intelligence. Reason, or intelligence, in which these Ideas appear, and which, in fact, they make up, is not individual, is not ours, is not even human; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal to us, is our free and voluntary activity; what is not free and not voluntary, is adventitious to man, and does not constitute an integrant part of his individuality. Intelligence is conversant with truth; truth, as necessary and universal, is not the creature of my volition; and reason, which, as the subject of truth, is also universal and necessary, is consequently impersonal. We see, therefore, -th by a light which is not ours, and reason is a revelation of God in man. The Ideas of which we are conscious belong not to us, but to absolute intelligence. They constitute, in truth, the very mode and manner of its existence. For consciousness is only possible under plurality and difference, and intelligence is only possible through consciousness. The divine nature is essentially comprehensible. For the three Ideas constitute the nature of the Deity; and the very nature of ideas is to be conceived. God, in fact, exists to us, only in so far as he is known; and the degree of our knowledge must always determine the measure of our faith. The relation of God to the universe is therefore manifest, and the creation easily understood. To create, is not to make something out of nothing, for this is contradictory, but to originate from self. We create so often as we exert our free causality, and something is created by us, when something begins to be by virtue of the free causality which belongs to us. To create is, therefore, to cause, not with nothing, but with the very essence of our being,-with our force, our will, our personality. The divine creation is of the same character. God, as he is a cause, is able to create; as he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create. In creating the universe, he does not draw it from nothing; he draws it from himself. The creation of the universe is thus necessary; it is a manifestation of the Deity, but not the Deity absolutely in himself; it is God passing into activity, but not exhausted in the act. The universe created, the principles which determined the creation are found still to govern the worlds of matter and mind. Two Ideas and their Connection explain the intelligence of God; two laws in their counterpoise and correlation explain the material universe. The law of Expansion is the movement of unity to variety; the law of Attraction is the return of variety to unity. In the world of mind the same analogy is apparent. The study of consciousness is psychology. Man is the microcosm of existence; consciousness, within a narrow focus, concentrates a knowledge of the universe and of God; psychology is thus the abstract of all science, human and divine. As in the external world, all phænomena may be reduced to the two great laws of Action and Reaction; so, in the internal, all the facts of consciousness may be reduced to one fundamental fact, comprising in like manner two principles and their correlation; and these principles are again the One or the Infinite,—the Many or the Finite,—and the Connection of the infinite and finite. In every act of consciousness we distinguish a Self or Ego,) and something different from self, a Non-ego; each limited and modified by the other. These, together, constitute the finite element. But at the same instant when we are conscious of these existences, plural, relative, and contingent, we are conscious likewise of a superior unity in which they are contained, and by which they are explained ;-a unity absolute as they are conditioned, substantive as they are phænomenal, and an infinite cause as they are finite causes. This unity is GOD. The fact of consciousness is thus a complex phænomenon, comprehending three several terms: (1) The idea of the Ego and Non-ego as Finite; (2) The idea of something else as Infinite; and 39, The idea of the Relation of the finite element to the infinite. These elements are revealed, in themselves and in their mutual connection, in every act of primitive or Spontaneous consciousness. They can also be reviewed by Reflection in a voluntary act; but here reflection distinguishes, it does not create. The three Ideas, the three Categories of intelligence, are given in the original act of instinctive apperception, obscurely, indeed, and without contrast. Reflection analyses and discriminates the elements of this primary synthesis; and as Will is the condition of reflection, and will at the same time is personal, the Categories, as |