nary habits and tastes of his class Mr Douglas's work may seem, we are bound to say that it is not chargeable with the faults which generally mark the efforts of a mere amateur. Whatever may be its imperfections-and those we shall have occasion to point out are but too considerable—they are not such as spring from any deficiency of preparation in philosophical learning, or from any indisposition to sound the deeper parts of the subject. His reading appears to have ranged over a field of no inconsiderable extent; indeed, we suspect he has employed more time and pains in making himself acquainted with the opinions of others— in trying to comprehend what is incomprehensible, and to reconcile what is irreconcilable in those opinions-than in prosecuting investigations commenced on his own account. For, besides that his work is not distinguished by much original speculation, we find in it but few traces of those exact and methodical habits of thought, which well-conducted metaphysical researches naturally tend to generate.

Mr Douglas, however, as is probably known to most of our readers, is by no means new to the labours of authorship; having previously published several well-written works on some of the most interesting and important subjects that can engage the human attention-such, namely, as relate to the religious, moral, and social advancement of our species. But though these subjects are connected, at certain points, with the topics which he has here undertaken to discuss, he may be considered, on the whole, as having ventured on a new field.

We should suspect Mr Douglas to have entered on the composition of the present work without any very definite views or objects. He does not, we believe, profess to have any opinions absolutely new on the theory of mind generally, or on the particular questions which it involves; neither can his work be taken, whether in intention or effect, as a systematic outline of the science of mind in what may be regarded its present state. Its character, so far as it possesses any distinctive character at all, is that of a commentary on the history and more prominent doctrines of mental philosophy. In composing it, however, the author seems never to have exactly settled with himself what class of readers he meant more especially to address. Written in that abrupt allusive style, which supposes in the reader a tolerable degree of familiarity with the subject, it yet communicates little beyond what, on that supposition, must be already known. But passing over this defect, and taking the work in the character of a commentary, we cannot but regard its author as very indifferently fitted for discharging what should be the chief part of a commentator's office-namely, to clear up the darker,

Mr

and disentangle the more perplexed parts of the subject. Douglas is a man of a well-stored and contemplative mind; and the work presents not a few specimens of acute observation, and of ingenious and striking reflection; but he almost uniformly fails in combining his materials with reference to any definite result. He is essentially destitute of that which is vulgarly, but expressively, called a clear head. The work is full of examples of his inability to discriminate, in a complicated enquiry, the exact point on which the dispute turns; or when that point has been discriminated, to preserve it free from intermixture with other allied or resembling questions. He is also deficient in the faculty of perceiving the relation and dependency of the different members of an argument or exposition; and in the art of stating them according to their natural order and connexion. His mind, indeed, presents a singular mixture of acuteness and obtuseness. With evidences of a capacity to apprehend the nicest distinctions, he often confounds subjects the most easily separable. While affording what might be taken as satisfactory indications that he sees his way clearly through a subject, he no sooner enters into it than he stumbles and wanders like one blind. It is not the least singular amongst his peculiarities, that often, whilst himself exhibiting the most helpless perplexity, or labouring under the most inextricable confusion, he yet professes to have afforded a complete key to all the difficulties of the subject under discussion. Indeed, he is seldom more thoroughly unintelligible than when he appears to feel satisfied of having placed a point beyond all farther possibility of doubt or dispute.

Mr Douglas, however, is not, properly speaking, a wandering or discursive writer. Between a wandering style and that which he here exemplifies, there is much the same difference as in music between modulating into a variety of keys, and frequently changing the pitch on the same key. He does not diverge from his subject-he moves in parallels to it; sometimes in near parallels, but not in the line of it, and not long in one parallel. The motion of his thoughts is like that of a knight in the game of chess, which is neither backward, forward, sideway, nor diagonal, but, with every leap in a certain course, a start out of it. Or, as it is common to speak of a vein of thought, we should say that the vein of Mr Douglas's thoughts is not only separated by frequent interstices; but that the opposite sides of the fracture do not correspond-each of the severed masses being either somewhat heaved up, or somewhat depressed.

The work consists of two principal divisions, respectively entitled, Speculative Opinions,' and 'Investigation by Induc'tion.' As we shall require all the space we can devote to it,

for the remarks which we have to offer on some points touched upon in the second part, we can notice but very generally that division which is entitled 'Speculative Opinions.' To the A whole of this division, the observation already made applies; that, while the information it contains is of too desultory and incomplete a kind to be in any degree available to one entering on the study of philosophical history, it has too little of novelty to excite much interest in one further advanced. In the facts, of course, much novelty is not to be looked for; and in Mr Douglas's manner of stating and commenting upon them, (though he is not without occasional indications of depth and acuteness,) there is such a want of distinctness and continuity of thought, that one can rarely carry away from the perusal any thing of a precise or definite character. In the mode in which the earlier stages of philosophical history are treated, we think we discern something like an attempt to hide at once our ignorance of ancient systems, and the futilities and absurdities of these systems, so far as we do know them, under an assemblage of pompous words.

In his desire, indeed, to confer an interest on this part of his subject, Mr Douglas sometimes appears to sacrifice the consistency and connexion of his statements to the mere graces of composition; and to use phrases that 'become the mouth well,' without much caring whether they are otherwise applicable or appropriate. Apparently seeking to avoid the fault of Bruckerwho, as he complains,' stripped the materials he had collected of • their beauty and spirit, and flung them together, a mere mass 'destitute of symmetry and life'-Mr Douglas tries to enter into the spirit and feelings, and even to assume something of the manner, of an ancient. This ambitious design will, we think, tend to lead the inexperienced inquirer into a habit of accepting sounds instead of sense-(for what are most of the systems and opinions that Mr Douglas has occasion to describe, but a set of imposing terms without meaning?)-and certainly cannot supply, in the eyes of persons of more mature judgment, the defects on account of which the work of Brucker is disliked. The fact is, that Mr Douglas appears to have been himself to a certain extent imposed upon, by the specious jargon so often passed off for philosophy; at least we should judge so from the tone of gravity and intelligence with which he sometimes discusses systems and opinions, of which all that can be truly said is, that they are utterly destitute of sense or meaning. It is but just to say, however, that many parts of this division of the work are very agreeably written.

We may

mention, as an instance, an account of Cardan, containing some curious particulars, narrated in a strain of amusing pleasantry.

We have already noticed a peculiar sort of incoherency or unconnectedness that often characterises Mr Douglas's observations-a sort of dislocation, as it were, of his thoughts, by which his premises are always slipping out of the joint that should unite them to his conclusions. The following passage may be quoted as an instance of this :

Truth is the conformity of our thoughts with the nature of things; in order, therefore, to arrive at truth, we must become acquainted with external things by means of induction. Induction, therefore, according to Aristotle's principles, is the great source of knowledge. Dialectics only arrange the truths we have already acquired. But here there is a great opposition between the principles and the practice of Aristotle; he has sedulously cultivated dialectics, and neglected the true logic-the method of induction.

He

The reason of this contradiction is found in a peculiarity of Aristotle's philosophy-which, though it alone sufficiently explains his tenets, yet appears to be neglected by his commentators, he set aside the principles of Plato, without substituting any certain principles in their stead. rejected the ideas of Plato as absurd, because they were nothing more than "eternal objects of sense;" but what is the "form" ("eidos") of Aristotle, but the "idea" of Plato, mutilated and imperfect? Each take [takes] the same view of matter, that it is mere capability. Plato explains whence it derived the forms which we see it possessed of; but whence are the forms of Aristotle ?-they are the very absurdities that he attributes to his master, "eternal sensibles;" whereas the ideas of Plato are themselves impressed upon this fleeting and changing world.

'The same defect attends the Deity of Aristotle when compared with the Deity of Plato,-the theory of Plato may be visionary, but it is complete-no links are wanting to the hypothesis-its only want is the want of reality. The Deity of Aristotle is the Deity of Plato stripped of the logos or intellectual world-stripped of his moral attributes, and reduced to be only the first mover and the first cause.

'The same explanation applies to dialectics and induction. Dialectics are the art of carrying on a dispute-for dialectica is the art of dialogue, -and a dialogue possessed little interest unless the speakers disagreed. Dialectics were an engrossing pursuit of the Greeks; the search after truth was less thought of than victory over an antagonist. This, indeed, was the great fault imputed to the Sophists; but none of their philosophers, not even Socrates himself, was entirely free from sophistry. As sects increased, disputes multiplied likewise; and their time, their thoughts, and their writings were expended upon endless strifes. The Pythagoreans furnished the ten categories, and the Eleatics abundance of arguments, which Zeno, Euclid, and Stilpo reduced into dialectics and Aristotle completed the logic, falsely so called, of the Greeks, by perfecting the syllogism. Aristotle had justly remarked, that induction of particulars must precede dialectics, or the inference from universals. This was true, according to his metaphysics, which referred the origin of knowledge to the senses. The logic of the Greeks was, therefore, more suitable to the

:

philosophy of Plato, who considered the universal notions inherent in the mind as the basis of knowledge, than to the opinions of Aristotle, who, if he had formed his dialectics according to his own theory, should have laid the chief stress upon induction, and considered dialectics as a very subordinate branch in the conduct of the understanding.'—P. 56-59.

Here it will be observed, that the avowed object of the author is to account for the contradiction between the principles and the practice of Aristotle,' exhibited in the sedulous cultivation of dialectics, to the neglect of induction. And the reason of this contradiction is stated to be, that he set aside the principles of Plato without substituting any certain principles in their 'stead.' But how the reason given explains the contradiction, we cannot, by any powers of penetration with which we are gifted, discover. Of the comparison between the eidos of Aristotle, and the idea of Plato, we neither understand the meaning nor the aim. The remainder of the quotation, if somewhat more intelligible, and even presenting some just and ingenious observations, is at least as foreign to the purpose specified.

In his chapter on Perception,' (the first of the second part of his work,) Mr Douglas has presented the subject in the stage at which Dr Reid left it; without adverting to that more minute and exact analysis of the phenomena of perception which has been effected by later writers, particularly Brown and Mill. In stating that our sensations are attended with the immediate perception of external objects, and that our perceptions (contrary to what had been maintained by the sceptical writers) are distinct from sensations, Dr Reid was right. He was wrong in supposing (as he seems to have done) that the perception is connected, by an original law of our nature, with the sensation; so that alongst with the sensation, there is conveyed, at once and from the first, a belief of external existence. For our own part, we think there is no proposition in the whole range of metaphysical science more certain than this, that none of the five external senses, nor all of them togetheras distinct from the power of voluntary motion and its accompanying muscular sensations-could ever have given us an idea of the existence of matter;-nay, we will say that without any of the external senses, and with that of voluntary motion, we should have better attained an idea of matter than on the reverse supposition. Mr Douglas allows that three of the senses (smelling, taste, and hearing) give no idea of the existence of matter; but he supposes that by these senses (as, for instance, by the 'smell of the rose) we become acquainted with an existence 'which is separate from and independent of our own.' This appears to us altogether incorrect. That' (to use the words