Neceffity, in Contradiftinction to a natural, or ra"ther an unnatural Neceffity, outward Coaction, or "Force upon us by external Circumftances. Thus "our natural Defire of Good is a general fixed Prin

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ciple, which inevitably determines us in all our "Actions; and whoever attends to what paffes in "his own Mind, will find feveral Paffions or Af"fections in it, exciting to this End: fome of which, "as more ftrictly regarding the Agent himfelf, are "called private Paffions; and others, regarding the "Syftem with which he is connected, are called

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publick or benevolent Paffions. The Exercise of "the focial Paffions is our highest Enjoyment; and "the confiftent Gratification of all the Paffions, private and publick, is our greateft Happiness; "which is always obtain'd in Proportion to our De"grees of Knowledge, Power, and external Circum"ftances.--- And thus Virtue hath, and, in my Opi

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nion, only can have, a Foundation on the neceffita"rian Scheme.--- To fuppofe a dependent Being acting contrary to the Intention and Will of the Being "on whom it depends, is an exprefs Contradiction. "-- And, granting that a Being of perfect Good"nefs, Wifdom, and Power, is the Author and Go "vernor of the Universe, every thing in it must "be for the beft, good, perfect, and according to "his Intention and immediate Direction.--- As to the "Evils which come to pafs, while a perfect Being prefides, they muft be only relatively, or appa"rently fo, but really good in the whole Scheme of "Things. It is evidently incompatible with the "Character of a perfect Being to make any of his "Works ill, or to permit any of them to run wrong "fo as to need mending."

In the Anfwer to this, Mr. Jackfon takes notice alfo in what Particulars Mr. Dudgeon and he are come to an Agreement, and in what they yet differ. He is pleased that Mr. Dudgeon fees and owns, That we are really exiftent Minds and intelligent Beings distinct from God, and dependent upon him. [And certain it

is, the Stile of Mr. Dudgeon's laft Letter is fuch, as denotes his thinking in this Manner; tho' yet he has made no formal Acknowledgement, as I can fee, of its being his Sentiment.] He profeffes, on the other hand, to concur with Mr. Dudgeon, in fuppofing, That our Existence and all our Powers are continually fupported by the infinite omniprefent Subftance and Power of God; but its being fo does not imply either that our Minds are not the Subject of Properties, diftinct from the Attributes of God, or that what we call our Action is only the Effect of Activity in God, and mere Paffiveness in us. He thinks therefore that Mr. Dudgeon is mistaken in fancying he feels that God affects him with the Ideas of Pleasure and Pain, independent of his Will; he muft feel, he tells him, that many of his Ideas are the Effect of voluntary Reflection; that he chufes to revive fome which were before received, and to form others by Comparison and Compofition of fimple Ideas. This, as he adds, is his own, not God's act; and in refpect of those Ideas, in the Perception of which we are paffive, our Affent or Diffent in point of Action is still voluntary.

Part of this Letter is employed in evincing the Existence of material Substance diftinct from the Subftance of God, and in overthrowing Mr. Dudgeon's Hypothefis relating to it, the Foundation of which is, that one Mind can only excite Ideas in others, without the Medium of Matter. But this, which I look upon as only an incidental Point, I barely mention, that I may give the Reader a fuller Idea of the main Subjects of the Controverfy. One of these has been pretty well difcufs'd, viz. the Existence of Subftances diftinct from that of the Deity; of the other here. follows a brief Abstract.

1ft, Mr. Jackson no way approves of Mr. Dudgeon's talking of a voluntary, and at the fame Time, neceflary Activity of God, and Paffiveness in us; or of his faying God acts neceffarily, and fo in the perfectest Manner. On the contrary, as he afferts, to act neceffarily, is indeed not to act, but to be acted

upon,

upon, which is an Imperfection; and is that Paffivenefs which diftinguifheth dependent Beings from God. Agency and Neceffity in the fame Respects, as Mr. Dudgeon fuppofes, are an Affociation of Ideas which are incompatible, and deftroy each other. If the Divine Mind by Neceffity (external or internal) and not by Will exerted God's Power, in the Production of Things, every Thing would be neceffarily eternal, infinite, and immutable, and fo independent; which we fee is not the Cafe.

2dly, Another Error of Mr. Dudgeon that Mr.Jackson opposes is, his fancying that human Virtue is confiftent with Neceffity. Whereas, if we acted neceffarily, as we neceffarily perceive, approve, and disapprove, we could neither be capable of Virtue or Vice, Good or Evil; nor confequently ought to be capable of Pain or Pleasure, Happiness or Mifery, as the Confequence of them; unless we fuppofe Virtue and Vice in mere Perception and Motion.

On this Ground, Virtue must be of an indifferent Nature, as all necessary Perceptions and Motions are, and can be but nominally diftinct from Vice: * Neceffity evidently destroys all Duty and Disobedience, Merit or Demerit.

Lastly, Mr. Jackfon blames Mr. Dudgeon for making Liberty to be acting contrary to the Intention and Will of God, whereas this is only true of Neceffity. The very Idea, he fays, of Liberty, fupposeth it to be God's Will, that rational Beings fhould act freely one Way or the other; and that he gives them Power to make themselves Happy or Miferable,

*It is flrange that fo profound a Metaphyfician as Mr. Jackson fhould fay, there can be but a nominal Diftinction between Virtue and Vice upon the neceffitarian Scheme; whereas nothing is more evident than that their Diftinction cannot be any how affected by any Scheme at all. It is exactly the fame upon that of Neceffity as on the other of Liberty. They wont indeed be Virtue and Vice upon the former as upon the latter Scheme; but however their Nature may change, their Diftinction is immutable. Every Man must be satisfied of this upon a Review of his Ideas of what is commonly called Vice and Virtue.

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by Obedience or Difobedience to his Laws; and fo they are far from being independent, as Mr. Dudgeon argues: And thus it is God's Will that final Happinefs and Misery should not be the Effect of blind Neceffity, but of free Agency. If human Actions were neceffary, or determined by the immediate Direction of God, without any Will or proper Agency of our own, they would be invariably right, wife, and good, as being determined by the Rectitude, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, and fo moral Evil could not have place in us any more than in God himfelf; otherwife we muft fuppofe (what is the greatest Abfurdity) a perfectly good Being to be the Author of real Evil, a perfectly wife Being to be the Author of Folly; and that he forceth us to act contrary to his own Nature and Will, and then makes us miferable for fo doing. If God acts thus by his Will, he is a malevolent Being; if by the Neceffity of his Nature, he is ftill an imperfect Being; and every Way the Scheme of Neceffity is a Scheme of Providence which destroys all Divine Perfection, and ends in Atheism.

I could hardly forbear fmiling, in looking over thefe Letters, to obferve, how the Opponents alternately triumph on one another's fancied Conversion to their Antagonist's Opinions; when I am perfuaded their Readers can discover very little Agreement, if any at all, between them. So here Mr. Dudgeon, in his Answer to the Letter from which I have just now cited the foregoing Paragraph, is glad that Mr. Jackson and he are of one Mind about the first and grand Subject of Debate, viz. The Existence of one only immenfe Subftance; nay, as Mr. Dudgeon reprefents the Matter, Mr. Jackfon has confequentially given up the Reality of material Subftance; and fo may be thought, by fuch as will enquire no farther, to have yielded to Mr. Dudgeon in that Respect also. But be this laft Point as it will, or however they unite in the prime Subject of the Controverfy, there is another which that led them into, viz, The Nature of Neceffity or Fate, and the Foundation and Diftination

Diftinction of Virtue and Vice upon that Scheme, with respect to which they are ftill at variance. Mr. Jackfon yet thinks that the Scheme of Neceffity ends in Atheism whereas Mr. Dudgeon, for his Part, cannot fee that it does, but on the contrary, that, when rightly explained, it ends in Theifm. And this he endeavours to evince, by firft fhewing, How the Actions of God are at the fame time neceffary, voluntary, and good; and next, How the Actions of Men are neceffary, voluntary, virtuous, or vicious; and lastly, though imperfect, confpiring to the greateft Good in the whole. And,

Ift," To be acted upon by another, he allows, " is an Imperfection, and this cannot poffibly be the "Neceffity whereby God acts. But God acts by a

Neceffity of his own Nature, i. e. from his natural "Difpofition, which is the Spring of all his Actions, " and which is the Thing that denominates a Being, "good, evil, or felfifh. If, fays he, it is a bene"volent Difpofition, then it is ftiled good; if it is "a Difpofition to make fenfible Beings unhappy, "then it is called evil; and if it is a Difpofition "to purfue his own Happiness, without Regard "either to the Happiness or Mifery of other Beings, "but as they conduce to his own Happiness, then "it is termed selfish.

"The natural Difpofition of God to communi"cate Happiness is the necessary Caufe of his willing "it, and of his Knowledge and Power being applied "for this End. And thus it appears, that Willing "and Acting for the Happiness of fenfible Beings "are the natural neceffary Effects of his natural Dif"pofition, which is neceffarily benevolent. And fo "far as we are convinced of a Being's acting neceffa "rily from a benevolent or good natural Difpofition, "fo much our Love of that Being, our Truft in, "and Submiffion to him, increaseth: So far is the "Notion of Neceffity, or of God's acting neceffari"ly in confequence of his natural Difpofition, from deftroying Religion, that it is the beft Foundation

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