The History of the Works of the Learned ...

ral Government of the World; the Nature of Neceffity and Fate, and of Liberty of Action; and the Foundation, Distinction, and Confequences of Virtue and Vice, Good and Evil. It was occafioned by two Books of Mr. Jackson's, one entituled, The Existence and Unity of God proved from his Nature and Attributes. The other being the Defence of it.

Mr. Dudgeon had carefully perufed these Books, and he thought that Mr. Jackfon had therein fully demonftrated the neceffary Existence of God, his Eternity, Immenfity, and Unity: but then he could frame no Idea of his Power being exerted ad Extra, frequently fuppofed and argued from in both thofe Treatifes: nay, he apprehended a Power exerted either from Eternity or in Time, ad Extra, with respect to the immenfe Being, to be impoffible; and the Suppofition of it, or of any Thing's exifting, in confequence thereof, ad Extra, while nothing can be imagined to exift externally to the immenfe Substance, a Contradiction in Terms.

Mr. Jackson, in Answer to this, first defines the Meaning of God's exerting Power ad Extra to be, "The Exertion of Power in the Production or Go"vernment of Things of extraneous Effence and "Substance, or fuch as are not his Subftance, and "whose Existence is in Space, and comprehended "by the immenfe omnipresent Subftance of God." And then he directly afferts, in Oppofition to Mr. Dudgeon, that "The Subftance of God comprehending all Things, does not exclude the Existence "of Things comprehended by it, or make them to "be his Substance: nor does the Nature of one "immense Being exclude the Poffibility of the Ex"istence of other Beings, whether finite or infinite; "but only of another immenfe Being of the fame ❝ Kind."

This did not prove fatisfactory to Mr. Dudgeon, who in a fecond Letter repeats and enforces his Objection. "Exertion of Power, fays he, hath a neceffary Relation to particular Place, Time, Mo

«tion,

tion, Change; all which Ideas are contradictory to our Ideas of an immenfe Subftance. ---- But fup"pofing the Existence of other Subftances, in confequence of God's Exertion of Power, to be poffible, yet the immenfe Substance cannot comprehend ano"ther Substance of different kind, unless it hath Vacuity in it, equal to the real Dimenfions of the "comprehended Subftance, which is a Suppofing it "immenfe and not immense at the fame time. "But if it be faid that the Divine Substance pene"trates or pervades the Substances comprehended by "it, and that yet the Penetration is not mutual; this "is attempting to defend one Impoffibility by ano"ther or elfe we must fuppofe that the one hath "no real Dimenfions, and confequently is no real di"stinct Substance and Exiftence: wherefore, if the "Divine Immenfity is demonftrated, no other Sub• ftance exifts."

Some Paffages of Mr. Jackson's Reply to this are as follow. "You allow, fays he to Mr. Dudgeon, "the Divine Subftance is immense; and fince it is felf-evident, that there are other Exiftents, their "Place of Exiftence must be the Divine Immensity "or Space, which cannot exclude folid Exiftents, "unless itself be folid; which Motion demonftrates

it not to be: nor unfolid Exiftents, unless they are "of the fame kind, and coincided with it by Uni"formity of Existence. ----- The Exertion of the Di

vine Power requires no particular Place, Motion, "&c. When the human Mind exerts Power, as " by Volition, Reflection, &c. the Exertion of these "Powers fuppofes no Place, but that of the intellec"tual Subftance: Power is exerted in the Mind it"felf. So God's Power is not exerted extraneous to "his Substance; it exifts and is exerted in his Sub"ftance, not out of it, whatever is the Effect or

Production of that Exertion. ---- There is no Ab"furdity in fuppofing that God is LOCUS OMNIUM. "I cannot easily conceive different Kinds of Exten

fion, as I can of Subftance and Exiftence. If

"finite

*finite changeable Substance exists not, or is annihilated, I cannot conceive Space to be annihilated, or to "be more or less than it neceffarily is.-The Exiftence "of Subftance fuppofes Extenfion and Space; but "whether the Dimenfions of finite mutable Exiftents are diftinct from Space itfelf, is very difficult to "determine. If Extenfion diftinct from Space does "exift, and belong to other Exiftents, it is effentially diftinct in kind from Space, as being folid " and moveable. I do not at all fee the Confe"quence of Space, or the Immenlity of God's Sub"stance, excluding the Exiftence of all other Sub*ftances any more than that the Immensity or Infinity of his Properties, as Power, Knowledge, &c, muft neceffarily exclude the Existence of other finite Properties. †

In the Anfwer to this Letter Mr. Dudgeon charges Mr. Jackfon with begging the Question, when in his laft he fays, that the Existence of fomething which is not the immenfe Subftance of God, or any Property of it, is felf-evident. This, as he fays, is the Point yet to be proved. He can, as he adds, easily conceive

* SPACE is here fynonimous with the Immenfity of the Divine Subftance. The Divine Immenfity is an abstract Idea. Is it not odd to talk of an abstract Idea excluding the Existence of other Subftance? No one ever could fuppofe that Space excluded the Exiftence of any Subftance; but it is eafy and rational enough to fuppofe, a Subftance that abfolutely fills the Whole of Space muft exclude the Existence of all other Substance out of that Space which it entirely fills. And if Space is filled, it is fo no lefs with regard to Beings of a different than of the fame Prefence. In fhort, how justly foever Mr. Jackson may charge Mr. Dudgeon's Notion here with Abfurdity, I greatly queftion if he can clear his own Scheme from the fame Imputation. That Fancy of God's filling infinite Space can never, I fear, be difengaged from Mr. Dudgeon's Confequences and feeing thefe Confequences are oppofite to our cleareft Conceptions, we have fome Reafon to doubt the Truth of that Principle from which they feem fo readily to flow. Upon a Survey of the whole Debate it appears, that these acute and ingenious Difputants have fairly overthrown one another's Tenets, but have

neither of them establish'd their own.

+ Methinks every one that confiders muft difcern the Cafes to be widely different.

that the Idea of an immense Substance includes the Idea of infinite Power to fupport infinite Modes, inhering in it; but to fuppofe other Substances, besides it, finite or infinite, of different kind, to exist, appears to him an abfolute Impoffibility. And this he apprehends to be agreeable to what Mr. Jackson himself had faid in Defence of Existence and Unity, p. 179. viz. That one Being can no more have the fame Prefence than the fame Exiftence, or than it can be the fame Being with another. "Now the Divine Subftance being omni"present, either it hath the fame Prefence with the fuppofed different Subftances, which Mr. Jackson owns to be, as indeed it is, impoffible; or else

they have no Prefence at all; and confequently no "diftinct Existence or Subftance. An immense "Subftance comprehending another or different Sub"ftance is an impoffible Suppofition: as on the con

trary it is evident, that any comprehending Sub"stance must have Vacuity in it, equal to the real "Dimenfions of the comprehended Subftance or Sub"ftances; which to fuppofe of the immenfe Sub"ftance is a plain Contradiction; and a finite Sub

ftance of no Dimenfions is an Abfurdity." Mr. Fackfon at the Close of his last Letter had hinted, as if Mr. Dudgeon's Reasoning might infer the Impoffibility of any Existence but of God, which he calls an evident Abfurdity. Mr. Dudgeon here owns the Confequence, if by Existence is meant Subftance; and the Abfurdity, as he fays, feems to lie in the contrary Suppofition. But if by Existence be meant Things immediately dependent upon, and comprehended by, the immense Substance or Being, no fuch Conclufion follows. He goes on," Intelligence and Will, as "they are Properties of the one infinite Being, have "no relation to particular Time, Place, &c. But " for Volitions, Reflections, &c. they have a neceffary "relation to particular Time, at leaft." He carries this Confideration fomewhat farther, but what I have quoted may fuffice.

In the Answer to this, Mr. Jackson tells Mr. Dudgeon, that in confeffing himself to exift, he owned that to be felf-evident which Mr. Jackson held to be fo, but which he faid was the Point to be proved: for his own Existence, which is diftinct from God's, must be either Subftance or Property; and yet neither God's Subftance or any Property of it. And then as to the Objection against the Exiftence of any Substance but God's, from there being no Vacuity in it to comprehend any other, he fays, "Finite Exiftents, and Motion of Exiftents, are fo far from being incompatible with the Immenfity of the Di"vine Substance or Space, that they cannot be conceived without the Prefuppofition of it; and are only excluded by the Immenfity of the same spe"cifick Substance, or by folid or refifting Sub"ftance. God's Prefence excludes the Prefence "of nothing which has not the fame Prefence or "Mode of Existence: and Modes or Properties "cannot be conceived without fome kind of Pre"fence belonging to them. Whatever we are, fure "we move and act in Space, and fo are prefent in it.

In the Letter wherein Mr. Dudgeon replies to this, he is very explicite in delivering thofe Opinions, for the fake of which he engaged in this Controversy, and which he had not fo diftinctly afferted before. "I confefs, fays he, my own Existence, moft certain "but that I, a diftinct Subftance, exift, I never faid. "On the contrary, I faid,* that I immediately de"pend upon, and am fupported and comprehended "by the omnipotent and omnipresent Substance of "God; which is confiftent with the Existence of "one only Substance, and every thing's being Mo

difications of his Effence." - Mr. Dudgeon thinks this Notion fhould not appear irrational to Mr. JackJon, who himself says in his Existence and Unity, The finite Continuance or Time of every Thing, is their Exiftence in particular Portions of God's Duration. Now, as he afks, may not their finite Existence itself be as *He does fo in his preceding Letter. C 3

well

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