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ast paragraph are sufficiently explicit in the declartion that we join Great Britain to avoid a junction with the five powers! and that we search ourelves, to avoid being searched by British cruisers! Studiously ambiguous, and profuse of phrases to Ceceive, while stinted of facts to inform, the mesage still lets out enough to betray these hidden and momentous meanings. The treaty has not been ficially communicated to our Government. But ay it not have been unofficially? and if so, by hom? for what purpose? and what are its conents? Instead of answering these pertinent inuiries, so naturally suggested by the declaration f the non-official communication, the sentence obques off into the empty supposition that the conents are well known to the public! Why tell us his? why tell us what the public knows? We want know what the Government knows-how it obained its information-and what it is required to Eo. Instead of that, it tells us of the public: and hen flies off to France, and informs us what we well knew before-that France had not signed. All this is foreign to the point. We want to know hat concerns ourselves-whether the five powrs are occupied with our affairs-and whether hey have shown us their treaty-and for what puruse? The message says: "No application has een made to the United States to become a party this quintuple alliance, but . . . but... but.. he course we may take is the subject of attention, nd discussion, and warmth, and excitement in Euope!" But what all this tends to, and what is reuired of us to allay this excitement, the message oes not say. Instead of satisfying the curiosity which it excited as to the course of things in relaon to us in Europe, it flies back to this continenteverts to the President's message at the commenceent of the session-denies the right of searchserts the immunity of flags-and then most omiously declares that it is better to execute our own ws, and perform our own obligations; and do this y our own means, and by our own power. Why is declaration? Were others about to execute ar laws, and perform our obligations, and to use leans and powers upon us, not our own? Was is the state of the case? and, if so, why not tell s? Why this paltering and equivocation, unless > hide a damned conclusion which must be sufered, but cannot be told? The next sentence, howver, approaches the point. "It is better to superede the motive and supposed necessity for this elicate and dangerous search." And, finally, in ie last words of the last sentence, the fatal secret is 4 out--that the articles now before the Senate ere entered into for the purpose of "removing all retext on the part of others for violating the imJanities of the American flag in the African as!" This is the secret; and after this, it stands onfessed that our naval and diplomatic alliance ith Great Britain is the price which we pay for ve years' exemption from search, and for the faof of not being made a party to the quintuple alance. The alliance with Great Britain is a subtute for these penalties: and a more ignominous purchase of exemption from outrage never disraced the annals of an independent nation.

We will now see what is the price we have conracted to pay for these exemptions; and for that urpose I read the 8th and 9th articles of the reaty:

ARTICLE VIII. The parties mutually stipulate that each hall prepare, equip, and maintain in service, on the coast of frica, a sufficient and adequate squadron, or naval force of esele, of suitable numbers and descriptions, to carry in all ot less than eighty guns, to enforce separately and respective. the laws, rights, and obligations of each of the two countries, or the suppression of the slave trade; the said squadrons to be dependent of each other, but the two Governments stipulating, evertheless, to give such orders to the officers commanding heir respective forces, as shall enable them most effectually to at in concert and co operation, upon mutual consultation, as xigencies may arise, for the attainment of the true object of is article; copies of all such orders to be communicated by ach Government to the other respectively.

ARTICLE IX. Whereas, notwithstanding all efforts which hay be made on the coast of Africa for suppressing of elave trade, the facilities for carrying on the traffic, d avoiding the vigilance of cruisers by the fraudulent se of flags, and other means, are so great, and the tempta fuus for pursuing it, while a market can be found for slaves, strong, as that the desired result may be long delayed, un *** all markets be shut against the purchase of African ne groes; the parties to this treaty agree that they will unite in ! becoming representations and remonstrances with any and il powers within whose dominions such markets are allowed exist; and that they will urge upon all such powers the propriety and duty of closing such markets effectually at once and forever."

This is the price! naval and diplomatic alliance with Great Britain! And the eleventh article stipu

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

lates that the naval alliance is to continue for five years, and afterwards until one of the parties shall give notice for its cessation. Of course, Great Britain will never give the notice. Of course, also, the American Administration which makes it, will never give the notice. The alliance is eternal, unless we break down the party which made it. And this is the course of all revolting and dangerous innovations. It is as temporary measures they are introduced. They are continued imperceptibly; and finally made permanent, and fastened irrevocably upon the country. This will be the case with this alliance, unless the elections of 1844 relieve us from the dominion of the party now in power. And now let us see the extent of the obligations we have incurred to purchase this exemption from search, and to be excused from signing the quintuple treaty. They are: First, to prepare, equip, and maintain in service on the coast of Africa, a squadron of "at least" eighty guns, to cooperate with a British squadron in suppressing the slave trade. Secondly, to unite with Great Britain in diplomatic remonstrances and rep. resentations against the purchase of African negroes, with all the powers which still admit such purchases, and urging them to cease the practice, and to close the door against such purchases at once and forever. These are the obligations; and it is seen at once that they constitute an alliancea,double alliance-between the United States and Great Britain. The first sensation of an American in discovering this ominous conjunction, is that of astonishment, indignation, and shame. The farewell words of Washington rush to the mind. He warned us against entangling ourselves in foreign alliance: and here we are deeply entangled, and that with the very nation which, of all the others in the world, is the most to be dreaded.

The consequences of this entanglement are beyond the reach of human foresight, or of mental divination. It is the commencement of involving our America, and with it the whole New World, in the systems and vortex of European politics. We begin with going to Africa to join Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, (for France declines the favor,) in redressing the grievances of the Old World; after that, it is a natural step for these great powers to come over here to redress the wrongs of the New World. If this fatal policy is suffered to continue; if we go on to mix ourselves in the affairs of Europe; if we quit our own, to stand upon foreign ground; if we hitch our cockboat to the grand navies of Europe, and tie on our little ministers behind the gorgeous representatives of mighty monarchs;-if we do this, then it is in vain that Providence isolated us, and that Washington warned us. We are doomed to foreign connexions, and to foreign interference; and may expect to see the affairs of the two Americas, from Baffin's Bay to Cape Horn, regulated by the Sovereign congresses of Vienna, St. Petersburg, and London; and the fleets and armies of Europe sent here to enforce their decrees.

Passing from the political consequences of this entanglement-consequences which no human foresight can reach-1 come to the immediate and practical effects which lie within our view, and which display the enormous inexpediency of the measure. First: the expense in money-an item which would seem to be entitled to some regard in the present deplorable state of the treasury-in the present cry for retrenchment-and in the present heavy taxation upon the comforts and necessaries of life. This expense for 80 guns will be about $750,000 per annum, exclusive of repairs and loss of lives. I speak of the whole expense, as part of the naval establishment of the United States, and not of the mere expense of working the ships after they have gone to sea. Nine thousand dollars per gun is about the expense of the establishment; 80 guns would be $720,000 per annum, which is $3,600,000 for five years. But the squadron is not limited to a maximum of 80 guns; that is the minimum limit: it is to be 80 guns "at the least." And if the party which granted these 80 shall continue in power, Great Britain may find it as easy to double the number, as it was to obtain the first eighty. Nor is the time limited to five years; it is only determinable after that period by giving notice; a notice not to be expected from those who made the treaty. At the least, then, the moneyed expense is to be $3,600,000; if the present party continues in power, it may double or treble that amount; and this, besides the cost of the ships. Such is the moneyed expense. In ships, the wear

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and tear of vessels must be great. We are to prepare, equip, and maintain in service, on a coast 4,000 miles from home, the adequate number of vessels to carry these 80 guns. It is not sufficient to send the number there; they must be kept up and maintained in service there; and this will require constant expenses to repair injuries, supply losses; and cover casualties. In the employment of men," and the waste of life and health, the expenditure must be large. Ten men and two officers to the gun, is the smallest estimate that can be admitted. This would require a complement of 960 men. Including all the necessary equipage of the ship, and above 1,000 persons will be constantly required. These are to be employed at a vast distance from home; on a savage coast; in a perilous service; on both sides of the equator; and in a climate which is death to the white race. This waste of men-this wear and tear of life and constitution-should stand for something in a Christian land, and in this age of roaming philanthropy; unless, indeed, in excess of love for the blacks, it is deemed merito. rious to destroy the whites. The field of operations for this squadron is great; the term "coast of Africa" having an immense application in the vocabulary of the slave-trade. On the western coast of Africa, according to the replies of the naval ofcers Bell and Paine, the trade is carried on from Senegal to Cape Frio-a distance of 3,600 miles, following its windings, as the watching squadrons would have to go. But the track of the slavers between Africa and America has to be watched, as well as the immediate coast; and this embraces à space in the ocean of 35 degrees on each side of the equator, (say four thousand miles,) and covering the American coast from Cuba to Rio Janeiro; so that the coast of Africa-the westcoast alone-embraces a diagram of the ocean of near 4,000 miles every way, having the equator in the centre, and bounded east and west by the New and the Old World. This is for the western coast only: the eastern is nearly as large. The same naval officers say that a large trade in negroes is carried on in the Mahometan countries bordering on the Red sea and the Persian gulf, and in the Portuguese East India colonies; and, what is worthy to be told, it is also carried on in the British presidency of Bombay, and other British Asiatic possessions. It is true, the officers say the American slavers are not yet there; but go there they will, according to all the laws of trading and hunting, the moment they are disturbed, or the trade fails, on the western coast. Wherever the trade exists, the combined powers must follow it: for good is not to be done by halves, and philana thropy is not to be circumscribed by coasts and latitudes. Great is the field of enterprise which presents itself to the British-American squadrons; great, also, is the field of labor for their diplomatic remonstrants. Spain, Portugal, Brazil; Cuba, Porto Rico, and other American islands; the Mahometan, Portuguese, and British possessions in southern Asia; all these will require the presence of the Anglo-American embassies. Great will be the expense of these embassies; for the ambassadors must not only be paid, but go loaded with costly presents when barbarians are to be treated with. And here the treating is to be double-with the savage negro chiefs who tolerate the sale, and with Christian or Mahometan kings who tolerate the purchase. Even if no unlucky consequence supervenes, the expense of these embassies must still be great; but if our ministers chance to be assassinated by the negro chief, or insulted by the Christian or Mahometan king--what then? Shall we resent the injury, at a good loss of men and money? or shall we count the cost, and pocket the outrage? What if the Emperor of Brazil, boy as he is; or the Queen of Spain, child as she is; or the Queen of Portugal, lady as she is, should give our minister advice to return home and free his own country from slaves before he went about to close the markets of the world against them? True, there is a difference between purchasing, and the purchased. The intellect can detect the difference. But still it is a case for a sarcasm, and for an insult; and the American minister who should go upon these expeditions should look out for answers very different from what may be given to the representative of Great Britain. She, having liberated her own slaves, may stand up and speak. But how will it be with the American minister, when he commences rehearsing his remonstrance? This business of remonstrating is a delicate operation between individuals; more so when a sovereign is in the case; and becomes ex

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ceedingly critical when the remonstrant is about in the condition himself which he attacks in others. Among all the strange features in the comedy of errors which has ended in this treaty, that of sending American ministers abroad, to close the markets of the world against the slave-trade, is the most striking. Not content with the expenses, loss of life, and political entanglement of this alliance, we must electioneer for insults, and send ministers abroad to receive, pocket, and bring them home.

In what circumstances do we undertake all this fine work? What is our condition at home, while thus going abroad in search of employment? We raise 1,000 men for foreign service, while reducing our little army at home! We send ships to the coast of Africa, while dismounting our dragoons on the frontiers of Missouri and Arkansas! We protect Africa from slave-dealers, and abandon Florida to savage butchery! We send cannon, shot, shells, powder, lead, bombs, and balls, to Africa, while denying arms and ammunition to the young men who go to Florida! We give food, clothes, pay, to the men who go to Africa, and deny rations even to those who go to Florida! We cry out for retrenchment, and scatter $3,600,000 at one broad cast of the hand! We tax tea and coffee, and send the money to Africa! We are borrowing and taxing, and striking paper money, and reducing expenses at home, when engaging in this new and vast expense for the defence of Africa! What madness and folly! Has Don Quixotte come to life, and placed himself at the head of our Government, and taken the negroes of Africa, instead of the damsels of Spain, for the objects of his chivalrous protection?

The slave-trade is diabolical and infamous; but Great Britain is not the country to read us a lesson upon its atrocity, or to stimulate our exertions to suppress it. The nation which, at the peace of Utrecht, made the asiento-the slave contract-a condition of peace, fighting on till she obtained it; the nation which entailed African slavery upon us -which rejected our colonial statutes for its suppression--which has many, many ten millions of white subjects in Europe and in Asia in greater slavery of body and mind, in more bodily misery and mental darkness, than any black slaves in the United States;-such a nation has no right to cajole or to dragoon us into alliances and expenses for the suppression of slavery on the coast of Africa. We have done our part on that subject. Considering the example and instruction we had from Great Britain, we have done a wonderful part. The Constitution of the United States, mainly made by slaveholding States, authorized Congress to put an end to the importation of slaves by a given day. Anticipating the limited day by legislative action, the Congress had the law ready to take effect on the day permitted by the Constitution. On the 1st day of January, 1808, Thomas Jefferson being President of the United States, the importation of slaves became unlawful and criminal. A subse. quent act of Congress, following up the idea of Mr. Jefferson in his first draught of the Declaration of Independence, qualified the crime as piratical, and delivered up its pursuers to the sword of the law, and to the vengeance of the world, as the enemies of the human race.

Vessels of war cruising on the coast of Africa, under our act of 1819, have been directed to search our own vessels--to arrest the violators of the law, and bring them in--the ships for confiscation, and the men for punishment. This was doing enough-enough for a young country, far remote in the New World, and whose policy is to avoid foreign connexions and entangling alliances. We did this voluntarily, without instigation, and without supervision from abroad; and now there can be no necessity for Great Britain to assume a superiority over us in this particular, and bind us

He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare-the opprobrium of infidel powers-is the warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain, determined to keep open a market where men should be hought and sold. He has prosti tuted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce; and, that this 17semblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting the very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people on whom he has obtruded them; thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another."- Original draught of the Declaration of Independence, as drawn by Mr. Jefferson, and before it was altered by the committee.]

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

in treaty stipulations, which destroy all the merit of a voluntary action. We have done enough; and it is no part of our business to exalt still higher the fanatical spirit of abolition, which is now become the stalking-horse of nations and of political powers. Our country contains many slaves, derived from Africa; and, while holding these, it is neither politic nor decent to join the crusade of European powers to put down the African slave-trade. From combinations of powers against the present slavetakers, there is but a step to the combination of the same powers against the present slaveholders; and it is not for the United States to join in the first movement, which leads to the second. "No entangling alliances" should be her motto! And as for her part in preventing the foreign slave-trade, it is sufficient that she prevents her own citizens, in her own way, from engaging in it; and that she takes care to become neither the instrument, nor the victim, of European combinations for its suppression.

The past administrations have been careful to save us from the entanglement of these connexions: they have been as careful to save us from these dangerous connexions, as the English have been anxious to involve us in them. Mr. Van Buren rejected, as "unauthorized by instructions, and contrary to the established and well-known principles and policy of the Government," the arrangement made by the commander of the United States schooner Grampus with the commander of her Britannic Majesty's sloop the Wolverine, on the 11th of March, 1840, authorizing the British commander "to detain all vessels under American colors found to be fully equipped for and engaged in the slave-trade, handing over to the American commander the vessels found to be American." Mr. Van Buren rejected this arrangement (the seminal principle of the present treaty) as contrary to the PRINCIPLES and the POLICY of the Government; and now this treaty comes to carry out on a great scale, what he wisely condemned on a small one.

The papers communicated do not show at whose instance these articles were inserted; and the absence of all minutes of conferences leaves us at a loss to trace their origin and progress in the hands of the negotiators. The little that is seen would indicate its origin to be wholly American; evidence aliunde proves it to be wholly British; and that our Secretary negotiator was only doing the work of the British minister in assuming the ostensible paternity of the articles. In the papers communicated, there is not a syllable upon the subject from Lord Ashburton. His finger is not seen in the affair. Mr. Webster appears as sole mover and conductor of the proposition. In his letter of the 30th of April to Captains Bell and Paine of the United States navy, he first approaches the subject, and opens it with a series of questions on the African slave-trade. This draws forth the answers which I have already shown. This is the commencement of the business. And here we are struck with the curious fact, that this letter of inquiry, laying the foundation for a novel and extraordinary article in the treaty, bears date 44 days before the first written communication from the British to the American negotiator! and 47 days before the first written communication from Mr. Webster to Lord Ashburton! It would seem that much was done by word of mouth before pen was put to paper; and that in this most essential part of the negotiations, pen was not put to paper at all, from one negotiator to the other, throughout the whole affair. Lord Ashburton's name is never found in connexion with the subject: Mr. Web. ster's only in the notes of inquiry to the American naval officers. Even in these he does not mention the treaty, nor allude to the negotiation, nor indicate the purpose for which information was sought! So that this most extraordinary article is without a clew to its history, and stands in the treaty as if it had fallen from the clouds, and chanced to lodge there! Even the President's message, (which undertakes to account for the article, and to justify it, is silent on the point, though laboring through a mass of ambiguities and obscurities, evidently calculated to raise the inference that it originated with us. From the papers communicated, it is an American proposition, of which the British negotiator knew nothing until he signed the treaty. That is the first place where his name is seen in conjunction with it, or seen in a place to authorize the belief that he knew of it. Yet, it is certainly a British proposition; it is certainly a British article. Evi

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dence aliunde establishes the fact; and as it is an important fact, and the more so from its studious concealment, I will examine that evidence; and for that purpose will have to go back near forty years in this branch of our diplomatic intercourse with Great Britain.

Sir, this is no new project with the British. They have been at it near forty years; but never found an Administration before to answer their purpose. As far back as the year 1806, when Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney were ministers in London, the British commenced this business; but in a form so gentle and innocent, that one is at a loss to understand, except as now explained, their anxiety to obtain a treaty stipulation for it. The request then was, for an intercommunication of laws against the slave-trade; and for co-operation to procure the consent of other powers to the abolition of the trade by law, as Great Britain and the United States had abolished it. It was an innocent request, and would have been complied with, without the compulsion of a treaty obligation. We send our laws and public documents now to all the powers which have ministers here. Great Britain sends us all her parliamentary papers; and a valuable present they are. All this is done by virtue of the comity of nations, and from the civilization of the age, and not by virtue of national compacts. Yet, to obtain a page or two of our laws on a particular subject, and to get us to join her in requesting other nations to abolish the slave-trade, nothing short of a treaty stipulation would content her extreme anxiety. The article was put into a treaty in 1806, and here it is:

"The high contracting parties engage to communicate to each other, without delay, all such laws as have been, or shall be hereafter, enacted by their respective Legislatures; as as all measures which shall have been taken for the abolition or limitation of the African slave trade; and they further agree to use their best endeavors to procure the co-operation of other powers for the final and complete abolition of a trade so repug nant to the principles of humanity and justice."

This is the article. And what more harmless! To give copies of our laws, and to request other nations to abolish the trade by law, as we had done. This was the extent of the stipulation. The British proposed it, and pressed its adoption with zeal. The protocols show it; for, in those days, treaties were not negotiated without showing how; and the American ministers, in their correspondence with their Government, stated explicitly that the British proposed it, and pressed it upon them. Their words are: "The British commissioners proposed the article, and showed a great desire that ve should accede to it." Now, why this great desire, unless for some ulterior purpose? The article was nothing in itself; and this anxiety about it can only be accounted for from a desire to lay a nestegg, to be hatched into life by the_diplomatic incubation of future negotiators. The alliances, naval and diplomatic, of 1842, show the depth and character of their long-sighted policy.

The treaty of 1806 was not ratified; it was rejected by Mr. Jefferson, without communication to the Senate; and for a reason which I shall have occasion to mention in another part of my speech. The treaty fell, and with it the agreed article on the slave-trade. But the desires of the British did not fall, nor did they abate; and at the treaty of Ghent their instances were renewed for some stipulation on this point, with all the warmth of a first love, and with all the pertinacity of a settled de sign. Advancing beyond the nugatory stipulations of 1806, pretermitting the unnecessary engagement for the communication of laws, and endeavoring to substitute actions for words, the British commissions at Ghent proposed an article requiring the United States "to exert every means in their power to accomplish the suppression of this trade. The American commissioners found this proposition too strong. Though indefinite in its terms, and binding us to nothing specific, it was still deemed too strong; and, upon their objection, it was diInted into a blank engagement-"to use their best endeavors." In this diluted form, the article was agreed to; and now stand thus, as article 10 of the Ghent treaty:

"Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the prin ciples of humanity and justice; and whereas, both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition; it is hereby agreed that both the cor tracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object."

This is the article-certainly a faint one, and binding the United States to nothing. But it was a nest egg; and out of that egg, and by the maternal incubation of the present American Secretary of

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State, twenty-eight years thereafter, an alliance for the suppression of the slave-trade, by arms and remonstrances, was negotiated between the two powers. The President of the United States, in his message othe Senate, and in that part of it which relates to the African articles, three times refers to the article in he Ghent treaty; and so refers to it as to make it he cause and the justification for the present stipaations. He says:

The early and prominent part which the Government of he United States has taken for the abolition of this unwful and inhuman traffic, is well known. By the 10th rticle of the treaty of Ghent, it is declared that the traffic in laves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and ustice, and that both his Majesty and the United States are deirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire aboli ion; and it is thereby agreed that both the contracting parties thall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an ob

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"It has been thought, therefore, expedient, not only in ac ordance with the stipulations of the treaty of Ghent, but t the same time as removing all pretext on the part of others r violating the immunities of the American flag upon the sas, as they exist and are defined by the law of nations, to en. r into the articles now submitted to the Senate."

Here the Ghent treaty is quoted-three times noted-to justify this alliance. The stipulation or the eighty-gun squadron is presented as growag out of the Ghent treaty-as fulfilling the obigations of that treaty-as being in accordance with the stipulations of that treaty; when a reecurrence to the treaty shows that it contains no ach obligation--no such stipulation. That treaty ras made near thirty years ago; and certainly this very late in the day to find out a new meaning 1it. But no such meaning is there; and our Secetary of State has taken a great liberty with the 'resident, in getting him to sign what the facts will ot justify.

The next piece of evidence to which I refer, to how that the British are the authors of the alliance rticles in the present treaty, is the engagement enred into between a British and an American capin on the coast of Africa, in 1840; and which was > promptly rejected by Mr. Van Buren. That ngagement was in these words:

"Commander William Tucker, of her Britannic Majesty's oop Wolverine, and senior officer on the west coast of Africa, ad Lieutenant John S. Paine, commanding the United States hooner Grampus, in order to carry into execution, as far as ible, the orders and views of their respective Governments *pecting the suppression of the slave-trade, hereby request ach other, and agree to detain all vessels under American col s found to be fully equipped for and engaged in the slave. de; that, if proved to be American property, they shall be aded over to the United States schooner Grampus, or any her American cruiser; and that, if proved to be Spanish, ortuguese, Brazilian, or English property, to any of her Bri ane Majesty's cruisers employed on the west coast of Africa the suppression of the slave-trade, so far as their respective Ws and treaties will permit.

"Signed and exchanged at Sierra Leone, this 11th day of Larch, 1840."

This engagement, as I have said before, was the eminal principle of the present alliance; and the romptitude with which it was disavowed and recled by Mr. Van Buren, as contrary to the prinples and policy of this Government, gives us the allest assurance that, if he had continued Presient, the double alliance which we now have, and -f which that little Sierra Leone agreement was he seed, would not have taken place. The 8th nd 9th articles of the Washington city treaty, of 42, are nothing but the enlarged edition of the Sierra Leone engagement of 1840; and the British egro colony on the coast of Africa was a very proper place to commence the entanglement in which we are now involved, and from which a wise and atriotic President temporarily relieved us. Tru, the British had many reasons for interfering in r late Presidential election, and seconding the ederal cry of-change! change! change!

I crown these historical facts in favor of my asertion, that the British minister was the author of he articles in the present treaty, by recurring gain to the studied and ominous ambiguities of he President's message. I recur to them, to prove ne contrary of their intention. Their intention was to establish the alliance as being of American origin, and voluntary: I recur to them to prove its origin to be British, and compulsory. Without reading the passages over again, I refer to the phrases: "Seizure and detention of American vessels by British cruisers on the coast of Africa:

The British Trealy—Mr. Benton.

treaty signed in London by the five powers: not officially communicated to this Government: no application to become party to it: but the five powers attentive to our course: discussion, warmth, and excitement in Europe about our course: better to execute our laws, by our own means, and our own power: delicacy of the right of search: immunity of flags: visitation by cruisers lead to dangerous results: as removing all pretext on the part of others for violating the immunities of the American flag: therefore, entered into the articles now submitted to the Senate." I point to these phrases in the President's message, so ambiguous and so unsatisfactory, always raising a curiosity which they do not satisfy; and the second member of each sentence always turning off from the conclusions to which the first member of it would lead. I point to these as the crowning evidences of my assertion, and as betraying what they were intended to conceal-that these anti-slave-trade stipulations are of British origin, were given to our Secretary by the special minister, and by our Secretary presented to the American public as his own. This is my opinion; and if anybody wants any further evidence, they may have it in the magnitude and openness of the kindred movements-the abolition movements-now going on in London. Abolitionism is the father of these articles: that father resides in London, but his children are here. Conscious of the dangerous ground upon which he was treading, the President has endeavored to shield his work behind the stipulations of the Ghent treaty. Three times, in the course of a few brief paragraphs, he has invoked that treaty, and called it in for the justification of his own. Three times he has called it to his help. But, stop. Let the message speak for itself. Hear it.

"By the tenth article of the treaty of Ghent, it is declared that the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of hu manity and justice; and that both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition; and it is, therefore, agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object. The Government of the United States has, by law, declared the African slave trade piracy," &c. Desirous of maintaining those principles fully, at the same time that esisting obligations should be fulfilled, I have thought it most consistent with the honor and dignity of the country that it should execute its own laws, and perform its own obligations, by its own means, and its own power. It has ben thought, therefore, expedient, not only in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty of Ghent, but, at the same time, as removing all pretext on the part of others for violating the immu. nities of the American flag upon the seas, as they exist and are defined by the law of nations, to enter into the articles now sub. mitted to the Senate."

This is the message-this its appeal to the Ghent treaty, to its obligations, its stipulations: as if it contained any stipulation or any obligation in favor of this alliance! Vain invocation! and more insidious than vain! The Ghent treaty can give them no help. It has no aid or countenance to lend them. Though weak and reprehensible as is this tenth article, yet it binds us to nothing, and was harmless under the previous administrations. It was an imprudent concession to dormant abolitionism at the time it was made; but it is impossible to charge it with the crime of this alliance. We are fulfilling no existing obligation arising under it, in raising this subsidiary fleet, or in sending forth our Quixotic ambassadors. There is no accordance, in these naval and diplomatic engagements, with anything in the vague stipulations of the Ghent treaty. This fighting on the coast of Africa, and remonstrating through Europe, Asia, Africa, and the two Americas, is no continuation of the statutory enactments against the slave-trade contemplated by the treaty of Ghent. That treaty cannot father the eighty guns, and the remonstrating ambassadors; and the appeal to it to justify these measures, was an admission that justification was wanted, and could not be found. And here we must pause, to remark the disingenuousness of this invocation. Always remembering that I consider the message the work of the Secretary, I point out, to the reprehension of the Senate and the country, the errors of fact which it contains, to mislead the public mind; and, among these, I now have to point out these three invocations of the Ghent treaty to justify this British alliance, when that treaty contains not a syllable which can justify the invocations.

The French Government has taken care of itself: it has refused to sign the quintuple alliance, or the substitute for it. We have signed the substitute; and may thank the French Chamber of Deputies, and the pamphlet of General Cass, that it is no worse. The debates of that chamber, the arguments of that pamphlet, and the refusal of France

Senate.

to sign, have doubtless prevented the "official" communication of the five-powers treaty to us, and the formal application to us to become parties to it. Such a communication, and such an application, in the present deplorable constitution of the Federal Executive-diseased dread of war, and cankered love of peace--must have been indescribably calamitous.

One more view of this eighty-gun squadron, and I dismiss it from my speech.

ments.

1 am no man to invoke our Constitution on every petty occasion, and to eke out all arguments with a cry of a violation of that sacred instrument. The Salaminian galley was only launched on great occasions. I am slow to cheapen our Constitution by appealing to it in doubtful or frivolous circumstances. But it does seem to me that here there is room neither for doubt nor frivolity; and that the raising this squadron for the defence of Africa, and for the redress of moral evils in that remote region, is an act wholly without the pale of our Constitution. To Congress alone it belongs to raise fleetsand that, for the defence of our own country: but here is a fleet to be raised, not by Congress, but by the President, the Senate, and the Queen of Great Britain; and this fleet for the defence, not of these Confederated States, but of African tribes; and for the suppression, not of political, but of moral evils. It does seem to me that Congress itself could have no power to do this-still less the President, Senate, and Queen Victoria. To provide and maintain navies, is a power specifically granted to Congress: it is a legislative power-and properly so; because, with us, the questions of war and peace, of fleets and armies, of loans and taxes, are all legislative powers, and peculiarly under the charge of the people's immediate representatives. It will not do to deceive ourselves by analogies to other governOurs is a government of limitations, and of separate departments. Each department must keep within its own sphere. It must not transcend its own limits-much less invade those of another. The treaty-making power is a distinct power, and its acts are the supreme law of the land. But it is not everything which the President and Senate, and a foreign prince, or an Indian chief, may choose to insert in a treaty, that is this supreme law. Were it so, there would soon be no power in our country but that of the President and Senate, acting with some foreign kings, or with savage tribes. To gain this character of supreme law, or even of law at all, the subject-matter of the treaty must be within the competency of the treaty-making power: it must be a subject for treaty regulation, and not for legislative, judicial, or executive action. And this competency must be tried by our own Constitution, and not by the constitutions or practices of European monarchs. What is fit matter for treaty regulation in one country, is not so in another; and in no country is the treaty-making power more limited and circumscribed than in our own. The mass of the powers of our Government are given to Congress; and whatever is given to Congress is taken away from all other powers. Now, apply these principles to the act in question. This treaty stipulates to prepare, equip, and maintain a squadron-to keep it up for five years, and afterwards, until the President of the United States, or the British Government, gives notice for it to be withdrawn-to employ it, in conjunction with a British squadron, for the defence of Africans, and for suppressing the moral evil of slave-taking; the squadron to be of eighty guns at the least. Now, the preparing, equipping, and maintaining in service this squadron, is a legislative act, specifically given by the Constitution to Congress. Thus far, it is an invasion of the legislative department. All the rest is sheer usurpation, such as Congress itself could not make legal. Congress itself cannot create a squadron for five years; for the same, or any other Congress, may repeal the law. It cannot make the continuance of the squadron dependent upon the will of the President, or of a foreign prince; but it must depend upon the will of Congress itself. It cannot raise fleets for objects foreign to the objects of the Union-as the defence of Africa; or for redressing moral wrongs-as the suppression of the African custom of selling one another; but the fleet must be raised for the defence of the Union, or of the rights and interests of its citizens abroad. Thus, the treaty stipulation for this squadron is, in its first step, an invasion of the legislative authority, and is void: in every subsequent step, it is sheer usurpation, and such as Congress could not legalize if it would. I wish to be

27TH CONG....SD SESS.

understood; and what I mean to say is, that Congress itself cannot legalize this treaty --that Gongress itself cannot raise this squadron for five years, for this foreign object!

The Constitution names this subject, and gives to Congress a certain degree of power over it: it was to prohibit the importation of slaves after the year 1808. That power has been exercised; it has been exhausted; and it is fair to infer that it was all that was intended to be granted. In a government of limited powers, when a certain quantum is given, it is all that is to be taken. In this case the authority to prohibit the importation of slaves after a given period, was an authority obtained by compromise, and after much hesitation and difficulty in the convention. It was a long time before even this much, on a subject so differently viewed in different sections of the Union, could be agreed upon. After this, is it to be supposed that a clause could have been obtained to clothe Congress-to clothe the Representatives of the people themselves, much less the President, Senate, and a foreign prince--with power to raise fleets for terms of years, to put down the slave-trade in Africa itself? Certainly not! No one that reads the Madison Papers on this head can suppose, for an instant, that this power ever would have been granted. Then how is it obtained? By assuming the illimitability, as well as the supremacy of the treatymaking power! by assuming that that power is as large here as it is in Great Britain! by assuming that it may absorb the legislative power-that it may transcend the legislative power-that it may do what Congress can, and what Congress cannotthat it may employ arms for the suppression of moral evils, and send the ships and armies of the United States quixotting through the world to redress the wrongs of the human race. As part of the treaty-making power, I, for one, deny the constitutionality of this squadron engagement; and shall vote against the ratification of this treaty. As part of the legislative power, I again deny its constitutionality; and shall vote against the appropriations to carry it into effect. I shall have two chances at the unconstitutional, dangerous, and improvident scheme; and shall make the best use of both. I will fight the appropriations annually, through so many of the five years they are to continue as I shall have to remain here.

But it is not so much on this floor, as in the other end of the Capitol, that these appropriations should be fought. That duty belongs especially to the immediate Representatives of the people. If they give up to these eighty guns, and five years, and this redress of moral wrongs in Africa, they give up everything. The President and Senate, with a king or a savage that can sign a writing and call it a treaty, may send as many ships as they please, to as many countries as the please, for as many years as they please, and for any object that suits the pleasure or interest of the moment.

I shall move to strike these articles from the treaty. Even if proper in themselves, (which they are not,) they are improperly placed in this treaty, and made to play an undue part in its ratification. The Senators from the non-slaveholding States can hardly be expected to vote against a treaty that contains stipulations which, in the present state of the abolition question, presents itself so powerfully to the sympathies of so many. It is presented as an indissoluble part of the treaty, involving the loss of the whole in its own loss; and war, horrid war, is denounced if the treaty fails. Of course, all the lovers of peace, be it what sort of peace it may, must retain the articles, to save the treaty. They act a great and undue part in assuring the ratification; and, therefore, are wrongly placed, even if proper in themselves. But it is a stipulation which is not proper in itself, but hideously and frightfully wrong. It is unconstitutional and impolitic, novel and dangerous. It entangles us in a foreign alliance for a foreign object. It engages us in a foreign, distant, dangerous, and expensive service. It requires money which we have not to spare, and men who are wanted on our own frontiers. It hitches on our little navy to the great navy of Great Britain, and threatens us with a realization of the fabled alliance of the giant and he dwarf. It deprives us of our independence for five years certain, and longer if the present party shall continue in power. If I fail in my motion to strike out-if this stipulation is retained in the treaty, and ratified, and the appropriations voted by the two Houses-if all this is done, I do not say, tear up the Declaration of Independence! But

The British Teaty-Mr. Benton.

I do say, Take it down; dislodge it from its con-
spicuous place on our walls; carry it away; hide it
in a dark chamber; cover it with a black veil! and
let it hang in shame, shrouded in gloom and mourn-
ing, until some new Jacksonian President shall re-
trieve his country's disgrace, break the chains which
bind us to England, and let America again be free.

I proceed to the third subject and last article in
the treaty-the article which stipulates for the mu-
tual surrender of fugitive criminals. And here
again we are at fault for these same protocols.
Not one word is found in the correspondence up.
on this subject, the brief note excepted of Lord
Ashburton of the 9th of August-the day of the
signature of the treaty-to say that its ratification
would require the consent of the British Parlia-
ment, and would necessarily be delayed until the
Parliament met. Except this note, not a word is
found upon the subject; and this gives no light upon
its origin, progress, and formation-nothing to
show with whom it originated-what necessity for
it in this advanced age of civilization, when the
comity of nations delivers up fugitive offenders
upon all proper occasions-and when explana
tions upon each head of offences, and each class of
fugitives, is so indispensable to the right under-
standing and the safe execution of the treaty. To-
tal and black darkness on all these points. Nor is
any ray of light found in the President's brief
paragraphs in relation to it. Those paragaphs (the
work of his Secretary, of course) are limited to the
commendation of the article, and are insidiously
deceptive, as I shall show at the proper time. It tells us
nothing that we want to know upon the origin and
design of the article, and how far it applies to the
largest class of fugitive offenders from the United
States--the slaves who escape with their masters'
property, or after taking his life-into Canada and
the British West Indies. The message is as silent
as the correspondence on all these points; and it is
only from looking into past history, and cotempo-
raneous circumstances, that we can search for the
origin and design of this stipulation, so unnecessa-
ry in the present state of international courtesy,
and so useless, unless something unusual and ex-
traordinary is intended. Looking into these sources,
and we are authorized to refer the origin and de-
sign of the stipulation to the British minister, and
to consider it as one of the objects of the special
mission with which we have been honored.* Be
this as it may, I do not like the article. Though
fair upon its face, it is difficult of execution. As a

'Since the ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate, a conference has taken place in New York between the British minister and the executive committee of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, which supplies part of the information wanted. The following is an extract:

"Lord Ashburton went into an explanation of the 10th ar.
ticle, and mentioned several particulars of the discussion that
took place, both on that topic and others relating to slaves. He
said that it was very desirable to have an article in the treaty to
meet cases similar to that of Holmes, who fled from Canada in-
to Vermont; and the cases that would frequently arise, consid.
ering the extent of the bordering lines, and the temptation for
criminals to flee across the lines, in hope of securing themselves
from arrest and punishment. The Governor of Canada was
anxious that deserters should be included; but as Lord A. learned
that a claim would be put in for the delivering up of fugitive
slaves, he abandoned the question of deserters from her Britan
nic Majesty's possessions. He was also very desirous to secure
the delivery of mutineers; but did not press it, lest it should
involve, on the part of his Government, the delivery of slaves
situated as were those on board the Creole. With regard to the
case of the slave Hackett, he did not know all the facts. Sir
Charles Bagot was known to him, and he did not believe he
would do anything intentionally wrong. But he had just enter.

ed upon his duties, and was probably desirous, at that juncture,
of promoting good feeling with his great neighbor. The fact
that the slave had taken his master's watch, was a circumstance
that probably went against him. Had he only taken the horse,'
said Lord A., (looking at Gerrit Smith significantly, though he
could not be supposed ever to have read the advice of that gen-
tleman to fugitive slaves,) 'he would not, probably, have been
surrendered; for you know the horse was necessary for his es-
cape.' Lord Ashburton said that, in framing the 10th article,
great care had been taken to provide that inferior magistrates in
Canada should have no authority to surrender fugitives, as bad
been urged by the other party, and that only the Governor him.
self could perform an act of so great importance. Great care
would be taken, he had no doubt, to protect the innocent; and
that the taking of any article necessary to effect an escape,
would not be considered felonious. If, said he, the operation of
the 10th article proves injurious, he had no doubt the British
Government would put an end to it, agreeably to another
vision of the treaty, viz: 'The 10th article shall continue in
force until one or the other party shall signify its wish to ter-
minate it, and no longer.' Lord A. said that when the delega
tion came to read his correspondence with Mr. Webster, they
would see that he had taken all possible care to prevent any
injury being done to the people of color; that, if he had even
been willing to introduce an article including cases similar to
that of the Creole, his Government would never have ratified
it, as they will adhere to the great principles they have so long
avowed and maintained; and that the friends of the slave in
England would be very watchful to see that no wrong practice
took place under the 10th article."

pro.

Senate.

general proposition, atrocious offenders, and especially between neighboring nations, ought to be given up; but that is better done as an affair of consent and discretion, than under the constraints and embarrassments of a treaty obligation. Political offenders ought not to be given up; but, under the stern requisitions of a treaty obligation, and the benefit of an ex parte accusation, political offenders may be given up for murder, or other crimes, real or pretended; and then dealt with as their Government pleases. Innocent persons should not be harassed with groundless accusations; and there is no limit to these vexations, if all emigrants are placed at the mercy of malevolent informers, subjected to arrest in a new and strange land, examined upon ex parte testimony, and sent back for trial if a probable case is made out against them.

This is a subject long since considered in our country, and on which we have the benefit both of wise opinions and of some experience. Mr. Jefferson explored the whole subject when he was Secretary of State under President Washington, and came to the conclusion that these surrenders could only be made under three limitations: 1. Between coterminous countries. 2. For high offences. 3. A special provision against political offenders. Under these limitations, as far back as the year 1793, Mr. Jefferson proposed to Great Britain and Spain (the only countries with which we held coterminous dominions, and only for their adjacent provinces) a mutual delivery of fugitive criminals. His proposition was in these words:

"Any person having committed murder of malice prepense, not of the nature of treason, or forgery, within the United States or the Spanish provinces adjoining thereto, and fleeing from the justice of the country, shall be delivered up by the Govern ment where he shall be found, to that from which he fled, when ever demanded by the same "

This was the proposition of that great statesman: and how different from those which we find in this treaty! Instead of being confined to coterminous dominions, the jurisdiction of the country is taken for the theatre of the crime; and that includes, on the part of Great Britain, possessions all over the world, and every ship on every sea that sails under her flag. Instead of being confined to two offences of high degree--murder and forgery-one against life, the other against property--this article extends to seven offences; some of which may be incurred for a shilling's worth of property, and another of them without touching or injuring a human being. Instead of a special provision in favor of political offenders, the insurgent or rebel may be given up for murder, and then hanged and quartered for treason; and in the long catalogue of seven offences, a charge may be made, and an ex parte case estab lished, against any political offender which the British Government shall choose to pursue.

To palliate this article, and render it more acceptable to us, we are informed that it is copied from the 27th article of Mr. Jay's treaty. That apology for it, even if exactly true, would be but a poor recommendation of it to the people of the United States. Mr. Jay's treaty was no favorite with the American people, and especially with that part of the people which constituted the Republican party. Least of all was this 27th article a favorite with them. It was under that article that the famous Jonathan Robbins, alias Thomas Nash, was surrendered--a surrender which contributed largely to the defeat of Mr. Adams, and the overthrow of the Federal party, in 1800. The apology would be poor, if true: but it happens to be not exactly true. The article in the Webster treaty differs widely from the one in Jay's treaty--and all for the worse. The imitation is far worse than the original-about as much worse as modern Whigery is worse than ancient Federalism. Here are the two articles; let us compare them:

MR. WEESTER'S TREATY.
Article 10.

"It is agreed that the United States and her Britannic Majes ty shall, upon mutual requisitions by them, or their ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, beingcharged with the crime of murder, or as sault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged papers com mitted within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found, within the territories of the other: provided, that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offence had there been committed; and the respective judges and other magistrates shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon con plaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the appre hension of the fugitive or person so charged, that he may be brought before such judges, or other magistrates, respec tively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered, and if, on such hearing, the evidente

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"It is further agreed that his Majesty and the United States, a mutual requisitions by them, respectively, or by their re xcave ministers, or officers, authorized to make the same,

deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with urder, or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of either, a i seek an asylum within any of the countries of the other: orded, that this shall only be done on such evidence of crimaily as, according to the laws of the place where the fugi e or person so charged shall be found, would justify his prehension and commitment for trial if the offence had there en cominitted. The expense of such apprehension and deery shall be borne and defrayed by those who make the quisition, and receive the fugitive."

These are the two articles, and the difference tween them is great and striking. First, the mber of offences for which delivery of the offendis to be made, is much greater in the present aly. Mr. Jay's article is limited to two offences nurder and forgery: the two proposed by Mr. ferson; but without his qualification to exclude litical offences, and to confine the deliveries to enders from coterminous dominions. The prestreaty embraces these two, and five others; The five added king seven in the whole. ences are-assault, with intent to commit mur

piracy; robbery; arson; and the utterance of ged paper. These additional five offences, ugh high in name, might be very small in dee. Assault, with intent to murder, might be thout touching or hurting any person; for, to a weapon at a person within striking distance, hout striking, is an assault: to level a fire-arm 1 person within carrying distance, and without ng, is an assault; and the offence being in the ent, is difficult of proof. Mr. Jefferson excluded and so did Jay's treaty; because the offence was small and too equivocal to be made a matter of ernational arrangement. Piracy was excluded, anse it was absurd to speak of a pirate's counHe has no country. He is hostis humani eris-the enemy of the human race; and is hung erever he is caught. The robbery might be of hilling's worth of bread; the arson, of burning traw shed; the utterance of forged paper, might the emission or passing of a counterfeit sixpence. these were excluded from Jay's treaty, because their possible insignificance, and the door they Bed to abuse in harassing the innocent, and in tiplying the chances for getting hold of a politI offender for some other offence, and then ishing him for his politics.

triking as these differences are between the sent article and that of Mr. Jay's treaty, there .still more essential difference in another part; La difference which nullifies the article in its y material bearing in our favor. It is this: Jay's treaty referred the delivery of the fugito the executive power. This treaty intervenes Judiciary, and requires two decisions from a ge or magistrate before the Governor can act. is nullifies the treaty in all that relates to fugie slaves guilty of crimes against their masters. the eye of the British law, they have no master, I can commit no offence against such a person asserting their liberty against him, even unto tth. A slave may kill his master, if necessary his escape. This is legal under British law; 1, in the present state of abolition feeling throughthe British dominions, such killing would not ly be considered fair, but in the highest degree ritorious and laudable. What chance for the covery of such a slave under this treaty? Read -the concluding part--after the word "commit" and see what is the process to be gone through. mplaint is to be made to a British judge or ice. The fugitive is brought before this judge justice, that the evidence of the criminality may heard and considered-such evidence as would stify the apprehension, commitment, and trial of e party, if the offence had been committed there. upon this hearing, the evidence be deemed suffi ent to sustain the charge, the judge or magistrate to certify the fact to the executive authority; and en, and not until then, the surrender can be ade. This is the process; and in all this the ew treaty differs from Jay's. Under his treaty, e delivery was a ministerial act, referring itself the authority of the Governor: under this treaty, becomes a judicial act, referring itself to the dis retion of the judge, who must twice decide against le slave (first, in issuing the warrant; and next,

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

in trying it) before the Governor can order the surrender. Twice judicial discretion interposes a barrier, which cannot be forced; and behind which the slave, who has robbed or killed his master, may repose in safety. What evidence of criminality will satisfy the judge, when the act itself is no crime in his eyes, or under his laws, and when all his sympathies are on the side of the slave? What chance would there be for the judicial surrender of offending slaves in the British dominions, under this treaty, when the provisions of our own Constitution, within the States of our own Union, in relation to fugitive slaves, cannot be executed? We all know that a judicial trial is immunity to a slave pursued by his owner, in many of our own States. Can such trials be expected to result better for the owner in the British dominion, where the relation of master and slave is not admitted, and where abolitionism is the policy of the Government, the voice of the law, and the spirit of the people? Killing his master in detence of his liberty, is no offence in the eye of British law or British people; and no slave will ever be given up for it.

[Mr. WRIGHT here said, that counterfeiting American securities, or bank notes, was no offence in Canada; and the same question might arise there in relation to forgers.]

Mr. BENTON resumed. Better far to leave things as they are. Forgers are now given up in Canada, by Executive authority, when they fly to that province. This is done in the spirit of good neighborhood; and because all honest Governments have an interest in suppressing crimes, and repelling criminals. The governor acts from a sense of propriety, and the dictates of decency and justice. Not so with the judge. He must go by the law; and when there is no law against the offence, he has nothing to justify him in delivering the offender.

Conventions for the mutual surrender of large offenders, where dominions are coterminous, might be proper. Limited, as proposed by Mr. Jefferson in 1793, and they might be beneficial in suppression of border crimes and the preservation of order and justice. But extended as this is to a long list of offenders-unrestricted as it is in the case of murder-applying to dominions in all parts of the world, and to ships in every sea,-it can be nothing but the source of individual annoyance and national recrimination. Besides, if we surrender to Great Britain, why not to Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and all the countries of the world? If we give up the Irishman to England, why not the Pole to Russia, the Italian to Austria, the German to his prince; and so on throughout the catalogue of nations? Sir, the article is a pestiferous one; and as it is determinable upon notice, it will become the duty of the American people to elect a President who will give the notice, and so put an end to its existence.

Addressing itself to the natural feelings of the country, against high crimes and border offenders, and in favor of political liberty, the message of the President communicating and recommending this treaty to us, carefully presents this article as conforming to our feelings in all these particulars. It is represented as applicable only to high crimesto border offenders; and to offences not political. In all this, the message is disingenuous and deceptive, and calculated to ravish from the ignorant and the thoughtless an applause to which the treaty is not entitled. It says:

"The surrender to justice of persons who, having committed high crimes, seek an asylum in the territories of a neighbor. ing nation, would seem to be an act due to the cause of general justice, and properly belonging to the present state of civilization and intercourse. The British provinces of North Amer ica are separated from the States of the Union by a line of sev eral thousand miles; and, along portions of this line, the amount of population on either side is quite considerable, while the passage of the boundary is always easy.

"Oftenders against the law on the one side transfer themselves to the other. Sometimes, with great difficulty, they are brought to justice; but very often they wholly escape. A consciousness of immunity, from the power of avoiding justice in this way, instigates the unprincipled and reckless to the commission of offences; and the peace and good neighborhood of the border are consequently often disturbed.

"In the case of offenders fleeing from Canada into the United States, the Governors of States are often applied to for their surrender; and questions of a very embarrassing nature arise from these applications. It has been thought highly important, therefore, to provide for the whole case by a proper treaty stipulation. The article on the subject, in the proposed treaty, is carefully confined to such offences as all mankind agree to regard as heinous and destructive of the security of life and of property. In this careful and specific enumeration of crimes, the object has been to exclude all political offences, or crim inal charges arising from wars or intestine commotions. Trea son, misprision of treason, libels, desertion from military ser vice, and other offences of a similar character, are excluded."

Senate.

In these phrases the message recommends the ar ticle to the Senate and the country; and yet nothing could be more fallacious and deceptive than such a recommendation. It confines the surrender to border offenders-Canadian fugitives: yet the treaty extends it to all persons committing offences under the "jurisdiction" of Great Britain-a term which includes all her territory throughout the world, and every ship or fort over which her flag waves. The message confines the surrender to high crimes: yet we have seen that the treaty includes

imes which may be of low degree--low indeed! A hare or a partridge from a preserve; a loaf of bread to sustain life; a sixpenny counterfeit note passed; a shed burnt; a weapon lifted, without striking! The message says all political crimes, all treasons, misprision of treason, libels, and desertions are excluded. The treaty shows that these offences are not excluded-that the limitations proposed by Mr. Jefferson are not inserted; and, consequently, under the head of murder, the insurgent, the rebel, and the traitor who has shed blood, may be given up; and so of other offences. When once surrendered, he may be tried for anything. The fate of Jonathan Robbins, alias Nash, is a good illustration of all this. He was a British sailor-was guilty of mutiny, murder, and piracy on the frigate Hermione--deserted to the United States--was demanded by the British minister as a murderer under Jay's treaty-given up as a murderer--then tried by a court-martial on board a man-ofwar for mutiny, murder, desertion, and piracy-found guilty-executed--and his body hung in chains from the yard-arm of a man-of-war. And so it would be again. The man given up for one offence, would be tried for another; and in the number and insignificance of the offiences for which he might be surrendered, there would be no difficulty in reaching any victim that foreign Government chose to pursue. If this article had been in force in the time of the Irish rebellion, and Lord Edward Fitzgerald had escaped to the United States, after wounding, as he did, several of the myrmidons who arrested him, he might have been demanded as a fugitive from justice, for the assault with intent to kill; and then tried for treason, and hanged and quartered; and such will be the operation of the article if it continues.

The article is improper in itself; unequal in its operation; intended to give the British the right of demanding all fugitives, or emigrants from all parts of her dominions, and all her ships; intended to authorize their arrest for desertion or political offences, under the guise of reclaiming them for crimes; worth nothing to us on the two main points of fugitive slaves and forgers; and actually putting us in a worse condition than we were in without this agreement. Lord Ashburton says it cannot take effect in England without an act of Parliament to sanction it. I have not examined the question; but would suppose that if an act of Parliament were necessary in England to give it validity, an act of Congress would be equally necessary here for the same purpose. In that event, the Representatives of the people may yet save an immense emigrant population from the persecutions and annoyance to which political offenders as well as criminals, and the innocent as well as the guilty, may be subjected under this renewed and aggravated edition of one of the worst parts of Jay's treaty.

I have done with the consideration of this article; and with it, I have done with my detailed and special objections to the contents of the treaty, Other general objections I have to it, and so stated at the opening of my speech. Besides the leading general objection, that this treaty was not a settlement of all matters in dispute; that it settled what concerned Great Britain and the Northern States; and was, in fact, a virtual separate treaty with those States;besides this objection, which I stated at large, there were other general objections which I barely named, and will now proceed to state more fully.

"He (President Adams) considers an offence committed on board a public ship of war on the high seas, to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the nation to which the ship belongs. Nash is charged, it is understood, with piracy and murder on board the British frigate Hermione, on the high seas, and, consequently, within the jurisdiction of his Britannic Majesty; and, therefore, by the 27th article of the treaty of amity with Great Britain, Nash ought to be delivered up as requested by the British minister, provided such evidence of his criminality be produced as. by the laws of the United States, or of South Carolina, (where the fugitive was,) would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the offence had been committed within the United States."-(Mr. Pickering's letter to the British minister, Mr. Liston, surrendering Robbins, alias Nash, by order of President Adams.)

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