306 Sureties in suits suo nomine. omnimodo satisdari debet, quia nemo alienae rei sine satisdatione defensor idoneus intelligitur. sed si quidem cum cognitore agatur, dominus satisdare iubetur; si vero cum procuratore, ipse procurator. idem et de tutore et de curatore iuris est. (102.) Quod si proprio nomine aliquis iudicium accipiat in personam, certis ex causis satisdari solet, quas ipse Praetor significat. quarum satisdationum duplex causa est. nam aut propter genus actionis satisdatur, aut propter personam, quia suspecta sit. propter genus actionis, velut iudicati depensive, aut cum de moribus mulieris agetur: propter personam, velut si cum eo agitur qui decoxerit, cuiusve bona a creditoribus possessa proscriptave sunt, sive cum eo herede agatur quem Praetor suspectum aestimaverit. 103. Omnia autem iudicia aut legitimo iure consistunt aut because no one is considered competent to take up another's case unless there be sureties': but the furnishing thereof will be laid on the principal, when the proceedings are against a cognitor, whilst if they be against a procurator, the procurator himself must provide them. The latter is also the rule applying to a tutor or curator. 102. On the other hand, if a man be defendant on his own account in an action in personam, he has to give sureties in certain cases wherein the Praetor has so directed. For such furnishing of sureties there are two reasons, as they are provided either on account of the nature of the action, or on account of the untrustworthy character of the person. On account of the nature of the action, in such actions as those on a judgment or for money laid down by a sponsor or that de moribus mulieris3: on account of the person when the action is against one who has squandered his property, or one whose goods have been taken possession of or advertised for sale by his creditors, or when the action is brought against an heir whose conduct the Praetor considers suspicious*. 103. All actions before judices are either founded on the statute law or based on the imperium of the Praetor3. 104. Judicia Legitima et Imperio continentia. 307 imperio continentur. (104.) Legitima sunt iudicia quae in urbe Roma vel intra primum urbis Romae miliarium inter omnes cives Romanos sub uno iudice accipiuntur: eaque e lege Iulia iudiciaria, nisi in anno et sex mensibus iudicata fuerint, expirant. et hoc est quod vulgo dicitur, e lege Iulia litem anno et sex mensibus mori. (105.) Imperio vero continentur recuperatoria et quae sub uno iudice accipiuntur interveniente peregrini persona iudicis aut litigatoris. in eadem causa sunt quaecumque extra primum urbis Romae miliarium tam inter cives Romanos quam inter peregrinos accipiuntur. ideo autem imperio contineri iudicia dicuntur, quia tamdiu valent, quamdiu is qui ea praecepit imperium habebit. (106.) Of the former kind are those which are heard before a single judex in the city of Rome or within the first milestone from the city of Rome, wherein all the parties are Roman citizens: and these, according to the provisions of the Lex Julia Judiciaria', expire unless a decision be pronounced upon them within a year and six months. This is what is meant by the common saying that a suit dies in a year and six months by the Lex Julia Judiciaria2. 105. In the other class are comprised actions before recuperatores3, and those which are heard before a single judex, when a foreigner is concerned either as judex or litigant. In the same category are all actions heard beyond the first milestone from the city of Rome, whether the parties in them be citizens or foreigners. These actions are said to be "based on the imperium," because they are effectual only during such time as the Praetor who granted them remains in office (retains his imperium). 106. If then the 1 Temp. Augusti. 2 D. 46. 7. 2. From the following passages it will be seen that the suffering an action to die, if done wilfully, was sometimes equivalent to fraud or dolus, D. 4. 3. 18. 4 and D. 42. 8. 3. I. 3 Recuperatores were possibly, at their original institution, delegates chosen from two nations at variance as to some right or question, to act as umpires and arrange the dispute amicably. Hence the name was subsequently applied to persons who had a function analogous to that of a judex in cases where foreigners were concerned. In accordance with the original notion of their being delegates chosen by different parties, they would in all cases be more than one in number; and so the name came to be applied to others who sat (two or more together) to decide cases connected with the jus gentium, even when both parties were Roman citizens. See also notes on I. 20, IV. 46. 308 Exceptiones rei judicatae et in judicium deductae. Et siquidem imperio continenti iudicio actum fuerit, sive in rem sive in personam, sive ea formula quae in factum concepta est sive ea quae in ius habet intentionem, postea nihilominus ipso iure de eadem re agi potest. et ideo necessaria est exceptio rei iudicatae vel in iudicium deductae. (107.) at vero si legitimo iudicio in personam actum sit ea formula quae iuris civilis habet intentionem, postea ipso iure de eadem re agi non potest, et ob id exceptio supervacua est. si vero vel in rem vel in factum actum fuerit, ipso iure nihilominus postea agi potest, et ob id exceptio necessaria est rei iudicatae vel in iudicium deductae. (108.) Alia causa fuit olim legis actionum. nam qua de re actum semel erat, de ea postea ipso iure agi non action resorted to be one "based on the imperium," whether it be in rem or in personam, and whether it have a formula the intentio whereof is in factum or one whereof the intentio is in jus', another action may nevertheless according to the letter of the law be brought afterwards upon the same facts. And therefore there is need of the exceptio rei judicatae or the exceptio in judicium deductae. 107. But if proceedings in personam by action based on statute law be taken under a formula which has a civil law intentio, by the letter of the law there cannot be a second action on the same facts, and therefore the exceptio is superfluous. But if the action be in rem, or be a personal action in factum, another action may nevertheless according to the letter of the law3 be afterwards brought upon the same facts, and therefore the exceptio rei judicatae or that in judicium deductae is necessary. 108. In olden times the case was different with the legis actiones, for when once an action had been tried about any matter, there could not according to the letter of the law be another action on the same facts: and there was not any employment Perpetual and annual actions. 309 poterat nec omnino ita, ut nunc, usus erat illis temporibus exceptionum. (109.) Ceterum potest ex lege quidem esse iudicium, sed legitimum non esse; et contra ex lege non esse, sed legitimum esse. nam si verbi gratia ex lege Aquilia vel Ouinia vel Furia in provinciis agatur, imperio continebitur iudicium idemque iuris est et si Romae aput recuperatores agamus, vel aput unum iudicem interveniente peregrini persona. et ex diverso si ex ea causa, ex qua nobis edicto Praetoris datur actio, Romae sub uno iudice inter omnes cives Romanos accipiatur iudicium, legitimum est. : 110. Quo loco admonendi sumus, eas quidem actiones quae ex lege senatusve consultis proficiscuntur, perpetuo solere Praetorem accommodare: eas vero quae ex propria ipsius iurisdictione pendent, plerumque intra annum dare. (111.) aliquando at all of exceptiones as there is now. IC9. Further, an action may be derived from a lex and yet not be "statutable," and, conversely, it may not be derived from a lex and yet be 66 statutable." For if, to take an example, an action be brought in the provinces under the Lex Aquilia' or Ovinia* or Furia the action will be one "based upon the imperium:" and the rule is the same if we bring an action at Rome before recuperatores, or before one judex when there is a foreigner connected with the suit". So, conversely, if in a case where an action is granted under the Praetor's edict the trial be at Rome before a single judex and all the parties be Roman citizens, the action is "statutable.” 6 110. At this point we must be reminded that the Praetor's practice is to grant at any time those actions which arise from a lex or from senatusconsulta, but in general to grant those which spring from his own special jurisdiction only within one year. III. Sometimes, however, the Praetor in 1 III. 210. 2 Nothing is known about this law. 3 The Lex Furia de Sponsu; for this lex is stated in III. 121 to be applicable to Italy only as a matter of course, and therefore if carried into effect in a province must have been a title in the edict of the praeses of that province, and so not "statuta ble," but "based on the imperium." 4 Note on IV. 105. 5 Either as judex or litigant; see IV. 105. 6 The Praetor granted these actions any length of time after the ground of action arose: the others he only allowed to be brought if the formula were applied for within one year. It is very likely that the rule 310 Actions which lie for or against an heir. tamen ipse quoque Praetor in actionibus imitatur ius legitimum : quales sunt eae quas Praetor bonorum possessoribus ceterisque qui heredis loco sunt accommodat. furti quoque manifesti actio, quamvis ex ipsius Praetoris iurisdictione proficiscatur, perpetuo datur; et merito, cum pro capitali poena pecuniaria constituta sit. II2. Non omnes actiones quae in aliquem aut ipso iure competunt aut a Praetore dantur, etiam in heredem aeque competunt aut dari solent. est enim certissima iuris regula, ex maleficiis poenales actiones in heredem nec competere nec Praetorem dare, velut furti, vi bonorum raptorum, iniuriarum, damni iniuriae: sed heredibus actoris huiusmodi actiones competunt nec denegantur, excepta iniuriarum actione, et si qua his actions imitates the precedent of the statutable actions': for instance, in those actions which he grants to bonorum possessores and others who occupy the position of heir. The actio furti manifesti also, though issuing from the jurisdiction of the Praetor himself, is granted at any time; and very properly, since the Praetor's pecuniary penalty has been imposed instead of the capital penalty (of the Twelve Tables). II2. Not every action which is either maintainable at strict law or granted by the Praetor against any one, is equally maintainable or granted against his heir. For there is a firmly-established rule of law that penal actions on delicts do not lie against the heir (of the offender), nor will the Praetor grant them, for instance the actions furti, vi bonorum raptorum, injuriarum, damni injuriae*: but actions of this kind lie for the heir (of the person aggrieved) and are not refused to him, except the action injuriarum and any other action that may resemble originally was that they could only be applied for whilst the same Praetor was in office whose year had witnessed the offence, but subsequently the space of time was a definite one, and irrespective of the possible retirement of one Praetor and succession of another. After the time of Theodosius perpetuum came to have a restricted meaning, and a perpetua actio was one which could be brought within 30, or in some cases 40 years, 1 Sc. Grants them perpetuo. 4 III. 182-223. 5 The reason for this is that the actio injuriarum was regarded by the Roman law as a purely personal remedy; "the heir had suffered |