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cognitorem quidem agat«r, ulla satisdatio vel ab ipso vel a domino desideratur. cum enim certis et quasi sollemnibus verbis in locum domini substituatur cognitor, merito domini loco habetur. (98.) Procurator vero si agar, satisdare iubetur ratam rem dominum habiturum: periculum enim est, ne iterum domin«s de eadem re experiatur. quod periculum non intervene, si per cognitorem actum fuit; quia de qwz, re quisque per cognitorem egerit, de ea non magis amplius actionem habet quam si ipse egerit . (99.) Tutores et curatores eo modo quo et procuratores satisdare debere verba edicti faciunt. sed aliquando illis satisdatio remittitur. (100.) Haec ita si in rem agatur: si vero in personam, ab actoris quidem parte quando satisdari debeat quaerentes, eadem repetemus quae diximus in actione qua in rem agitur. (101.) ab eius vero parte cum quo agitur, si quidem alieno nomzni aliquis interveniat,

even though a suit be brought by means of a cognitor, no sureties are required either from him or his principal. For since the cognitor is put into the place of the principal in words of a formal and almost solemn character1 he is fairly regarded as occupying the position of the principal. 98. Hence when a procurator brings an action, he is ordered to furnish sureties that his principal will ratify his proceedings: for there is the risk that the principal may again sue for the same thing*. But when the proceedings are conducted by means of a cognitor this risk does not exist, because when a man sues by such an agent, he no more has a second action than he would have if he himself sued. 99. According to the letter of the edict tutors and curators ought to furnish sureties in the same manner as procurators must; but from this necessity of finding sureties they are sometimes excused. 100. The above are the rules when the action is in rem, but if it be in personam, what we have already stated with reference to the action in rem will be our answer to those who want to know when sureties ought to be furnished on the part of the plaintiff. 101. As to the case of a defendant,—when a man defends in another's name, sureties must always be furnished,

1 iv. 8.5. tores at some length in pro Quinct,

2 Cicero treats the subject of с 7, 8. satisdatio by cognitores and troc:ira

Зо6 Sureties in suits suo nomine.

omnimodo satisdan debet, quia nemo alienae rei sine satisdatione defensor idoneus intelligitur. sed si quidem cum cog>iitore agatur, dominus satisdare iubetur; si vero cum procuratore, ipse procurator, idem et de tutore et de curatore iuris est. (102.) Quod si proprio nomine aliquis iudicium 2xcip>izl in personam, certis ex causis satisdan solet, quar ipse Praetor significat. quarum satisdationum duplex causa est . nam aut propter genus actionis satisdatur, aut propter personaw, quia suspecta sit. propter genus actionis, velut iudicati depensive, aut cum de moribus mulieris agetur: propter personam, velut si cum eo agitur qui decoxerit, cuiusve bona a creditoribus possessa proscriptave sunt, sive cum eo herede agatur quem Praetor suspectum aestimaverit.

103. Omnia autem iudicia aut legitimo iure consistunt aut

because no one is considered competent to take up another's case unless there be sureties1: but the furnishing thereof will be laid on the principal, when the proceedings are against a cognitor, whilst if they be against a procurator, the procurator himself must provide them. The latter is also the rule applying to a tutor or curator. 102. On the other hand, if a man be defendant on his own account in an action in personam, he has to give sureties in certain cases wherein the Praetor has so directed. For such furnishing of sureties there are two reasons, as they are provided either on account of the nature of the action, or on account of the untrustworthy character of the person. On account of the nature of the action, in such actions as those on a judgment or for money laid down by a sponsor2 or that de moribus mulieris3: on account of the person when the action is against one who has squandered his property, or one whose goods have been taken possession of or advertised for sale by his creditors, or when the action is brought against an heir whose conduct the Praetor considers suspicious4.

103. All actions before judices are either founded on the statute law or based on the imperium of the Praetor5. 104. Judicia Legitima et Imperio continentНа. 307

1 D. 3. 3. 46. 2, D. 3. 3. 53, D. « Cic. pro Quinct. с 8. T>.\i. 5. 46. 7. 10. 31, D. 42. 5. 33. 1.

2 iv. 25. 6 UL J80i ,gI. 8 See Ulpian, VI. 12, 13.

imperio continintur. (104.) Legitima sunt iudicia quae in urbe Roma vel intra primum urbis Romae miliarium inter omnes cives Romanos sub uno iudice accipiuntur: eaque e lege Iulia iudiciarz«, nisi in anno et sex mensibus iudicata fuerint, expirant. et hoc est quod vulgo dicitur, e lege Iulia litem anno et sex mensibus mori. (105.) Imperio vero continents recuperatoria et quae sub uno iudice accipiuntur interveniente peregrini persona iudicis aut litigatoris. in tzrfem causa sunt quaecumque extra primum urbis Romae miliarium tam inter cives Romanar quam inter peregrinos accipiuntur, ideo autem imperio contineri iudicia dicuntur, quia tamdiu valent, quamdiu is qui ea praecepit imperium habebit. (106.)

Of the former kind are those which are heard before a single judex in the city of Rome or within the first milestone from the city of Rome, wherein all the parties are Roman citizens: and these, according to the provisions of the Lex Julia Judiciaria1, expire unless a decision be pronounced upon them within a year and six months. This is what is meant by the common saying that a suit dies in a year and six months by the Lex Julia Judiciaria*. 105. In the other class are comprised actions before recuperatores3, and those which are heard before a single judex, when a foreigner is concerned either as judex or litigant. In the same category are all actions heard beyond the first milestone from the city of Rome, whether the parties in them be citizens or foreigners. These actions are said to be "based on the imperium" because they are effectual only during such time as the Praetor who granted them remains in office (retains his imperium). 106. If then the

1 Temp. Augusti. had a function analogous to that of a

2 D. 46. 7. 2. From the follow- judex in cases where foreigners were ing passages it will be seen that the concerned. In accordance with the suffering an action to die, if done original notion of their being delewilfully, was sometimes equivalent gates chosen by different parties, they to fraud or dolus, D. 4. 3. 18. 4 and would in all cases be more than one D. 42. 8. 3. 1. in number; and so the name came

3 Recuperatores were possibly, at to be applied to others who sat (two their original institution, delegates or more together) to decide cases chosen from two nations at variance connected with the/«í gentium, even as to some right or question, to act when both parties were Roman citias umpires and arrange the dispute zens. See also notes on I. 20, IV. amicably. Hence the name was 46.

subsequently applied to persons who

3o8 Exceptiones reijudicatae et in judicium deductae.

Et siquidem imperio continenti iudicio actum fuerit, sive in rem sive in personam, sive ea formula quae in factum concepta est sive ea quae in ius habet intentionem, postea nihilominus ipso iure de eadem re agi potest. et ideo necessaria est exceptio rei iudicatae vel in iudicium deductae. (107.) at vero si legitimo iudicio in personam actum sit ea formula quae iuris civilis habet intentionem, postea ipso iure de eadem re agi non potest, et ob id exceptio supervacua est. si vero vel in rem vel in factum actum fuerit, ipso iure nihilominus postea agi potest, et ob id exceptio necessaria est rei iudicatae vel in iudicium deductae. (108.) Alia causa fuit olim legis actionum. nam qua de re actum semel erat, de ea postea ipso iure agi non

action resorted to be one "based on the imperium" whether it be in rem or in personam, and whether it have a formula the intentio whereof is in factum or one whereof the intentio is in jus1, another action may nevertheless according to the letter of the law be brought afterwards upon the same facts. And therefore there is need of the exceptio rei judicatae or the exceptio in judicium deductae3. 107. But if proceedings in personam by action based on statute law be taken under a formula which has a civil law intentio, by the letter of the law there cannot be a second action on the same facts, and therefore the exceptio is superfluous. But if the action be in rem, or be a personal action in factum, another action may nevertheless according to the letter of the law3 be afterwards brought upon the same facts, and therefore the exceptio rei judicatae or that in judicium deductae is necessary. 108. In olden times the case was different with the legis actiones, for when once an action had been tried about any matter, there could not according to the letter of the law be another action on the same facts: and there was not any employment

1 IV. 45. 2 Ш. 181. (solutia or acceptilatio), had taken

3 An obligation is said to be de- place. A formula would then be

stroyed ipso jure in two cases; hrstly granted, and the plaintiff would not

when there had already been a judg- apply for the insertion of an exceptio,

ment in a legitimum judicium, in pleading, as it were, a general issue,

which cases the Praetor will grant and establishing his defence in judi

no formula for a second action; and cio by proof of the payment: this

this is the case dealt with here: se- latter case is however foreign to the

condly, when there had been no ac- topic Gaius is here discussing. See

tion, but a payment real or fictitious, Themis, VI. p. 413.

Perpetual and annual actions. 309

poterat: nec omnino ita, ut nunc, usus erat illis temporibus exceptionum. (109.) Ceterum potest ex lege quidem esse iudicium, sed legitimum non esse; et contra ex lege non esse, sed legitimum esse. nam si verbi gratia ex lege Aquilia vel Ouinia vel Furia in provinciis agatur, imperio continebitur iudicium: idemque iuris est et si Romae aput recuperatores agamus, vel aput unum iudicem interveniente peregrini persona, et ex diverso si ex ea causa, ex qua nobis edicto Praetoris datur actio, Romae sub uno iudice inter omnes cives Romanes accipiatur iudicium, legitimum est.

11o. Quo loco admonendi sumus, eas quidem actione« quae ex lege senatusve consultis proficiscuntur, perpetuo solere Praetorem accommodare: eas vero quae ex propria ipsius iurisdictione pendent, plerumque intra annum dare. (i11.) aliquando

at all of exceptiones as there is now. 1C9. Further, an action may be derived from a lex and yet not be "statutable," and, conversely, it may not be derived from a lex and yet be "statutable." For if, to take an example, an action Ьг brought in the provinces under the Lex Aquilia1 or Ovinia2 or Furia3 the action will be one "based upon the Imperium:" and the rule is the same if we bring an action at Rome before recuperatores1, or before one judex when there is a foreigner connected with the suit5. So, conversely, if in a case where an action is granted under the Praetor's edict the trial be at Rome before a single judex and all the parties be Roman citizens, the action is "statutable."

11o. At this point we must be reminded that the Praetor's practice is to grant at any time6 those actions which arise from a lex or from senatusconsidla, but in general to grant those which spring from his own special jurisdiction only within one year. i11. Sometimes, however, the Praetor in

1 i11. 210. ble," but "based on the Imperium."

2 Nothing is known about this 4 Note on IV. 105.

law. 6 Either as judex or litigant; see

3 The Lex Furia de Sponsin for IV. 105.

this lex is stated in III. 121 to be ap- 6 The Praetor granted these ac

plicable to Italy only as a matter of tions any length of time after the

course, and therefore if carried into ground of action arose: the others

effect in a province must have been he only allowed to be brought if the

a title in the edict of the pracses of formula were applied for within one

that province, and so not "statuta- year. It is very likely that the rule

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