138 Per damnationem. Caduca. nec mancipaverit, usucapione dumtaxat pleno iure fit legatarii : finitur autem usucapio, ut supra quoque diximus, mobilium quidem rerum anno, earum vero quae solo tenentur, biennio. (205.) Est et alia differentia inter legatum per vindicationem et per damnationem: si enim eadem res duobus pluribusve per damnationem legata sit, si quidem coniunctim, plane singulis partes debentur sicut in per vindicationem legato. si vero disiunctim, singulis solida res debetur, ut scilicet heres alteri rem, alteri aestimationem eius praestare debeat. et in coniunctis deficientis portio non ad collegatarium pertinet, sed in hereditate remanet. 206. Quod autem diximus deficientis portionem in per damnationem quidem legato in hereditate retineri, in per vindicationem vero collegatario accrescere, admonendi sumus ante legem Papiam iure civili ita fuisse: post legem vero Papiam deficientis portio caduca fit et ad eos pertinet qui in eo testamento liberos habent. (207.) Et quamvis prima causa sit in mancipating it, it only becomes the legatee's in full title by usucapion: and usucapion, as we have also said above', is completed in the case of moveable things in one year, but in the case of those connected with the soil in two. 2c5. There is also another difference between a legacy by vindication and one by damnation for supposing the same thing be bequeathed to two or more persons by damnation, if it be conjointly, clearly equal portions are due to each as in a legacy by vindication: but if disjointly, the whole thing is due to each, so that in fact the heir must give up the thing to one and its value to the other. Also, in conjoint legacies, the portion of one who fails to take does not belong to his co-legatee, but remains in the inheritance. 206. But as to our statement that the portion of one failing to take is retained in the inheritance in the case of a legacy by damnation, but accrues to the co-legatee in the case of one by vindication: we must be reminded that it was so by the civil law before the Lex Papia: but that now, when the Lex Papia has been passed, the portion of one failing becomes a lapse, and belongs to those persons named in the testament who have children. 207. And although in claiming lapses, the first 1 II. 41. 2 A.D. 10. See note (G) in Appendix. caducis vindicandis heredum liberos habentium, deinde, si heredes liberos non habeant, legatariorum liberos habentium, tamen ipsa lege Papia significatur, ut collegatarius coniunctus, si liberos habeat, potior sit heredibus, etiamsi liberos habebunt. (208.) sed plerisque placuit, quantum ad hoc ius quod lege Papia coniunctis constituitur, nihil interesse utrum per vindicationem an per damnationem legatum sit. 209. Sinendi modo ita legamus: HERES MEUS DAMNAS ESTO SINERE LUCIUM TITIUM HOMINEM STICHUM SUMERE SIBIQUE HABERE. (210.) Quod genus legati plus quidem habet quam per vindicationem legatum, minus autem quam per damnationem. nam eo modo non solum suam rem testator utiliter legare potest, sed etiam heredis sui: cum alioquin per vindicationem nisi suam rem legare non potest; per damnationem autem cuiuslibet extranei rem legare potest. (211.) Sed si quidem mortis testatoris tempore res ipsius testatoris sit vel heredis, plane utile legatum est, etiamsi testamenti faciundi tempore neutrius fuerit. (212.) Quodsi post mortem testatoris right belongs to the heirs who have children, and then, if the heirs have no children, the right belongs to the legatees who have children, yet it is laid down in the Lex Papia itself, that a co-legatee conjoined (with the person who fails to take), if he have children, is to have a claim prior to that of the heirs, even though they have children. 208. But so far as concerns this right established by the Lex Papia for conjoint legatees, it is generally held that it is immaterial whether the legacy be by vindication or by damnation. 209. We bequeath sinendi modo thus: "Let my heir be bound to allow Lucius Titius to take the man Stichus and have him for himself." 210. Which kind of legacy is more extensive than one by vindication, but less extensive than one by damnation. For in this way a testator can validly bequeath not only his own property, but also that of his heir. Whereas, on the other hand, by vindication he cannot bequeath anything but his own property: whilst by damnation he can bequeath the property of any stranger. 211. Now if the thing at the time of the testator's death belong either to him or to the heir, the legacy is undoubtedly valid, even though it belonged to neither at the time the testament was made. 212. But if the thing commenced to be the property ea res heredis esse coeperit, quaeritur an utile sit legatum. et plerique putant inutile esse: quid ergo est? licet aliquis eam rem legaverit quae neque eius umquam fuerit, neque postea heredis eius unquam esse coeperit, ex senatusconsulto Neroniano proinde videtur ac si per damnationem relicta esset. (213.) Sicut autem per damnationem legata res non statim post aditam hereditatem legatarii efficitur, sed manet heredis eo usque, donec is heres tradendo vel mancipando vel in iure cedendo legatarii eam fecerit; ita et in sinendi modo legato iuris est: et ideo huius quoque legati nomine in personam actio est QUIDQUID HEREDEM EX TESTAMENTO DARE FACERE OPORTET. (214.) Sunt tamen qui putant ex hoc legato non videri obligatum heredem, ut mancipet aut in iure cedat aut tradat, sed sufficere, ut legatarium rem sumere patiatur; quia nihil ultra ei testator imperavit, quam ut sinat, id est patiatur legatarium rem sibi habere. (215.) Maior illa of the heir after the death of the testator, it is a disputed point whether the legacy is valid: and the general opinion is that it is void. What follows then? Although a man have bequeathed a thing which was neither his at any time nor ever subsequently began to be the property of his heir, yet by the senatusconsultum of Nero, it is regarded as if left by damnation'. 213. In like manner as a thing bequeathed by damnation does not become the property of the legatee immediately that the inheritance is entered on, but remains the heir's, until the heir makes it the legatee's by delivery, or mancipation, or cessio in jure: so also is the law regarding a legacy sinenai modo: and therefore in respect of this legacy also the action is personal: "whatsoever the heir ought to give or do according to the testament"." 214. There are, however, those who think that in this kind of legacy the heir is not to be considered bound to mancipate, make cessio in jure, or deliver, but that it is enough for him to allow the legatee to take the thing: because the testator laid no charge on him except that he should allow, i. e. suffer the legatee to have the thing for himself. 1 Ulp. XXIV. 11 a. Gaius proba bly intends the latter half of this paragraph to be a denial of the doctrine of the "plerique" of the first 215. The following more half: but if so, he words his sentence so badly that he omits the very case under discussion, and that only. 2 IV. 2. dissensio in hoc legato intervenit, si eandem rem duobus pluribusve disiunctim legasti: quidam putant utrisque solidum deberi, sicut per damnationem: nonnulli occupantis esse meliorem condicionem aestimant, quia cum in eo genere legati damnetur heres patientiam praestare, ut legatarius rem habeat, sequitur, ut si priori patientiam praestiterit, et is rem sumpserit, securus sit adversus eum qui postea legatum petierit, quia neque habet rem, ut patiatur eam ab eo sumi, neque dolo malo fecit quominus eam rem haberet. 216. Per praeceptionem hoc modo legamus: LUCIUS TITIUS HOMINEM STICHUM PRAECIPITO. (217.) Sed nostri quidem praeceptores nulli alii eo modo legari posse putant, nisi ei qui aliqua ex parte heres scriptus esset: praecipere enim esse praecipuum sumere; quod tantum in eius personam procedit qui aliqua ex parte heres institutus est, quod is extra portionem hereditatis praecipuum legatum habiturus sit. (218.) Ideo important dispute arises with regard to this kind of legacy, if you have bequeathed the same thing to two or more disjointly some think the whole is due to each, as in a legacy by damnation: some consider that the condition of the one who first gets possession is the better, because, since in this description of legacy the heir is to suffer the legatee to have the thing, it follows that if he suffer the first legatee and he take the thing, he is secure against the other who subsequently demands the legacy, because he neither has the thing so as to allow it to be taken from him, nor has he fraudulently brought it to pass that he has it not. 216. By praeception we bequeath in this manner: "Let Lucius Titius first take the man Stichus." 217. But our authorities think that a bequest can be made in this form to no one who is not appointed heir in part: for praecipere means to take in advance: which only is possible in the case of one who is appointed heir to some part, since he can have the legacy in advance and clear of his share of the inheritance'. 1 He is ordered to take "in advance." "In advance" must mean before he takes some other benefit: now an ordinary legatee takes nothing but his legacy, and therefore praecipito must refer to an heir, the only legatee whom we can conceive as taking another benefit in addition to his legacy. que si extraneo legatum fuerit, inutile est legatum, adeo ut Sabinus existimaverit ne quidem ex senatusconsulto Neroniano posse convalescere: nam eo, inquit, senatusconsulto ea tantum confirmantur quae verborum vitio iure civili non valent, non quae propter ipsam personam legatarii non deberentur. sed Iuliano ex Sexto placuit etiam hoc casu ex senatusconsulto confirmari legatum: nam ex verbis etiam hoc casu accidere, ut iure civili inutile sit legatum, inde manifestum esse, quod eidem aliis verbis recte legatur, velut [per vindicationem et per damnationem et] sinendi modo: tunc autem vitio personae legatum non valere, cum ei legatum sit cui nullo modo legari possit, velut peregrino cum quo testamenti factio non sit; quo plane casu senatusconsulto locus non est. (219.) Item nostri praeceptores quod ita legatum est nulla ratione putant posse consequi eum cui ita fuerit legatum, praeterquam iudicio familiae erciscundae quod inter heredes de hereditate erciscunda, id est dividunda accipi solet: officio enim iudicis id 218. Therefore, if the legacy have been left to a stranger, the legacy is void, so that Sabinus thought it could not even stand by virtue of Nero's senatusconsultum: for he says, by that senatusconsultum those bequests alone are upheld which are invalid at the civil law through an error of wording, not those which are not due on account of the very character of the legatee. But Julianus, according to Sextus, thought that the legacy was in this case upheld by the senatusconsultum : because from the following consideration it was plain that in this case too the wording caused the invalidity of the bequest at the civil law, viz. that the legacy could be validly left in other words, as for instance, (by vindication or damnation or) sinendi modo: and (he said) that a legacy was invalid from defect of the person only when the legacy was to one to whom a legacy could by no means be given, for instance, to a foreigner with whom there is no testamenti factio': in which case undoubtedly the senatusconsultum is inapplicable. 219. Likewise, our authorities think the legatee can obtain a legacy left in this manner by no other means than a judicium familiae erciscundae2, which is usually employed between heirs for the purpose of "erciscating," i. e. dividing the inheritance: for it appertains to the |