We see no force in the claim that the judgment is in violation of any provision of the federal constitution. The claim of appellant in that connection appears to be substantially that the doctrine of Puckhaber v. Henry, 152 Cal. 425, [125 Am. St. Rep. 75, 14 Ann. Cas. 844, 93 Pac. 114], cannot be held applicable to this case without depriving her of vested rights, in that prior to that decision it was declared by our decisions that a pledgor of property could retake the same from the pledgee without paying the debt for which it was pledged as soon as the debt itself was barred by the statute of limitations, the lien of the pledge being extinguished by the lapse of the time which bars the principal obligation. (Civ. Code, sec. 2911.) That a pledgee could not retain the pledged property after the lapse of such time was declared in Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Fruit Co., 142 Cal. 477, [76 Pac. 67], and possibly in Conway v. Supreme Council, 131 Cal. 437, [63 Pac. 727], both of which cases were decided subsequent to the giving of the pledge here involved. Puckhaber v. Henry, disapproving the former of these cases and distinguishing the latter, was decided December 2, 1907. There is no claim that any such rule was declared by any decision prior to Conway v. Supreme Council, 131 Cal. 437, [63 Pac. 727]. It is obvious therefore that there is no basis in fact for any claim that at the time the contract of pledge was entered into the doctrine announced in the cases referred to became a part of the contract of the parties, even if such a situation would have existed had the decisions referred to been made prior to the contract of pledge, a matter that we by no means concede. (See Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184, [16 L. R. A. 646, 30 Pac. 213]; Alferitz v. Borgwardt, 126 Cal. 201, [58 Pac. 460].) It is certainly clear that the doctrine of the cases just cited is applicable to the claim of learned counsel for Mrs. Taylor that she is entitled under the federal constitution to prevail by reason of decisions of this court rendered subsequent to the making of the contract of pledge.

The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.

Rehearing denied.

Beatty, C. J., does not participate in the foregoing.

CLXVII Cal.-50

[L. A. No. 3255. In Bank.-June 3, 1914.]

HARRY H. MOODY et al., Appellants, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY (a Corporation), et al., Respondents.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-APPLICATION TO MARRIED WOMEN-RULE AT COMMON LAW.-Under the common law, where upon marriage the legal rights of a woman were suspended, the statute of limitations for her protection was also suspended and not allowed to run against any cause of action which might have been enforced by her except for the disability of marriage. In more modern times the wife, having been freed from many of the common-law disabilities arising from her marriage, the legislatures have to a corresponding extent provided that the statute of limitations may be made to run against her.

ID.-ACTION BY MARRIED WOMAN-NECESSITY OF HUSBAND BEING MADE PARTY AS AFFECTING LIMITATIONS.-In this state, in so far as a married woman is entitled to bring an action without joining her husband, all limitations as to the time of commencement of the action may be urged against her suit; but where the husband is a necessary party with her, she is deemed to be under disability as to the commencement of the action and the limitation of time cannot be urged.

ID. PERSONAL Injuries to MARRIED WOMAN-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. In an action by a married woman to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by her, she is entitled to the benefit of section 352 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that "if a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in chapter 3 of this title, be, at the time the action accrued, . . . a married woman, and her husband be a necessary party with her in commencing such action;— the time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action."

...

ID.-ACTION BY WIFE FOR PERSONAL INJURIES-HUSBAND AS PARTY.— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries to a married woman, the husband is a necessary party, as is also the wife.

ID. INJURY TO MARRIED WOMAN-Two CAUSES OF ACTION-PARTIES.While the husband may have a separate action, which he is entitled to maintain in his own name for damages caused him by reason of his wife's injuries, such as the loss of her service and medical and other expenses incurred, for those damages which are purely personal to the wife, such as her pain, suffering, etc., the wife is a necessary party.

ID.-JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION NOT PERMISSIBLE.-These two causes of action cannot be joined, but must be made the subject of separate suits.

ID. CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INJURY TO WIFE AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY— WIFE NECESSARY PARTY.-Although a right of action for damages for suffering due to personal injuries to a married woman is community property, she is a necessary party thereto.

ID. CHANGE OF RULE BY CODE AMENDMENT-PROSPECTIVE OPERATION.— The amendment of 1913 to section 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereby the wife may sue alone in such actions, does not apply to an action begun before the adoption of the amendment.

APPEAL from a judgment of dismissal of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. J. P. Wood, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Crouch & Crouch, for Appellants.

J. W. McKinley, W. R. Millar, and A. W. Ashburn, Jr., for Respondents.

SHAW, J.-This cause was transferred to the district court of appeal and therein, upon an opinion by Mr. Justice James, the judgment was reversed. Thereupon this court vacated that decision and transferred the cause to the supreme court. Upon further consideration we are satisfied with the reasoning and conclusion of the learned justice of the district court and adopt his opinion as the opinion of this court. It is as follows:

"This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff Claire Moody through the negligence of defendant corporation in the management of a train upon which the said plaintiff was a passenger. The negligent acts were alleged to have been committed on the 22d day of May, 1907, and the complaint in the action was filed on January 2, 1912. Defendant interposed a demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint, setting up, first, the general ground that sufficient facts were not stated to constitute a cause of action, and the further ground that the alleged cause of action was barred by the provisions of sections 337, 338, 339, and 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This demurrer was sustained by the court, and no amended complaint being filed within the time allowed, judgment of dismissal was entered, from which judgment this appeal is taken.

"Harry H. Moody, the coplaintiff of Claire Moody, was the husband of the latter, and the preliminary portion of the complaint contained the following allegation: "That during all the times herein mentioned plaintiffs, Harry H. Moody and Claire Moody, were, and still are, husband and wife; and during all times mentioned, and ever since said times, plaintiffs have lived together.' The complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action, as is admitted by counsel for respondents, the respondents' sole contention being that the judgment of the court was correct because the statute of limitations had interposed to bar a right of recovery. Appellants answer this contention with the argument that the husband was a necessary party to this action and that such being the case, plaintiff Claire Moody, as a married woman, was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of subdivision 4 of section 352 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The section referred to, in that part which is material to a consideration of this question, reads as follows: 'If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in chapter three of this title, be, at the time the cause of action accrued, . . .: 4. A married woman, and her husband be a necessary party with her in commencing such action:-the time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.'

"Under the common law, where upon marriage the legal rights of a woman were suspended, the statute of limitations for her protection was also suspended and not allowed to run against any cause of action which might have been enforced by her except for the disability of marriage. In more modern times the wife having been freed from many of the commonlaw disabilities arising from her marriage, the legislatures have to a corresponding extent provided that the statute of limitations may be made to run against her. (Wood on Limitations, sec. 240.) In this state, in so far as a married woman is entitled to bring an action without joining her husband, all limitations as to the time of commencement of such action may be urged against her suit. Where, however, the husband is a necessary party with her she is deemed to be under disability as to the commencement of the action and the limitation of time cannot be urged. It has been settled by our supreme court that in an action brought for damages by reason of personal injuries caused to the wife, the husband

is a necessary party, as is also the wife. (McKune v. Santa Clara V. M. & L. Co., 110 Cal. 480, [42 Pac. 980], and cases therein cited.) In the decision in that case it is pointed out that, while the husband may have a separate action which he is entitled to maintain in his own name for damages which are caused to him by reason of his wife's injuries, such as the loss of her service and medical and other expenses incurred, for those damages which are purely personal to the wife, such as her pain and suffering, etc., the wife is a necessary party. These two causes of action, it is also held, cannot be joined, and must be made the subject of separate suits. Counsel for respondents cite the cases of Martin v. Southern Pacific Co., 130 Cal. 285, [62 Pac. 515], and Basler v. Sacramento Gas & Electric Co., 158 Cal. 514, [Ann. Cas. 1912A, 642, 111 Pac. 530], and contend that the conclusions expressed in these decisions on the point here urged, are at variance with the holding in the McKune case. A close examination of the decisions cited will show that they contain no statement of the law contrary to the expressions occurring in the McKune case. "The order sustaining the demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint, under the statute and authorities cited, seems to have been improperly made."

The rehearing was granted chiefly for the purpose of again considering the previous decisions of this court upon the subject.

In this state all property acquired by a husband or wife during marriage, and while they are living together, is community property, except that which is acquired by gift, devise, or descent. At common law, property acquired by either spouse during marriage, otherwise than by gift, devise, or descent to the wife, was the separate property of the husband. A right of action for damages caused by personal injuries to the wife during marriage is property. By the common-law rule it was the separate property of the husband. According to the rule in this state it is community property. The husband has the like absolute power to dispose of the community property, other than household goods and clothing, that he has of his own separate property, except that he cannot make a gift thereof without the consent of the wife. (Civ Code, sec. 172.) In general, the husband is the only party entitled to sue in respect to community property and the wife is