the San Francisco Labor Council passed resolutions calling upon "all members of organized labor and all citizens favoring the impartial administration of justice to work and vote with us to frustrate the election of Judge Murasky."102 These efforts to prevent his re-election were not successful. This ruling of Judge Murasky's prohibiting all picketing of a boycotted place of business was fully sustained by a decision rendered in July, 1906, in the case appealed by the Stablemen's Union.103 This is the first and only time that the California Supreme Court has ruled on the subject of what actions in a controversy of this kind are subject to judicial restraint, as the only previous case of this kind was dismissed because of a defective complaint.104 The decision, which was written by Justice McFarland and concurred in by the other six judges of the court, was based entirely on the rulings in similar cases of the federal courts and the courts of Eastern states. It was held that the complaint clearly established the existence of a boycott, and the fact that the pickets and representatives of the union carrying placards and transparencies intimidated the patrons of the plaintiffs' business. "And such acts, having such effect, undoubtedly interfered with, and violated plaintiff's constitutional right to acquire, possess, defend, and enjoy property." It was shown that, in the cases cited, the boycott had been repeatedly enjoined without reference to the means used to carry it into effect. The complainants were entitled to ask for the exercise of the restraining power of the court, first, because relief in damages to be recovered by an action at law was entirely inadequate; second, because the injury was continuing and irreparable, and not capable of admeasurement according to legal principles. The argument that the injunction was forbidden by the California statute of 1903 was dismissed with the assertion that this law could not be construed as prohibiting the court from enjoining the main wrongful acts charged in the complaint, and if so 102 Labor Clarion, October 19, 1906, Minutes of the Labor Council for October 12. 103 Goldberg Bowen Co. v. Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal. 429, 432. 104 Davitt v. American Bakers' Union, 124 Cal. 99. construed was void, because violative of the constitutional right to acquire, possess, enjoy, and protect property. It was agreed that the part of the judgment which forbade a mere expression of opinion at any time or place as to the plaintiff and his business should be amended, 105 but the injunction as finally confirmed restrained the union from "interfering with, or harassing, or obstructing plaintiff in the conduct of his business, .. by causing any agent or agents, representative or representatives, or any picket or pickets, or any person or persons, to be stationed in front of or in the immediate vicinity of said place of business, with a placard or transparency having on it the words and figures as alleged in the complaint herein, or any placard or transparency of similar import, and from, at said places of business, or in front thereof, or in the immediate vicinity thereof, by means of pickets or transparencies, or otherwise, threatening or intimidating any person or persons transacting or desiring to transact business with said plaintiff, or being employed at said place or places by the plaintiff. ''106 These five decisions rendered in the California courts between July, 1901, and July, 1906, show clearly the rapid development of judicial restraint of trade-union activities. The first of these decisions declared the enticement of a servant, and the use of such terms as "unfair" unlawful on the ground that they were forbidden in the Civil Code. Peaceful persuasion of customers or possible future employees was permitted. In 1905 the section of the Civil Code protecting from the enticement of his servant was repealed, and Judge Sloss also declared that, owing to a decision of the California Supreme Court which declared all restraint of freedom of speech unconstitutional, the enjoining of slander was erroneus. The other decisions are founded on the assumption that a business is a property right, entitled to the protection of the courts. The general phrase "enjoined from all interference with the business of plaintiff," recurs frequently in the injunctions 105 Goldberg Bowen Co. v. Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8760, 149 Cal. 429, 434-5. 106 Ibid., 435. issued by the California courts. The specifications of the acts which the courts regard as unlawful interference vary from the use of force or violence, or threats of force or violence, to the mere giving of information by means of placards or word of mouth. In Judge Troutt's injunction it would seem that the "combining and conspiring together" is enjoined, and Judge Murasky is clearly of the opinion that the union pickets have no right to address any one on the street for the most polite and peaceful persuasion. Finally the Supreme Court, without attempting to argue the matter from the standpoint of previous California decisions, or existing statutes, declared the boycott to be an unlawful interference with property rights, and found ample precedents for enjoining all forms of picketing. This rapid development was promoted by the decisions in other parts of the country which we have already reviewed, and also by the fact that the California branches of the federal courts rendered decisions during this period which showed the more radical tendencies in the use of the injunction. Three important cases were decided in the United States Circuit Court of the Northern District of California, in each of which precedents were established for a restraint of trade-union activities such as had not hitherto been attempted in the state courts. CALIFORNIA FEDERAL COURT INJUNCTION CASES. Soon after the passage of the California law of 1903 restraining the issuance of injunctions in the state courts, several applications for such restraining orders were made to judges of the federal courts on the ground that the plaintiffs were residents of other states. The first of these cases, afterwards dismissed because the complainant failed to press the suit, arose out of the boycott of a certain rubber pad by the Journeymen Horseshoers' Union. The boycott was due to the fact that the proprietor of this pad had refused to unionize his horseshoeing shop in New York City. In granting an injunction pendente lite, Judge Beatty declared the boycott unlawful, and characterized the efforts of trade-unions to use it in the interests of their members as illegal monopolies. He said, "Whenever any organization, even for the benefit of its members, through its control over them by injunction or direction to them or its influence upon the public, and upon patrons, takes steps to prevent others from enjoying any lawful occupation in their labor or business, or attempts by concerted action to disparage the business or goods of another, or, in other words boycott said goods, it acts in violation of the law. If such can be done as to one man's trade and goods, it may be done as to another's, and so continue until all competitors are out of the way; thus entailing injury not only upon the individual but also upon the public. This is a monopoly of the worst character, and is most obnoxious to the law."'107 At about the same time two injunctions were granted restraining the activities of members of the Bag Workers' Union, who were then conducting strikes against two San Francisco firms.108 In his decision on the Gulf Bag Company case, Justice Beatty conceded the right of peaceful persuasion, but claimed that in this case, though there was no direct evidence proving the defendants guilty, unlawful acts had been committed. He held that "when any assemble in numbers for some object they must be held responsible for what their associates do, whether they approve of or advise it or not." The permanent injunction granted restrained the members of the Bag Makers' Union from all interference with the remaining employees of plaintiff, and from congregating and maintaining a picket or patrol in front of or in the immediate vicinity of plaintiff's factory for the purpose of molesting any person whatsoever, or of preventing any person whatsoever from obtaining free and unobstructed access to plaintiff's factory.109 In July, 1905, the question of the right of the California labor organizations to conduct a boycott in the interests of striking members of an Eastern trade-union again came before the federal court.1 110 After citing the numerous decisions in which the boycott had been held to be unlawful, Judge Morrow considered the argument which, on the authority of the famous 107 Hallanan v. Storey et al.; Case No. 13405, Circuit Court, Northern District of California. Filed June 9, 1903. 108 Gulf Bag Co. v. Suttner et al.; Case No. 13412, 124 Fed. Rep. 467. 109 Ames and Harris v. Bag Workers' Union, Case No. 13462. 110 Loewe et al. v. Cal. State Federation of Labor et al., 139 Fed. Rep. 71. English case, Allen v. Flood, held that an act not in itself actionable does not become so because the motive is malicious or bad, or because it is done in combination with two or more persons. He pointed out that in a later English decision,111 where the facts were similar to the case under consideration, such acts were held to be illegal and unjustifiable, "in that they were not performed in the line of legitimate trade competition, or for the purpose of advancing the interests of the workmen themselves, but for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff in his trade." He also cited a recent decision of Justice Holmes in the United States Supreme Court which declared that the liberty to combine to inflict injury upon another, even upon such intangibles as business or reputation, is not among the rights which the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to preserve, and the defense that motives are not actionable is true in determining what a man is bound to foresee, but not necessarily true in determining the extent to which he can justify harm which he has fore seen. 112 The writ as granted enjoined all combining or conspiring together to injure the business of the plaintiff. Among the acts - specifically forbidden were the publication, either orally or in writing, of statements calling attention to the strike in the complainants' factory, and all efforts to coerce or influence any person not to wear or deal in the hats manufactured by the complainant.113 A few months after the Loewe decision was rendered another similar case111 came before the same court, growing out of the boycott of a certain brand of beer. Judge Beatty delivered the decision orally, without notes. Since 1892, when he issued the injunctions in the famous Coeur d'Alene cases, Judge Beatty's decisions have been among those showing the more radical tendencies in the development of judicial restraint of trade-union activities, so it is not surprising to find that this late decision marks another advance in the assertion of such powers. 111 Quinn v. Leathem, A. C. 1901, p. 495. 112 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194. 113 Loewe v. California Federation of Labor, 139 Fed. Rep. 71, 86. |