portions of the complaint was granted, and, as the plaintiffs' attorneys neglected to amend the complaints, the cases were dismissed seven or eight months later.

In October and November of 1901, the Superior Court of San Francisco granted two temporary injunctions restraining the activities of the Bakers' Union in a controversy they were having with a. large bakery and restaurant.79 In one of these cases Judge Troutt granted an injunction pendente lite on January 13, 1902, which restrained defendants from boycotting plaintiffs, and from calling on or seeking out the customers of plaintiffs and threatening them into ceasing to do business with plaintiffs; from maintaining pickets in front of plaintiffs' place of business and displaying banners announcing to the public that plaintiffs were working their bakers seven days a week, or that they intended to work their bakers seven days a week; and from posting placards announcing to the public that plaintiffs worked their employees seven days a week, or from making any other false and defamatory statements intended to injure the plaintiffs' business. The defendants were further restrained from combining and conspiring together to prevent plaintiffs from carrying on their business, and from attempting to injure their business by threats of violence.80 The plaintiffs swore to a complaint charging defendants with a willful violation of this injunction, but, on the settlement of the difficulties between the contending parties, the injunctions were allowed to lapse, and the cases of contempt seem to have been dropped.

It will be seen by a comparison of these two decisions that Judge Troutt enjoined the same actions which had been declared legal by Judge Sloss. It is true that the terms used in describing the actions vary with the point of view of the judges. The efforts to induce the customers to withdraw their patronage are described as "persuading" in one case, and as "threatening" in the other; what one judge regards as combined action to promote the welfare of members of the union, the other holds to be

79 Ruediger et al. v. Bakers' Union et al.; Case No. 78387, Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco. Weber v. Bakers' Union, Local No. 24; Case No. 78387, Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco. so See report and criticism of the decision in the San Francisco Examiner, January 15, 1902.

"combining and conspiring together to prevent plaintiffs from carrying on their lawful business." Though inconsistent with California decisions, Judge Troutt's injunction was not more radical in its terms than many that had been granted by the courts of Eastern states.

In November, 1902, this rapid development of judicial restraint of trade-union activities culminated in an injunction which not only went further than any that had previously been issued by the California courts, but was also as drastic in its terms as the most radical of the injunctions issued by judges of the other states.81 This injunction was also unique in that it was procured in the name of the non-union men who were taking the places of the striking employees. Judge Buckles, who granted the injunction, sat with Judge Armstrong when the latter decided the first injunction case of this kind to come before the California courts, and in the twelve years that had elapsed since the Sacramento Bee case had been decided, he had evidently retained his faith in the power of the courts to deal with labor controversies.

The injunction issued November 14 was a temporary one, with directions to show cause why it should not be made permanent on December 8. By it the members of the Leather Workers' Union were restrained "from in any manner interfering with or preventing the plaintiffs, or any of them, from working for Kullman, Salz and Co., a corporation, and from following their usual vocations in the employ of said corporation; and also restraining the said defendants, and each of them, from interfering with the plaintiffs, or any of them, in any manner, way, or form, while engaged in said employment, or at any other time or times, or at any other place or places, and restraining said defendants, and each of them, from using towards plaintiffs, or any of them, threats, intimidations, persuasions, or force; and from endeavoring to prevent the plaintiffs, or any of them, from continuing such service in the employ of said corporation; and restraining said defendants, and each of them and their associates, from gathering on the streets of the city of Benicia, in said county of Solano, in the vicinity of the tan81 Labor Clarion, November 21, 1902.

nery of said corporation, or along the approaches adjacent thereto, for the purpose of intimidating or persuading the plaintiffs or any of them, into leaving the employ of said corporation; and from picketing or patrolling said tannery, or streets, or approaches thereto, and also from going, either singly, or collectively, to the houses or places of sojourn of the plaintiffs, or any of them, for the purpose of inducing them, by threats or intimidations, or otherwise, to leave said corporation's service, or in any way to intimidate the wives or families of said plaintiffs, or any of them, on the said streets of the said city of Benicia, with threats, or intimidation, or violent language; and from in any manner depriving or attempting to deprive said plaintiffs, or any of them, in the pursuit of their ordinary avocations, of peace and quiet."

The terms of this injunction, particularly the parts restraining the strikers from peaceful persuasion, and from gathering in the streets, were severely criticized. The protests were not confined to the vigorous denunciations of the labor papers, but were also voiced by other more disinterested representatives of the public press. The sympathy for the strikers was augmented by a disorderly and unprovoked outbreak of their non-union competitors, in which an old citizen of Benicia, who was in no way connected with the labor controversy, was killed, and several other persons were seriously injured.

When, in the latter part of December, Judge Buckles finally heard the arguments in the case, he took occasion to remark upon the attacks on his honor and integrity as a judge, and, in answer to the severe criticisms of the terms of the injunction, declared that, had an application been made for a modification, it would have been granted, as there was no intention that it should deprive the tanners of their constitutional right of peaceful assembly in the streets. He decided that there was no cause for continuing the injunction.82

ANTI-INJUNCTION LEGISLATION.

As the time for the meeting of the legislature approached, the labor organizations felt that it could no longer be claimed 82 Labor Clarion, December 26, 1902. Organized Labor, January 3, 1903.

that a law restricting the use of the injunction by California courts was unnecessary. The San Francisco Labor Council and the State Federation of Labor prepared to make a vigorous effort for the passage of the two measures that were proposed for this purpose. Judge Sloss' decision had suggested the need of repealing the part of the Civil Code which forbade the enticement of a servant from his master.83 The American Federation of Labor bill "to limit the meaning of the word 'conspiracy,' and also the use of 'restraining orders' and 'injunctions' as applied to disputes between employers and employees," was again introduced.

The second of these bills which called forth many lengthy and heated debates, read as follows: "No agreement, combination or contract, by or between two or more persons to do or procure to be done any act in contemplation or furtherance of any trade dispute between employers and employees in the State of California, shall be deemed criminal, nor shall those engaged therein be indictable or otherwise punishable for the crime of conspiracy, if such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime, nor shall such agreement, combination, or contract be considered as in restraint of trade or commerce, nor shall any restraining order or injunction be issued with relation thereto. Nothing in this act shall exempt from punishment, otherwise than as herein expected, any person guilty of conspiracy, for which punishment is now provided by any act of the Legislature, but such act of the Legislature shall, as to the agreements, combinations, and contracts hereinbefore referred to, be construed as if this act were therein contained."

83 This section of the Civil Code read as follows: Sec. 49. The rights of personal relations forbid:

1. The abduction of a husband from his wife, or of a parent from his child.

2. The abduction or enticement of a wife from her husband, of a child from a parent, or from a guardian entitled to its custody, or of a servant from his master.

3. The seduction of a wife, daughter, orphan sister, or servant.

4. Any injury to a servant which affects his ability to serve his master. It was proposed to omit the clause in italics, as it was claimed that this provision was a remnant of the earlier personal relationship between master and servant, and out of harmony with the modern purely contractual status of the employee. This act failed of passage in 1903, but was enacted in 1905. See Statutes of California and Amendments to the

Codes, 1905, p. 58.

Grove L. Johnson, the chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, undertook to introduce this bill, with the understanding that he might amend it if he found it best to do so. The cooks and waiters of a hotel within a block of the State Capitol were then conducting a boycott in a manner that seemed offensive to many members of the legislature. Johnson said that at first he had intended to introduce the bill without change, but that the actions of these men suggested the need of amending the bill by adding the proviso: "That nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize the use of force, violence, or intimidation."

84

The bill, with this amendment, was reported favorably from the committee. The representatives of the San Francisco Labor Councils who were in charge of the labor bills obtained legal advice upon the possible effects of the amendment to the bill. They were assured that it was immaterial to its substance and that it in no way vitiated or modified its terms. After consulting with the executive committee of the Labor Council, it was determined to make an attempt to have the proviso stricken out. But Macarthur's efforts in the judiciary committee were unsuccessful, and he and Wisler decided that, since the amendment had been declared harmless by able lawyers, it was better to accept it than to endanger the whole bill, and so announced their willingness, on behalf of the Labor Council, to do so.

86

In the lengthy debates on the floor of the Assembly, the proviso was vigorously attacked. The phrase "or intimidation" was most objectionable, because it was declared that the courts would give the term so broad an interpretation that the force of the law would be destroyed. Finally the motion of

87

84 San Francisco Examiner, February 5, 1903, p. 1.

85 Walter Macarthur and R. I. Wisler were the representatives of the Labor Council in Sacramento at this time.

86 Examiner, February 5, 1903. Labor Clarion, February 13, 1903. 87 That their fears were well founded is shown by the following extract from Judge Beatty's opinion in a recent federal court case. In speaking of a boycott notice he said, "That is not anything apparently oppressive at first sight. It is simply calling attention to the fact that these parties are using the beer; but what is the design of it and what is the result of it? Why it is to intimidate these people or prevent them from dealing in complainants' beer. That far it is oppressive of the business of complainant and tends to destroy its business. There is no question about that, in so far as it would intimidate these people. It