CHAPTER XXXIV. On the abuse of terms.-Enthusiasm.-Superstition.-Zeal for religious opinions no proof of religion. To guard the mind from prejudice, is no unimportant part of a royal education. Names govern the world. They carry away opinion, decide on character, and determine practice. Names, therefore, are of more importance than we are aware. We are apt to bring the quality down to the standard which the name establishes, and our practice rarely rises higher than the current term which we use when we speak of it. The abuse of terms has at all times been an evil. To enumerate only a few instances. We do not presume to decide on the measure which gave birth to the clamour, when we assert, that in the progress of that clamour, greater violence has seldom been offered to language than in the forced union of the two terms, liberty and property.* A conjunction of words, by men who were, at the same time, labouring to disjoin the things. If liberty, in their sense, had been established, property would have had an end, or rather would have been transferred to those who, in securing what they termed their liberty, would have made over to themselves that property, in the pretended defence of which the outcry was made. At a more recent period, the term equality has been substituted for that of property. The word was altered, but the principle retained. And, as the preceding clamour for liberty was only a plausible cover for making property change hands, so it has of late been tacked to equality, with a view to make power change hands. Thus, terms the most popular and imposing have been uniformly *By Wilkes, and his faction. used as the watch-words of tumuit, plunder, and sedition. But the abuse of terms, and especially their unnecessary adoption, is not always limited to the vulgar and the mischievous. It were to be wished that those persons of a better cast, who are strenuous in counteracting the evils themselves, would never naturalize any terms which convey revolutionary ideas. In England, at least, let us have no civic honours, no organization of plans. Let There are perhaps few words which the reigning practice has more warped from its legitimate meaning and ancient usage than the term proud. us try whether Johnson's definition sanctions the adopted use." Proud," says that accurate philologist," means, elated-haughty-daring-presumptuous-ostentatious," &c. &c. Yet, do we not continually hear, not merely the journalist and the pamphleteer, but the legislator and the orator, sages who give law, not to the land only, but to the language, using the term exclusively in an honourable sense."They are proud to acknowledge,"-" proud to confess." Instead of the heart-felt language of gratitude for a deliverance or a victory, we hear of "a proud day," a proud circumstance,"-" a proud event,"-thus raising to the dignity of virtue, a term to which lexicographers and moralists have annexed an odious, and divines an unchristian sense. If pride be thus enrolled in the list of virtues, must not humility, by a natural consequence, be turned over to the catalogue of vices? If pride was made for man, has not the Bible asserted a falsehood? In the age which succeeded to the Reformation, "holiness" and "practical piety" were the terms employed by divines when they would inculcate that conduct which is suitable to Christians. The very words conveyed a solemnity to the mind, calculated to assist in raising it to the prescribed standard. But those very terms being unhappily used during the usurpation, as marks to cover the worst purposes, became, under Charles, epithets of ridicule and reproach; and were supposed to imply hypocrisy and false pretence. And when, in a subsequent period, decency resumed her reign, and virtue was countenanced, and religion respected; yet mere decorum was too often substituted for religious energy, nor was there such a general superiority to the dread of censure, as was sufficient to restore the use of terms which hypocrisy had abused and licentiousness derided.* Indifference in some assumed the name of moderation, and zeal in others either grew cool, or was ashamed to appear warm. The standard of lan guage was either let down to accommodate itself to the standard of practice, or piety itself was taken some notes lower, to adapt it to the established phraseology. Thus, morality, for instance, which heretofore had only been used (and very properly) as one name amongst many, to express right conduct, now began to be erected into the exclusive term. The term itself is most unexceptionable. Would that all who adopt it, acted up to the rectitude which it implies! but, partly from its having been antecedently used to express the pagan virtues; It is, however, to be observed, that at no period, perhaps, in English history, was there a more strict attention to public morals, or a more open avowal of religion, than during the short reign of queen Mary. Nothing was, with that excellent princess, so momentous an object, as that religion might attain its just credit, and diffuse its effectual influences amongst society. Upon this her deepest thoughts were fixed; to this her most assiduous endeavours were directed. And it was not wholly in vain. A spirit of pious activity spread itself both through clergy and laity. Religious men took fresh courage to avow themselves, and merciful men laboured in the cause of humanity with increased zeal and success. It seems to have been under this brief, but auspicious government, that the dissolute habits of the two former reigns received their first effectual check. partly from its having been set up by modern philosophers, as opposed to the peculiar graces of Christianity, and consequently converted by them into an instrument for decrying religion; and partly because many who profess to write theories of morality, have founded them on a mere worldly principle, we commonly see it employed, not in its own distinct and limited meaning, but, on the contrary, as a substitute for that comprehensive principle of elevated, yet rational piety, which forms at once the vital spring and essential characteristic of Christian conduct. It is necessary also to apprize those whose minds we are forming, that when they wish to inquire into the characters of men, it is of importance to ascertain the principles of him who gives the character, in order to obtain a fair knowledge of him of whom the character is given. To exemplify this remark by the term enthusiasm. While the wise and temperate Christian deprecates enthusiasm as highly pernicious, even when he hopes it may be honest; justly ascribing it to a perturbed and unsound, or at least, an over eager and weak mind-the irreligious man, who hates piety, when he fancies he only hates fanaticism, applies the term enthusiast to every religious person, however sober his piety, or however correct his conduct. But even he who is far from remarkable for pious ardours, may incur the stigma of enthusiasm, when he happens to come under the censure of one who piques himself on still greater latitude of sentiment. Thus, he who professes to believe in "the only begotten Son of God as in glory equal with the Father," will be deemed an enthusiast by him who embraces the chilling doctrines of Socinus. And we have heard, as if it were no uncommon thing, of a French philosopher of the highest class, accounting his friend un peu fanatique, merely because the latter had some suspicion that there was a God. In fact, we may apply to enthusiasm, what has been said on another occasion : Ask where's the North-At York, 'tis on the Tweed, At Greenland, Zembla But, it may be asked, has religious enthusiasm, after all, no definite meaning? or are religion and frenzy really so nearly allied, that no clearly distinctive line can be drawn between them? One of our most eminent writers has told us, that "enthusiasm is a kind of excess in devotion, and that superstition is the excess, not only of devotion, but of religion in general." A strange definition! For what is devotion, and what is religion, if we cannot be in earnest in them, without hazarding our rationality; which, however, must be the case, if this definition were accurate? For, if the excess of devotion were enthusiasm, and the excess of religion were superstition, it would follow, that to advance in either would be to approximate to fanaticism. Of course, he who wished to retain his mental sanity, must listen with caution to the apostolic precept, of growing in grace. But, with all due respect to Mr. Addison, may we not justly question, whether there can be such a thing as an excess of either devotion or religion, in the proper sense of the terms? We never seriously suppose that any one can be too wise, too pure, or too benevolent. If at any time we use a language of this apparent import, we always conceive the idea of some spurious intermixture, or injudicious mode of exercise. But when we confine our thoughts to the principle itself, we do not apprehend that it can become too predominant; to be too virtuous, being just as inconceivable as to be too happy. Now, if this be true of any single virtue, must it not hold equally good respecting the parent princi |