from their proper issue by the abuse of moral liberty on the part of the creature. Taking this view, we see that divine goodness stands unimpeached, though sinners perish forever. The system which God put in operation, would have eventuated in the happiness of all his creatures, had it not been turned aside from its natural course by mal-conduct on the part of the creature; hence, divine goodness and wisdom are to receive credit for having originated a system which, in it self, was calculated to produce happiness without the least degree of misery, while what evil has arisen from this system argues, not a defect in divine goodness, but a fault in the conduct of man as a moral agent. But it may be said in reply to this, that though God created a system which was in itself calculated to produce good, and only good, yet he knew that evil would grow out of it. This may be true, but still it will follow that he knew at the same time that much more good than evil would be the result; hence, to suppose that goodness was bound to withhold existence from our race, because wisdom saw that some evil would be the result, is no less than to say that wisdom is bound to sacrifice a greater good to prevent a less evil, which is absurd. As a greater amount of good than evil is the actual result of the existence of the human family, on the supposition that some are endlessly lost, it follows that their creation is an act of goodness and not an act of cruelty, as universalists affirm; for cruelty would not produce more good than evil. It only remains to be shown, on the supposition that the doctrine of endless punishment is true, that more good than evil will still be the result of creation. This will appear when we consider that the number that is saved will far exceed the number of the lost.

1st. All infants will be saved, it is admitted on all hands, and they form a considerable portion of the human family.

2d. All pious adults, of every period, land and nation, will be saved. This number will increase in proportion to the whole, just as piety becomes more and more general in the world. Suppose then, as is the general opinion of the church, that christianity is yet to fill the world, and that time will then measure out some thousands of years of millenial glory, when the human family shall be much more numerous than

at any former period, and we may imagine the ranks of the redeemed so filled up as to render the lost but a small portion of our entire race.

Should it still be urged that goodness would not suffer the existence of those whom wisdom saw would be lost, we reply,

1. Goodness could not have prevented their existence, without preventing the existence of those who are saved, as remarked above. This would have prevented more good than evil, which would have rendered it, in view of the whole, an evil act instead of a good one.

2. Those who are lost have the same opportunity to secure salvation as those who shall be finally saved; and that they do not secure salvation is their own fault. Both the saved and the lost are ushered into being under circumstances precisely the same, and hence, the act of producing both must be the same in moral quality; and as it cannot be denied that the creation of such as are saved is an act of goodness, so on the other hand, it cannot be affirmed, in truth, that the creation of those who may be finally lost is not an act of good

ness.

But universalists argue from the fore-knowledge of God, and contend that the circumstance that God knows what will be their end, lays them under necessity, or an irresistible fate. To this we reply,

1. The knowledge of God can have no influence over the conduct of moral agents. If we apply the term fore-knowledge to God, it is doubtless to describe the knowledge which he possesses of things yet future. Now, we ask on what ground, the fore-knowledge of God is maintained? We answer, it must be on the ground of the certainty of his decree, or the perfection of his knowledge. Now, the first of these cannot be admitted; for it is worse than trifling to argue the certainty of an event from the fore-knowledge of God, when that fore-knowledge is made to rest upon a decree: Why not argue from the decree itself? The moment the doctrine of decrees is introduced, fore-knowledge is excluded from the argument, and can have nothing to do in the case; for if it can be proved that God has unchangeably decreed all things that come to pass, we will admit the necessity by which every thing comes to pass, without making the certain

decree still more certain by an argument drawn from the foreknowledge of God, which fore-knowledge is made to depend upon the decree itself. If, then, any argument is drawn from fore-knowledge, such fore-knowledge must be maintained on the ground of the perfection of God's knowledge-that God's knowledge being perfect, he must know all things, as things past, things present or things to come, or as things which might be, but still will not be. If then the argument is made to rest upon the perfection of God's knowledge, we maintain that as the knowledge of God is perfect, he must know things just as they are, certain or contingent, necessary, or merely possible. Now the fact in the case is, the sinner, who shall be finally lost, is a moral agent and might do differently from what he does and be saved; and if so, God knows this as a thing possible. Now, if the sinner were to do differently and be saved, still there would be no disappointment in the divine mind; for as the perfect knowledge of God arises from a view of the facts, and not the facts from his knowledge, were the acts and end of the sinner different, the knowledge of God on these points, would be different. Thus we plainly see that the knowledge of God can have no influ-. ence in producing events, while we see equally plain how events, growing out of the moral agency of man, might be different from what they are, and still be in accordance with the fore-knowledge of God. We have now shown that no argument can be drawn from the wisdom and goodness of God combined, to prove the final salvation of all men, or to disprove the doctrine of endless punishment.

But Universalists also call to the assistance of this argument the power of God. Mr. Morse says, in the above mentioned letter, God "possesses power to annihilate hell and sweep its inhabitants into the dark abyss of non-existence:"What God has power to do, when power alone is consulted, and what he can consistently do in view of all the perfections of his nature, are points quite different from each other. It cannot be denied that God has the same power to annihilate a limited hell that he has to annihilate an endless hell; and this he does not see fit to do. Some, who contend for the final salvation of all men, admit that there is a hell in the future world in which sinners will be punished for ages,

and all universalists pretend to believe that sin is punished in this world or the next; and they cannot deny that sin, sorrow and death have reigned in this world for nearly six thousand years. Now, God can have no more power to destroy sin and misery than he had to prevent them; if indeed his power slumber over the reign of sin and misery, over sighs and groans, and death, for six thousand years, no argument can be drawn from the power of God to prove that he will ever see it consistent to destroy sin and misery, or annihilate its wretched subjects.

To the above, universalists sometimes add the holiness of God, in farther proof that he will destroy sin and misery.. The argument is founded upon a supposed absurdity that a holy God should perpetuate unholiness forever. There can be no force in this. If sin and misery cannot exist forever without being perpetuated by God, then they cannot exist for six thousand years without being perpetuated by him for that length of time; and if a holy God can perpetuate the existence of unholiness for six thousand years, his holiness can form no objection to its endless existence.

To bring up the rear of the arguments drawn from the perfections of God, universalists introduce the will of God. The argument is sometimes stated as follows:

What the goodness of God wills or proposes, and his wisdom plans, his power will execute. It is said that God wills the salvation of all men, and whatever he wills he has power to execute. If he does not will the salvation of all men, he is wanting in goodness, and if he does will the salvation of all men, and does not effect it, he must be deficient in power. To this we reply,

1. That God does not will the salvation of all men irrespectively of their moral agency. We admit that God wills the salvation of all men on gospel terms; but all men, as moral agents, do not comply with the terms of the gospel.

"Who

2. The will of God is not done in all things, by moral agents. The text, on which universalists rely to prove that God wills the salvation of all men, is 1 Tim. ii. 4. will have all men to be saved and come unto the knowledge of the truth" This text as clearly proves that it is the will of God that all men should "come unto the knowledge of

the truth" as it does that he wills that all men should be saved. Now, it is clear that all men do not come to the knowledge of the truth, and those who defeat the will of God in this respect, will also find it defeated in its purposes of their salvation. God wills the salvation of all men now, and that they should come to the knowledge of the truth as the means of effecting it, but all men are not saved now. It is said to the Laodiceans, Revelations iii. 15. "I know thy works that thou art neither cold nor hot: I would that thou wert cold or hot." Here God plainly declares that they were not what he would that they were; hence, his will was frustrated in the moral character of this luke-warm church. It is useless to waste time and paper to prove that the will of God is not done in all things by man; for every sin is a violation of the divine will. God has given us his commands and what he has commanded, he wills that men should do; but men do them not. The law that speaks in deep toned thunders from the cloudy summit of Sinai, and the gospel that breathes a pardon upon the repenting sinner, in the milder voice of a crucified Redeemer, alike declare that the will of God has been violated. But universalists often quote Isa. xlvi. 10. "My counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure." This text does not relate to the final salvation of all men, but to the events which transpired under the reign of Cyrus. The counsel of God described in this text, was his purpose to overthrow Babylon and deliver the Jews from their captivity by the hand of Cyrus. But what has this to do with the salvation of all men? Just as much and no more than his counsel to destroy the old world by water, or to overthrow the Jews by the Romans.

We have now done with the arguments drawn from the divine perfections, and whether or not we have furnished a sufficient reply we leave the candid reader to judge.

II. Universalists argue the salvation of all men from the corrective nature and design of punishment. The argument may be thus stated: "All divine punishment is designed to reform the sufferer, but endless punishment cannot reform the sufferer, therefore no divine punishment can be endless." The fallacy of this argument lies in the major proposition, which asserts, that all punishment is designed to reform the