son in the divine attributes. We presume universalists can see no reason in the divine goodness, why a holy, devoted and useful minister should be put to the rack, and caused to suffer a most painful death by the hand of an ungodly sinner; and we can see no reason in the divine justice, why God should take the murdered and the murderer to the same heaven.

2. The perfections of God do not enable us to determine what the desert of sin is; a point which must be settled before it can appear that endless punishment is not consistent with divine justice and goodness. Can universalists, from any knowledge they have of the divine perfections, clearly determine the extent of the evil of sin, and what and how much punishment the sinner is liable to endure? If they can, they will confer a favor on the world to speak out, and say just what, and how much the sinner must endure to answer the claims of the divine law; and if they cannot determine from the divine perfections, what, and how much the sinner deserves, they cannot know but that a punishment worse, and much longer than they have imagined, may be consistent with the perfections of God. We believe these points must be settled by the law and the testimony of God's word, and not by some rule of consistency, in our own imaginations, by which we would direct the attributes of God in the government of the world.

3. The perfections of God, in our opinion, do not of themselves, so far as we are enabled to understand them, prove the immortality of the soul or the resurrection of the body. What is there discoverable in the perfections of God, that proves that the spirits of men, that go upward, are any more immortal than the spirits of beasts, that go downward; or that our bodies will be raised any more than theirs? And if a future state is not clearly discoverable from the perfections of God, they cannot, independently of direct revelation, prove the final salvation of all men.

4. If the future destiny of man can be determined from the perfections of God, no good reason can be given why every other point in theology cannot be proved in the same way. Now, will universalists pretend that they can discover what is truth, and what is error, from their knowledge of the divine perfections? If they can, then all those portions of

the scriptures which do not relate to the attributes of God, are not necessary in order to a correct theory of religion; and if universalists cannot determine from the attributes of God what is, and what is not religious truth, it cannot appear that they can prove from this source what will be the punishment of sin or what will be the sinner's final destiny. It must be perfectly plain, that if we have a view of the perfections of God sufficiently clear, to enable us to determine what is, and what is not consistent with them, we can need no farther revelation than that which relates directly to God and his attributes; for whatever is consistent with the divine attributes, must be true, and does or may exist; and whatever is not consistent with the divine perfections must be false, and does not and cannot exist.

5. So far as any thing can be proved from the perfections of God, on this subject, the argument is in our favour. Though we cannot discern what is consistent with the perfections of God, from any view we have of his perfections; yet, we can determine that some things are consistent with them from the actual existence of the things themselves. We know that whatever does exist must be consistent with the divine perfections; hence, when we behold the eixstence of any thing and infer from thence that such thing is consistent with the perfections of God, we reason from matter of fact, and not from the perfections of God. We cannot prove from the divine perfections that the existence of sin and misery are consistent with such perfections, yet this point can be proved from matter of fact; for sin and misery do exist, and therefore, we know from their actual existence that they are consistent with the perfections of God. This throws the weight of the argument into our side of the scales, for matter of fact says that it is consistent with the divine perfections that sin and misery should exist, while matter of fact cannot be brought to bear on the other side of the question. Matter of fact cannot prove that it is consistent with the perfections of God to save all men, whatever may be their conduct, for all men are not saved. Not only so, but as it is now consistent with the divine attributes that sin and misery should exist, and as those attributes are unchangeable, the inference is a fair one that it may always be consistent with the

divine perfections that sin and misery should exist. We think we have now removed the entire foundation of every argument drawn from the perfections of God, in favour of universalism; hence, the arguments must fall; but as this is the strong ground of universalists we will examine the arguments separately.

Universalists argue the salvation of all men from the divine goodness, love and mercy. We connect goodness with the love and mercy of God in one reply, because universalists blend them together in the same argument. In the letter above referred to, Mr. Morse says, "The love of God is unbounded. All christians believe in the universal goodness of God." In proof of this he quotes Mark x. 18. "There is none good but one, that is God." From this it is clear that the terms in question are used reciprocally for each other. Not only so, but it must appear plain that a reply to an argument drawn from either the goodness, love or mercy of God, must be, in point of fact, a reply to an argument drawn from each or all of these perfections. Mr. Morse, in the above named letter, introduces his argument thus: "All will be finally holy and happy, because the universal parent of creation possesses love underived, uncaused, unbounded, unchangeable, and endless." Here are five reasons rendered why all men will be saved. It is said,

1. All men will be saved "because the love of God is underived." We admit that the love of God is underived, but deny that it follows from thence that all men will be saved. If universalists could prove that the love of God has just been derived from some foreign source they might argue that all will now be saved as the fruit of this new accession. to the divine perfections; but as God's love has always existed the same, it must be difficult to see why it should be any more efficacious in the destruction of sin and misery than it was in preventing them.

2. It is said, "the love of God is uncaused." The object of this proposition was, to furnish occasion to show that the death of Christ did not produce the divine love. This we admit; but maintain that the death of Christ, as our atoning sacrifice, is the only medium through which we can enjoy the love of God; and that therefore we may be saved be

cause Christ died, rather than for the reason that the love of God is uncaused.

3. It is said, "God's love is unbounded." By this it is meant that God's love extends to all his creatures; but it cannot prove the final holiness and happiness of all men ; since it did not keep them holy and happy when they were So. The argument would have applied to Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden, in proof that they could never become unholy and unhappy, with the same propriety that it does to us, in proof that we cannot remain unholy and unhappy. It might have been said to them, God's love is boundless; he loves all the creatures he forms, you cannot therefore become unholy and wretched; and as it would have been false in view of what is past, so it is not to be relied upon in view of what is to come.

This

4. It is said, "the love of God is unchangeable." cannot prove the salvation of all men ; for if the love of God is unchangeable, it is the same now that it was when sin and misery first entered the world; and if it change not, no good reason can be given why it will not suffer them to remain on the same terms that it admitted them at first. If universalists could prove that the love of God will change at some future period so as to operate very differently in the moral system from what it now does, they might argue the salvation of all men as the result of such change.

5. It is said, that "the love of God is endless." That the love of God is endless in itself, we have no doubt, but this cannot prove that all men will be saved. For God to be love is one thing; but for men to enjoy God is something quite different. God's love exists independently of all his creatures; but man's enjoyment of God depends upon his moral state. Again, for God to love sinners is one thing, and for sinners to love God is something else. God loves all men, as his creatures, but all men do not love God, as their Creator. Now, as no man can be holy and happy who does not love God, it is for universalists to prove that all men will love God endlessly, and not that God's love is endless. God loves sinners now; but sinners are not now saved, and if ent love does not produce present salvation, it cannot appear that endless love will certainly produce endless salvation.

pres

But to strengthen this argument, drawn from the divine goodness, universalists call in the wisdom of God to its aid. Mr. Morse reasons thus: "If any created being will be endlessly miserable, God knew it before that being was created. Goodness would have prevented such creation." To this we reply,

1. It is fallacious to consider the creation of such as may be endlessly miserable, separately from the creation of those who shall be saved, or from the whole. God could not prevent the existence of such as may be lost, without preventing the existence of such as shall be saved; for their existence, in the order of things, is alternately derived from each other. The question then, with divine goodness and wisdom must be, not whether those who will be finally lost shall be created or have an existence, but whether our race shall exist as a whole, taking lost and saved together. This leads us to remark,

If

2. That God might have seen that any other race of beings which he might have created, would sin and become as wicked and miserable as have the human family. It must appear clear that God could not have created a race of intelligent and accountable beings without a liability to sin, for beings cannot be accountable subjects of a moral government unless they are moral agents, and moral agents may sin. then any other race of beings which God might have created would have been equally liable to fall into sin and misery, the question is narrowed down to this: Is it consistent with divine goodness that such a race as the human family should exist, on the supposition that sinners are liable to endless punishment, divine wisdom foreseeing this issue? This leads us to remark,

3. That a greater amount of good than evil will be the final result of the creation of the human family, though some of our race be forever lost; and if a greater amount of good than evil result from the existence of the human family, then their creation was an act of goodness. In making an estimate of the comparative good and evil that results from the creation of the human family, we are not to draw our conclusions from what is the actual result, but from what the system would produce, were not its operations turned aside