but is limited to commerce and transactions which, either immediately or at some stage of their progress, are extraterritorial.22 [4] D. Commerce with Indian Tribes. Commerce with the Indian tribes means commerce with II. GENERAL POWER TO [5] A. In General. The question as to what is the proper dividing line between the respective powers of congress and those of the states to regulate commerce has been declared to be the most perplexing topic in American constitutional law.25 This question, involving as it does the interpretation and construction of the commerce clause of the United States constitution, has been the subject of multitudinous decisions,26 and, while the supreme court of the United States is the one ultimate judicial authority on all questions of interstate commerce, as has been often pointed out, and even admitted by the court itself, the decisions of that high tribunal have been far from uniform.28 Still it can safely be said that the differences of opinion manifested have not been so much on fundamental principles as on the application of those principles 27 27. U. S.-Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, 13 SCt 622, 37 L. ed. 463. Ark. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 115 Ark. 564, 171 SW 859. Miss. Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Greenwald, 104 Miss. 417, 61 S 426. Mo.-Security State Bank v. Simmons, 251 Mo. 2, 157 SW 585; Potter v. Kansas City So. R. Co., 187 Mo. A. 56, 172 SW 1153. V. N. C.-Blalock Hardware Co. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 170 N. C. 395, 86 SE 1025. Okl.-McCord v. State, 2 Okl. Cr. 214, 101 P 280. "The Supreme Court of the United States is the final arbiter in all matters relating to commerce between the States." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 115 Ark. 564, 565, 171 SW 859. "Whether or not the police regulations of a state constitute an unlawful interference with interstate commerce is distinctly a question for the ultimate decision of the highest federal court." Erie R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Comrs., (N. J. Sup.) 98 A 13, 26. "The decisions of the highest Federal Court determine conclusively for us the true construction and meaning of the Interstate Commerce act and the legal consequences flowing from its enactment, and we are bound to accept its construction without regard to our own views as to what it should be." Blalock Hardware Co. v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 170 N. C. 395, 399, 86 SE 1025. 28. Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 SCt 1087, 38 L. ed. 962; In re Rahrer. 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 8 SCt 1380, 32 L., ed. 311; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230, 7 SCt 857, 30 L. ed. 888; State v. Indiana, etc., Oil, etc., Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 NE 778, 6 LRA 579 and note; State v. Woodruff Sleeping, etc., Coach Co., 114 Ind. 155, 15 NE 814. [a] It was admitted, in one case, that the court had not always employed the same language, and that REGULATE COMMERCE to particular facts and the construction of the various state statutes which have been under consideration. The principles themselves are fairly well settled.29 In view of these facts, the supreme court has said that it would be a useless task to undertake to fix an arbitrary rule by which the line separating the powers of the state from the exclusive power of congress in this regard must in all cases be located, and that it is better to settle each case as it arises on a view of the particular rights involved.30 Generally speaking, commerce, for the purpose of defining and limiting federal and state jurisdiction in legislation, is divided into three fields: (1) That in which the power of congress is exclusive; (2) that in which the authority of the state is exclusive; and (3) that in which the state may act in the absence of legislation by congress.* all of the judges of the court who had written opinions for it might not have meant precisely the same thing. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230, 7 SCt 857, 30 L. ed. 888. 29. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 17 SCt 265, 41 L. ed. 632; Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 SCt 1087, 38 L. ed. 962. "The great volume of cases that record the controversies that for nearly a century have revolved about the commerce clause of the federal Constitution disclose that, whatever deviation there may have been in some of its rulings, to one principle the Supreme Court of the United States has uniformly, consistently and steadfastly adhered, as a fixed and established principle of constitutional government, extending to and binding alike upon the governments of the states and of the United States, and that principle is that, under the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, the federal government has absolute and exclusive control over commerce between the states, that over interstate commerce the federal government is supreme, and that any interference by a state government, that amounts essentially to a regulation of commerce among the states, is repugnant to the federal Constitution and is void." Van Winkle v. State, 27 Del. 578, 624, 91 A 385, AnnCas1916D 104. [a] Leading case followed-The cases have almost uniformly adhered to the fundamental principles which Chief Justice Marshall laid down in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 6 L. ed. 23, as to the nature and extent of the grant of power to congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and also of the limitations, express and implied, which it imposes on state legislation with regard to taxation, to the control of domestic commerce, and to all persons and things within its limits which are purely of internal concern. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 SCt 6, 32 L. ed. 346. 30. Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois 118 U. S. 557, 7 SCt 4, 30 L. ed. 244; Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307. 6 SCt 334, 338, 1191, 29 L. ed. 636; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547. 31. U. S.-Southern R. Co. V. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 32 SCt 140, 56 L. ed. 257 [rev 153 N. C. 490, 69 SE 618] (where, however, the court remarked that these three divisions but express the extreme boundaries of the subject); Covington, etc., Bridge 31 Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 N. Y.-Peo. v. Erie R. Co., 198 N. Y. 369, 91 NE 849, 139 AmSR 828, 29 LRANS 240, 19 AnnCas 811 [rev 135 App. Div. 767, 119 NYS 873]. V. N. C.-Blalock Hardware Co. Seaboard Air Line, R. Co., 170 N. C. 395, 86 SE 1025. Oh.-Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. State, 31 Oh. Cir. Ct. 20. Tenn.-Palmer v. Southern Express Co., 129 Tenn. 116, 165 SW 236. "In the regulation of interstate commerce there are three powers: The exclusive State power, exclusive National power, and the concurrent power. First, those in which the power of the State is exclusive. These 'concern the strictly internal commerce of the State; and while the regulations of the State may affect interstate commerce directly, their bearing upon it is so remote that it cannot be termed, in any just sense, an interference.' This embraces construction of highways, turnpikes, railroads and canals between points in the same State, and the regulation of toll for the use of the same, and the bridging and regulation of non-navigable streams and control of navigation of strictly internal waters and other strictly internal transportation. Second, where Congress has not acted, in its silence the States may act on subjects local in their nature, but which incidentally affect or facilitate commerce; and this is the concurrent power. It involves regulation of pilots; quarantine and inspection laws and the policing of harbors; the improvement and bridging of navigable streams (subject to an overseeing by Congressional legislation that the improvement does not interfere with interstate and foreign commerce); the establishment of ferries; in a word, that immense mass of legislation' usually referred to as the police power of the State, which may affect incidentally or facilitate foreign or interstate commerce, and regulate for the protection of the health, morals or general welfare of the State, the instrumentalities of commerce, so long as Congress itself does not cover the subject with regulations which conflict with the State regulations. Third, where the laws are from their nature national in character, instead of being of a local nature and affecting interstate commerce, but incidentally, the silence 36 nating state legislation.35 Indeed, the need of some equitable and just regulation of commerce was one of the most influential causes which led to the adoption of the constitution.3 The power to regulate commerce conferred on congress by the constitution of the United States is plenary,37 subject to no limitations other than those prescribed by the constitution itself,38 but subject to the constitutional limitations, especially those contained in the fifth amendment. Also, this great, broad," distinct, 40 [6] B. Power of Congress-1. Source, Nature, and Extent of, in General.32 The constitution of the United States provides that "the Congress shall have Power to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.'' 33 This provision gives all the authority that congress has over commerce.34 Among the reasons, if not the strongest reason, for vesting in congress the power to regulate interstate commerce was the desirability of insuring uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discrimiof Congress indicates that it wills | vention.-"A careful reader of the L. ed. 167, 31 LRANS 7 [aff 168 Fed. that such commerce shall be free history of the times which immedi- 990]. and untrammelled by State legisla- ately preceded the assembling of the As to particular legislation permistion, to this extent-quick or dead- convention that framed the Amer-sible in exercise of power see infra the power of Congress is exclusive." ican Constitution cannot fail to dis§ 60 et seq. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. State, 86 Ark. cover that the need of some equi412, 431. 111 SW 456. table and just regulation of commerce was among the most influential causes which led to its meeting. States having fine harbors imposed unlimited tax on all goods reaching the Continent through their ports. The ports of Boston and New York 32. Specific subjects tion see infra §§ 17-59. of regula 33. U. S. Const. art 1 § 8 cl 3. Meaning of term "regulate" see infra § 60. 34. Van Winkle v. State, 27 Del. 578, 91 A 385, AnnCas1916D 104, 27 Del. 405, 88 A 807. 35. U. S.-Houston, etc., R. Co. v. C. S., 234 U. S. 342, 34 SCt 833, 58 L. ed. 1341 [aff 205 Fed. 391]; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 SCt 729, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 LRANS 1151, AnnCas1916A 18; Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. V. U. S., 175 U. S. 211, 20 SCt 96, 44 L. ed. 136; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 12 SCt 806, 36 L. ed. 672; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 SCt 681, 34 L. ed. 128; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 SCt 6, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 232; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 7 SCt 1126, 30 L. ed. 1187; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344, 26 L. ed. 565; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123, 26 L. ed. 103; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347: Dubuque, etc., R. Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584, 22 L. ed. 972; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. ed. 146; Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568, 14 L. ed. 545; Brown V. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. 6 L. ed. 678; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23. Ky.-Adams Express Co. v. Com., 160 Ky. 66, 169 SW 603. Mo.-State v. Addington, 12 Mo. A. 214 [aff 77 Mo. 110]. S. C.-Jaro v. Holstein, 73 S. C. 111, 52 SE 870. S. D.-State v. Zophy, 14 S. D. 119, 84 NW 391, 86 AmSR 741. Tenn.-Palmer v. Southern Express Co., 129 Tenn. 116, 165 SW 236. [a] "The reason for giving Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several States was to protect legitimate interstate commerce from regulations made in each State in the interest of that State, rather than in the interest of the people of the United States as whole." Adams Express Co. v. Com., 160 Ky. 66, 70, 169 SW 603. a [b] "Under the Articles of Confederation commerce among the original States was subject to vexatious and local regulations that took no account of the general welfare. But it was for the protection of the general interests, as involved in interstate and international commerce, that Congress, representing the whole country, was given by the Constitution full power to regulate commerce among the States and with foreign nations." Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, 352, 24 SCt 436, 48 L. ed. 679. 36. Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 689, 1062, 31 L. ed. 700; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557. 7 SCt 4, 30 Led. 244; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 24 L. ed. 1015; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419, 6 L. ed. 678. [a] Cause of assembling of con were far behind Newport, in the 37. Adams Express Co. v. Ken- "By virtue of the comprehensive The "The power to regulate commerce among the states was carved out of the general sovereign power by the people when the national government was formed, and granted by the Constitution to the Congress of the nation. That grant is exclusive. United States may exercise that power to its utmost extent, may use all means requisite to its complete exercise, and no state, by virtue of any power it possesses, either under the name of the police power or under any other name, may lawfully restrict or infringe this grant, or the plenary exercise of this power; for these are paramount to all the powers of the state and inhere in the supreme law of the land." Shepard v. Northern Pac. R. Co.. 184 Fed. 765. [a] No question with reference to [aff 133 Ky. 724, 118 SW 990]: At- V. 38. U. S.-Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U. S. 190, 35 SCt 824, 59 L. ed. 1267, LRA1916C 273, Ann Cas1915D 1167; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 SCt 729, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 LRANS 1151, AnnCas 1916A 18; Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308, 33 SCt 281, 57 L. ed. 523, 43 LRANS 906, AnnCas1913E 905 and note [aff 187 Fed. 992]; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 31 SCt 265, 55 L. ed. 297, 34 LRANS 671; Atlantie, etc., R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 31 SCt 164, 55 L. ed. 167, 31 LRANS 7; Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, 24 SCt 436, 48 L. ed. 679 [aff 120 Fed. 721]; Buttfield V. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 SCt 349, 48 L. ed. 525; Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410, 23 SCt 472, 47 L. ed. 525; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 23 SCt 321, 47 L. ed. 492; U. S. Joint Traffic Assoc., 171 U. S. 505, 19 SCt 25, 43 L. ed. 259 [rev 89 Fed. 1020, 32 CCA 491 (aff 76 Fed. 895)]; Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 14 SCt 1125, 38 L. ed. 1047, 155 U. S. 3, 15 SCt 19, 39 L. ed. 49; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, 13 SCt 622, 37 L. ed. 463; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 SCt 681, 34 L. ed. 128; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 9 SCt 28, 32 L. ed. 352; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 SCt 6, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 232; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123, 26 L. ed. 103; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, L. ed. 678; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L. ed. 565; Weber v. Freed, 224 Fed. 355, 140 CCA 41; Smeltzer v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 158 Fed. 649; Kelley v. Great Northern R. Co., 152 Fed.. 211. V. Ark.-St. Louis, etc., R. Co. Heyser, 95 Ark. 412, 130 SW 562, AnnCas1912A 610. La.-State v. Kennedy, 19 La. Ann. 397. Tex.-State v. Texas, etc., R. Co., 58 Tex. Civ. A. 410, 124 SW 984. Vt.-State v. Peet, 80 Vt. 449, 68 A 661, 130 AmSR 998, 14 LRANS 677. [a] The congressional power is not limited by the reason of the framers, but is complete in itself. Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211, 20 SCt 96, 44 L. ed. 136 [mod 85 Fed. 271, 29 CCA 141, 46 LRA 122]. 39. Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161, 28 SCt 277, 52 L. ed. 436, 13 AnnCas 764; Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 14 SCt 1125, 38 L. ed. 1047, 155 U. S. 3, 15 SCt 19, 39 L. ed. 49; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, 13 SCt 622, 37 L. ed. 463. 40. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, 335, 13 SCt 622, 37 L. ed. 463 (where the court said: "This is one of the great powers of the national government, one whose existence and far-reaching extent have been affirmed again and again by this court in its leading opinions"). 41. Caminetti v. U. S., 242 U. S.. 470, 37 SCt 192. [7] 2. As to Particular Kinds of Commerce. By virtue of the constitutional grant, congress has sole and exclusive power over interstate commerce 42. U. S. v. Delaware, etc., Co., | 164 Fed. 215 [rev on other grounds 213 U. S. 366, 29 SCt 527, 53 L. ed. 836]. 43. U. S. v. Colorado, etc., R. Co., 157 Fed. 321, 85 CCA 27, 15 LRANS 167, 13 AnnCas 893 [certiorari den 209 U. S. 544, 28 SCt 570, 52 L. ed. 919]. 44. U. S. v. Scott, 148 Fed. 431 (where it was said that the tide of advancing events has inevitably forced on the courts the necessity of giving broad, and apparently ever expanding, latitude to the commerce clause of the constitution); Welch Lumber Co. v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 137 App. Div. 248, 121 NYS 985; Loverin, etc., Co. v. Travis, 135 Wis. 322, 115 NW 829. 45. U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 SCt 249, 39 L. ed. 325; U. S. v. The William, 28 F. Cas. No. 16,700; Lloyd v. North Carolina R. Co., 162 N. C. 485, 78 SE 489. Effect of statutes passed under commerce clause having quality of police regulations see infra § 60. 46. U. S.-New Mexico v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 203 U. S. 38, 27 SCt 1, 51 L. ed. 78; Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189, 24 SCt 234, 48 L. ed. 401; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 24 SCt 132, 48 L. ed. 268; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 23 SCt 321, 47 L. ed. 492; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622, 23 SCt 229, 47 L. ed. 336; Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211, 20 SCt 96, 44 L. ed. 136; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 18 SCt 664, 42 L. ed. 1088 [rev 90 Iowa 496, 58 NW 887, 24 LRA 245]; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 SCt 488, 42 L. ed. 878; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185, 17 SCt 604, 41 L. ed. 965; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 17 SCt 265, 41 L. ed. 632; Henninton v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 16 SCt 1086, 41 L. ed. 166; Western Union Tel. Co. V. James, 162 U. S. 650, 16 SCt 934, 40 L. ed. 1105; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 SCt 900, 39 L. ed. 1092; U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 SCt 249, 39 L. ed. 325; Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U. S. 217, 12 SCt 121, 163, 35 L. ed. 994; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 11 SCt 851, 35 L. ed. 649; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 10 SCt 862, 34 L. ed. 455; Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 10 SCt 725, 34 L. ed, 150; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 SCt 681, 34 L. ed. 128; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Seay, 132 U. S. 472, 10 SCt 161, 33 L. ed. 409; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 9 SCt 256, 32 L. ed. 637; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 SCt 6, 32 L. ed. 346; Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 689, 1062, 31 L. ed. 700; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 564, 31 L. ed. 508; Philadelphia, etc., SS. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 7 SCt 1118, 30 L. ed. 1200; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 SCt 592, 30 L. ed. 694; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 6 SCt 454. 29 L. ed. 691; Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, 5 SCt 739, 28 L. ed. 1137: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067: Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547; Hannibal, etc.. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527; Henderson v. Wickham, 92 U. proper;46 or, as frequently stated, as to all subjects of commerce which are national in their character, admitting of and requiring one uniform plan or system of regulation affecting alike all the states, the power of congress to regulate is not only supreme but exclusive, and the failure of congress to act as to matters of such a national character is equivalent to a declaration that the matter shall be free from regulation or restriction by any S. 259, 23 L. ed. 543; Philadelphia, | etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall, 232, 21 L. ed. 146; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L. ed. 744, 745; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; Snead v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 151 Fed. 608; J. Rosenbaum Grain Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 130 Fed. 46 [aff 130 Fed. 110, 64 CCA 444]; Sheldon v. Wabash R. Co., 105 Fed. 785. Ala.-Cook v. Rome Brick Co., 98 Ala. 409, 12 S 918. Ark. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hesterly, 98 Ark. 240, 135 SW 874. Cal. Carson River Lumbering Co. v. Patterson, 33 Cal. 334; Mitchell v. Steelman, 8 Cal. 363; Peo. v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169. Colo.-Wilcox v. Peo., 46 Colo. 382, 104 P 408; Smith v. Farr, 46 Colo. 364, 104 P 401. D. C.-Beitzell v. District of Columbia, 21 App. 49. Ga. Kavanaugh V. Southern R. Co., 120 Ga. 62, 47 SE 526, 1 AnnCas 705; Kehrer v. Stewart, 117 Ga. 969, 44 SE 854. Ind. Southern R. Co. v. State R. Commn., 179 Ind. 23, 100 NE 337; State v. Indiana, etc., Oil, etc., Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 NE 778, 6 LRA 579 and note; State v. Woodruff Sleeping, etc., Coach Co., 114 Ind. 155, 15 NE 814. Iowa.-Gatton v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 95 Iowa 112, 63 NW 589, 28 LRA 556; Carton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 59 Iowa 148, 13 NW 67, 44 AmR 672 and note. Kan.-Hardy v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 32 Kan. 698, 5 P 6; State V. Saunders, 19 Kan. 127, 27 AmR 98. Ky.Com. v. Hogan, 74 SW 737, 25 KyL 41. Me.-Bennett v. American Express Co., 83 Me. 236, 22 A 159, 23 AmSR 774, 13 LRA 33. Md. Myers v. Baltimore County, 83 Md. 385, 35 A 144, 55 AmSR 349, 34 LRA 309. Mass.-Com. Mass. 217, 66 NE 807. Minn.-Foster V. Blue Earth County, 7 Minn. 140. V. Petranich, 183 Mo.-State v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 208 Mo. 622, 106 SW 1005. N. Y.-Peo. v. Buffalo Fish Co., 164 N. Y. 93, 58 NE 34, 79 AmSR 622, 52 LRA 803. N. C.-Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Campen, 135 N. C. 506, 47 SE 658. N. D.-Downey v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 19 N. D. 621, 125 NW 475, 26 LRANS 1017. Oh.-State v. Yanders, 5 OhS&CP 575, 7 OhNP 659. Pa.-Com. v. Vandyke, 9 Pa. Dist. 41; Wigton v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 20 Phila. 184. Tex. Houston Direct Nav. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 89 Tex. 1, 32 SW 889, 59 AmSR 17. 30 LRA 713; Barnhard V. Morrison, (Civ. A.) 87 SW 376. W. Va.-Wall v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 52 W. Va. 485, 44 SE 294, 94 AmSR 948, 64 LRA 501. Matters over which congress and states possess concurrent powers see infra §§ 13-15. 47. U. S.-Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 SCt 349, 48 L. ed. 525; Atlantic. etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 23 SCt 817. 47 L. ed. 995; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622, 23 SCt 229, 47 L. ed. 336; Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky. 154 U. S. 204, 14 SCt 1087, 38 L. ed. 962; In re Rahrer, 140 47 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 SCt 681, 34 L. ed. 128; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 9 SCt 256, 32 L. ed. 637; Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 689, 1062, 31 L. ed. 700; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 SCt 592, 30 L. ed. 694; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 SCt 4, 30 L. ed. 244; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 5 SCt 826, 29 L. ed. 158; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Ex p. Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717; Hannibal, etc.. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527; Henderson v. Wickham, 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. ed. 543; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. ed. 146; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 20 L. ed. 449; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L. ed. 744. 745; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed. 702; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678. Cal-State v. The Constitution, 42 Cal. 578, 10 AmR 303. Ind.-State V. Indiana, etc., Oil, etc., Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 NE 778, 6 LRA 579. Iowa.-Carton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 59 Iowa 148, 13 NW 67, 44 AmR 672. Mo.-Lusk v. Atkinson, 186 SW 703. Mont.-Welch v. Dean, 49 Mont. 263, 141 P 548; Terr. v. Guyott, 9 Mont. 46, 22 P 134. Okl.-Fruit Dispatch Co. v. Wood, 42 Okl. 79, 140 P 1138. Or-State v. Jacobson, 80 Or. 648, 157 P 1108, LRA1916E 1180. Vt.-State v. Peet, 80 Vt. 449, 68 A 661, 130 AmSR 998, 14 LRANS 677. Va.-Southern Express Co. v. Goldberg, 101 Va, 619, 44 SE 893, 62 LRA 669. "The power granted to the Congress of the United States by this constitutional provision is necessarily exclusive whenever the subjects of it are national in their character or admit only of one uniform system or plan of regulation." State v. Jacobson, 80 Or. 648, 652, 157 P 1108, LRA1916E 1180. [a] The leading case on this proposition is Cooley v. Philadelphia Bd. of Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 299, 13 L. ed. 996. [b] The history of the attitude of the court (1) shows some inconsistency in its views. In 1824 Marshall. C. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 6 L. ed. 23, declared that the power of congress was exclusive, which theory, although somewhat shaken by Wilson V. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. (U. S.) 245, 7 L. ed. 412, remained the doctrine of the court until 1851, when Curtis, J., pronounced the famous sentence in Cooley v. Philadelphia Bd. of Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 299, 319, 13 L. ed. 996: "Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by congress." (2) This doctrine, although at times misquoted, still remains the rule of the court, but its application is still unsettled. For twenty years the court was inclined to allow the states large powers, as notably in Gilman v. Philadelphia. 3 Wall. (U. S.) 713, 18 L. ed. 96, where enactments either of congress or of the states.18 The differences of opinion which have existed in the cases on this subject have arisen not from a denial of the power of congress when exercised, but on the question whether the inaction of congress was in itself equivalent to the affirmative interposition of a bar to any action by the states, or, in other words, whether the power of congress to regulate commerce is exclusive or only paramount.19 The inference prohibiting state action drawn from nonaction by congress is said to be stronger in the case of foreign 48. U. S.-Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 92, 21 SCt 561, 45 L. ed. 765 [aff 58 Nebr. 192, 78 NW 519]; Robbins V. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 SCt 592, 30 L. ed. 694; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 SCt 4, 30 L. ed. 244; Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U. S. 34, 6 SCt 635, 29 L. ed. 785; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 6 SCt 454, 29 L. ed. 691; Brown v. Huston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 SCt 1091, 29 L. ed. 257; Mob'le County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; State Freight Tax Cases, 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. ed. 146; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 462, 12 L. ed. 702 (per Grier, J.); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 222, 6 L. ed. 23, per Johnson, J.; Haskell v. Cowham, 187 Fed. 403, 109 CCA 235. Ind.-State V. Indiana, etc., Oil, Kan.-Hardy v. Atchison, etc., R. Md.-Foote v. Clagett, 116 Md. 228, Mont.-Welch V. Dean, 49 Mont. 263, 141 P 548; Terr. v. Guyott, 9 Mont. 46, 22 P 134. 53. U. S. v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 6 SCt 1109, 30 L. ed. 228; U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 407, 18 L. ed. 182. 54. U. S. v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 6 SCt 1109, 30 L. ed. 228; U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 407, 18 L. ed. 182. 55. U. S.-Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, 27 SCt 153, 51 L. ed. 298; Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211, 20 SCt 96, 44 L. ed. 136; Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 19 SCt 522, 43 L. ed. 786 [aff 89 Fed. 144]; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 18 SCt 757, 43 L. ed. 49; Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 17 SCt 627, 41 L. ed. 1064; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 SCt 1138, 41 L. ed. 256; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commn., 162 U. S. 184, 16 SCt 700, 40 L. ed. 935; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 16 SCt 600, 40 L. ed. 793; U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 SCt 249, 39 L. ed. 325; Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 14 SCt 1125, 38 L. ed. 1047, 155 U. S. 3, 15 SCt 19, 39 L. ed. 49; Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 SCt 1087, 38 L. ed. 962; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 12 SCt 806, 36 L. ed. 672; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, 10 SCt 348, 33 L. ed. 784 [aff 66 Miss. 662, 6 S 203, 14 AmSR 599, the states were allowed to bridge | supersede existing state legislation | L. ed. 728; U. S. v. Johnston, 232 Fed. navigable waters. Hinson v. Lott, 8 and to preclude further state action. 970. Wall (U. S.) 123, 148, 19 L. ed. 387; See infra § 15. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 284, 21 L. ed. 164, and Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 479, 21 L. ed. 470, where a state discriminating tax was upheld, although the question of discrimination was not argued, are further illustrations of this tendency. (3) The opposite leaning is noted in 1873, when the court held void a state license tax on goods of foreign origin (Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347) (4) and the head money provision (Henderson V. Wickham, 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. ed. 543). (5) A temporary return to state rights occurred in Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, 24 L. ed. 97, where the court upheld a state fare regulation when one terminus was within the state; (6) but in the next year it held that the state could not require separate accommodations for negroes (Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547) (7) and went on in 1885 to quash a state tax on the business of an interstate ferry (Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 5 SCt 826, 29 L. ed. 158). (8) In the two succeeding years the court further cut down state authority by overruling two cases decided in the previous decade. Philadelphia, etc., SS. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 7 SCt 1118, 30 L. ed. 1200 [overr Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 284, 21 L. ed. 164]; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 SCt 4, 30 L. ed. 244 [overr Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 184, 24 L. ed. 97]. (9) In 1887 it was also held that, even in the absence of discrimination a state could not levy a tax on drummers engaged in interstate business. Robbins V. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 SCt 592, 30 L. ed. 694. (10) In 1888 in Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, court dende 1h2, 31 L. ed. 700, the court denied the power of the state to forbid the importation of liquor and went so far in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 SCt 681, 34 L. ed. 128, as to extend this doctrine to a sale of liquor in the original packages. (11) The extremity of this decision provoked congress to set it aside by legislation (see In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572), and for a time the court was more lenient toward the states. (12) In Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 11 SCt 876, 35 L. ed. 613, the state was allowed to tax an interstate carrier proportionately to its business in the state; (13) and in Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 15 SCt 154, 39 L. ed. 223, a state oleomargarine statute was upheld, the case being in spirit opposed to Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 SCt 681, 34 L. ed. 128. (14) In Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 18 SCt 757, 43 L. ed. 49, concernng oleomargarine, although clearly distinguishable from the Plumley case, the court shows an antistate tendency again. (15) The more recent cases are concerned largely with the question as to whether congress, by enacting legislation pertaining to a certain subject, has so far covered the subject or shown an intention to take possession of the entire field as to N. Y.-Peo. v. Reardon, 184 N. Y. 431, 77 NE 970, 112 AmSR 628, 8 LRANS 314, 6 AnnCas 515 [aff 204 U. S. 152, 27 SCt 188, 51 L. ed. 415,5 LRA 132]; Western Union Tel. Co. v. 9 AnnCas 736]. Compare Lemmon v. Peo., 20 N. Y. 562, 611 (where, in the stress of the anti-slavery feeling, it was held that the fact that congress had not regulated the interstate transshipment of slaves "partly on land and partly on water" allowed state action). Oh.-State v. Yanders, 5 OhS&CP 575, 7 OhNP 659. Vt.-State v. Peet, 80 Vt. 449, 68 A 661, 130 AmSR 998, 14 LRANS 677. 669. Effect of silence of congress respecting matters of a local nature see infra § 14. 49. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572. 50. Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 689, 1062, 31 L. ed. 700. them. 51. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 456, 470, 22 L. ed. 678 (where the following language is used by Bradley, J.: "The navigable waters of the earth are recognized public highways of trade and intercourse. Νο franchise is needed to enable the navigator to use But it is different with transportation by land. This, when the Constitution was adopted, was entirely performed on common roads, and in vehicles drawn by animal power. No one at that day imagined that the roads and bridges of the country (except when the latter crossed navigable streams) were not entirely subject, both as to their construction, repair and management, to state regulation and control," etc.). 52. The Abby Dodge v. U. S., 223 U. S. 166, 32 SCt 310, 56 L. ed. 390; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 SCt 349, 48 L. ed. 525; U. S. v. Arjona, 120 U. S. 479, 7 SCt 628, 30 Seay, 132 Ü. S. 472, 10 SCt 161, 33 L. ed. 409; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 SCt 6, 32 L. ed. 346; Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 689, 1062, 31 L. ed. 700; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230, 7 SCt 857, 30 L. ed. 888; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 SCt 4, 30 L. ed. 244; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067; Lord v. Goodall SS. Co., 102 U. S. 541, 26 L. ed. 224; U. S. v. Steffens, 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. ed. 550; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547; The Daniel Ball v. U. S., 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 999; U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41, 19 L. ed. 593; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 16 L. ed. 243; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed. 702; U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 9 L. ed. 1004; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; U. S. v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425; The Katie, 40 Fed. 480, LRA 55; The Gretna Green, 20 Fed. 901; The Bright Star, 4 F. Cas. No. 1,880, 1 Woolw. 266; King V. American Transp. Co., 14 F. Čas. No. 7,787, 1 Flipp. 1; The Thomas Swan, 23 F. Cas. No. 13,931, 6 Ben. 42; U. S. v. The James Morrison, 26 F. Cas. No. 15,465, Newb. Adm. 241. Ind. Sears v. Warren County, 36 Ind. 267, 10 AmR 62. La. New Orleans v. The Martha J. Ward, 14 La. Ann. 289. Mont.-Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, etc., County, 28 Mont. 484, 72 P 982, 98 AmSR 572. N. Y.-Peo. v. Huntington, 4 NY LegObs 187; North River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713. Oh.-Thoms v. Greenwood, 6 Oh.. Dec. (Reprint) 639, 7 AmLRec 320. Tex.-Houston, etc., Nav. Co. v. Dwyer, 29 Tex. 376; State R. Commm. v. Texas, etc., R. Co., (Civ. A.) 140 SW 829. [a] Inland navigation.—The act 57 regulate interstate or foreign commerce,56 but it may constitutionally provide at what point in their transportation subjects of interstate commerce shall become subject to state law and to state regulation," and it may declare that certain subjects of interstate or of foreign commerce shall be regulated by such laws as the states may respectively enact for that purpose, where the subject is one not demanding uniformity of regulation, and which, therefore, the states have a right to regulate in the absence of legislation on the subject by congress." Also, congress does not exceed its authority when, in the exercise of its power to regulate, it devolves ministerial duties upon certain officials or departments,59 or when it delegates certain details of regulation to the interstate commerce commission.6 limiting the liability of the owners of vessels for the loss of property shipped on the vessels does not apply to vessels engaged in inland navigation, and is not unconstitutional as an attempt of the federal government to control commerce within the several states. Lord v. Goodall SS. Co., 102 U. S. 541, 26 L. ed. 224. Power of state over internal commerce see infra § 10. 56. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572 [rev 43 Fed. 556, 10 LRA 444]; Stoutenburgh v. Hennich, 129 U. S. 141, 9 SCt 256, 32 L. ed. 637; Cooley v. Philadelphia Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 299, 13 L. ed. 996; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 6 L. ed. 23; In re Van Vliet, 43 Fed. 761, 10 LRA 451; In re Spickler, 43 Fed. 653, 10 LRA 446. 57. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572 [rev 43 Fed. 556, 10 LRA 444]; In re Van Vliet, 43 Fed. 761, 10 LRA 451; In re Spickler, 43 Fed. 653, 10 LRA 446. Subjection of intoxicating liquors to state laws on their arrival in state see infra §§ 31, 119. 58. Cooley v. Philadelphia Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 299, 13 L. ed. 996; Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30, 36 NE 857. 59. Miller v. New York, 10 Fed. 513. 18 Blatchf. 212 [aff 109 U. S. 385, 3 SCt 228, 27 L. ed. 971]; Peo. v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475. 60 58 62 [§ 9] 4. Effect Thereon of Interstate Compact. The powers of congress over commerce can be in no way affected by an agreement between two states.61 [10] C. Power of States-1. Internal Commerce. A state has an inherent and reserved right to regulate local, domestic, and internal commerce. The question whether a state statute is in violation of the commerce clause of the federal constitution does not arise, where it is sought to apply the statute to purely internal commerce,63 and, in such case, the decisions of the interstate commerce commission, or the acts of congress on which they are based, are not binding." [11] 2. Foreign and Interstate Commerce.65 It is without the power of a state directly to regulate, prohibit, or burden interstate commerce, 66 or Tex.-Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. J. H. Nations Meat, etc., Co., (Civ. A.) 136 SW 833. Wash.-State v. Northern Express Co., 80 Wash. 309, 141 P 757, 76 Wash. 636, 136 P 1160 (holding that commerce that is confined and limited to business done within the state of Washington has within it no shade U. S. 352, 33 SCt 729, 57 L. ed. 1511, S. C.-State v. Pinckney, 44 S. C. L. 48 LRANS 1151, AnnCas1916A 18: 474. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How, 227, 16 L. ed. 243; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23 [rev 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 488]; State v. Adams Express Co., 219 Fed. 794, 135 CCA 464, LRA1916C 291; Hocking Valley R. Co. v. New York Coal Co., 217 Fed. 727, 132 CCA 387; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hughes, 201 Fed. 727; Southern Pac. Co. v. California R. Commn., 193 Fed. 699; Southern Pac. Co. v. Campbell, 189 Fed. 696; The Bright Star, 4 F. Cas. No. 1,880, Woolw. 266; Halderman v. Beckwith, 11 F. Cas. No. 5,907, 4 McLean 286; King v. American Transp. Co., 14 F. Cas. No. 7,787, 1 Flipp. 1; U. S. v. The James Morrison, 26 F. Cas. No. 15,465, Newb. Adm. 241; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 27 F. Cas. No. 15,867, 1 Woodb. & M. 401. Ala. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. McCleskey, 160 Ala. 630, 49 S 433. Cal. Cowden v. Pacific Coast SS. Co., 94 Cal. 470, 29 P 873, 28 AmSR 142, 18 LRA 221. Colo.-Rio Grande Southern R. Co. v. Campbell, 44 Colo. 1, 96 P 986. Fla.-State v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 S 969, 32 LRANS 639. Ida. In re Abel, 10 Ida. 288, 77 P 621. Ind. Vandalia R. Co. v. State R. Commn., 101 NE 85; Brechbill v. Randall, 102 Ind. 528. 1 NE 362. 52 AmR 695; Sears v. Warren County, 36 Ind. 267, 10 AmR 62. Kan.-Larabee Flour Mills Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 74 Kan. 808, 88 P 72. Ill-Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. State Public Utilities Commn., 268 Ill. 49, 108 NE 729; Luken v. Lake Shore, 60.. Interstate Commerce Commn. etc., R. Co., 248 Ill. 377, 94 NE 175, v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 140 AmSR 220, 21 AnnCas 82 (hold32 SCt 436, 56 L. ed. 729 [rev 190 ing that the powers over commerce Fed. 943]; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. not delegated to the federal governInterstate Commerce Commn., 184 ment by the constitution are reserved Fed. 118, 122 (where, after stating to the states, and a state may the rule against the delegation of leg-pass such laws regulating commerce islative power and its exceptions, the within the state as it deems expecourt said: "It would be difficult to dient). instance an occasion in the history of federal legislation so plainly subject to the application of this exceptional rule as the enactment of the interstate commerce law and the carrying forward of its scheme by subsequent amendments. It is manifest that some such scheme as this must have been adopted or the purpose to control carriers engaged in interest commerce must fail. It would have been impossible for Congress to have forseen the multitude of questions depending upon the special facts presented sometimes in one complication and sometimes in another, and declare a single rule applicable to each. The most that it could do would be to declare the general rule to indicate its purpose and to serve as guides in the determination of questions that would arise, and delegate the power of applying them to some competent public agency always in the field and ready to entertain and dispose of controversies"); Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Wood-Hagenbarth Cattle Co., 105 Tex. 178, 146 SW 538 [aff (Civ. A.) 130 SW 8571. La.-State V. Hammond Packing Co., 110 La. 180, 34 S 368, 98 AmSR 459; New Orleans v. The Martha J. Ward, 14 La. Ann. 289. Mass.-Com. V. People's Express Co., 201 Mass. 564, 88 NE 420, 131 AmSR 416. Mo.-Lusk 703. V. Atkinson, 186 SW Nebr.-State v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 81 Nebr. 15, 115 NW 614 (holding that the domestic commerce of a state and the facilities by which it is conducted are within the control of the state, and the legislature may make such reasonable rules governing its domestic commerce as seem best fitted for the interest of its citizens, provided such regulations do not burden or interfere with the interstate commerce of the nation). N. J.-State v. Corson, 67 N. J. L. 178. 50 A 780. N. Y.-Fitch v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. Super. 492: Peo. v. Huntington, 4 NY LegObs 187. or element of interstate commerce, and may be lawfully regulated by the state). [a] Right to protect commerce.The right of a state to regulate the business of common carriers within its boundaries, so far as that business affects the public, is founded on the state's right to protect its commerce. Platt v. LeCocq, 150 Fed. 391 [rev on other grounds 158 Fed. 723, 85 CCA 621, 15 LRANS 558]. Specific regulations of domestic commerce see § 63 et seq. 63. Farrell v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 82 S. C. 410, 64 SE 226. 64. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. McCleskey, 160 Ala. 630, 49 S 433. 65. Field which may be covered by either state or federal legislation see infra §§ 13-15. 66. U. S.-Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U. S. 48, 36 SCt 510, 60 L. ed. 880; Baltic Min. Co. V. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 34 SCt 15, 58 L. ed. 127 [aff 207 Mass. 381, 93 NE 831, 212 Mass. 35, 98 NE 1056, AnnCas1913C 805]; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218, 29 SCt 633, 53 L. ed. 972; McNeill V. Southern R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 SCt 722, 50 L. ed. 1142; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 23 SCt 272, 47 L. ed. 400; Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed. 702; Fidelity Title, etc., Co. V. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 219 Fed. 614; William R. Compton Co. V. Allen, 216 Fed. 537; Haskell v. Cowham, 187 Fed. 403, 109 CCA 235 (holding that neither a state nor its officers by the exercise of, or refusal to exercise, any of its powers, may prevent or unreasonably burden interstate commerce in any sound article thereof or substantially discriminate against interstate commerce or the right to carry it on); Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Stevens, 172 Fed. 595; Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1, 84 CCA 167 [certiorari den 212 U. S. 577 mem, 29 SCt 686 mem, 53 L. ed. 658 mem]; Smith v. Lowe, 121 Fed. 753, 59 CCA 185. Ark. Frank A. Menne Factory v. Harback, 85 Ark. 278, 107 SW 991. Colo.-International Trust Co. V. Leschen, etc., Rope Co.. 41 Colo. 299, 92 P 727. 14 AnnCas 861; Stubbs v. Peo., 40 Colo. 414. 90 P 1114, 122 Am SR 1068, 11 LRANS 1071, 13 AnnCas 1025 and note. Fla. Circular Adv. Co. v. American Mercantile Co., 66 Fla. 96, 63 S_3; State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617. 47 S 969. 32 LRANS 639. Ida.-Belle City Mfg. Co. v. Friz |