97 94 the state may have acted. The same result follows from the regulation of an agency or instrumentality of commerce by the interstate commerce commission by virtue of the power delegated to it by congress.95 To have the effect of superseding a state statute, it is not sufficient that a congressional regulation of commerce invades the same field; it must expressly cover the precise subject matter, or show a purpose to take legislative possession of the whole field,96 and this purpose. must be manifested by a valid statute. A state statute may be allowed to stand unless the repugnancy and conflict between it and the act of congress are so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or stand together.98 And where the federal statute expressly provides that the state power of regulation is not superseded by it, the state's authority remains unimpaired.99 The fact that federal and state statutes relating to the same subject are in cise of the power of Congress over the subject of commerce, must give way before the supremacy of the national authority." Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 564, 31 L. ed. 508 [quot Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 SCt 169, 56 L. ed. 327, 38 LRANS 44 (aff 173 Fed. 494, and rev 82 Conn. 373)]. "The federal government is the paramount authority in the regulation of interstate commerce, and the laws of Congress on that subject supersede and override all state statutes conflicting therewith. Also where the federal government, acting through its constitutional agencies, has fully covered the subject by regulations of its own, there is usually no room for further state regulation. Congress has acted in the matter of regulating this feature of interstate commerce and that action excludes further or additional regulation covering the same subject by the state legislature." Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Rock County Sugar Co., 162 Wis. 374, 378, 156 NW 607. [a] Where the statutes of two states are identical, (1) and the statute of one is held by the United States supreme court to be in conflict with, and superseded by, the Interstate Commerce Act and its amendments (Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 15 SCt 802, 39 L. ed. 910), (2) that decision will be deemed conclusive of the invalidity of the statute of the other state (Spratlin v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 76 Ark. 82, 88 SW 836 [dist Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Hanniford, 49 Ark. 291, 5 SW 294, on the ground that at the date of that decision congress had not passed the amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act which brings the federal and state statutes into conflict ]). [b] "Foreign commerce has been fully regulated by Congress, and any regulations imposed by the states upon that branch of commerce would be a palpable interference." Philadelphia, etc., SS. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 336, 7 SCt 1118, 30 L. ed. 1200. Particular federal regulations of commerce superseding state statutes see infra §§ 64, 66, 101-103, 108, 112114, 116, 117, 120, 121. a 94. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. (U. S.) 227, 243, 16 L. ed. 243 (where it was said, per Nelson, J., that federal statute would override a state statute "without regard to the source of power whence the State Legislature derived its enactment"). 95. The Ingrid, 195 Fed. 596; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Michigan R. Commn.. 183 Mich. 6, 148 NW 800, AnnCas1916E 695: Morphis v. Southern Express Co., 167 N. C. 139, 83 SE 1. 96. U. S.-Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412, 34 SCt 790, 58 L. ed. 1377, LRA1915E 942; Savage conflict does not render the state regulation invalid nor repeal it, but merely suspends it while the federal statute is in force,1 to the extent that it affects commerce outside the state as it comes within the state;2 and consequently the state statute revives on the repeal of the federal statute.3 The time when congress shall exercise its power to regulate interstate or foreign commerce is optional with it. The fact that it does not exercise it at an early date, as to a particular matter, does not prevent it from subsequently exercising it to the detriment of individuals or corporations who, in the absence of federal action and under state authority, have made valuable improvements. Also, the date of the enactment of a statute by congress is the time when the state's authority to regulate the same phase of commerce terminates, although the act is not to become operative until the expiration of a specified time thereafter." v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 32 SCt 715, 56 L. ed. 1182 [foll Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540, 32 SCt 784, 56 L. ed. 1197]; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 SCt 488, 42 L. ed. 878 (holding that, although congress had acted on a certain subject of interstate commerce, if it did not cover the whole subject, the state had power to enact valid police laws not in conflict with the act of congress); Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 207 Fed. 1, 124 CCA 573 [aff 201 Fed. 946]. Ark.-Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. State, 86 Ark. 412, 111 SW 456. Fla. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 65 Fla. 123, 61 S 185. Ga.-Armour v. Augusta, 134 Ga. 178, 67 SE 417, 27 LRANS 676. Ind.-Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. V. State R. Commn., 171 Ind. 189, 86 NE 328. Mass. -Com. v. Moore, 214 Mass. 19, 100 NE 1071. N. Y.-Winfield v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., 216 N. Y. 284, 110 NE 614, AnnCas1916A 817 [aff 168 App. Div. 351, 153 NYS 499]. Or.-Martin v. Oregon, R., etc., Co., 58 Or. 198, 113 P 16. Tex.-Bailey v. Western Union Tel. Co., (Civ. A.) 171 SW 839. [a] "The rule rests upon fundamental grounds that should not be disregarded. In Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 SCt 92, 47 L. ed. 108, the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, said: It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested. This court has said-and the principle has been often reaffirmed that "In the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the state law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, SO that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together." Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. (U. S.) 227, 16 L. ed. 243.' In Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533, 32 SCt 715, 56 L. ed. 1182, the court said: 'When the question is whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must of course be considered and that which needs must be implied is of no less force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be accomplished— if its operation within its chosen fields else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect-the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power [citing cases]. But the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.'" Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412, 419, 34 SCt 790, 58 L. ed. 1377, LRA1915E 942. 97. Chicago, etc., R. Co. V. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 33 SCt 58, 57 L. ed. 966 [aff 170 Ill. A. 140] (holding that the purpose of congress to take control of a subject, SO as to supersede state statutes cannot be manifested by a void statute, as such a statute is not a law for any purpose). 98. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 SCt 92, 47 L. ed. 108; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 SCt 488, 42 L. ed. 878; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. (U. S.) 227, 16 L. ed. 243; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Beatty, 34 Okl. 321, 118 P 367, 126 P 736, 42 LRANS 984. 99. Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 475, 18 L. ed. 608. 1. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Bright, (Tex. Civ. A.) 156 SW 304; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Turner, (Tex. Civ. A.) 138 SW 1126, 1128 [cit Cyc]. 2. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547. 3. Henderson v. Spofford, 59 N. Y. 131 [aff 3 Daly 361, 10 AbbPrNS 140]; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Yerkes, (Tex. Civ. A.) 156 SW 579, 581 [cit Cyc]; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Bright, (Tex. Civ. A.) 156 SW 304, 307 [cit Cyc]; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Turner, (Tex. Civ. A.) 138 SW 1126, 1128 [cit Cyc]. 4. Union Bridge Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364, 27 SCt 367, 51 L. ed. 523 [aff 143 Fed. 377]. Exercise of power to regulate commerce by causing removal of bridge constructed under state authority see infra § 86. 5. Erie R. Co. v. Peo., 233 U. S. 67, 34 SCt 756, 58 L. ed. 1149, 52 LRANS 266, AnnCas1915D 138 [rev 198 N. Y. 369, 91 NE 849, 139 AmSR 828, 29 LRANS 240, 19 AnnCas 811]; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 378, 32 SCt 160, 56 L. ed. 237 [rev 53 Wash. 673, 102 P 876, 17 AnnĈas 1013 and note] (where the court, per White, C. J., said: "It is elementary that the right of a State to apply its police powers for the purpose of regulating interstate commerce, in a case like this, exists only from the silence of Congress on the subject, and ceases when Congress acts on the subject or manifests its purpose to call into play its exclusive power. This being the conceded premise upon which alone the state law could have been made applicable, it results that as the enact [§ 16] E. Power of Canadian Parliament and Provincial Legislatures. By the British North America Aet, the dominion parliament of Canada is given the power to legislate exclusively as to the regulation of trade and commerce. This power is broader than that of congress under the constitution of the United States; it is general, without limitation or restriction, and excludes the action of provincial legislatures, even as to purely internal commerce." However, the power of the dominion parliament to regulate trade and commerce does not deprive the local legislatures of the power to regulate property and civil rights of a merely local and private nature, even though such regulations incidentally affect matters connected with trade and commerce, provided they do not conflict with regulations made by the dominion parliament." III. SUBJECTS OF REGULATION [17] A. In General. All commerces is under the control either of the state or of the nation, and the test as to which has power as to a particular matter constituting a subject of regulation, because of its being commerce, is held to be not the kind of business a person or corporation is engaged in, nor the instrumentalities it employs therein, nor that it is conducted on navigable waters, but whether the business is carried on between the states or affects them, or is conducted on the high seas.' Stated in another way, the test as to whether any given commerce is of an interstate character is to be determined by what is actually done."1 The subjeets on which congress can act under its power to regulate commerce are of infinite variety,1 em ment by Congress of the law in question was an assertion of its power, by the fact alone of such manifestation that subject was at once removed from the sphere of the operation of the authority of the State. To admit the fundamental principle and yet to reason that because Congress chose to make its prohibitions take effect only after a year, the matter with which Congress dealt remained subject to state power, is to cause the act of Congress to destroy itself; that is, to give effect to the will of Congress as embodied in the postponing provision for the purpose of overriding and rendering ineffective the expression of the will of Congress to bring the subject within its control-a manifestation arising from the mere fact of the enactment_of_the_statute"); Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hughes, 201 Fed. 727; State v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.. 212 Mo. 658, 111 SW 500; State v. Texas, etc., R. Co., 58 Tex. Civ. A, 410, 124 SW 984; State v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 136 Wis. 407, 117 NW 686, 19 LRANS 326. All of the above cases relate to the act of March 4, 1907 (34 U. S. St. at L. 1415), regulating the hours of labor of interstate railroad employees and providing that it should not become effective until one year from date, and hold that a state is precluded, during the interim between the date of the act and the time when it should go into effect, from making or enforcing, as to such employees, a local regulation limiting hours of labor. The case of State v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 36 Mont. 582, 93 P 945, 15 LRANS 134, 13 AnnCas 144. is to the contrary. 6. Fredericton v. Reg., 3 Can. S. C. 505; Severn v. Reg., 2 Can. S. C. 70; Reg. v. Kings County, 11 CanLJNS 249, 251 (where the court said that the power given to the dominion parliament must include traffic in articles of merchandise, not only in connection with foreign countries, but also that which is internal between different provinces of the Dominion, as well as that which is carried on within the limits of an individual province"); Reg. v. Wing Chong, 1 B. C. Pt II 150; Rex v. Ferries, (Sask.) 15 WestLR 331. 7. Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 4 Can, S. C. 215; Reg. v. Howe, 2 B. C. 36. 8. "Commerce” defined see supra $ 1. 9. U. S. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 149 Fed. 486. 12 10 [18] B. Subjects of Commerce. Only such commodities as may lawfully become the subjects of purchase, sale, or exchange are articles of commerce which, on their movement from state to state, become subjects of interstate commerce, within the protection of the commerce clause of the constitution.16 The power to regulate commerce includes 10. Independent Tug Line v. Lake | fore, subject to be regulated by ConSuperior Lumber, etc., Co., 146 Wis. 121, 131 NW 408. 11. South Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U. S. 537. 35 SCt 158, 59 L. ed. 350, LRA1915F 792. Test as to whether certain acts and transactions constitute interstate commerce see infra § 19. 12. Caminetti v. U. S., 242 U. S. 470, 37 SCt 192; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Cooley v. Philadelphia Bd. of Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 299, 318, 13 L. ed. 996 (holding that "commerce,' as used in U. S. Const. art 1 § 8 cl 3 declaring that congress shall have "power to regulate commerce" with foreign nations and among the several states, embraces a vast field containing not only many, but exceedingly various, subjects quite unlike in their nature). 13. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 6 L. ed. 23 [rev 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 488]. 14. Reilly v. U. S., 106 Fed. 896, 46 CCA 25 [rev on other grounds 188 U. S. 375, 23 SCt 334, 47 L. ed. 508]. [a] The powers of congress keep pace with new methods and inventions (1) as notably in the case of the telegraph. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 708. (2) "Constitutional provisions do not change, but their operation extends to new matters as the modes of business and the habits of life of the people vary with each succeeding generation. . . . Just so it is with the grant to the national government of power over interstate commerce. The Constitution has not changed. The power is the same. But it operates to-day upon modes of interstate commerce unknown to the fathers, and it will operate with equal force upon any new modes of such commerce which the future may develop." In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 591, 15 SCt 900, 39 L. ed. 1092 [quot U. S. v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 234 Fed. 127]. (3) "As new methods of transacting business are devised, if they are found to be in effect methods of carrying on commerce in any business, and the means for commercial transactions between the owner of the article on the one hand, and the person who wants to deal in it or use it in carrying on his business on the other hand, whether it be manufacturing, selling, trading, leasing, transportation, communication, or information, and it is sent or transported from one state to another, it is interstate commerce, and there gress under the commerce clause of the Constitution." U. S. v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 234 Fed. 127, 145. 15. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 23 L. ed. 819; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534. And as to particular subjects of regulation see infra §§ 18-59. [a] All parts of commerce.-(1) The power to regulate commerce among the states is general, and includes authority to regulate all its parts; the subjects of commerce, the articles, information, and intelligence transported from state to state; the transactors of commerce, the merchants, carriers, and laborers who carry it on; the means, the vehicles, cars, steamboats, coaches, and wagons by which subjects of commerce are carried; and the operation, the contracts, terms, and rates under which it is conducted. U. S. v. Colorado, etc., R. Co., 157 Fed. 321, 85 CCA 27, 15 LRANS 167, 13 AnnCas 893 [certiorari den 209 U. S. 544, 28 SCt 570, 52 L. ed. 919]. (2) "Contracts to buy, sell or exchange goods to be transported among the several States, the transportation and its instrumentalities, and articles bought, sold or exchanged for the purpose of such transit among the States, or put in the way of transit, may be regulated, but this is because they form part of interstate trade commerce." Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211, 239, 20 SCt 96, 44 L. ed. 136. To same effect U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 SCt 249, 39 L. ed. 325; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 SCt 6, 32 L. ed. 346; American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 NYS 6. 16. U. S. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 18 SCt 757, 43 L. ed. 49; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 SCt 681, 34 L. ed. 128; In re 272; Scheitlin, 99 Fed. Sawrie V. V. Tennessee, 82 Fed. 615; Donald Scott, 74 Fed. 859; In re Ware, 53 Fed. 783. or Kan.-State v. Hickox, 64 Kan. 650, 68 P 35. Me.-Bennett v. American Express Co., 83 Me. 236, 22 A 159, 23 AmSR 774, 13 LRA 33. Md.-Ballock v. State, 73 Md. 1, 20 A 184, 25 AmSR 559, 8 LRA 671. N. Y.-Peo. v. Niagara Fruit Co., 75 App. Div. 11, 77 NYS 805 [aff 173 N. Y. 629 mem, 66 NE 1114 mem]. Tenn.-Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 48 SW 305, 70 AmSR 703, 50 the power to declare what property or things may be the subject of commerce, and therefore congress has power to prescribe what articles of merchandise shall or shall not be the subject of interstate or foreign commerce," and articles recognized by congress as subjects of interstate commerce cannot be held to be otherwise.18 The failure of congress to make any express declarations on the subject has not submitted to the several states the decision of the question in each locality, as to what shall and 19 what shall not be articles of traffic in the interstate commerce of the country." However, articles which, from their inherent nature or their existing condition, are inimical to the public health or morals, are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce so as to be within the exclusive regulating power of congress when moved in interstate traffic, but fall within the police powers of the state.20 It is also within the power of the state to determine whether certain articles shall be subjects of intra-state com LRA 478 [aff 179 U. S. 343, 21-SCt | 1063; State v. Hickox, 64 Kan. 650, 132, 45 L. ed. 224]. v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 567, 48 SW 305, 70 AmSR 703, 50 LRA 478 [aff 179 U. S. 343, 21 SCt 132, 45 L. ed. 224]. [b] Legitimate articles of commerce include: (1) Newspapers. Preston v. Finley, 72 Fed. 850. (2) Natural gas, when reduced to possession. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229, 31 SCt 564, 55 L. ed. 716, 35 LRANS 1193 [aff 172 Fed. 545]; Manufacturers Gas, etc., Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas, etc., Co., 155 Ind. 545, 58 NE 706; Avery v. Indiana, etc., Oil, etc., Co., 120 Ind. 600, 22 NE 781; State v. Indiana, etc., Oil, etc., Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 NE 778, 6 LRA 579. (3) Petroleum. In re Wilson, 10 N. M. 32, 60 P 73, 48 LRA 417. (4) Oleomargarine. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 18 SCt 757, 43 L. ed. 49; In re Scheitlin, 99 Fed. 272; In re Brundage, 96 Fed. 963 [rev on other grounds 180 U. S. 499, 21 SCt 455, 45 L. ed. 6391; Ex p. Scott, 66 Fed. 45; In re Worthen, 58 Fed. 467; In re McAllister, 51 Fed. 282; In re Gooch, 44 Fed. 276, 10 LRA 830; Fox v. State, 89 Md. 381, 43 A 775, 73 AmSR 193; Com. v. Huntley, 156 Mass. 236, 30 NE 1127, 15 LRA 839; Waterbury v. Egan, 3 Misc. 355, 23 NYS 115; Com. v. Paul, 170 Pa. 284, 33 A 82, 50 AmSR 776, 30 LRA 396; Com. v. Schollenberger, 156 Pa. 201, 27 A 30, 36 AmSR 32, 22 LRA 155. (5) Baking powder. In re Ware, 53 Fed. 783. (6) Convict-made goods. In re Opinion of Justices, 211 Mass. 605, 98 NE 334, AnnCas1913B 815. (7) Tobacco. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 21 SCt 132, 45 L. ed. 224 [aff 101 Tenn. 563, 48 SW 305, 70 AmSR 703, 50 LRA 478]; Sawrie v. Tennessee, 82 Fed. 615; In re Minor, 69 Fed. 233; McGregor v. Cone, 104 Iowa 465, 73 NW 1041, 65 AmSR 522, 39 LRA 484; State v. Goetze, 43 W. Va. 495, 27 SE 225, 64 AmSR 871. Contra Blaufield v. State, 103 Tenn. 593, 53 SW 1090. (8) Intoxicating liquors generally. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S. 70, 32 SCt 189, 56 L. ed. 355; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 18 SCt 674. 42 L. ed. 1100; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 17 SCt 265, 41 L. ed. 632; O'Neill v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 12 SCt 693, 36 L. ed. 450; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sci 865, 35 L. ed. 572; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 SCt 681, 34 L. ed. 128; Thurlow V. Massachusetts, 5 How. (U. S.) 504, 12 L. ed. 256; U. S. v. U. S. Express Co., 180 Fed. 1006 [rev on other grounds 191 Fed. 673, 112 CCA 219]; Donald v. Scott, 74 Fed. 859; Ex p. Loeb, 72 Fed. 657; Jervey v. The Carolina, 66 Fed. 1013; Ex p. Edgerton, 59 Fed. 115; In re Beine, 42 Fed. 545; State v. Allmond, 8 Del. 612; Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30, 36 NE 857; State v. Hanaphy, 117 Iowa 15, 90 NW 601; Wind v. Iler, 93 Iowa 316, 61 NW 1001, 27 LRA 219; State v. Rhodes, 90 Iowa 496, 58 NW 887, 24 LRA 245; State v. Corrick, 82 Iowa 451, 48 NW 808; State v. Pfleajor, 81 Iowa 759, 46 NW low v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504, 12 L. ed. 256; Weber v. Freed, 224 Fed. 355, 140 CCA 41; U. S. v. Popper, 98 Fed. 423; Ex p. Loeb, 72 Fed. 657; U. S. v. Gould, 25 F. Cas. No. 15,239. Ala.-Southern Express Co. V. Whittle, 69 S 652. Ky.-Adams Exp. Co. v. Com., 160 Ky. 66, 169 SW 603. Miss.-American Express Co. V. Beer, 107 Miss. 528, 65 S 575. Mont. State v. Harper, 48 Mont. 456, 138 P 495, 51 LRANS 157, Ann Cas1915D 1017 (holding that, if the rule stated in the text did not obtain, the power of congress to regulate commerce would be circumscribed by the ability of the state to determine what should or what should not be regulated). "The power of the Congress 'to regulate commerce among the states' undoubtedly necessarily comprehends the power to define what shall be commerce among the states, and, with a view to the appropriate exercise of its power, to distinguish between things deleterious and things beneficial or innocuous,' and, in natural consequence, to deny, absolutely or conditionally, entrance into such commerce to those things which are deleterious." Southern Express Co. v. Whittle, (Ala.) 69 S 652, 654. 68 Р 35; State V. Intoxicating 17. U. S.-Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 SCt 349, 48 L. ed. 525; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 SCt 681, 34 L. ed. 128; Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 689, 1062, 31 L. ed. 700; Thur 677. a [a] What not recognition.-An act of congress levying a tax on certain articles for the purposes of revenue only, without more, is not such a recognition of them as legitimate articles of commerce as will prevent a state from declaring them not legitimate articles of commerce. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 15 SCt 154, 39 L. ed. 223. 19. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865, 35 L. ed. 572; Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 689, 1062, 31 L. ed. 700. [a] Local policy of state.-"If the state may not regulate commerce among the states in a commercial article at all, it may not oust the national jurisdiction by merely declaring a commercial commodity not to be a commercial commodity merely because the local policy of the state would be subserved thereby." Sawrie v. Tennessee, 82 Fed. 615, 622. 20. U. S.-Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 14 SCt 829, 38 L. ed. 719; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 11 SCt 851, 35 L. ed. 649: In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 SCt 865. 35 L. ed. 572; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. 10 SCt 681, 34 L. ed. 128: Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 689, 1062, 31 L. ed. 700; Peirce V. New Hampshire, 5 How. 554. 12 L. ed. 256; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678. merce. While, in case certain articles are harmful or deleterious and therefore are not legitimate subjects of commerce, the fact that they are in original packages will not protect them from state regulation. the question whether an article is or is not a subject of lawful interstate commerce must depend on the intrinsic state or condition of the artiele, and not on a mere declaration by the state legislature.23 27 The fact that certain acts or transactions require an office and employees to perform or transact them is not important in determining whether they constitute interstate commerce. 35 31 [§ 20] 2. Contracts Generally.32 The power of congress to regulate interstate or foreign commerce includes the power to legislate on the subject of private contracts which directly and substantially relate to such commerce,33 as, for instance, contracts which directly involve transportation from one state to another.34 On the other hand, contracts which in no way involve transportation are not in, and of, themselves any part of interstate commerce. Neither is a contract of an interstate character where interstate commerce may become only incidental to its execution, and is not a part of it as between the parties to the contract.36 Where parties contract to engage in interstate commerce, they do so subject to the right of congress subsequently to pass laws regulating such commerce,37 and the constitutional guaranty of liberty to the individual to enter into private contracts does not limit the power of congress and prevent it from legislating on the subject of contracts in respect to interstate and foreign commerce.38 Congress has power to enact antitrust laws regulating or prohibiting contracts and combinations in restraint of interstate or foreign commerce.39 The interstate com Persons have been said not to be subjects of commerce, but it has been held erpressly that the transportation of persons is an act of commerce.25 Money is not an article of commerce," 26 but is merely a medium of exchange.2 [19] C. Acts of Commerce-1. In General. Transactions of interstate commerce comprehend every negotiation, initiatory and intervening act, contract, trade, and dealing between citizens of any state or territory, or the District of Columbia, with those of another political division of the United States, which contemplates and causes an importation into the state, either of goods, of persons, or of information.28 Substance, and not form, controls in determining whether a particular transaction is one of interstate commerce;29 and the right to engage in interstate commerce free from state interference embraces those acts which are necessary to the complete enjoyment of the right protected.3 Kan-State v. Hickox, 64 Kan. 650, | erly be made mala prohibita. They 68 P 35. are a species of gambling, and wrong Miss.-American in their influences. Any one, therefore, who accepts a lottery charter does so with the implied understanding that the people, in their sovereign capacity, and through their properly constituted agencies, may resume it at any time when the public good shall require, whether it be paid for or not." Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 821. 25 L. ed. 1079. (7) Water abstracted contrary to a state statutory prohibition cannot legitimately enter into interstate Express Co. V. Beer, 107 Miss. 528, 65 S 575, AnnCas 1916D 127. N. Y.-Peo. v. Niagara Fruit Co.. 75 App. Div. 11, 77 NYS 805 [aff 173 N. Y. 629 mem, 66 NE 1114 mem]. Tenn.-Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 48 SW 305, 70 AmSR 703, 50 LRA 478 [aff 179 U. S. 343, 21 SCt 132, 45 L. ed. 224]. Wash.-Hathaway v. McDonald, 27 Wash. 659, 68 P 376, 91 AmSR 889. V. commerce. 30 McCarter V. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N. J. Ea. 695, 65 A 489, 118 AmSR 754, 14 LRANS 197, 10 AnnCas 116 [aff 70 N. J. Eq. 525, 61 A 710, and aff 209 U. S. 349, 28 SCt 529, 52 L. ed. 828]. 21. American Express Co. v. Beer, 22. Com. V. Huntley, 156 Mass. 23. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 24. New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. (U. 25. See infra § 22. Padgett v. Gulfport Fertilizer [a] Illustrations.—(1) Adulterated articles of food are not legitimate articles of commerce. Schollenberger V. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 18 SCt 757, 43 L. ed. 49; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 15 SCt 154, 39 L. ed. 223; Com. v. Huntley, 156 Mass. 236, 30 NE 1127, 15 LRA 839; Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 48 SW 305, 70 AmSR 703, 50 LRA 478 [aff 179 U. S. 343, 21 SCt 132, 45 L. ed. 224]. (2) Oleomargarine put up and colored in imitation of genuine butter is not a lawful subject of commerce, and is subject to the police powers of the state. Plumley Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 15 SCt 154, 39 L. ed. 223; In re Scheitlin, 99 Fed. 272; Com. v. Huntley, 156 Mass. 236, 30 NE 1127, 15 LRA 839. Contra In re Brundage, 96 Fed. 963 [rev on other grounds 180 U. S. 499, 21 SCt 455, 45 L. ed. 639]. (3) So too animals having contagious or infectious diseases are not lawful subjects of commerce and may be excluded by the state under the exercise of its police power. Missouri, etc., R. Co. V. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 SCt 488, 42 L. ed. 878; Kimmish v. Ball, 129 C. S. 217, 9 SCt 277, 32 L. ed. 695; Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527. (4) Congress may prohibit interstate trade in gambling or lottery tickets. Champion V. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 23 SCt 321, 47 L. ed. 492; Reilly v. U. S., 106 Fed. 896, 46 CCA 25 [rev on other grounds 188 U. S. 375, 23 SCt 334, 47 L. ed. 508]. (5) A state may prohibit chartered lotteries in its midst, even though the persons engaged in the sale of tickets hold federal licenses. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 462, 18 L. ed. 497. (6) The court speaking on the question, in one case, as follows: "They [lotteries] are not, in the legal acceptation of the term, mala in se, 33. Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. but, as we have just seen, may prop- S., 175 U. S. 211, 20 SCt 96, 44 L. ed. 27. 28. See Money [27 Cyc 817]. International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 SCt 481, 54 L. ed. 678, 27 LRANS 493, 18 AnnCas 1103; U. S. v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 234 Fed. 127; U. S. v. Tucker, 188 Fed. 741; Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1, 84 CCA 167 [certiorari den 212 U. S. 577 mem, 29 SCt 686 mem, 53 L. ed. 658 mem]; Security State Bank v. Simmons, 251 Mo. 2, 157 SW 585. 29. Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. S. 178, 35 SCt 403, 59 L. ed. 527; Dalton Adding Mach. Co. v. Com., 118 Va. 563, 88 SE 167. 30. Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. S. 178, 35 SCt 403, 59 L. ed. 527. 31. Security State Bank v. Simmons, 251 Mo. 2, 157 SW 585. 32. Contracts of sale see infra §§ 25, 26. 136_[mod 85 Fed. 271, 29 CCA 141, 46 LRA 122]; U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assoc., 171 U. S. 505, 19 SCt 25, 43 L. ed. 259; U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 SCt 249, 39 L. ed. 325. [a] Contracts impeding commerce. -The power of congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce was never intended to be exercised so as to interfere with private contracts not designed at the time when they were made to create impediments to such commerce. Dubuque, etc., R. Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 584, 22 L. ed. 173. ས. 34. Howard Illinois Cent. R. Co., 161 Ky. 783, 171 SW 442. 35. Pacific R. Adv. Co. v. Conrad, 168 Cal. 91, 141 P 916 (contracts for display advertising in street cars and steam cars carrying passengers). 36. Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 15 SCt 207, 39 L. ed. 297; Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 128 Tenn. 417, 161 SW 488 (contract whereby one, as an agent, agreed to furnish theatrical talent to the owners of various theaters). [a] Reason for rule.-"If the power to regulate interstate commerce applied to all the incidents to which said commerce might give rise and to all contracts which might be made in the course of its transaction, that power would embrace the entire sphere of mercantile activity in any way connected with trade between the States, and would exclude State control over many contracts purely domestic in their nature." Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 655, 15 SCt 207, 39 L. ed. 297 [quot Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 128 Tenn. 417, 424, 161 SW 488]. Labor contracts see infra § 21. 37. Elliott Mach. Co. V. Center, 227 Fed. 124; Fitzgerald v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 63 Vt. 169, 22 A 76, 13 LRA 70. 38. Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211, 20 SCt 96, 44 L. ed. 136; U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assoc., 171 U. S. 505, 19 SCt 25, 43 L. ed. 259. 39. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, 24 SCt 436, 48 L. ed. 679 [aff 120 Fed. 721]; Montague. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 24 SCt 307, 48 L. ed. 608: Addyston Pipe, etc.. Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211. 20 SCt 96, 44 L. ed. 136; U. S. v. New Jersey Standard Oil Co.. 173 Fed. 177 [aff 221 U. S. 1, 31 SCt 502, 52 L. ed. 619. 34 LRANS 834, AnnCas1912D 734 and note]; U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assoc., 171 U. S. 505, 19 SCt 25, 43 L. ed. 259; U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 SCt 249, 39 L. ed. 325; U. S. v. Agler, 62 Fed. 824. And see Monopolies [27 Cyc 910]. [a] Power to suppress monopoly merely incidental.-The power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by which commerce shall be governed, and is a power independent of the power to suppress monopoly. But it may operate in repression of monopoly whenever that comes within the rules by which commerce is governed or whenever the transaction is itself a monopoly of commerce." U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 12, 15 SCt 249, 39 L. ed. 325. 40. Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U. S. 48, 36 SCt 510, 60 L. ed. 880. 41. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 21 SCt 128, 45 L. ed. 186; Taylor v. Southern R. Co., 178 Fed. 380. 42. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 21 SCt 128, 45 L. ed. 186; Shepperd v. Sumter County, 59 Ga. 535, 27 AmR 394; State v. Napier, 63 S. C. 60, 41 SE 13. 43. Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499, 46 AmR 347./ 44. Cross references: Power of congress and states over immigration see Aliens §§ 47, 48. Transportation as part of definition of 'commerce" see supra § 1. 45. U. S. v. Burch, 226 Fed. 974; Johnson v. U. S., 215 Fed. 679, 131 CCA 613, LRA1915A 862; Bennett v. U. S., 194 Fed. 630, 114 CCA 402 [aff 227 U. S. 333, 33 SCt 288, 57 L. ed. 531]; U. S. v. Hoke, 187 Fed. 992 [aff 227 U. S. 308, 33 SCt 281, 57 L. ed. 523]; U. S. v. Southern R. Co., 164 Fed. 347 [aff 222 U. S. 20, 32 SCt 2, 56 L. ed. 72]; State v. Harper, 48 Mont. 456, 138 P 495, 51 LRANS 157, AnnCas1915D 1017; Matter of McClellan, 146 App. Div. 594, 131 NYS 633 [aff 204 N, Y. 677 mem, 98 NE 1107 mem]. And see Kansas City V. McDonald, (Mo.) 175 SW 917 (dictum). 46. U. S.-U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assoc., 171 U. S. 505, 19 SCt 25, 43 L. ed. 259; Philadelphia, etc.. SS. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 7 SCt 1118, 30 L. ed. 1200; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230, 7 SCt 857, 30 L. ed. 888; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 SCt 4, 30 L. ed. 244; Lord v. Goodall SS. Co., 102 U. S. 541, 26 L. ed. 224; Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U. S. 232, 21 L. ed. 146; Gibbons V. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; U. S. v. Southern R. Co., 164 Fed. 347 [aff 222 U. S. 20, 32 SCt 2, 56 L. ed. 72]. Iowa. Carton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 59 Iowa 148, 13 NW 67, 44 AmR 672. Kan.-Hardy v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 32 Kan. 698, 5 P 6. Md.-Foote v. Clagett, 116 Md. 228, 81 A 511. Minn.-State v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 40 Minn. 267, 41 NW 1047, 12 AmSR 730, 3 LRA 238. Mo.-Kansas City v. McDonald, 175 SW 917. N. J.-Lehigh, etc., Coal Co. V. Carrigan, 39 N. J. L. 35. 46 45 [§ 22] 4.. Transportation"-a. In General. The transportation of persons and property is commerce, irrespective of the purpose of it, provided it is carried on for others as an independent business and is subject to federal or state regulations, accordingly as it is interstate or intra-state in character. The transportation of freight and passengers from one state to another, either by land or by water, is interstate commerce, regardless of the distance from which it comes or to which it is bound before or after crossing the state line,19 ern R. Co., 187 U. S. 617, 23 SCt 214, 47 L. ed. 333; State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 S 969, 32 LRANS 639. 48. U. S.-Rossi v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 62, 36 SCt 677, 59 L. ed. 1201 [rev 53 Pa. Super. 210]; South Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U. S. 537, 35 SCt 158, 59 L. ed. 350 LRA1915F 792 (holding that there is no doubt that an uninterrupted transportation of passengers between states, in the same cars, and under practically the same management, and for a single fare, constitutes interstate commerce); Chiles V. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 218 U. S. 71, 30 SCt 667, 54 L. ed. 936; Hanley v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 187 U. S. 617, 23 SCt 214, 47 L. ed. 333; U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assoc., 171 U. S. 705, 19 SCt 25, 43 L. ed. 259; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 18 SCt 664, 42 L. ed. 1088; Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.. 125 U. S. 465, 8 SCt 689, 1062. 31 L. ed. 700; Philadelphia, etc.. SS. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 7 SCt 1118, 30 L. ed. 1200; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 SCt 4, 30 L. ed. 244; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. ed. 146; Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 16 L. ed. 644; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 15 L. ed. 435; Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed. 702; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; Pullman Co. v. Linke, 203 Fed. 1017; Steers v. U. S., 192 Fed. 1, 112 CCA 423; U. S. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 149 Fed. 486: Globe El. Co. v. Andrew, 144 Fed. 871 [aff 156 Fed. 664. 84 CCA 3761; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock-Yards Co., 79 Fed. 679; Donald v. Scott, 74 Fed. 859; Baird v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 41 Fed. 592; Ex p. Koehler, 30 Fed. 867; Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Sessions, 28 Fed. 592; Pullman Southern Car Co. v. Nolan, 22 Fed. 276 [aff 117 U. S. 34, 68 SCt 635, 29 L. ed. 785]; Kaeiser v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 18 Fed. 151, 5 McCrary 496; Indiana v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 16 Fed. 193, 11 Biss. 561. Ala.-Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Sims, 169 Ala. 295, 53 S 826; Southern R. Co. v. Harrison, 119 Ala. 539, 24 S 552, 72 AmSR 936, 43 LRA 385. Ark. Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Brooks, 84 Ark. 233, 105 SW 93; Porter v. St. Lou's Southwestern R. Co., 78 Ark. 182, 95 SW 453. Cal.-Peo. v. Raymond, 34 Cal. 492. Ga.-Williams V. Fears, 110 Ga. 584, 35 SE 699, 50 LRA 685. Ill-State v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 NE 814. Ind.-State V. Indiana, etc.. Oil, etc., Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 NE 778, 6 LRA 579; Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552, 30 AmR 238. Iowa.-Council Bluffs V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 45 Iowa 338, 24 AmR 773. Kan.-Enright v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 96 Kan. 546, 152 P 629; Watt v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 91 Kan. 466. 135 P 600; Metz v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 90 Kan. 460, 135 P 667; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. New Era Milling Co., 80 Kan. 141, 101 P 1011; Hardy v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 32 Kan. 698, 47. Hanley v. Kansas City South- 5 P 6. 48 Ky.-Newport v. Wagner, 168 Ky. 641, 182 SW 834, AnnCas1917A 962: Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Goode, 155 Ky. 153, 159 SW 695; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Coquillard Wagon Works, 147 Ky. 530, 144 SW 1080; Com. v. Southern Exp. Co., 103 SW 339, 31 KyL 813; Com. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 101 SW 894, 31 KyL 99. Me Bennett v. American Express Co., 83 Me. 236, 22 A 159, 23 AmSR 774, 13 LRA 33, Md.-Foote v. Clagett, 116 Md. 228, 81 A 511. Miss.-Yazoo R. Co. v. McGraw, 105 Miss. 878, 63 S 277. Mo.-Potter v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 187 Mo. A. 56, 172 SW 1153; Ligon v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 184 Mo. A. 187, 168 SW 647; Berry Coal, etc., Co., v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 116 Mo. A. 214, 92 SW 714. Compare State v. Seagraves, 111 Mo. A. 353, 85 SW 925 (holding that the carrying of a pleasure party on a steamboat is not interstate merce, although the boat may touch the shores of different states). com N. J.-State v. Carrigan, 39 N. J. L. 35; State v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 30 N. J. L. 473. N. Y.-Peo. v. Fargo, 137 App. Div. 727, 122 NYS 553 [rev 63 Misc. 381. 118 NYS 454]; North River Steamboat Co. y. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713. Or.-Zoller Hop Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 72 Or. 262, 143 P 931; Baldwin Sheep, etc., Co. v. Columbia R. Co., 58 Or. 285, 114 P 469. Tenn.-Harrell v. Speed, 113 Tenn. 224, 81 SW 840, 106 AmSR 814, 1 LRANS 639, 3 AnnCas 260; Foppiano v. Speed, 113 Tenn. 167, 82 Sw 222. Tex.-Galveston, etc., R. Co. V. Wood-Hagenbarth Cattle Co., 105 Tex. 178, 146 SW 538 [aff (Civ. A.) 130 SW 857]; Fuqua v. Pabst Brewing Co., 90 Tex. 298, 38 SW 29, 750, 35 LRA 241; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Sherwood, 84 Tex. 125, 19 SW 455, 17 LRA 643; Southern Pac. R. Co. V. Haas, 17 SW 600; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Carmack, (Civ. A.) 176 SW 158; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Fort Grain Co., (Civ. A.) 72 SW 419; State v. International, etc., R. Co., 31 Tex. Civ. A. 219, 71 SW 994; American Starch Co. v. Bateman, (Civ. A.) 22 SW 771. Vt.-Lynch v. Central Vermont R. Co., 89 Vt. 363, 95 A 683. W. Va.-Jennings v. Big Sandy, etc., R. Co., 61 W. Va. 664, 57 SE 272. [a] The transportation of food products in interstate and foreign commerce is within the power of congress to regulate. Com. v. Moore, 214 Mass. 19, 100 NE 1071. [b] The transmission of stocks and bonds from one state to another, whether through the mails or the instrumentality of common carriers, constitutes interstate commerce. Geiger-Jones Co. v. Turner, 230 Fed. 233. 49. Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568, 35 SCt 419, 59 L. ed. 721 [rev 88 Kan. 589, 128 P 1114]; State v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 NE 814. [a] Where the terminus is in the state the transportation from and to the state line is nevertheless interstate commerce beyond the power of the state to regulate directly. Fargo v. Stevens, 121 U. S. 230, 7 SCt 857, |