CHAP. VIIL capture of Lee, obeyed promptly the orders 1776. which had been directed to that officer, and, crossing the Delaware at Philipsburg, joined the commander in chief about the twentieth, whose effective force was now increased to nearly seven thousand men. He was also joined on the same day by general Gates with a part of the northern army.

go into win

All attempts of the British general to get possession of boats for the purpose of transporting his army over the Delaware having failed, he The British appeared to have determined to close the camfer quarters. paign, and to retire into winter quarters. About four thousand men were cantoned on the Delaware, at Trenton, Bordentown, the White Horse, and Burlington; and the remaining part of the army of Jersey was distributed from that river to the Hackensack. Strong corps were posted at Princeton, Brunswick, and Elizabeth town; but general Washington apprehended that the intention of taking Philadelphia, in the course of the winter, was only postponed till the ice should become sufficiently firm to bear the army.

To intimidate as much as possible, and thereby impede the recruiting business, was believed to have been no inconsiderable inducement with general Howe for covering, with his army, so large a portion of Jersey. To counteract his views in this respect, was an object of real importance. For that purpose general

Washington ordered three regiments, who were CHAP. VIII, marching from Peck's-Kill, to halt at Morris- 1776. town, and to unite with about eight hundred Jersey militia, who had collected under colonel Ford at the same place. General Maxwell was detached to take the command of these troops, with orders to watch the motions of the enemy, and to endeavour to harass them in their marches, to give intelligence of all their movements, and especially of such as might be made from Brunswick towards Princeton or Trenton; to keep up the spirits of the militia, and, as much as possible, prevent the inhabitants from going within the British lines, making their submission, and taking protections.

The short interval between the enemy's going into winter quarters, and the recom- December 2o. mencement of active operations, was employed by general Washington in repeating the representations he had so often made to congress respecting the army for the ensuing campaign. The extreme dangers resulting from short inlistments, and of relying on militia, had now been fully exemplified; and his remonstrances on that subject were supported by that severe experience, which improves while it chastises. He had felt greatly, in the course of the campaign, his want of cavalry, of artillery, and of engineers; he had before stated to congress his ideas on these important subjects, and he now re-urged them on that body. He was earnest

CHAP. VIII. With them, too, to increase the number of con1776. tinental regiments. It was admitted that those already voted would, most probably, not be completed; but he contended that by directing an additional number, and appointing other officers, more men would be inlisted, as every officer would recruit a few. With respect to the additional expense to be incurred by the measures he recommended, it was observed, "that our funds were not the only object now to be taken into consideration. The enemy, it was found, were daily gathering strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snowball by rolling, would increase, unless some means could be devised to check effectually the progress of their arms. Militia might possibly do it for a little while; but in a little while also the militia of those states which were frequently called upon, would not turn out at all, or would turn out with so much reluctance and sloth, as to amount to the same thing. Instance New Jersey! witness Pennsylvania! could any thing but the river Delaware have saved Philadelphia?

"Could any thing," he asked, "be more destructive of the recruiting business, than giving ten dollars bounty for six weeks service in the militia, who come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where: who consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last in a critical moment.

"These, sir," he added, " are the men I CHAP. VIIL am to depend upon ten days hence. This is 1776. the basis upon which your cause will rest, and must forever depend, until you get a large standing army sufficient of itself to oppose the enemy."

He also hinted the idea, extremely delicate in itself, of enlarging his powers so as to enable him to act without constant applications to congress for their sanction of measures, the immediate adoption of which was essential to the public interests. "This might," he said, "be termed an application for powers too dangerous to be intrusted." He could only answer, "that desperate diseases required desperate remedies. He could with truth declare that he felt no lust for power, but wished with as much fervency as any man upon this wide extended continent, for an opportunity of turning the sword into a ploughshare: but his feelings as an officer, and as a man, had been such as to force him to say, that no person ever had a greater choice of difficulties to contend with than himself."

After stating several measures he had adopted, not within the powers conferred on him by congress, and urging many other necessary arrangements, he added, "It may be thought I am going a good deal out of the line of my duty, to adopt these measures, or advise thus freely: a character to lose, an estate to forfeit,

CHAP. VIII. the inestimable blessing of liberty at stake, and 1776. a life devoted, must be my excuse.'

The present aspect of their affairs was extremely unfavourable to the United States. The existing army, except a few regiments from Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York, affording an effective force of about fifteen hundred men, would dissolve in a very few days. New Jersey had, in a great measure, submitted to the enemy. The militia of Pennsylvania had not turned out with the alacrity expected from them. General Howe would, most probably, avail himself of the ice which was now to be expected, and of the dissolution of the American army, to pass the Delaware and seize Philadelphia. This event was greatly dreaded, not only on account of its intrinsic importance at any time, but on account of its peculiar importance at this; when that army was to be recruited on which the future hopes of America were to rest, and which was to decide her destiny. It was greatly feared, and with much reason, that this event would make so unfavourable an impression on the public mind, as to deter the American youth from engaging in a contest becoming so desperate.

Impelled by these considerations, and by that enterprise of temper which he possessed in a very great degree, general Washington no sooner perceived the dispersed situation of the