"The critical situation of our affairs at this CHAP. VIII. time will justify my saying that no time is to 1776. be lost in making fruitless experiments. An unavailing trial of a month, to get an army upon the terms proposed, may render it impracticable to do it at all, and prove fatal to our cause, as I am not sure whether any rubs in the way of our inlistments, or unfavourable turn in our affairs, may not prove the means of the enemy's recruiting men faster than we do. To this may be added the inextricable difficulty of forming one corps out of another, and arranging matters with any degree of order, in the face of an enemy who are watching for advantages.

"At Cambridge last year, where the officers (and more than a sufficiency of them) were all upon the spot, we found it a work of such extreme difficulty to know their sentiments (each having some terms to propose) that I despaired, once, of getting the arrangement completed, and do suppose that at least a hundred alterations took place before matters were finally adjusted; what must it be then under the present regulation, where the officer is to negotiate this matter with the state he comes from, distant, perhaps, two or three hundred miles; some of whom, without any license from me, set out to make personal application, the moment the resolution got to their hands?

CHAP. VIII What kind of officers these are, I leave congress 1776. to judge.

"If an officer of reputation (for none other should be applied to) is asked to stay, what answer can he give? but, in the first place, that he does not know whether it is at his option to do so; no provision being made in the resolution of congress even recommendatory of this measure, consequently that it rests with the state he comes from (surrounded perhaps with a variety of applications, and influenced perhaps with local attachments) to determine whether he can be provided for, or not. In the next place, if he is an officer of merit, and knows that the state he comes from is to furnish more battalions than it at present has in the service, he will scarcely, after two years faithful services, think of continuing in the rank he now bears, when new creations are to be made and men appointed to offices (no ways superior in merit, and ignorant of service perhaps) over his head.

"A committee sent to the army from each state may, upon the spot, fix things with a degree of propriety and certainty, and is the only method I can see, of bringing measures to a decision with respect to the officers of the army; but what can be done in the mean time towards the arrangement in the country, I know not. In the one case, you run the hazard of losing your officers; in the other, of encoun

tering delay; unless some method could be CHAP. VIII. devised of forwarding both at the same instant. 1776. "Upon the present plan, I plainly foresee an intervention of time between the old and new army, which must be filled with militia, if to be had, with whom no man, who has any regard for his own reputation, can undertake to be answerable for consequences. I shall also be mistaken in my conjectures, if we do not lose the most valuable officers in this army, under the present mode of appointing them; consequently, if we have an army at all, it will be composed of materials, not only entirely raw; but, if uncommon pains are not taken, entirely unfit; and I see such a distrust and jealousy of military power, that the commander in chief has not an opportunity, even by recommendation, to give the least assurances of reward for the most essential services.

"In a word, such a cloud of perplexing circumstances appears before me, without one flattering hope; that, I am thoroughly convinced, unless the most vigorous and decisive exertions are immediately adopted to remedy these evils, that the certain and absolute loss of our liberties will be the inevitable consequence; as one unhappy stroke will throw a powerful weight into the scale against us, and enable general Howe to recruit his army, as fast as we shall ours; numbers being disposed and many actually doing so already. Some of

CHAP. VIII. the most probable remedies, and such as ex1776. perience has brought to my more intimate

knowledge, I have taken the liberty to point out; the rest I beg leave to submit to the consideration of congress.

"I ask pardon for taking up so much of their time with my opinions, but I should betray that trust which they and my country have reposed in me, were I to be silent upon matters so extremely interesting."

On receiving this very serious letter, it was resolved that the pay of the officers should be raised according to the wishes of the general; and that it should be recommended to the legislatures of those states having any regiments now in the continental service, either at New York, Ticonderoga, or New Jersey, forthwith to depute committees to those places in order to appoint officers to the regiments to be raised under the new establishment; that they might re-inlist those men now in service, who should incline to engage for the war. They also recommended to these committees, in making these appointments, to advise with the general and to promote such officers as had distinguished themselves for abilities, activity, and vigilance, and more especially for their attention to military discipline; and not to appoint any officer who should leave his station in the army, and be absent without leave. On further reflection, they added another recommendation,

which manifests the sense they entertained of CHAP. VIII. the ill consequences of the pernicious mode of 1776. creating officers originally adopted. It was, that all the officers to be appointed be men of bonour and known abilities, without a particular regard to their having before been in serIn addition to the pay of the privates, a suit of regimentals was allowed them annually; and the states, as far as Virginia, were urged to use their utmost endeavours to complete their quotas.

vice.

The armies did not long retain their position on York island. General Howe was sensible of the strength of the American camp, and had no inclination to force it. His plan was to compel general Washington either to abandon it, or to fight him in a situation in which a defeat must be attended with the total

destruction of his army. With this view, he determined, after throwing up intrenchments on M'Gowan's hill for the protection of NewYork, to gain the rear of the American camp, by the New England road, along which their principal supplies of provisions were received; and also to possess himself of the North river above King's bridge. To assure himself of the practicability of this plan, so far as respected the river, three frigates passed up it under the fire from fort Washington, and the post opposite to

* See Note, Nb. XIX. at the end of the volume.