Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation: A Theory of Discourse FailureIn public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is both instrumentally and epistemically rational. The deliberative practices of a liberal democracy (let alone repressive or non-democratic societies) cannot be improved so as to overcome the tendency for rational citizens to believe and say things at odds with reliable propositions of social science. The theory has several corollaries. One is that much contemporary political philosophy can be seen as an unsuccessful attempt to vindicate, on symbolic and moral grounds, the forms that discourse failure take on in public political deliberation. Another is that deliberative practices cannot be rescued even on non-epistemic grounds, such as social peace, impartiality, participation, and equality. To alleviate discourse failure, this book proposes to reduce the scope of majoritarian politics and enlarge markets. |
Contents
Section 1 | 5 |
Section 2 | 8 |
Section 3 | 13 |
Section 4 | 18 |
Section 5 | 24 |
Section 6 | 44 |
Section 7 | 53 |
Section 8 | 54 |
Section 19 | 161 |
Section 20 | 166 |
Section 21 | 168 |
Section 22 | 170 |
Section 23 | 179 |
Section 24 | 181 |
Section 25 | 183 |
Section 26 | 186 |
Section 9 | 65 |
Section 10 | 78 |
Section 11 | 87 |
Section 12 | 98 |
Section 13 | 105 |
Section 14 | 123 |
Section 15 | 126 |
Section 16 | 132 |
Section 17 | 142 |
Section 18 | 150 |
Section 27 | 189 |
Section 28 | 192 |
Section 29 | 194 |
Section 30 | 204 |
Section 31 | 211 |
Section 32 | 224 |
Section 33 | 228 |
Section 34 | 230 |
Section 35 | 242 |
Section 36 | 247 |
Other editions - View all
Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation: A Theory of Discourse Failure Guido Pincione,Fernando R. Tesón No preview available - 2011 |
Common terms and phrases
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