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marks and blemishes. The speaker therefore must of course believe a future state thus circumstanced, if he believed any future state at all. Here is no room for the Writer's evasion: who supposes the philosophers might reject the fables of Acheron, and Styx, and Cocy tus, and Elysian Fields, and yet believe the thing conveyed under these words. For hère the belief of the thing is expressly said to be built on the authority of those fables: but those fables our Author gives up as not really believed. By his favour therefore I would conclude that the thing built upon them was not believed.

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But as I little thought this. Writer would have had the better of me on the believing side, I will suppose, as he does contrary to evidence, that the speaker did indeed in this place deliver his real sentiments. Let us see now what will come of it. He asks, Who can read the Gorgias, and conceive, that Plato did not really believe when he has professed at large. So then; the dispute between us is, Whether PLATO believed a future state of rewards and punishments? And, to prove that PLATO did, he gives me a speech of SOCRATES. For unluckily what he quotes for the words of Plato are the words of his master; who, I have endeavoured to shew, by better reasons than such a kind of speech, did really believe a future state of rewards and punishments.

But he goes on:And IF THEY IMAGINED men to be punished for sin, and rewarded for virtue, even supposing that this was talked of in a way that might be PROVED fabulous, yet the doctrine itself was unshaken. Without doubt, if I will allow they imagined a future state of rewards and punishments, he will prove they believed one; that being the conclusion he seems to aim at in the aukward expression of proved fabulous, andwas unshaken. For the point between us is not about what was true or false, but about what was believed or disbelieved. But he himself seems dissatisfied with his expression, and therefore attempts to mend it in this repetition (for it would be hard that he who begs his question, should not be able to get to his conclusion). Suppose the fables of Acheron, and Styx, and Cocytus, and Elysian Fields, may be all DEMONSTRATED to be false, yet it does not follow, that the thing conveyed under VOL. XI.

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these words was believed to be all false. Here again his words, demonstrated to be false, leave him just where he was. For nothing can be concluded concerning the philosophers believing or not believing a thing, from our demonstrating it to be true or false. His expression fails him here again. He therefore attempts it a third time. It does not follow, that souls were believed to die, or to be uncapable of receiving punishments or rewards, but only that this manner of representing them Is FALSE. As ill as ever! He is still in the very place where he set but. And that which at first so perplexed him, has stuck by him through all his variation of phrase Is false, for, was not believed. As if the philosophers must needs disbelieve all that was false, and believe all that was true. And indeed it seems to have been this strange prepos session that has made him run into all his confusion of language. A disease that fatally infected the Lawyer of late memory, I put his expressions in the most favour able bght. For if there be no blunder, there is much malice: The period (supposing the words accurate) tending to prove the credibility of a future state of rewards and punishments; which, being directed against my dis course, necessarily insinuates, that I had wrote something against that credibility. But I have too good opinion of his honesty, to believe this to be his secret purpose.

What therefore this. Writer so fruitlessly labours to bring forth, is this simple conception, That the philosophers might believe the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments in general, and yet disbelieve all the particular fables of the populace concerning it But those who are acquainted with antiquity, will know, that this was not, and could not be the case. I have given a reason in the first volume of The Divine Legation, to shew, it was not, in these words: “We have

given just above a quotation from Tully's oration, for "Cluentius, in which he having ridiculed the popular fables concerning a future state, subjoins, If these be "false, as all men see they are, what hath death deprived "us of besides a sense of pain? Nam nunc quidem "quid tandem illi mali mors attulit: Nisi forte ineptüs. uc fabulis ducimur, ut existimemus illum apud inferos • Div. Leg, Vol. III. pp. 122, 123.

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impiorum supplicia perferre, &c. Qal sr Fatsa sunt, id quod omnes intelligant, quid ei tandem atrad mor's "eripuit præter sensum doloris? Frotn this inference of "Cicero's it appears, that we have not concluded amiss, “when, from several quotations, interspersed throughout this work, in which a disbelief of the common notion of

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a future state of rewards and punishments is implied, "we have inferred the Writer's disbelief of a future state "of rewards and punishments in general." There are many reasons likewise, why it could not be the case; too long indeed to mention here; however, I will just hint at one. The Pagan notion of a future state of rewards and punishments was founded in old tradition: but that tradition, which conveyed down the general doctrine, brought along these circumstances of it. But I forget, that I am arguing with an enemy to all tradition: who, as highly as he advances the knowledge of the philosophers; yet is unwilling to allow they were indebted for it to any thing but their own reason. So entirely has that childish sophism got the better of him: Whatsoever reason might teach, it did teach. But how has he made out his point? By encountering a few weak efforts of the Fathers in? support of traditional knowledge. He has great reason to boast his victory: it is like his who triumphed for having tript up a cripple. But reverence for age should dispose us to spare the Fathers, especially when more able-bodied men stand in our way. Till he meet with these, I would recommend the following fact to his cour sideration. The more ancient philosophers, in the delis very whether of their moral, natural, or theologic prins ciples, constantly recommend them on this footing. that they received them from TRADITION: one truth came from a priest of this religion; and another from? the sacred books of that. Scarce any thing is ever repre sented as the deduction of their own reasoning: thought such a representation had been attended with muche honour, and we know they were iminoderately fond of] glory. Now if this were the case, I only ask, hy should we not believe them ?

II. The Writer's second remark begins thus: "It has "been maintained indeed by some, that all that the old "philosophers

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"follow, that the thing conveyed under these words "were [was] believed to be all false. It does not follow "that souls were believed to die, or to be uncapable of receiving punishments or rewards: but only that this manner of representing them is false." p. 400.-These are his words; and they deserve to be well considered.

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It is not of any moment (he says) to enter further into what philosophers have said, when they attempt to account for the soul's ETERNITY. I thought it of great moment. I am sure I found it of great difficulty. And if I have ill explained what the philosophers meant by the soul's eternity, one reason was, that I wanted more helps than antiquity would afford me. But it is the privilege of veteran disputers, to want nothing but willing hearers. But why will he enter no further, when he goes out of his way to pay me this visit?

Because common sense (he says) taught them, that real proper punishments were inflicted upon men for sins. I have shewn from fuct that common sense did not teach them. No matter: he will prove from reason that it did. His argument is plain and simple. Common scrse might teach them: therefore common sense did teach them. This it is to be a practised disputant. It is but knowing what common sense might teach, and he will presently tell you, by his scale of logic, what it did. By the same way, I make no doubt, he could prove that the Epicureans believed a Providence; the Stoics inequality of crimes; and the Pyrrhonians the certainty of truth. He has only to shew that common sense taught them, or was ready to teach them; and we have only to believe, that they were as ready to learn. I had myself a kind of guess, that common sense might have taught the philosophers that real proper punishments were inflicted upon men for sins; and had I known no more of antiquity than this Writer has entered into, 'tis ten to one but I had concluded as he does, that common sense did teach them. Though hardly, I think, after another had clearly shewn the contrary from antiquity. However, the reader may not be displeased to hear how much I gave to common sense in the introduction to my discourse on the philosophers. These were my words:--"It will be proper to premise, that the constitution of

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"the Greek philosophy being ahove measure refined and speculative, it always used to be determined by metaphysical rather than moral principles; and to stick to "all consequences, how absurd soever, that were seen to " arise from such principles. Of this we have a famous "instance in the ancient democritic philosophy, &c.-So "well supported, we see, is that censure which a cele"brated French writer passes upon them: When the philosophers once besot themselves with a prejudice, they are even more incurable than the people them"selves: because they besot themselves not only with the prejudice, but with the false reasoning employed o support it. The reverence and regard to metaphysical principles being so great, we shall see, that the Greek philosophers must of necessity reject the doctrine of a "future state of rewards and punishments, how many "invincible moral arguments soever there really be in support of it, when we come to shew, that there were "two metaphysical principles concerning God and the "soul, universally embraced by all, which necessarily "exclude all notion of a future state of reward and “punishment *"

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In the conclusion I repeat the same observation in the following words :-"These two errors in the metaphy"sical speculations of the philosophers, concerning the "nature of God and of the soul, were what necessarily

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kept them from giving credit to a doctrine highly pro→ "bable in itself, and rendered so even by themselves, "from many moral considerations, perpetually preached "up to the people. But, as we observed before, it was "their ill fate to be determined, in their opinions, rather by metaphysical than moral arguments. This is seen by comparing the belief and conduct of SOCRATES "with the rest. He was singular in confining himself to "the study of morality, and as singular in believing the "doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment. "What could be the cause of this latter singularity but "the former? Of which it was a natural consequence. "For, having thrown aside all other speculations, he had nothing to mislead hin. Whereas the rest of the "philosophers applying themselves, with a kind of fana

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