1. Δικαιοσύνη makes men δίκαιοι 314 C, it is also of paramount excellence, ib. d. 2. ǹ áλŋ0ǹs dóža deals with existence, 315 a. 3. Real existence is changeless, 316 b. 4. Laws are for the good of subjects, 318 a b. 5. Crete and Lacedæmon are praised as usual, 318 c d. 6. The good man resembles God, 319 a. 7. Zeus is a gopiorns, and has τéxvn, 319 C. 8. Law is based on Morality, 320 a. 9. Law, in its effects, is compared to Gymnastic, 321 c d. 10. The definition of Law-dóypa Tóλɛws—the will of the State, is accepted with qualification in both Minos, 314 d e, and Laws, 1, 644 d. APPENDIX G. TRUE AND FALSE PLEASURE AND PAIN. Few of Plato's modes of expression have been more vehemently assailed than his application of the predicates true and false to Pleasure and Pain. It has been condemned by Mr. Grote, Professor Bain, and Mr. Poste. Whether the terms are appropriate or not is a question of taste; but the question for the metaphysician is whether the explanation given by Plato is sound or not. Reserving the question of propriety of language, Plato's explanation of the offensive terms is clear, and, I believe, justifiable; and it is somewhat odd that he carefully provides against the very objection, which is urged against him. As follows: an empirical judgment, dóka, is true or false according as it is verified or falsified by further experience. Thus I see what I imagine to be a man under a tree: I approach nearer and find it to be a wooden figure. My judgment, dóka, is accordingly false. Phil. 38, c d. Falsity, accordingly, exists only in the reference to future experience. But the subjective impression, whether ultimately verified or falsified by further experience, is never in itself false, οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἄν τε ὀρθῶς ἄν τε μὴ ὀρθῶς δοξάσῃ, τὸ γε δοξάζειν ὄντως οὐδέποτ ̓ ἀπόλλυσιν, 37 a b. In the same way, the pleasure, as actually experienced, cannot be false, but may attract that predicate, when examined by the light of further experience, οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἄν τε ὀρθῶς ἄν τε μὴ ἤδηται, τό γε ὄντως ἤδεσθαι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε ảπoλεĩ, 37, b, cf. 37, e; 38, a. In other words, Pleasure, as a subject admits of the predicate, true or false, according as it is followed by good or evil effects, 39, e. Pleasure and Pain may be also termed true or false in relation to the Law of Contrast, and the effects of the latter on the vividness of our feelings. As to the appropriateness of the terms: Plato's Ethics are rational and not sentimental; it is, therefore, not inappropriate to apply such terms to Pleasure and Pain, and thus force us to see that the Reason or Intellect is the ultimate judge of human feeling and conduct. If Plato had used the terms repented and unrepented, no modern would have excepted, but his terminology in that case would be sentimental and not rational. I do not press his argument, that Pleasure and Pain are To Tive, that is, as subjects admit of predicates of quality. To discuss this fully belongs to the Metaphysics of Logic. But it fully answers Mr. Poste's objection that “Pleasure can never be an imaginary predicate, but always an immediate sensation." Philebus, p. 179. APPENDIX H. WORDSWORTH'S ODE ON IMMORTALITY. Mr. Mill tells us that the celebrated line, "Our life is but a sleep and a forgetting," is not Platonic, because we are capable of dváμvnois. But, surely, the process, which áváμvnois counteracts, is λnoŋ; and therefore, where there is no aváμvnois, our life is a forgetting. Nay, more, the majority of men are not, in Plato's opinion, pióropo, and therefore never go through the process of ἀνάμνησις at all. I had intended adding an appendix on Real Existence, but shall reserve it for a more fitting occasion. In p. 36, sixth line from foot, a reference to Laws was omitted, τὸ γὰρ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον αὐτῆς (sc. ψυχῆς) ὅπερ δῆμός τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεως ἐστιν. 3, 689 a b. FINIS. ERRATUM. p. 58, Sixth line from foot, insert the before Platonic Virtue. |