Plato thinks, we can discover a non-transient element in the Ego, the reality of that permanence is as much a fact as the reality of the nervous organism, by which the Materialist explains it away. Nay, an Idealist would add, that there is more evidence for the former than the latter.

To resume:-Good things are good by the presence of Goodness; and in the same way, Pleasure is caused by the presence of Pleasant qualities: now, as both the prudent and the imprudent man, the brave man and the coward, are susceptible of pleasure and of pain, it would follow, that if pleasure and good are identical, these people, so far as they receive pleasure or pain in equal degrees, are equally good or bad, 499. b. We must, then, draw a distinction between pleasures, which are beneficial and those, which are not -that is between those, which, produce some permanent advantage, and those, which produce mere temporary gratification-a distinction insisted on in the Republic, the Protagoras and the Philebus. But if pleasures differ thus in kind, we require Science to discover their properties and to tabulate them, according to their respective utilities. And the relation of Science to Virtue has been already discussed in the Protagoras.

We have now, says Socrates, established an inconsistency between the doctrine that it is good to satisfy all our desires, and the doctrine that it is good to satisfy some only. And the inconsistency thus evolved from the thorough-going doctrine of Callicles, shows that is not true. But if we are to gratify some desires only, we must put in requisition the ascetic qualities, Temperance and Justice, to temper the outward tendencies of the non-ascetic qualities, Courage and Wisdom. Hence, then, the task of the Ethical Expert, whether private or public-the virtuous individual, or the wise politician-is to produce Harmony and Order

in the body ethical or politic; and thus bring the Microcosm into harmony with the all-pervading law of Order, which rules the Universe. Nay more, even in the non-ascetic Virtues, whose direct tendency is outwards-Wisdom (póvnois) and Courage-we can detect ascetic elements: in Wisdom, as it embraces in its comprehensive ken all consequences whatsoever; and in Courage, for that enables us not merely to confront danger and pain, but to combat the pleasures which "war against the soul." 504-507. But, if this is so, Socrates has proved his point, that, next to being completely happy, in and through abstinence from injustice and exemption from suffering wrong, the second best thing is to undergo chastisement

That must be cruel, only to be kind, provided it be the necessary step to the rehabiliation of the wrong-doer.

The positive result of the Gorgias is, to borrow a metaphor from modern physics, that, as in the Macrocosm, the centrifugal force is tempered by the centripetal, so, in the Microcosm, the impulsive qualities, Wisdom and Courage, must be harmonised by the repressive qualities, Temperance and Justice. And we have seen, in the preceding sections, that Wisdom and Courage, Temperance and Justice, are the fractional parts of the one integer, Virtue.

The main conclusion of the Gorgias is condemned by Mr. Grote as inexact. Mr. Grote objects, that the Platonic Ideal exacts as Good, order, system, or discipline; and that, granting this, Plato does not tell us in what particular order, good, system, or discipline consists. Now, as Plato is arguing, throughout the dialogue, against the exertion of the egoistic forces at the expense of the altruistic tendencies, and as the egoistic forces do not require to be strengthened, it is surely to the point, to show that Excellence in Conduct involves a certain amount of self-repression.

When Rhetoric is recommended as a mere instrument of power, quite independent of its use or abuse, when the possible Means of doing evil is exalted to an End, when the Anti-social Qualities are praised just so far as they override the social tendencies, it is surely no small contribution to Ethical science, to enunciate that these doctrines, so far as they regard self alone, are wrong-wrong in theory and wrong in practice. It is, surely, something, to show that the man, who has never done wrong, must repress Self, in order to keep clear of wrong, and to show, that he, who has actually done wrong, requires to have Self still further repressed. And the two conclusions of the Gorgias may be nearly given in the words of the only English Moralist, who approaches Greek Ethics in dignity of purpose and masculine severity of thought; upright creatures may want to be improved; depraved creatures want to be renewed.

The alleged inconsistencies between the Protagoras and the Gorgias will be considered in the closing section.

V.

THE PHILEBUS.

PLEASURE AND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL.

The following section deals with the Philebus so far only as that Dialogue is ethical. To justify Plato's classification of the various objects of the human faculties, would involve an examination of the Platonic. metaphysics. Without entering upon that field of speculation, sufficient may be gathered from the Philebus to complement the partial, but not incompatible, doctrines of the Protagoras and the Gorgias.

One metaphysical distinction must be insisted on here. Plato divides the objects of cognition into two classes-The Transient and the Non-Transient. The Transient element is equivalent to the province of Causation as set forth by Hume, Brown, and Mill. An antecedent A is followed by a consequent B, and B in turn is the antecedent to a new consequent C, and so on to infinity. To this class belong the external world, and our organism. The other class, the Non-Transient, is not subject to Antecedence and Consequence, but is permanent and non-temporal. Το this second class belong the higher faculties of the mind, and the Divine Causal Energy, God. In the first class, Plato sets the objects of the bodily appetites, and all such pleasures as are reliefs of an antecedent want. As a want is more or less painful, Plato calls all pleasures that act by stimulation mixed, that is, mixed with pain. The pleasures which are not mere reliefs, he calls unmixed or pure. These words have no ethical significance; they do not connote praise or

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blame, but signify merely the presence or absence of want. But as the second class—the non-transient— are the objects of certain mental faculties, Plato confers upon these objects the name Good. Now Good has no contrary of equal rank. To cognise Good, we must be free from certain bodily states, and the presence of such bodily states is Evil. Hence the state of a man may be good, as well as pleasant. His state may be, likewise, evil and pleasant. But his state cannot be good and evil at the same time. Evil, as far as it extends, effectually excludes Good. Consequently, Pleasure and Pain-Good and Evil-are in Plato's philosophy cross-divisions. This will be seen from

the Philebus.

Pleasures are divided into two classes: First, pleasures, mixed with either physical or mental pain; Second, pleasures, unmixed with either physical or mental pain. This classification is obviously psychological.

The Mixed Pleasures are subdivided into three species: Those in which both sensations are corporeal; those in which one sensation is corporeal, and the other mental; and those in which both sensations are mental. But, in each of these three species, some pleasures are good, some bad, and some indifferent. That is to say, the good man will choose the good, eschew the bad, and submit to the indifferent, when necessity compels. What renders them good or bad is the influence which they exert upon the higher faculty-that which confronts Good. It is evident, then, that this division of pleasures is ethical.

On the other hand, the Unmixed Pleasures are all good. They are also subdivided into three species: those belonging to the sense of Smell; those of Sight and Hearing; and those of Intellect. And the latter species includes the objects of the Platonic Dialectic, Being in its highest essence, so far as it can be cognised by human beings.