558 c, 559 d e, 561 e, 564 a, 566 d, Rep. ix. 571 a, 574 e, 576 c, 577 c, 578 a, 579 c, 580 c d, 588 b, 592 a, Rep. x. 605 b, 612 c. The Laws deals with the province of Legislation opórηrós Tε καὶ ἁμαρτίας πέρι νόμων, ἥτις ποτέ ἐστι φύσει 1, 627 d; and the Politicus sets before us the Master of Statecraft, who combines the comprehensiveness of a Code with the power of scrupulously adjusting it to the specialities of Cases, 294 a b, 295 b-296 a.

One would imagine that a disciple of the Positive School would bear in mind the distinctness of the provinces of Ethics and Legislation, yet Mr. G. H. Lewes, in his anxiety to point out the inconsistencies of Plato, confounds Law and Morality in the following passage: "Even the Socratic view of Virtue being identical with Knowledge, consequently of Vice being Ignorance, and therefore involuntary-even this idea he learned in his old age to repudiate, as we see in the Laws (v. p. 385), where he calls incontinence no less than ignorance (di' dμaθίαν ἢ δι ̓ ἀκράτειαν) the cause of Vice. In the same sense (IV. p. 138), after speaking of anger and pleasure as causes of error, he says, "There is a third cause of our faults, and that is ignorance (τρίτον ἄγνοιαν τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἰτίαν). So that here he places Ignorance only as a third Cause; and by so doing, destroys the whole Socratic argument respecting the identity of Virtue and knowledge."-History of Philosophy, I. 214-3, 3rd edition. Whatever destruction there is, does not come of Plato. I do not know to what edition Mr. Lewes refers, but the passage in the fifth book occurs in 734 b. Steph. The second I am unable to find, except in the ninth, 863 b c. Now, in the ninth book, Plato expressly raises the question, How is Legal Responsibility compatible with his doctrine that. Vice-Injustice-aduría-is involuntary? Legg. 9, 860 b.-861 e. Plato resolves the difficulty by pointing out, that though Viceadikia is involuntary, yet that ẞλaßn-damnum-damage in the legal sense, may be caused either purposely or not. Now, as was shown before, Justice-individual Virtue-Alkaloσúvη— is the ascendancy in action of the higher principles, and Injustice-adikia―of the lower. But the Legislator is mainly concerned with dμaprýμara, i.e. Delicts, and with the motives which lead to them-in Roman language their Causa-namely, Passion or Anger-Ovμós; Pleasure or Sensuality--ǹcový; and

Ignorance, either mere absence of Knowledge, or positive Delusion, ayvola, 863 b c. Hence, Plato quite consistently tells us that, an act may be just, but at the same time damnific, and that another may be unjust, but beneficent, 863 e, 864 a. τὴν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ—τὴν τοιαύτην βλάβην. In modern words, the question, Is A liable to an action in tort? has nothing to do with the question, Is A in a state of Grace?

In the first passage quoted by Mr. Lewes, Plato is talking of the causes which make a man fall short of σωφροσύνη, τοῦ owopovεiv ¿vdens wv, 5, 734 b, and he puts down as causes, ἀμαθία and ἀκράτεια, i.e. a want of φρόνησις and of ἀνδρεία. But in tracing the historical growth of states, in Legg. 3, 4, he tells us that he is talking of every day awopooúvn, 710 a, and not of owppoovvn in its high sense; and he also insists that a Law should not be merely a command or prohibition, but should have a prooemium or preamble containing the reasons which induce the Legislator to make the Law, 4, 721-723 b. The Legislator should also give his subjects a catalogue of divine and human things in their order of desirability. The student of Bentham will remember two similar suggestions. Now amongst these desirable objects are the various kinds of moral life suited to the individual; and one of these is the temperate, owppwv, in the popular sense; and the two causes which impede σωφροσύνη are ακράτεια and ἀμαθία, that is, in the popular sense, for he had shown in the Protagoras, that apatia was the essence of all Vice. Here then the Legislator is obviously dealing with the motives of Delict and its opposite. In brief, Ethical Wrong-Vice—is involuntary drovσov, and is the result of ignorance qualía: but Legal Wrong-Delict—áμápтημa, is the result of aμalía, as well as of other causes, and is both aкovolov and έkovσLov. Besides, the Laws, all through, is conceived in a popular spirit: Plato's assistants are from Sparta and Crete, intellectually the least cultivated of Greek states. Plato, on a remarkable occasion, claims to manage the discussion all his own way, 10, 892 d e, and the Cretan thinks Homer a clever fellow, though he has not read much of him, 3, 860 c. The treatise, too, opens with the statement that the author of Laws is Oɛós, 624; and 0ɛós and Ocios are always in Plato opposed to réxvn, science, Ion. 542 a b, Meno. 99 C, to end. On the whole, we may pronounce the Laws

to be an adaptation of Platonism to popular intelligence and sympathies, although even here, Plato maintains that the peculiarities of the Republic are theoretically better than the compromises of the Laws, 5, 739 b. e.

The different arrangements of the several polities in the Republic, the Politicus, and the Laws, which are set forth by Professor Lewis Campbell in his introduction to the Politicus, pp. XLI.-XLV., can be easily accounted for by differences in the Principium Divisionis in each Treatise. Thus, the third Laws deals with the historical growth of Polity, 3, 676 a. The Republic deals with the various Polities in the order of their deviation from the ideal State, Rep. 543 -544 a; that which deviates least, being least bad. There is only one Ideal or perfect state, either Monarchy or Polyarchy, which governs the Whole for the good of the Whole. All others are deviations, and govern only for the good of a part. These deviations are infinite in number, Rep. 445 e; cf. Polit. 291 a b; but in this infinity of deviation, we find the four well marked types, Timocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy, and Tyranny. From the point of view of the Republic, Oligarchy takes precedence of Democracy, because Oligarchy governs on principle-the good of the Oligarchy; whereas Democracy has no principle at all, Rep. 8, 557 d c, and as the state is, so is the democrat, 561 cd, Everything by starts, and nothing long,

and so the Democracy is a very pleasant and genial place to live in, ἆρ ̓ οὐ θεσπεσία καὶ ἡδεῖα ἡ τοιαύτη διαγωγὴ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ; 558 a. Now the standard in the Politicus is Eπiornμn-scienceon the part of the Sovereign, be it one or many, and the deviations are judged of by their pleasantness as constitutions to live under, τίς οὖν δὴ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν τούτων ἥκιστα χαλεπὴ συζῆν, πασῶν χαλεπῶν οὐσῶν, καὶ τίς βαρυτάτη. Pol. 302 b. In this way, Democracy is more genial, and therefore preferable to Oligarchy, which, judging from small towns in general, must have been excessively unpleasant.

As to the Minos, the following points of resemblance between it and acknowledged dialogues must be admitted, whatever views be held as to its authorship. Mr. Grote and Mr. Lewes have done good service to criticism in general, by their protest against the German test of authenticity, the Platonisches Gefühl, which proves any thing.

1. Δικαιοσύνη makes men δίκαιοι 314 C, it is also of paramount excellence, ib. d.

2. ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα deals with existence, 315 a.

3. Real existence is changeless, 316 b.

4. Laws are for the good of subjects, 318 a b.

5. Crete and Lacedæmon are praised as usual, 318 c d. 6. The good man resembles God, 319 a.

7. Zeus is a σopɩorns, and has réxvn, 319 c.

8. Law is based on Morality, 320 a.

9. Law, in its effects, is compared to Gymnastic, 321 c d. 10. The definition of Law-dóypa Tóλews-the will of the State, is accepted with qualification in both Minos, 314 d e, and Laws, 1, 644 d.

APPENDIX G.

TRUE AND FALSE PLEASURE AND PAIN.

Few of Plato's modes of expression have been more vehemently assailed than his application of the predicates true and false to Pleasure and Pain. It has been condemned by Mr. Grote, Professor Bain, and Mr. Poste. Whether the terms are appropriate or not is a question of taste; but the question for the metaphysician is whether the explanation given by Plato is sound or not.

Reserving the question of propriety of language, Plato's explanation of the offensive terms is clear, and, I believe, justifiable; and it is somewhat odd that he carefully provides against the very objection, which is urged against him. As follows: an empirical judgment, doğa, is true or false according as it is verified or falsified by further experience. Thus I see what I imagine to be a man under a tree: I approach nearer and find it to be a wooden figure. My judgment, dóta, is accordingly false. Phil. 38, c d. Falsity, accordingly, exists only in the reference to future experience. But the subjective impression, whether ultimately verified or falsified by further experience, is never in itself false, οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἄν τε ὀρθῶς ἄν τε μὴ ὀρθῶς δοξάσῃ, τὸ γε δοξάζειν ὄντως οὐδέποτ' ἀπόλλυσιν, 37 a b. In the same way, the pleasure, as actually experienced, cannot be false, but may attract that predicate, when examined by the light of further experience, οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἄν τε ὀρθῶς ἄν τε μὴ ἥδηται, τό γε ὄντως ἥδεσθαι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε dñoλεĩ, 37, b, cf. 37, e; 38, a. In other words, Pleasure, as a subject admits of the predicate, true or false, according as it is followed by good or evil effects, 39, e. Pleasure and Pain may be also termed true or false in relation to the Law of Contrast, and the effects of the latter on the vividness of our feelings.